Command & Staff College
Distance Education Program

THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR

Course Book & Required Readings

8801

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
College of Continuing Education
MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5068

Command and Staff College Distance Education Program

THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR

8801

APPROVAL SHEET

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Theory and Nature of War

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INTRODUCTION:

THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR

Theory cannot equip the mind with the formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action. There the mind can use its innate talents to capacity, combining them all to seize on what is ***right*** *and* ***true****--as though it were a response to the immediate challenge more than a product of thought.*

-- Clausewitz

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

-- Sun Tzu

The military profession is a thinking profession. Officers particularly are expected to be students of the art and science of war at all levels - tactical, operational, and strategic - with a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it.

-- MCDP 1

Course Overview

Warfare and Military Theory

A solid foundation of knowledge in the evolution of warfare and military theory is necessary for you to understand fully the concepts of war. The profession of arms is one of the few that denies its practitioners the opportunity to perfect their craft before they are required to translate their knowledge into action. The very atmosphere of war works against the rationality of thought in times of peace. In the past, the most adept practitioners of warfare have capitalized on knowledge gained in times of peace as the ultimate weapon in preparing for war.

Benefits of Military Theory

The study of the theory and nature of war is one way members of the profession of arms may test their intelligence and imagination against the complexities that warfare inevitably presents. Properly studied, military theories of the past and present offer you, professional officers, a means of understanding where your activities fit within the wider pattern of national and human affairs, while at the same time offering a certain defense against the future.

Utility of Theory

By definition, theory is a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of explanation. It can aid in understanding war, but cannot provide precise solutions to each separate problem in the field. Theory shows you the timeless qualities of war, but you also must be aware of the evolution of war.

War remains constant in some aspects and changes in others. Military officers must keep these two viewpoints in perspective, not preparing totally for the last war and not focusing exclusively on revolutionary change. Historical perspective and evolving change should be kept in balance.

Theory cannot be stagnant; it needs to evolve in support of, and as an explanation of current warfare. Theory must require you to synthesize theory, military history, and your own personal experiences so as to acquire an appreciation for the evolution of warfare and diverse possibilities and challenges inherent in possible future commitments and ensuing operations.

A Proper Balance

Finally, as related above, leaders should not make the mistake of "preparing for the last war," but they also should avoid focusing exclusively on change. A balance is needed, and a good grasp of military history and theory can do much to provide this. **Thus, remember when studying the distant or recent past, look for both the *similarities and dissimilarities* of an event, for the latter may be more significant than the former.**

Course Organization

Theory and Nature of War (8801) is organized in the following manner with respect to lessons, reading hours, issues hours, and total hours for the course.

Lesson	Reading Hours	Issues Hours	Total Hours	Page Number
Lesson 1: Classical Theorists (I): Sun Tzu	3.5	1	4.5	1-1
Lesson 2: War in the Early Modern Era (1648-1789)	2	1	3	2-1
Lesson 3: War in a Revolutionary Age (1789-1815)	2	1	3	3-1
Lesson 4: Classical Theorists (II): Clausewitz	4.5	1	5.5	4-1
Lesson 5: Classical Theorists (III): Jomini	2.5	1	3.5	5-1
Lesson 6: Mid-19th Century Warfare: American Civil War (1861-1865)	2.5	1	3.5	6-1
Lesson 7: Latter 19th Century Warfare: Prussia	2	1	3	7-1
Lesson 8: Modern Theorists (I): Naval--Mahan and Corbett	2.5	1	3.5	8-1
Lesson 9: The 20th Century: The Age of Total War (I)--The Character of World War I	1.5	1	2.5	9-1
Lesson 10: The 20th Century: The Age of Total War (II)--The Character of World War II	3	1	4	10-1
Lesson 11: Modern Theorists (II): Air--Strategic and Tactical	2	1	3	11-1
Lesson 12: Modern Theorists (III): Revolutionary War	1.5	1	2.5	12-1
Final Examination			2	
Total	29.5	12	43.5	

Reserve Retirement Credits

The total number of study hours required for this course, including the time for the comprehensive final examination, is 43.5 hours. For reservists, inactive duty retirement credits are awarded for every 3 hours of study time. **The total number of reserve retirement credits awarded to reserve officers for completing this course is 15.**

Course Objectives

Purpose	This course provides a foundation for analyzing and applying the theory and nature of war. You will develop your own thoughts on the contributions of significant military theorists to the evolution of warfare and on the value of their theories in this rapidly changing world. You will look at the American way of war, which will help you understand the framework from which the Marine Corps' theory of warfighting has been developed. You will then be able to develop your own view on applying this theory.
Evolution of Warfare	Assess the evolution of warfare from the 17th century to the present and analyze the manner in which the character of war has changed from one era to another, including the present.
Forces That Shape War	Describe the impact of the forces--cultural, social, economic, political, ideological, and technological--that shape the nature of war in any given period, and the character of any specific military event.
Theoretical Concepts	Explore theoretical concepts that have assisted military historians, analysts, and practitioners to analyze, comprehend, and evaluate the significance of trends and events.

Continued on next page

Course Objectives, Continued

Specific Missions The course objectives imply the following specific missions:

- Analyze the evolution of warfare from the 17th century to the present.
- Evaluate the nature of war and the nature of policy, and discern that war is **both** an instrument of policy (thus a rational tool) and an expression of politics (and thus a manifestation of human irrationality and emotion).
- Synthesize the relationship between significant military theorists and the evolution of warfare (and our understanding of it), and assess the significance of their contributions in both historical and contemporary terms.
- Synthesize a sophisticated personal view on both the **applications** and the **limits** of military power.
- Acquire a wider perspective on the future of warfare.

Professional Military Education This course is intended to stimulate your interest for further study in pursuit of your profession. This course also provides a foundation for future work, reflection, thought, and, most importantly, the acquisition of a historical perspective. It is a historical and theoretical foundation for the remainder of the Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP).

Course Description

Introduction

Theory and Nature of War (8801) is structured in a logical sequence--thee is a linkage between wars, analysis, and theorists, that illustrtes a basic point: ***although Theory and Nature of War (8801) is not a history course, it does use historical events, i.e., past experience.***

Upon reflection, this should not be surprising. Military theorists, historians, analysts, and professionals develop their ideas, changes, and actions, whether consciously or unconsciously, upon the experience of the past. This can be an analysis of the ancient campaigns of Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar, or an interpretation of the most recent operational experience, from Operations *Desert Sheild/Desert Storm* to Somalia, Bosnia, or Haiti. The course sequence is as follows:

Sun Tzu

Theory and Nature of War (8801) introduces the first of the classical theorists you will study, the Chinese writer Sun Tzu.

War in the Early Modern and Revolutionary Ages

The study of the history of modern war then commences, beginning with war in the Early Modern Era (1648-1789) and warfare in a Revolutionary Age (1789-1815), the latter which addresses the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

Clausewitz and Jomini

You then will read the two major theorists of warfare in the Western world, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. They attempted to explain what had occurred between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Battle of Waterloo.

19th Century Warfare

You will study mid- and late-19th century warfare as an indicator of future trends, with a focus on the American Civil War (1861-1865), and on Prussia during the latter half of the 19th century.

Naval Theorists

The first of the modern theorists will be introduced: the naval theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett.

Continued on next page

Course Description, Continued

The Age of Total War	War in the present century is addressed with the study of the 20th century as the age of total war; this will be accomplished through an analysis of World Wars I and II.
Air Power	The second group of modern theorists will be introduced--the air power theorists. Primarily focusing on Giulio Douhet, it also includes a maritime perspective given by Roy Geiger. By placing them in this sequence, you will be able to see how the direct experience of the World War I influenced theory, and then ascertain if the assumptions inherent in that theory were correct or not by relating their ideas to the ensuing major conflict, the World War II.
Revolutionary Warfare	Major theories associated with post-World War II operations will be analyzed: in particular, revolutionary warfare. By implication, the question is posed regarding their long term relevancy to the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras.

Continued on next page

Course Description, Continued

Course Themes

There are a number of themes that run throughout this course that are related to other courses in the Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP). These will not always be identified; hence, periodically refer back to this section.

- The constantly changing character of war: Limited/unlimited war and the "spirit of the age"
- Critical analysis: The complex interrelationship of politics, policy, strategy, operations, and tactics
- The international community and the balance of power
- The role of war in state formation, evolution, and (as appropriate) disintegration
- Civil-military relations
- The social composition of military forces, and what motivates people, groups, societies, states, and movements to fight
- International and domestic influences on policy and strategy
- Joint, combined, multinational, and coalition warfare
- Leadership and ethics (political and military)
- Principles of war
- The limits of military power

Conclusion

Through your study in *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) you will acquire a sense of the causes, chronology, character, and of the evolution of war over the past three and a half centuries. Linked to this are the changes in its scope, and the evolution of the profession of arms and the ideas of key theorists. This will prepare you for the strategic and operational level of war courses that follow this one.

Relationship to Joint Warfare

Building Joint Awareness	*Theory and Nature of War* (8801) begins the process of building joint awareness by study and discussion of the thought and strategies of many of the great "captains" of modern warfare. Course readings provide you with the tools necessary to analyze both the campaigns of their time and the reasons why those campaigns succeeded or failed. Many timeless concepts and definitions of warfare are introduced and studied. You will explore their application (or lack of application) and their contribution to a war's outcome.
Introduction to Joint Warfare	*Theory and Nature of War* (8801) is just the start of your introduction to joint warfare at the operational level. *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) does not provide all the information needed for work in a joint and combined environment. However, it does lay a solid foundation for continued study that, upon completion of the distance education program, will result in a good working knowledge of war as it is fought currently. The course also gives you an idea of how it may be fought in the future.

Course Readings

Required Readings

Theory and Nature of War (8801) is a book-based course. The foundation books for this course are as follows:

- Von Clausewitz, Carl. ***On War,*** edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. (not provided)

- Griffith, Samuel B., tr. ***Sun Tzu, The Art of War***. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. (not provided)

- Paret, Peter, ed. ***Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age***. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. (not provided)

- Corbett, Julian S. ***Some Principles of Maritime Strategy***. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988, reprint of the 1911 edition. (excerpt provided)

- Strachan, Hew. ***European Armies and the Conduct of War***. London: Allen and Unwin, 1983. (not provided)

- Weigley, Russell F. ***The American War of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy***. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company; reprinted, Indiana University Press. (not provided)

Reference Books

Though purchasing one is **NOT** mandatory, you might find a general background text on military history to be of value for this course. Two recent ones, which bring together the most recent research, analysis, and interpretation in this field are

- Charles Townshend, ed. ***The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War*** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

- Geoffrey Parker, ed. ***The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Herman Kinder & Werner Hilgermann, ***The Anchor Atlas of World History*** is also useful for general reference.

Course Evaluation

Introduction

First, understand the material presented in *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) so you develop personal syntheses and interpretations on the nature and character of war, significant military theorists, and the evolution of war and the profession of arms from the mid-17th through the 20th century. [JPME Areas 3b, 3d, 3e, and 5a]

Then, demonstrate your analysis and interpretation of the evolution of war from 1648 through the post-Cold War, using a complex multiple choice examination. [JPME Areas 3b, 3d, 3e, and 5a]

Examination

- The final requirement for *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) is a 2-hour, machine-graded, closed-book examination. There are 50 complex, multiple choice questions. The examination questions are drawn from the information contained in your Required Readings and from the lessons in your Syllabus.

- This examination is content-based in nature; you should be very familiar with course content and subject matter both in preparing for it and then in responding to the final examination items.

- There may be more than one answer that appears to be correct for a given item. You must choose the **best** answer.

Course Critiques

A course critique form is included with this course. Please comment accordingly because future changes in this course will be based, in part, on student comments and recommendations. **Please complete the critique and remember: What really helps for the future are *suggestions on how to do things better*!**

How to Obtain Assistance

Contacting MCI

The Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP) is administered by the Marine Corps Institute (MCI). Questions concerning program, course material, grades or enrollment status should be addressed to the MCI PME Help Desk by any of the following methods below.

Telephone: DSN 288-2299/0193 extension 303
Commercial (202) 433-2299/0193 extension 303

Internet: helpdeskp@mqg-smtp3.usmc.mil

Mail: Marine Corps Institute
ATTN: Registrar
Washington Navy Yard
912 Poor Street, SE
Washington, DC 20391-5680

Contacting CCE

The Marine Corps University College of Continuing Education (CCE) provides enhancements to the Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP) in the form of local seminars, interactive multimedia instruction, a video library, and other products designed to enhance the student's learning experience. In addition, several Regional Coordinators are available to answer questions.

Address your questions about course content to CCE by any of the methods below. Ask for the CSCDEP SME.

- DSN telephone: 278-4390/4324
- Commercial telephone: (703) 784-4390/4324
- Toll free telephone: 1-800-992-9210

Web page: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/cce/

LESSON 1
CLASSICAL THEORISTS (I): SUN TZU

The best policy is to attack the enemy's plans; the next best [is] *to disrupt his alliances, for to subdue the enemy's army without fighting is the acme of skill.*

--Sun Tzu

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson

- Introduces you to the ideas and concepts on war of the ancient Chinese writer Sun Tzu
- Helps you understand the nature of war and familiarizes you with strategies and tactics for fighting in different environments and situations

Why Study Sun Tzu?

- Sun Tzu's advice is timeless; it has influenced both Eastern and Western military leaders for many years. His influence within the Marine Corps has been significant. In point of fact, though FMFM 1: *Warfighting* (revised in 1997 to become MCDP 1) is primarily a Clausewitzian document, it is spiced throughout with ideas from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.
- Sun Tzu has influenced modern military theorists and commanders, particularly those from non-Western societies. Given our global perspective and military obligations, a view of war and conflict from another cultural perspective is very relevant and pertinent.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Sun Tzu and You: Your Task

As a Marine Corps officer, your study of Sun Tzu should enable you to understand his analysis of

- War
- Strategy
- Military-civil relations
- Other factors associated with the profession of arms

You should also compare and contrast Sun Tzu's theories with other theorists' ideas about the nature of war and strategies of waging war.

Relationship To Other Instruction

This lesson provides an introduction to early Eastern military thought and a foundation for further study on the development of both Eastern and Western military thought. It also provides a framework for analyzing revolutionary warfare in lesson 12. Further, the relationship between a nation's military, its political life, and its policies--an important component of Sun Tzu's writings--will be explored in *Strategic Level of War* (8802) and *Operational Level of War* (8803).

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 4.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Historical Context	Understand Sun Tzu in his historical context. [JPME Area 3d]
Basic Theories	Understand Sun Tzu's basic theories and his approach to warfighting. [JPME Area 3b]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/2.5 3/d/0.5

Historical Background

Origin of Sun Tzu's *Art of War*

- It is believed that Sun Tzu lived in China between 400 to 300 B.C. and that he authored *The Art of War*. However, the issue of his existence has never been resolved completely.
- Regardless of whether Sun Tzu was a real person or just a collective pen name for the compiled writings of many authors, the essays make up one of the earliest known treatises on the theory of war.

Historical Context

Sun Tzu lived during the Warring States Era (453-221 B.C.) of Chinese history. During this tumultuous period, China was comprised of a number of states of varying geographic size, population, and resources. The political landscape of China changed often during this era, as various states sought in turn to dominate their neighbors or as other states established alliances to bring down (or hold at bay) a powerful adversary.

Amalgamation and Consolidation

Although the military advantage could often shift from one of the major states to another, at least one clear trend is evident: The growth of large states at the expense of their smaller and weaker neighbors. Indeed, the process of amalgamation and consolidation--which saw smaller states absorbed (through conquest or intimidation) and consolidated by their larger neighbors--was a constant feature of Chinese historical development and culminated in 221 B.C. in establishing a monolithic state by the first universal emperor.

The Thirteen Chapters

Given that a state's survival often depended on its ability to defend itself from its neighboring states, Chinese rulers soon found that waging wars successfully required a coherent strategic and tactical theory and a practical doctrine governing intelligence, planning, command, operation, and administration. Sun Tzu, the author of *The Thirteen Chapters*, was the first man to provide such a theory and doctrine.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Chinese Thinkers

During this time, a number of intellectuals produced ideas ranging on the spectrum from the most concrete to the most abstract and from the most practical to the most theoretical. Among the most practical of the early Chinese thinkers were the military experts, one of the best of whom was Sun Wu. He was a legendary general who is believed to be the author of a remarkable text dating from the fourth century B.C. entitled *Ping-fa, The Art of War.*

Discovery of *The Art of War*

The Art of War has been studied for centuries in the East and has had some degree of influence on current Russian thought. By comparison, although a version of the book was available in France as early as 1772, the West really "discovered" Sun Tzu only in this century.

Sun Tzu's Maxims

The Art of War is not an organized volume on strategy or tactics. It does not have the organized structure or pointed philosophical approach of Clausewitz's *On War.* It is a loosely organized compendium of sayings, aphorisms "imperatives," and military experiences.

Required Readings

The Art of War

Griffith, Samuel B., trans., *The Art Of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Read only pp. 57 to 149. This is a highly regarded, significant, and insightful work on the subject of war. The volume consists of concise, pithy statements of practical advice on subjects such as the commander and his style of leadership, the importance of psychological elements in war such as deception and surprise, and the use of various "propaganda" sources to gain support from the local populace. Many consider this volume as valuable today as when it originally was written.

When you read Griffith's edition of Sun Tzu's writings, pay close attention to the political and military situations in the Warring States Era (453-221 B.C.).

MCDP 1
Warfighting

Review the entire publication. Keep in mind that *Warfighting* is at root a Clausewitzian document; the very chapter headings and titles are derived from *On War*. This reading is located immediately following this lesson.

Warfighting is very heavily spiced with the ideas of Sun Tzu. Look for Sun Tzu's influence as you review *Warfighting*.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

If you are interested in further non-Western approaches to war and a further adaptation of Sun Tzu, see the following:

- Sawyer, Ralph D., trans. *Sun Pin, Military Methods: A Brilliant Elaboration of the Art of War by the Great-grandson of Sun Tzu.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995.

- Lau, D. C. and Ames, Roger T., trans. *Sun Pin: The Art of Warfare: A Comprehensive Translation of the Fourth-Century B.C. Chinese Military Philosopher and Strategist.* New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

- Handel, Michael I., *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought.*

Issues for Consideration

Key Ideas

What are Sun Tzu's key ideas? Remember, for any theorist, historical context is important. Could his ideas and commentary have evolved because conditions in China were violent and wars and conflicts numerous and costly?

War and Politics

Sun Tzu felt war was a grave matter since it concerned survival of the state. Hence, it deserved serious study. Going to war, mobilizing an army, and committing it to battle should be done only for the most serious of causes. Careful analysis and planning are necessary before beginning a campaign. What did Sun Tzu feel was the relationship between war and politics and between political and military objectives?

Bloodless Battles

- Consider Sun Tzu's arguments about winning "bloodless battles." What does he have to say about using clever strategies? How about exercising patient, long-term strategies? Are they superficially attractive? What problems do they raise?

- Does his term *bloodless battle* really mean war in the sense westerners use the term *war,* or is his bloodless battle merely a course of political machinations short of war?

Sun Tzu Today

- Is a modern democracy capable of Sun Tzu's patient schemes?

- Can open societies with complex military organizations, a free media, and conflicting political institutions really execute such clever stratagems?

- What happens when a nation confronts a foe whose military policies and actions are rooted in these very concepts?

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 1

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Griffith, Samuel B., trans., *The Art Of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Comment:

This is a highly regarded, significant, and insightful work on the subject of war. The volume consists of concise, pithy statements of practical advice on subjects such as the commander and his style of leadership, the importance of psychological elements in war such as deception and surprise, and the use of various "propaganda" sources to gain support from the local populace. Many consider this volume as valuable today as when it originally was written.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 1

Subject: Required Readings

Title: *Warfighting.*

Comment:

Review the entire publication. Keep in mind that:

- *Warfighting* is at root a Clausewitzian document; the very chapter headings and titles are derived from *On War.*
- *Warfighting* is very heavily spiced with the ideas of Sun Tzu. Look for Sun Tzu's influence as you review *Warfighting.*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

20 June 1997

FOREWORD

Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication. Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy contained in *Warfighting*. Our philosophy of warfighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoniously with the other Services.

That said, I believe *Warfighting* can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements

in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It is in this spirit that *Warfighting* has been revised, and this publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. I have several goals for this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the nature of war—for example, to emphasize war's complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for modern conflict's expanding forms. Another goal is to clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander's intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability. It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and essential message of the original.

Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2 derives a theory about war from that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.

C. C. KRULAK
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000006 00

Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.

PREFACE

Eight years ago the Marine Corps published the first edition of *Warfighting*. Our intent was to describe my philosophy on warfighting, establish it as Marine Corps doctrine, and present it in an easy-to-read format. In the foreword to that manual, I charged every officer to read and reread the text, to understand it, and to take its message to heart. We have succeeded. *Warfighting* has stimulated discussion and debate from classrooms to wardrooms, training areas to combat zones. The philosophy contained in this publication has influenced our approach to every task we have undertaken.

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 stated, "War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously." Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated. Marine Corps Doctrinal

Publication 1 refines and expands our philosophy on warfighting, taking into account new thinking about the nature of war and the understanding gained through participation in extensive operations over the past decade. Read it, study it, take it to heart.

Semper Fidelis,

A. M. GRAY
General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chapter 1

The Nature of War

"Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."[1]

—Carl von Clausewitz

"In war the chief incalculable is the human will."[2]

—B. H. Liddell Hart

"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."[3]

—A. A. Vandegrift

To understand the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting, we first need an appreciation for the nature of war itself—its moral, mental, and physical characteristics and demands. A common view of war among Marines is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine because our approach to the conduct of war derives from our understanding of the nature of war.

WAR DEFINED

War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. These groups have traditionally been established nation-states, but they may also include any nonstate group—such as an international coalition or a faction within or outside of an existing state—with its own political interests and the ability to generate organized violence on a scale sufficient to have significant political consequences.

The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interactive social process. Clausewitz called it a *Zweikampf* (literally a "two-struggle") and suggested the image of a pair of wrestlers locked in a hold, each exerting force and counterforce to try to throw the other.[4] War is thus a process of continuous mutual

adaptation, of give and take, move and countermove. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans. While we try to impose our will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will on us. Appreciating this dynamic interplay between opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of war.

The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to this end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force. The target of that violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it may extend to the enemy population at large. War may range from intense clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to subtler, unconventional hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.

Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. Instead, they are extremes between which exist the relations among most political groups. This range includes routine economic competition, more or less permanent political or ideological tension, and occasional crises among groups. The decision to resort to the use of military force of some kind may arise at any point within these extremes, even during periods of relative peace. On one end of the spectrum, military force may be used simply to maintain or restore order in civil disturbances or disaster relief operations. At the other extreme, force may be used

to completely overturn the existing order within a society or between two or more societies. Some cultures consider it a moral imperative to go to war only as a last resort when all peaceful means to settle disagreements have failed. Others have no such hesitancy to resort to military force to achieve their aims.

FRICTION

Portrayed as a clash between two opposing wills, war appears a simple enterprise. In practice, the conduct of war becomes extremely difficult because of the countless factors that impinge on it. These factors collectively have been called *friction*, which Clausewitz described as "the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."[5] Friction is the force that resists all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.

The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills creates friction. In this dynamic environment of interacting forces, friction abounds.

Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. It may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance.

Friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated technologies. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical impact.

While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is *to fight effectively* despite the existence of friction. One essential means to overcome friction is the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit. While striving ourselves to overcome the effects of friction, we must attempt at the same time to raise our enemy's friction to a level that weakens his ability to fight.

We can readily identify countless examples of friction, but until we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hope to appreciate it fully. Only through experience can we come to appreciate the force of will necessary to overcome friction and to develop a realistic appreciation for what is possible in war and what is not. While training should attempt to approximate the conditions of war, we must realize it can never fully duplicate the level of friction of real combat.

UNCERTAINTY

Another attribute of war is uncertainty. We might argue that uncertainty is just one of many sources of friction, but because it is such a pervasive trait of war, we will treat it singly. All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty, or the "fog of war." Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly situation. While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize that we cannot eliminate them—or even come close. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

War is intrinsically unpredictable. At best, we can hope to determine possibilities and probabilities. This implies a certain standard of military judgment: What is possible and what is not? What is probable and what is not? By judging probability, we make an estimate of our enemy's designs and act accordingly. Having said this, we realize that it is precisely those actions that seem improbable that often have the greatest impact on the outcome of war.

Because we can never eliminate uncertainty, we must learn to fight effectively despite it. We can do this by developing simple, flexible plans; planning for likely contingencies; developing standing operating procedures; and fostering initiative among subordinates.

One important source of uncertainty is a property known as *nonlinearity*. Here the term does not refer to formations on the battlefield but describes systems in which causes and effects are disproportionate. Minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects. Outcomes of battles can hinge on the actions of a few individuals, and as Clausewitz observed, "issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes."[6]

By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estimation and acceptance of risk. Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Risk is equally common to action and inaction. Risk may be related to gain; greater potential gain often requires greater risk. The practice of concentrating combat power toward the main effort necessitates the willingness to accept prudent risk elsewhere. However, we should clearly understand that the acceptance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamble the entire likelihood of success on a single improbable event.

Part of uncertainty is the ungovernable element of chance. Chance is a universal characteristic of war and a continuous

source of friction. Chance consists of turns of events that cannot reasonably be foreseen and over which we and our enemy have no control. The constant potential for chance to influence outcomes in war, combined with the inability to prevent chance from impacting on plans and actions, creates psychological friction. However, we should remember that chance favors neither belligerent exclusively. Consequently, we must view chance not only as a threat but also as an opportunity which we must be ever ready to exploit.

FLUIDITY

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an inherent attribute of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, presenting a unique set of problems and requiring an original solution. Nevertheless, no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each episode merges with those that precede and follow it—shaped by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter—creating a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events. Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt—to proactively shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.

It is physically impossible to sustain a high tempo of activity indefinitely, although clearly there will be times when it is advantageous to push men and equipment to the limit. The tempo of war will fluctuate from periods of intense combat to periods in which activity is limited to information gathering, replenishment, or redeployment. Darkness and weather can influence the tempo of war but need not halt it. A competitive rhythm will develop between the opposing wills with each belligerent trying to influence and exploit tempo and the continuous flow of events to suit his purposes.

Military forces will mass to concentrate combat power against the enemy. However, this massing will also make them vulnerable to the effects of enemy fires, and they will find it necessary to disperse. Another competitive rhythm will develop—disperse, concentrate, disperse again—as each belligerent tries to concentrate combat power temporarily while limiting the vulnerability to enemy combat power.

DISORDER

In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war gravitates naturally toward disorder. Like the other attributes of war, disorder is an inherent characteristic of war; we can never eliminate it. In the heat of battle, plans will go awry,

instructions and information will be unclear and misinterpreted, communications will fail, and mistakes and unforeseen events will be commonplace. It is precisely this natural disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitation by an opportunistic will.

Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly disordered over time. As the situation changes continuously, we are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions have little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme.

By historical standards, the modern battlefield is particularly disorderly. While past battlefields could be described by linear formations and uninterrupted linear fronts, we cannot think of today's battlefield in linear terms. The range and lethality of modern weapons have increased dispersion between units. In spite of communications technology, this dispersion strains the limits of positive control. The natural result of dispersion is unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed flanks which can and will be exploited, blurring the distinction between front and rear and friendly- and enemy-controlled areas.

The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. We cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events. The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to influence the general flow of action rather than to try to control each event.

If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly environment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effectively in the face of disorder, we should seek to generate disorder and use it as a weapon against our opponent.

COMPLEXITY

War is a complex phenomenon. We have described war as essentially a clash between opposed wills. In reality, each belligerent is not a single, homogeneous will guided by a single intelligence. Instead, each belligerent is a complex system consisting of numerous individual parts. A division comprises regiments, a regiment comprises battalions, and so on all the way down to fire teams which are composed of individual Marines. Each element is part of a larger whole and must cooperate with other elements for the accomplishment of the common goal. At the same time, each has its own mission and must adapt to its own situation. Each must deal with friction, uncertainty, and disorder at its own level, and each may create friction, uncertainty, and disorder for others, friendly as well as enemy.

As a result, war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions and

incomplete information. A military action is not the monolithic execution of a single decision by a single entity but necessarily involves near-countless independent but interrelated decisions and actions being taken simultaneously throughout the organization. Efforts to fully centralize military operations and to exert complete control by a single decisionmaker are inconsistent with the intrinsically complex and distributed nature of war.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation on those who must do the fighting.[7] However, these effects vary greatly from case to case. Individuals and peoples react differently to the stress of

war; an act that may break the will of one enemy may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.

No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.

VIOLENCE AND DANGER

War is among the greatest horrors known to humanity; it should never be romanticized. The means of war is force, applied in the form of organized violence. It is through the use of violence, or the credible threat of violence, that we compel our enemy to do our will. Violence is an essential element of war, and its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. While the magnitude of violence may vary with the object and means of war, the violent essence of war will never change.[8] Any study of war that neglects this basic truth is misleading and incomplete.

Since war is a violent enterprise, danger is ever present. Since war is a human phenomenon, fear, the human reaction to danger, has a significant impact on the conduct of war.

Everybody feels fear. Fear contributes to the corrosion of will. Leaders must foster the courage to overcome fear, both individually and within the unit. Courage is not the absence of fear; rather, it is the strength to overcome fear.[9]

Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to cope with it. Courage and fear are often situational rather than uniform, meaning that people experience them differently at different times and in different situations. Like fear, courage takes many forms, from a stoic courage born of reasoned calculation to a fierce courage born of heightened emotion. Experience under fire generally increases confidence, as can realistic training by lessening the mystique of combat. Strong leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordinates can limit the effects of fear. Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and the self-confidence of individuals within the unit. In this environment, a Marine's unwillingness to violate the respect and trust of peers can overcome personal fear.

PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND MENTAL FORCES

War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral, and mental forces. The physical characteristics of war are generally easily seen, understood, and measured: equipment capabilities,

supplies, physical objectives seized, force ratios, losses of matériel or life, terrain lost or gained, prisoners or matériel captured. The moral characteristics are less tangible. (The term "moral" as used here is not restricted to ethics, although ethics are certainly included, but pertains to those forces of a psychological rather than tangible nature.)[10] Moral forces are difficult to grasp and impossible to quantify. We cannot easily gauge forces like national and military resolve, national or individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, morale, leadership, or esprit. War also involves a significant mental, or intellectual, component. Mental forces provide the ability to grasp complex battlefield situations; to make effective estimates, calculations, and decisions; to devise tactics and strategies; and to develop plans.

Although material factors are more easily quantified, the moral and mental forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war.[11] This is not to lessen the importance of physical forces, for the physical forces in war can have a significant impact on the others. For example, the greatest effect of fires is generally not the amount of physical destruction they cause, but the effect of that physical destruction on the enemy's moral strength.

Because it is difficult to come to grips with moral and mental forces, it is tempting to exclude them from our study of war. However, any doctrine or theory of war that neglects these factors ignores the greater part of the nature of war.

THE EVOLUTION OF WAR

War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously. Changes may be gradual in some cases and drastic in others. Drastic changes in war are the result of developments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war such as the rifled bore, mass conscription, and the railroad.

One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology. As the hardware of war improves through technolo- gical development, so must the tactical, operational, and strategic usage adapt to its improved capabilities both to maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our ene- my's.

It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not. We must stay abreast of the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant

advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.

THE SCIENCE, ART, AND DYNAMIC OF WAR

Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science, which is the methodical application of the empirical laws of nature. The science of war includes those activities directly subject to the laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disciplines; for example, the application of fires, the effects of weapons, and the rates and methods of movement and resupply. However, science does not describe the whole phenomenon.

An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, which is the employment of creative or intuitive skills. Art includes the creative, situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience, and so the art of war subsumes the science of war. The art of war requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. It involves conceiving strategies and tactics and developing plans of action to suit a given situation. This still does not describe the whole phenomenon. Owing to the va- garies of human behavior and the countless other intangible factors which influence war, there is far more to its conduct than can be explained by art and science. Art and science stop short of explaining the fundamental dynamic of war.

As we have said, war is a social phenomenon. Its essential dynamic is the dynamic of competitive human interaction rather than the dynamic of art or science. Human beings interact with each other in ways that are fundamentally different from the way a scientist works with chemicals or formulas or the way an artist works with paints or musical notes. It is because of this dynamic of human interaction that fortitude, perseverance, boldness, esprit, and other traits not explainable by art or science are so essential in war. *We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.*

CONCLUSION

At first glance, war seems a simple clash of interests. On closer examination, it reveals its complexity and takes shape as one of the most demanding and trying of human endeavors. War is an extreme test of will. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger are its essential features. War displays broad patterns that can be represented as probabilities, yet it remains fundamentally unpredictable. Each episode is the unique product of myriad moral, mental, and physical forces.

Individual causes and their effects can rarely be isolated. Minor actions and random incidents can have disproportionately large—even decisive—effects. While dependent on the laws of science and the intuition and creativity of art, war takes its fundamental character from the dynamic of human interaction.

Chapter 2

The Theory of War

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes."[1]

—Carl von Clausewitz

"Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant."[2]

—Sun Tzu

"Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuver, the less he demands in slaughter."[3]

—Winston Churchill

Having arrived at a common view of the nature of war, we proceed to develop from it a theory of war. Our theory of war will in turn be the foundation for the way we prepare for and wage war.

WAR AS AN ACT OF POLICY

War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force.[4] Policy and politics are related but not synonymous, and it is important to understand war in both contexts. Politics refers to the distribution of power through dynamic interaction, both cooperative and competitive, while policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political process. The policy aims that are the motive for any group in war should also be the foremost determinants of its conduct. The single most important thought to understand about our theory is that war *must serve policy*.

As the policy aims of war may vary from resistance against aggression to the unconditional surrender of an enemy government, so should the application of violence vary in accordance with those aims. Of course, we may also have to adjust our policy objectives to accommodate our chosen means. This means that we must not establish goals outside our capabilities. It is important to recognize that many political problems cannot be solved by military means. Some can, but rarely as

anticipated. War tends to take its own course as it unfolds. We should recognize that war is not an inanimate instrument, but an animate force which may likely have unintended consequences that may change the political situation.

To say that war is an extension of politics and policy is not to say that war is strictly a political phenomenon: It also contains social, cultural, psychological, and other elements. These can also exert a strong influence on the conduct of war as well as on war's usefulness for solving political problems.

When the policy motive of war is extreme, such as the destruction of an enemy government, then war's natural military tendency toward destruction will coincide with the political aim, and there will tend to be few political restrictions on the military conduct of war. On the other hand, the more limited the policy motive, the more the military tendency toward destruction may be at variance with that motive, and the more likely political considerations will restrict the application of military force.[5] Commanders must recognize that since military action must serve policy, these political restrictions on military action may be perfectly correct. At the same time, military leaders have a responsibility to advise the political leadership when the limitations imposed on military action jeopardize the military's ability to accomplish its assigned mission.

There are two ways to use military force to impose our will on an enemy. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist

us by physically destroying his military capabilities. The aim is the elimination, permanent or temporary, of the enemy's military power. This has historically been called a *strategy of annihilation*, although it does not necessarily require the physical annihilation of all military forces. Instead, it requires the enemy's incapacitation as a viable military threat, and thus can also be called a *strategy of incapacitation*.[6] We use force in this way when we seek an unlimited political objective, such as the overthrow of the enemy leadership. We may also use this strategy in pursuit of more limited political objectives if we believe the enemy will continue to resist as long as any means to do so remain.

The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist. This is a *strategy of erosion*, using military force to erode the enemy leadership's will.[7] In such a strategy, we use military force to raise the costs of resistance higher than the enemy is willing to pay. We use force in this manner in pursuit of limited political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.

MEANS IN WAR

At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear against

another. These include, for example, economic, diplomatic, military, and psychological forces. Our primary concern is with the use of *military force*. Nevertheless, while we focus on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other elements of national power. The use of military force may take any number of forms from the mere deployment of forces as a demonstration of resolve to the enforcement of a negotiated truce to general warfare with sophisticated weaponry.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Conflict can take a wide range of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. At one end of the spectrum are those actions referred to as military operations other than war in which the application of military power is usually restrained and selective. Military operations other than war encompass the use of a broad range of military capabilities to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities. At the other end of the spectrum is general war, a large-scale, sustained combat operation such as global conflict between major powers. Where on the spectrum to place a particular conflict depends on several factors. Among them are policy objectives, available military means, national will, and density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield. In general, the greater this

density, the more intense the conflict. Each conflict is not uniformly intense. As a result, we may witness relatively intense actions within a military operation other than war or relatively quiet sectors or phases in a major regional conflict or general war.

Military operations other than war and small wars are more probable than a major regional conflict or general war. Many political groups simply do not possess the military means to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. Many who fight a technologically or numerically superior enemy may choose to fight in a way that does not justify the enemy's full use of that superiority. Unless actual survival is at stake, political groups are generally unwilling to accept the risks associated with general war. However, a conflict's intensity may change over time. Belligerents may escalate the level of violence if the original means do not achieve the desired results. Similarly, wars may actually de-escalate over time; for example, after an initial pulse of intense violence, the belligerents may continue to fight on a lesser level, unable to sustain the initial level of intensity.

The Marine Corps, as the nation's force-in-readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greater challenge than it may appear: Military operations other than war and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war. A modern military force capable of waging a war against a large conventional force may find itself

ill-prepared for a "small" war against a lightly equipped guerrilla force.

LEVELS OF WAR

Activities in war take place at several interrelated levels which form a hierarchy. These levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical. (See figure 1.)

The highest level is the *strategic* level.[8] Activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives. Strategy applies to peace as well as war. We distinguish between *national strategy*, which coordinates and focuses all the elements of national power to attain the policy objectives,[9] and *military strategy*, which is the application of military force to secure the policy objectives.[10] Military strategy thus is subordinate to national strategy. Military strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars and securing peace. Strategy involves establishing goals, assigning forces, providing assets, and imposing conditions on the use of force in theaters of war. Strategy derived from political and policy objectives must be clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis for all operations.

The lowest level is the *tactical* level.[11] Tactics refers to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular mission



Figure 1. The Levels of War.

in either combat or other military operations. In war, tactics focuses on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a particular time and place. In noncombat situations, tactics may include the schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as enforcing order and maintaining security during peacekeeping op- erations. We normally think of tactics in terms of combat, and

in this context tactics can be thought of as the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and the immediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy. Included within the tactical level of war is the performance of combat service support functions such as resupply or maintenance. The tactical level also includes the *technical* application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for accomplishing specific tasks *within* a tactical action. These include the call for fire, techniques of fire, the operation of weapons and equipment, and tactical movement techniques. There is a certain overlap between tactics and techniques. We make the point only to draw the distinction between tactics, which requires judgment and creativity, and techniques and procedures, which generally involves repetitive routine.

The *operational* level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. It is the use of tactical results to attain strategic objectives.[12] The operational level includes deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle—and when, where, and under what conditions to *refuse* battle in support of higher aims. Actions at this level imply a broader dimension of time and space than actions at the tactical level. As strategy deals with winning wars and tactics with winning battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns. Its means are tactical results, and its ends are the established strategic objectives.

The distinctions between levels of war are rarely clearly delineated in practice. They are to some extent only a matter of scope and scale. Usually there is some amount of overlap as a single commander may have responsibilities at more than one level. As shown in figure 1, the overlap may be slight. This will likely be the case in large-scale, conventional conflicts involving large military formations and multiple theaters. In such cases, there are fairly distinct strategic, operational, and tactical domains, and most commanders will find their activities focused at one level or another. However, in other cases, the levels of war may compress so that there is significant overlap, as shown in figure 2. Especially in either a nuclear war or a military operation other than war, a single commander may operate at two or even three levels simultaneously. In a nuclear war, strategic decisions about the direction of the war and tactical decisions about the employment

Figure 2. The Levels of War Compressed.

of weapons are essentially one and the same. In a military operation other than war, even a small-unit leader, for example, may find that "tactical" actions have direct strategic implications.

INITIATIVE AND RESPONSE

All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either taking the *initiative* or reacting in *response* to the opponent. By taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy initiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will on the enemy. The initiative is clearly the preferred form of action because only through the initiative can we ultimately impose our will on the enemy. At least one party to a conflict must take the initiative for without the desire to impose upon the other, there would be no conflict. The second party to a conflict must respond for without the desire to resist, there again would be no conflict. If we cannot take the initiative and the enemy does, we are compelled to respond in order to counteract the enemy's attempts. The response generally has a negative aim, that of negating—blocking or counterattacking—the enemy's inten- tions. Like a counterpunch in boxing, the response often has as its object seizing the initiative from the opponent.

The flux of war is a product of the continuous interaction between initiative and response. We can imagine a conflict in which both belligerents try to take the initiative simultaneously—as in a meeting engagement, for example. After the initial clash, one of them will gain the upper hand, and the other will be compelled to respond—at least until able to wrestle the initiative away from the other. Actions in war more or less reflect the constant imperative to seize and maintain the initiative.

This discussion leads to a related pair of concepts: the *offense* and *defense*. The offense contributes *striking power*. We normally associate the offense with initiative: The most obvious way to seize and maintain the initiative is to strike first and keep striking. The defense, on the other hand, contributes *resisting power*, the ability to preserve and protect ourselves. The defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy's will.

The defense tends to be the more efficient form of warfare—meaning that it tends to expend less energy—which is not the same as saying the defense is inherently the stronger form of warfare. The relative advantages and disadvantages of offense and defense are situationally dependent. Because we typically think of the defense as waiting for the enemy to strike, we often associate the defense with response rather than initiative. This is not necessarily true. We do not necessarily assume the defensive only out of weakness. For example, the defense may confer the initiative if the enemy is

compelled to attack into the strength of our defense. Under such conditions, we may have the positive aim of destroying the enemy. Similarly, a defender waiting in ambush may have the initiative if the enemy can be brought into the trap. The defense may be another way of striking at the enemy.

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they cannot exist separately. For example, the defense cannot be purely passive resistance. An effective defense must assume an offensive character, striking at the moment of the enemy's greatest vulnerability. As Clausewitz wrote, the defense is "not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."[13] The truly decisive element of the defense is the counterattack. Thus, the offense is an integral component of the concept of the defense.

Similarly, the defense is an essential component of the offense. The offense cannot sustain itself indefinitely. At some times and places, it becomes necessary to halt the offense to replenish, and the defense automatically takes over. Furthermore, the requirement to concentrate forces for the offensive often necessitates assuming the defensive elsewhere. Therefore, out of necessity, we must include defensive considerations as part of our concept of the offense.

This brings us to the concept of the *culminating point*,[14] without which our understanding of the relationship between the offense and defense would be incomplete. Not only can

the offense not sustain itself indefinitely, but also it generally grows weaker as it advances. Certain moral factors, such as morale or boldness, may increase with a successful attack, but these very often cannot compensate for the physical losses involved in sustaining an advance in the face of resistance. We advance at a cost in lives, fuel, ammunition, and physical and sometimes moral strength, and so the attack becomes weaker over time. Enemy resistance, of course, is a major factor in the dissipation of strength. Eventually, we reach the culminating point at which we can no longer sustain the attack and must revert to the defense. It is precisely at this point that the defensive element of the offense is most vulnerable to the offensive element of the defense, the counterattack.

We conclude that there exists no clear division between the offense and defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to impose one artificially. The offense and defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous.

These relationships between initiative and response, offense and defense, exist simultaneously at the various levels of war. We may seize the initiative locally as part of a larger response—in a limited counterattack, for example. Likewise, we may employ a tactical defense as part of an offensive campaign, availing ourselves of the advantages of the defense tactically while pursuing an operational offensive aim.

STYLES OF WARFARE

Styles in warfare can be described by their place on a spectrum of attrition and maneuver.[15] Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior firepower. It is a direct approach to the conduct of war that sees war as a straightforward test of strength and a matter principally of force ratios. An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically. Enemy concentrations are sought out as the most worthwhile targets. The logical conclusion of attrition warfare is the eventual physical destruction of the enemy's entire arsenal, although the expectation is that the enemy will surrender or disengage before this happens out of unwillingness to bear the rising cost. The focus is on the efficient application of fires, leading to a highly proceduralized approach to war. Technical proficiency—especially in weapons employment—matters more than cunning or creativity.

Attrition warfare may recognize maneuver as an important component but sees its purpose as merely to allow us to bring our fires more efficiently to bear on the enemy. The attritionist tends to gauge progress in quantitative terms: battle damage assessments, "body counts," and terrain captured. Results are generally proportionate to efforts; greater expenditures net greater results—that is, greater attrition. The desire for volume and accuracy of fire tends to lead toward centralized control, just as the emphasis on efficiency tends to lead to an

inward focus on procedures and techniques. Success depends on an overall superiority in attritional capacity—that is, the ability to inflict *and* absorb attrition. The greatest necessity for success is numerical and material superiority. At the national level, war becomes as much an industrial as a military problem. Historically, nations and militaries that perceived they were numerically and technologically superior have often adopted warfare by attrition.

Pure attrition warfare does not exist in practice, but examples of warfare with a high attrition content are plentiful: the operations of both sides on the Western Front of the First World War; the French defensive tactics and operations against the Germans in May 1940; the Allied campaign in Italy in 1943-1944; Eisenhower's broad-front offensive in Europe after Normandy in 1944; U.S. operations in Korea after 1950; and most U.S. operations in the Vietnam War.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system"—to incapacitate the enemy *systemically*. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as part of a cohesive whole. Rather than being viewed as desirable targets, enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead of attacking enemy strength, the goal is the application of our strength against selected enemy

weakness in order to maximize *advantage*. This tack requires the ability to identify and exploit such weakness. Success depends not so much on the efficient performance of procedures and techniques, but on understanding the specific characteristics of the enemy system. Maneuver relies on speed and surprise for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon—often the most important. Success by maneuver—unlike attrition—is often disproportionate to the effort made. However, for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure. With attrition, potential losses tend to be proportionate to risks incurred.

Firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver. In fact, at the critical point, where strength has been focused against enemy vulnerability, attrition may be extreme and may involve the outright annihilation of enemy elements. Nonetheless, the object of such local attrition is not merely to contribute incrementally to the overall wearing down of the entire enemy force, but to eliminate a key element which incapacitates the enemy systemically.

Like attrition warfare, maneuver warfare does not exist in its theoretically pure form. Examples of warfare with a high enough maneuver content that they can be considered maneuver warfare include Allenby's decisive campaign against the Turks in Palestine in 1918; German *Blitzkrieg* operations of 1939-1941, most notably the invasion of France in 1940; the

failed Allied landing at Anzio in 1944, which was an effort to avoid the attrition battles of the Italian theater; Patton's break-out from the Normandy beachhead in late 1944; MacArthur's Inchon campaign in 1950; and III Marine Amphibious Force's combined action program in Vietnam which attacked the Viet Cong by eliminating their essential popular support base through the pacification of rural villages.

All warfare involves both maneuver and attrition in some mix. The predominant style depends on a variety of factors, not least of which are our own capabilities and the nature of the enemy. Marine Corps doctrine today is based principally on warfare by maneuver, as we will see in the fourth chapter, "The Conduct of War."

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time.[16] Some factors in combat power are quite tangible and easily measured such as superior numbers, which Clausewitz called "the most common element in victory."[17] Some may be less easily measured such as the effects of maneuver, tempo, or surprise; the advantages conferred by geography or climate; the relative strengths of the offense and defense; or the relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, or rear. Some may be wholly

intangible such as morale, fighting spirit, perseverance, or the effects of leadership.

It is not our intent to try to list or categorize all the various components of combat power, to index their relative values, or to describe their combinations and variations; each combination is unique and temporary. Nor is it even desirable to be able to do so, since this would lead us to a formulaic approach to war. Our intent is merely to make the point that combat power is the situationally dependent and unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and mental factors.

SPEED AND FOCUS

Of all the consistent patterns we can discern in war, there are two concepts of universal significance in generating combat power: *speed* and *focus*.

Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo—the consistent ability to operate quickly.[18] Speed over distance, or space, is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, *speed is a weapon*. In war, it is relative speed that matters rather than absolute speed. Superior speed allows us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of

action, forcing the enemy to react to us. Speed provides security. It is a prerequisite for maneuver and for surprise. Moreover, speed is necessary in order to concentrate superior strength at the decisive time and place.

Since it is relative speed that matters, it follows that we should take all measures to improve our own speed while degrading our enemy's. However, experience shows that we cannot sustain a high rate of speed indefinitely. As a result, a pattern develops: fast, slow, fast again. A competitive rhythm develops in combat with each belligerent trying to generate speed when it is advantageous.

Focus is the convergence of *effects* in time and space on some objective. It is the generation of superior combat power at a particular time and place. Focus may achieve decisive local superiority for a numerically inferior force. The willingness to focus at the decisive place and time necessitates strict economy and the acceptance of risk elsewhere and at other times. To devote means to unnecessary efforts or excessive means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principle of focus and is counterproductive to the true objective. Focus applies not only to the conduct of war but also to the preparation for war.

Since war is fluid and opportunities are fleeting, focus applies to time as well as to space. We must focus effects not only at the decisive location but also at the decisive moment.

We achieve focus through cooperation toward the accomplishment of the common purpose. This applies to all elements of the force, and involves the coordination of ground combat, aviation, and combat service support elements.

The combination of speed and focus adds "punch" or "shock effect" to our actions. It follows that we should strike with the greatest possible combination of speed and focus.

SURPRISE AND BOLDNESS

Two additional concepts are particularly useful in generating combat power: *surprise* and *boldness*.

By surprise we mean a state of disorientation resulting from an unexpected event that degrades the enemy's ability to resist. We achieve surprise by striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. It is not essential that we take the enemy unaware, but only that awareness came too late to react effectively. The desire for surprise is "more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable."[19] While a necessary precondition of superiority, surprise is also a genuine source of combat power in its own right because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisively affect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.

The advantage gained by surprise depends on the degree of disorientation and the enemy's ability to adjust and recover. Surprise, if sufficiently harsh, can lead to shock, the total, if temporary, inability to react. Surprise is based on speed, stealth, ambiguity, and deception. It often means doing the more difficult thing—taking a circuitous direction of attack, for example—in the hope that the enemy will not expect it. In fact, this is the genesis of maneuver—to circumvent the enemy's strength to strike at a weakness.

While the element of surprise is often of decisive importance, we must realize that it is difficult to achieve and easy to lose. Its advantages are only temporary and must be quickly exploited. Friction, a dominant attribute of war, is the constant enemy of surprise. We must also recognize that while surprise is always desirable, the ability to achieve it does not depend solely on our own efforts. Surprise is not what we *do*; it is the enemy's *reaction* to what we do. It depends at least as much on our enemy's susceptibility to surprise—his expectations and preparedness. Our ability to achieve surprise thus rests on our ability to appreciate and then exploit our enemy's expectations. Therefore, while surprise can be decisive, it is risky to depend on it alone for the margin of victory.

There are three basic ways to go about achieving surprise. The first is through *deception*—to convince the enemy we are going to do something other than what we are really going to do in order to induce him to act in a manner prejudicial to his

own interests. The intent is to give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture. The second way is through *ambiguity*—to act in such a way that the enemy does not know what to expect. Because he does not know what to expect, he must prepare for numerous possibilities and cannot prepare adequately for any one. The third is through *stealth*— to deny the enemy any knowledge of impending action. The enemy is not deceived or confused as to our intentions but is completely ignorant of them. Of the three, deception generally offers the greatest effects but is most difficult to achieve.

Boldness is a source of combat power in much the same way that surprise is. Boldness is the characteristic of unhes- itatingly exploiting the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than marginal ones. According to Clausewitz, boldness "must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces, for wherever it is superior, it will take advantage of its opponent's weakness. In other words, it is a genuinely creative force."[20] Boldness is superior to timidity in every instance although boldness does not always equate to immediate aggressive action. A nervy, calculating patience that allows the enemy to commit himself irrevocably before we strike him can also be a form of boldness. Boldness is based on strong situation awareness: We weigh the situation, then act. In other words, boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.

There is a close connection between surprise and boldness. The willingness to accept risks often necessary to achieve surprise reflects boldness. Likewise, boldness contributes to achieving surprise. After we weigh the situation, to take half measures diminishes the effects of surprise.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

It is not enough simply to generate superior combat power. We can easily conceive of superior combat power dissipated over several unrelated efforts or concentrated on some inconsequential object. To win, we must focus combat power toward a decisive aim. There are two related concepts that help us to think about this: *centers of gravity* and *critical vulnerabilities*.

Each belligerent is not a unitary force, but a complex system consisting of numerous physical, moral, and mental components as well as the relationships among them. The combination of these factors determines each belligerent's unique character. Some of these factors are more important than others. Some may contribute only marginally to the belligerent's power, and their loss would not cause significant damage. Others may be fundamental sources of capability.

We ask ourselves: *Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will?* These are *centers of gravity.*[21] Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale. They may be capabilities such as armored forces or aviation strength. They may be localities such as a critical piece of terrain that anchors an entire defensive system. They may be the relationship between two or more components of the system such as the cooperation between two arms, the relations in an alliance, or the junction of two forces. In short, centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are friendly centers of gravity, we want to protect them, and if they are enemy centers of gravity, we want to take them away.

We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative enemy weakness. So we also ask ourselves: *Where is the enemy vulnerable?* In battlefield terms, this means that we should generally avoid his front, where his attention is focused and he is strongest, and seek out his flanks and rear, where he does not expect us and where we can also cause the greatest psychological damage. We should also strike at a moment in time when he is vulnerable.

Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit, some are more critical to the enemy than others. Some may contribute significantly to the enemy's downfall while others may lead only to minimal gains. Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a *critical vulnerability*, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist us.

We should try to understand the enemy system in terms of a relatively few centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities because this allows us to focus our own efforts. The more we can narrow it down, the more easily we can focus. However, we should recognize that most enemy systems will not have a single center of gravity on which everything else depends, or if they do, that center of gravity will be well protected. It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequence to have the desired effect.

Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary concepts. The former looks at the problem of how to attack the enemy system from the perspective of seeking a source of strength, the latter from the perspective of seeking weakness. A critical vulnerability is a pathway to attacking a center of gravity. Both have the same underlying purpose: to target our actions in such a way as to have the greatest effect on the enemy.

CREATING AND EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITY

This discussion leads us to a corollary thought: the importance of creating and exploiting opportunity. In all cases, the commander must be prepared to react to the unexpected and to exploit opportunities created by conditions which develop from the initial action. When identification of enemy critical vulnerabilities is particularly difficult, the commander may have no choice but to exploit any and all vulnerabilities until action uncovers a decisive opportunity. As the opposing wills interact, they create various fleeting opportunities for either foe. Such opportunities are often born of the fog and friction that is natural in war. They may be the result of our own actions, enemy mistakes, or even chance. By exploiting opportunities, we create in increasing numbers more opportunities for exploitation. It is often the ability and the willingness to ruthlessly exploit these opportunities that generate decisive results. The ability to take advantage of opportunity is a function of speed, flexibility, boldness, and initiative.

CONCLUSION

The theory of war we have described provides the foundation for the discussion of the conduct of war in the final chapter. All acts of war are political acts, and so the conduct of war must be made to support the aims of policy. War takes place

at several levels simultaneously, from the strategic direction of the overall war effort to the tactical application of combat power in battle. At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of political power, of which military force is just one. Action in war, at all levels, is the result of the interplay between initiative and response with the object being to seize and maintain the initiative. All warfare is based on concepts such as speed, focus, surprise, and boldness. Success in war depends on the ability to direct our efforts against criti- cal vulnerabilities or centers of gravity and to recognize and exploit fleeting opportunities. As we will discuss, the warfighting doctrine we derive from our theory is one based on maneuver.

Chapter 3

Preparing for War

"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous."[1]

—Hans von Seeckt

"It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale: they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done—Marines with Marine training."[2]

—Earl H. Ellis

During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. Through its preparedness, a military provides deterrence against potential aggressors. As the nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must maintain itself for immediate employment in "any clime and place" and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine.

FORCE PLANNING

Force planning is planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities.[3] Planning plays as important a role in the preparation for war as it does in the conduct of war. The key to any plan is a clearly defined objective, in this case a required level of readiness.

The Marine Corps' force planning is concept-based. That is, all force planning derives from a common set of concepts which describe how Marine Corps forces will operate and perform certain key functions. These concepts describe the types of missions Marine forces are likely to be required to perform and how they might accomplish those missions. These concepts

provide the basis for identifying required ca- pabilities and implementing coordinated programs to develop those capabilities.

Based on this common set of concepts, force planning integrates all the efforts of the peacetime Marine Corps, including training, education, doctrine, organization, personnel management, and equipment acquisition. Unity of effort is as important during the preparation for war as it is during the conduct of war. This systematic process of identifying the objective and planning a course to obtain it applies to all areas and levels of preparations.

ORGANIZATION

The operating forces must be organized to provide forward deployed or rapidly deployable forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations in any environment. This means that in addition to maintaining their unique amphibious capability, the operating forces must maintain the capability to deploy by whatever means is appropriate to the situation.

The active operating forces must be capable of responding immediately to most types of crisis and conflict. Many sustained missions will require augmentation from the Reserve establishment.

For operations and training, Marine forces will be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of ground, aviation, combat service support, and command elements. They have no standard structure, but rather are constituted as appropriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a single commander a combined arms force that can be tailored to the situation faced. As the situation changes, it may of course be necessary to restructure the MAGTF.

Operating forces should be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Tables of organization should reflect the two central requirements of *deployability* and the *ability to task-organize according to specific situations*. Units should be organized according to type only to the extent dictated by training, administrative, and logistic requirements.

Commanders should establish habitual relationships between supported and supporting units to develop operational familiarity among those units. This does not preclude nonstandard relationships when required by the situation.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its

preparation and conduct.[4] Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting. It also provides a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.

Marine Corps doctrine is made official by the Commandant and is established in this publication. Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.

PROFESSIONALISM

Marine Corps doctrine demands professional competence among its leaders. *As military professionals charged with the defense of the Nation, Marine leaders must be true experts in the conduct of war.* They must be individuals both of action and of intellect, skilled at "getting things done" while at the same time conversant in the military art. Resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, they must also be energetic and insistent in execution.[5]

The military profession is a thinking profession. Every Marine is expected to be a student of the art and science of war. Officers especially are expected to have a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it.

Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives.

The Marine Corps' style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader for it generates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative, the willingness to act on one's own judgment, is a prerequisite for boldness. These traits carried to excess can lead to rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning.[6] We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no "zero defects" mentality. Abolishing "zero defects" means that we do not stifle boldness or initiative through the threat of punishment. It does not mean that commanders do not counsel subordinates on mistakes; constructive criticism is an important element in learning. Nor does it give subordinates free license to act stupidly or recklessly.

Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, but we must continue to encourage both traits *in spite of mistakes*. On the other hand, we should deal severely with errors of inaction

or timidity. We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inaction; it is each Marine's *duty* to take initiative as the situation demands. We must not tolerate the avoidance of responsibility or necessary risk.

Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders—trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.

Relations among all leaders—from corporal to general—should be based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. Until a commander has reached and stated a decision, subordinates should consider it their duty to provide honest, professional opinions even though these may be in disagreement with the senior's opinions. However, once the decision has been reached, juniors then must support it as if it were their own. Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advance- ment—the behavior of "yes-men"—will not be tolerated.

TRAINING

The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore is the main effort of a peacetime military. However, training should not stop with the commencement of war; training must continue during war to adapt to the lessons of combat.

All officers and enlisted Marines undergo similar entry-level training which is, in effect, a socialization process. This training provides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. It is the essential first step in the making of a Marine.

Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. All Marines, regardless of occupational specialty, will be trained in basic combat skills. At the same time, unit skills are extremely important. They are not simply an accumulation of individual skills; adequacy in individual skills does not automatically mean unit skills are satisfactory.

Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. They must ensure that

higher-level demands do not deny subordinates adequate opportunities for autonomous unit training.

In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Senior commanders influence training by establishing goals and standards, communicating the intent of training, and establishing a main effort for training. As a rule, they should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.

Training programs should reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals beginning with individual and small-unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms MAGTF. In general, the organization for combat should also be the organization for training. That is, units, including MAGTFs, should train with the full complement of assigned, reinforcing, and supporting forces they require in combat.

Collective training consists of drills and exercises. Drills are a form of small-unit training which stress proficiency by progressive repetition of tasks. Drills are an effective method for developing standardized techniques and procedures that must be performed repeatedly without variation to ensure speed and coordination. Examples are gun drills, preflight preparations, or immediate actions. In contrast, exercises are designed to train units and individuals in tactics under simulated combat conditions. Exercises should approximate the conditions of war as much as possible; that is, they should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder, and opposing wills.

This last characteristic is most important; only in opposed, free-play exercises can we practice the art of war. Dictated or "canned" scenarios eliminate the element of independent, opposing wills that is the essence of war.

Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Their purpose is to draw out the lessons of training. As a result, we should conduct critiques immediately after completing training, before memory of the events has faded. Critiques should be held in an atmosphere of open and frank dialogue in which all hands are encouraged to contribute. We learn as much from mistakes as from things done well, so we must be willing to admit mistakes and discuss them. Of course, a subordinate's willingness to admit mistakes depends on the commander's willingness to tolerate them. Because we recognize that no two situations in war are the same, our critiques should focus not so much on the actions we took as on why we took those actions and why they brought the results they did.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. From the initial stages of leadership training, a leader's career should be viewed as a continuous, progressive

process of development. At each stage, a Marine should be preparing for the subsequent stage.

The early stages of a leader's career are, in effect, an apprenticeship. While receiving a foundation in theory and concepts that will serve them throughout their careers, leaders focus on understanding the requirements and learning and applying the procedures and techniques associated with a particular field. This is when they learn their trades as aviators, infantrymen, artillerymen, or logisticians. As they progress, leaders should strive to master their respective fields and to understand the interrelationship of the techniques and procedures within the field. A Marine's goal at this stage is to become an expert in the tactical level of war.

As an officer continues to develop, mastery should encompass a broader range of subjects and should extend to the operational level of war. At this stage, an officer should not only be an expert in tactics and techniques but should also understand combined arms, amphibious warfare, and expeditionary operations. At the senior levels, an officer should be fully capable of articulating, applying, and integrating MAGTF warfighting capabilities in a joint and multinational environment and should be an expert in the art of war at all levels.

The responsibility for implementing professional military education in the Marine Corps is three-tiered: It resides not only with the education establishment, but also with the commander and the individual.

The education establishment consists of those schools— administered by the Marine Corps, subordinate commands, or outside agencies—established to provide formal education in the art and science of war. All professional schools, particularly officer schools, should focus on developing a talent for military judgment, not on imparting knowledge through rote learning. Study conducted by the education establishment can neither provide complete career preparation for an individual nor reach all individuals. Rather, it builds upon the base provided by commanders and by individual study.

All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship with their subordinates. Commanders are expected to conduct a continuing professional education program for their subordinates that includes developing military judgment and decisionmaking and teaches general professional subjects and specific technical subjects pertinent to occupational specialties. Useful tools for general professional development include supervised reading programs, map exer- cises, war games, battle studies, and terrain studies. *Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.*

Finally, every Marine has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare—the intel-

lectual content of the military profession—is a leader in appearance only. Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time. This is particularly true among officers; after all, the mind is an officer's principal weapon.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Since war is at base a human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. This is especially true for a doctrine of maneuver warfare, which places a premium on individual judgment and action. We should recognize that all Marines of a given grade and occupational specialty are not interchangeable and should assign people to billets based on specific ability and temperament. This includes recognizing those who are best suited to command assignments and those who are best suited to staff assignments—without penalizing one or the other by so recognizing.

The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding. We recognize that casualties in war will take a toll on personnel stability, but the greater stability a unit has initially, the better it will absorb those casualties and incorporate replacements.

Finally, promotion and advancement policy should reward the willingness to accept responsibility and exercise initiative.

EQUIPPING

Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with other equipment. It should require minimal specialized operator training. Further, equipment should be designed so that its use is consistent with established doctrine and tactics. A primary consideration is strategic and tactical lift—the Marine Corps' reliance on shipping for strategic mobility and on landing craft, helicopters, and vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft for tactical mobility from ship to shore and during operations ashore. Another key consideration is employability and supportability in undeveloped theaters with limited supporting infrastructure—where Marine Corps units can frequently expect to operate.

In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, the Marine Corps will exploit existing capabilities—"off-the-shelf" technology—to the greatest extent possible.

Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process based on established operating and functional concepts. Especially for the long term, the process must identify combat requirements and develop equipment to satisfy these require-

ments. Where possible, we should base these requirements on an analysis of likely enemy vulnerabilities and should develop equipment to exploit those vulnerabilities. At the same time, the process should not overlook existing equipment of obvious usefulness.

Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. Any piece of equipment requires support: operator training, maintenance, power sources or fuel, and transport. The anticipated enhancement of capabilities must justify these support requirements and the employment of the equipment must take these requirements into account.

The acquisition effort should balance the need for specialization with the need for utility in a broad range of environments. Increasing the capabilities of equipment generally requires developing increasingly specialized equipment. Increasingly specialized equipment tends to be increasingly vulnerable to countermeasures. One solution to this problem is not to develop a single family of equipment, but to maintain variety in equipment types.

As much as possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. For the same reason, initial operator training should also precede equipment fielding.

There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. Technology can enhance the ways and means of war by improving humanity's ability to wage it, but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate humanity from the process of waging war. Better equipment is not the cure for all ills; doctrinal and tactical solutions to combat deficiencies must also be sought. Any advantages gained by technological advancement are only temporary for someone will always find a countermeasure, tactical or itself technological, which will lessen the impact of the technology. Additionally, we must not become so dependent on equipment that we can no longer function effectively when the equipment becomes inoperable. Finally, we must exercise discipline in the use of technology. Advanced information technology especially can tempt us to try to maintain precise, positive control over subordinates, which is incompatible with the Marine Corps philosophy of command.

CONCLUSION

There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be inti-

mately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on the battlefield.

Chapter 4

The Conduct of War

"Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness."[1]

—Sun Tzu

"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions."[2]

—Sun Tzu

"Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the 'Principles of War,' listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. 'Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad,' he said. 'There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!'"[3]

—Sir William Slim

The sole justification for the United States Marine Corps is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot. How the Marine Corps proposes to accomplish this mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war.

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will help us function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment—in fact, one with which we can exploit these conditions to our advantage. It requires a concept with which we can sense and use the time-competitive rhythm of war to generate and exploit superior tempo. It requires a concept that is consistently effective across the full spectrum of conflict because we cannot attempt to change our basic doctrine from situation to situation and expect to be proficient. It requires a concept with which we can recognize and exploit the fleeting opportunities that naturally occur in war. It requires a concept that takes into account the moral and mental as well as the physical forces of war because we have already concluded that these form the greater part of war. It requires a concept with which we can succeed against a numerically superior foe because we cannot

presume a numerical advantage either locally or overall. Especially in expeditionary situations in which public support for military action may be tepid and short-lived, it requires a concept with which we can win quickly against a larger foe on his home soil with minimal casualties and limited external support.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. In order to fully appreciate what we mean by *maneuver*, we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage.[4] However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in other dimensions as well. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver *in time*—we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in all dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

Rather than wearing down an enemy's defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to *penetrate* the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-con- suming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have disrupted his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to maneuver warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. Engaged in combat, we can rarely go wrong if we aggressively

pursue the destruction of enemy forces. In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness. Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy's systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction—the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the disruption it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and more quickly than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see the situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for *speed* to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late—until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need to *focus* our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as

a source of disruption. We concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and in ways in which it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which we will direct all available combat power. When the *decisive* opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

An important weapon in our arsenal is *surprise*, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy, we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape the enemy's expectations. Then we will exploit those expectations by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every

opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.

ORIENTING ON THE ENEMY

Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy "system." The enemy system is whatever constitutes the entity confronting us within our particular sphere. For a pilot, it might be the combination of air defense radars, surface-to-air missiles, and enemy aircraft that must be penetrated to reach the target. For a rifle company commander, it might be the mutually supporting defensive positions, protected by obstacles and supported by crew-served weapons, on the next terrain feature. For an electronic warfare specialist, it might be the enemy's command and control networks. For a Marine expeditionary force commander, it might be all the major combat formations within an area of operations as well as their supporting command and control, logistics, and intelligence organizations.

We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can penetrate the

system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulnerabilities and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot function effectively. This means focusing outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy rather than inward on the mechanical execution of predetermined procedures.

If the enemy system, for example, is a fortified defensive works, penetrating the system may mean an infiltration or a violent attack on a narrow frontage at a weak spot to physically rupture the defense, after which we can envelop the enemy positions or roll them up laterally from within. In this way we defeat the logic of the system rather than frontally overwhelming each position.

We should try to "get inside" the enemy's thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so that we can set him up for defeat. It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms. We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, fights as we do, or has the same values or objectives.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND

It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, *in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must*

be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior's intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally better appreciate the true situation than a senior commander some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The principal means by which we implement decentralized command and control is through the use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later.

Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Communications equipment and command and staff procedures can enhance our ability to command, but they must not be used to lessen the human element of command. Our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate *implicitly*.[5] We believe that *implicit communication*—to communicate through *mutual understanding*, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even *anticipating* each other's thoughts—is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiar-

ity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.

This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people—"actuals"—should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in *how* we talk—our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.

Commanders should command from where they can best influence the action, normally well forward. This allows them to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation that they cannot obtain from reports. It allows them to exert personal influence at decisive points during the action. It also allows them to locate themselves closer to the events that will influence the situation so that they can observe them directly and circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result from passing information up and down the chain of command. Finally, we recognize the importance of personal leadership. Only by their physical presence—by demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation—can commanders fully gain the trust and confidence of subordinates. *We must remember that command from the front should not equate to oversupervision of subordinates.* At the same time, it is important to balance the need for forward

command with the need for keeping apprised of the overall situation, which is often best done from a central location such as a combat operation center. Commanders cannot become so focused on one aspect of the situation that they lose overall situational awareness.

As part of our philosophy of command, we must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. Moreover, maneuver warfare, with its emphasis on speed and initiative, is by nature a particularly disorderly style of war. The conditions ripe for exploitation are normally also very disorderly. For commanders to try to gain certainty as a basis for actions, maintain positive control of events at all times, or dictate events to fit their plans is to deny the nature of war. We must therefore be prepared to cope—even better, to *thrive*—in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction. If we can come to terms with those conditions and thereby limit their debili- tating effects, we can use them as a weapon against a foe who does not cope as well.

In practical terms, this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. We must not try to maintain excessive control over subordinates since this will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must not attempt to impose precise order on the events of combat since this leads to a formularistic approach to war. We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportu-

nities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined plans that have outlived their usefulness.

There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. First, while it is based on our warfighting style, this does not mean it applies only during war. We must put it into practice during the preparation for war as well. We cannot rightly expect our subordinates to exercise boldness and initiative in the field when they are accustomed to being oversupervised in garrison. Whether the mission is training, procuring equipment, administration, or police call, this philosophy should apply.

Next, our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competent person, the senior commander, who is the sole authority. A decentralized system requires leaders at all levels to demonstrate sound and timely judgment. Initiative be- comes an essential condition of competence among commanders.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Perhaps most important, our philosophy demands confidence among seniors and subordinates.

SHAPING THE ACTION

Since our goal is not merely the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, we must have some larger scheme for how we expect to achieve victory. That is, before anything else, we must conceive how we intend to win.

The first requirement is to establish what we want to accomplish, why, and how. Without a clearly identified concept and intent, the necessary unity of effort is inconceivable. We must identify those *critical* enemy vulnerabilities that we believe will lead most directly to undermining the enemy's centers of gravity and the accomplishment of our mission. Having done this, we can then begin to act so as to shape the campaign, operation, battle, or engagement to our advantage in both time and space. Similarly, we must try to see ourselves through our enemy's eyes in order to identify our own vulnerabilities that he may attack and to anticipate what he will try to do so that we can counteract him. Ideally, when the moment of engagement arrives, the issue will have already been resolved: Through our influencing of the events leading up to the encounter, we have so shaped the conditions of war that the result is a matter of course. We have shaped the action decisively to our advantage.

To influence the action to our advantage, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. We frequently do this through planning. This does not mean that we establish a de-

tailed timetable of events. We have already concluded that war is inherently disorderly, and we cannot expect to dictate its terms with any sort of precision. Rather, we attempt to shape the general conditions of war. This shaping consists of lethal and nonlethal actions that span the spectrum from direct attack to psychological operations, from electronic warfare to the stockpiling of critical supplies for future operations. Shaping activities may render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle. Examples include canalizing enemy movement in a desired direction, blocking or delaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a fragmented enemy force, or shaping enemy expectations through deception so that we can exploit those expectations. We can attack a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize a capability of our own such as launching an operation to destroy the enemy's air defenses so that we can maximize the use of our own aviation.

Through shaping, commanders gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of operations. We should also try to shape events in a way that allows us several options so that by the time the moment for decisive operations arrives, we have not restricted ourselves to only one course of action.

The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomes less a matter of direct influence and more a matter of laying the groundwork for possible future actions. As events approach

and our ability to influence them grows, we have already developed an appreciation for the situation and how we want to shape it.[6]

The higher our echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to shape the action. Senior commanders developing and pursuing military strategy look ahead weeks, months, or more, and their areas of influence and interest will encompass entire theaters. Junior commanders fighting the battles and engagements at hand are concerned with the coming hours, even minutes, and the immediate field of battle. Regardless of the sphere in which we operate, it is essential to have some vision of the result we want and how we intend to shape the action in time and space to achieve it.

DECISIONMAKING

Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions. If we fail to make a decision out of lack of will, we have willingly surrendered the initiative to our foe. If we consciously postpone taking action for some reason, that is a decision. Thus, as a basis for action, any decision is generally better than no decision.

Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. We must make our decisions in

light of the enemy's anticipated reactions and counteractions, recognizing that while we are trying to impose our will on the enemy, he is trying to do the same to us.

Time is a critical factor in effective decisionmaking—often the most important factor. A key part of effective decisionmaking is realizing how much decision time is available and making the most of that time. In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decisionmaking in execution thus becomes a time-competitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating tempo. Timely decisions demand rapid thinking with consideration limited to essential factors. In such situations, we should spare no effort to accelerate our decisionmaking ability. That said, we should also recognize those situations in which time is not a limiting factor—such as deliberate planning situations—and should not rush our decisions unnecessarily.

A military decision is not merely a mathematical computation. Decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. These abilities are the products of experience, education, and intelligence.

Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process based on experience. This will likely be the case at lower levels and in fluid, uncertain situations. Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several options.

This will more likely be the case at higher levels or in deliberate planning situations.

We should base our decisions on *awareness* rather than on mechanical *habit*. That is, we act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response. We must have the moral courage to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty—and to accept full responsibility for those decisions—when the natural inclination would be to postpone the decision pending more complete information. To delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of moral courage. We do not want to make rash decisions, but we must not squander opportunities while trying to gain more information.

Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonize over one. The essence of the problem is to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and to do it more quickly than our foe. In this respect, "a good plan violently executed *now* is better than a perfect plan executed next week."[7]

MISSION TACTICS

One key way we put maneuver warfare into practice is through the use of *mission tactics*. Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accom- plished.[8] We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the freedom—and establishing the duty—for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed necessary based on the situation. Mission tactics relies on a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding.

Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution only by exception. It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing situation. They inform the commander of what they have done, but they do not wait for permission.

Mission tactics serves as a contract between senior and subordinate. The senior agrees to provide subordinates with the support necessary to help them accomplish their mis- sions but without unnecessarily prescribing their actions. The senior is obligated to provide the guidance that allows subor- dinates to

exercise proper judgment and initiative. The subor- dinate is obligated to act in conformity with the intent of the senior. The subordinate agrees to act responsibly and loyally and not to exceed the proper limits of authority. Mission tactics requires subordinates to act with "topsight"—a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation.[9] In other words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission.

It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity not principally through imposed control, but through *harmonious* initiative and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander's *intent*, a device designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. The purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with higher commanders' aims.

There are two parts to any *mission*: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it.[10] The intent is thus a

part of every mission. The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the *purpose* of the action. The task denotes *what* is to be done, and sometimes *when* and *where*; the intent explains *why*. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more lasting and continues to guide our actions. Understanding the intent of our commander allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.

The intent for a unit is established by the commander assigning that unit's mission—usually the next higher commander, although not always. A commander normally provides intent as part of the mission statement assigned to a subordinate. A subordinate commander who is not given a clear purpose for the assigned mission should ask for one. Based on the mission, the commander then develops a concept of operations, which explains *how* the unit will accomplish the mission, and assigns missions to subordinates. Each subordinate mission statement includes an intent for that subordinate. The intent provided to each subordinate should contribute to the accomplishment of the intent a commander has received from above. This top-down flow of intent provides consistency and continuity to our actions and establishes the context that is essential for the proper bottom-up exercise of initiative.

It is often possible to capture intent in a simple ". . . in order to . . ." phrase following the assigned task. To maintain our focus on the enemy, we can often express intent in terms of the enemy. For example: "Control the bridge in order to prevent

the enemy from escaping across the river." Sometimes it may be necessary to provide amplifying guidance in addition to an ". . . in order to . . ." statement. In any event, a commander's statement of intent should be brief and compelling—the more concise, the better. A subordinate should be ever conscious of a senior's intent so that it guides every decision. An intent that is involved or complicated will fail to accomplish this purpose.

A clear expression and understanding of intent is essential to unity of effort. The burden of understanding falls on senior and subordinate alike. The seniors must make their purposes perfectly clear but in a way that does not inhibit initiative. Subordinates must have a clear understanding of what their commander expects. Further, they should understand the intent of the commander at least two levels up.

MAIN EFFORT

Another important tool for providing unity is the *main ef- fort.* Of all the actions going on within our command, we recognize one as the most critical to success at that moment. The *unit* assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main effort—the focal point upon which converges the combat power of the force. The main effort receives priority for support of any kind. It becomes clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in

the accomplishment of its mission. Like the commander's intent, the main effort becomes a harmonizing force for subordinate initiative. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: *How can I best support the main effort?*

We cannot take lightly the decision of which unit we designate as the main effort. In effect, we have decided: *This is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary.* We carefully design the operation so that success by the main effort ensures the success of the entire mission. Since the main effort represents our primary bid for victory, we must direct it at that object which will have the most significant effect on the enemy and which holds the best opportunity of success. The main effort involves a physical and moral commitment, although not an irretrievable one. It forces us to concentrate decisive combat power just as it forces us to accept risk. Thus, we direct our main effort against a center of gravity through a critical enemy vulnerability, exercising strict economy elsewhere.

Each commander should establish a main effort for each operation. As the situation changes, the commander may shift the main effort, redirecting the weight of combat power in support of the unit that is now most critical to success. In general, when shifting the main effort, we seek to exploit success rather than reinforce failure.

SURFACES AND GAPS

Put simply, surfaces are hard spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses. We avoid enemy strength and focus our efforts against enemy weakness with the object of penetrating the enemy system since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps.

Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy's dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability: a moment in time when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam in an air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unprepared in open terrain, or a boundary between two units.

Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replenished and consolidated a position or a technological superiority of a particular weapons system or capability.

An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. What is a surface in one case may be a gap in another. For example, a forest which is a surface to an armored unit because it restricts vehicle movement can be a gap to an infantry unit which can infiltrate through it. Further-

more, we can expect the enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us against a surface that appears to be a gap.

Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. Once we locate them, we must exploit them by funneling our forces through rapidly. For example, if our main effort has struck a surface but another unit has located a gap, we designate the second unit as the main effort and redirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner, we "pull" combat power through gaps from the front rather than "pushing" it through from the rear.[11] Commanders must rely on the initiative of subordinates to locate gaps and must have the flexibility to respond quick- ly to opportunities rather than blindly follow predetermined schemes.

COMBINED ARMS

In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation.

We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making him a vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If he moves to escape the impact of the grenades, we engage him with the automatic weapon.

We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to the supporting arms. If he seeks cover from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against him. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with his reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, he must stay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly.

If he moves slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.

CONCLUSION

We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. We have discussed some of the tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time, it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific methods used—we do not believe in a formularistic approach to war—but in the mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare, like combined arms, applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the nature of the con- flict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle.

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In

short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for "fighting smart."

The Nature of War

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. This unfinished classic is arguably the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: New American Library, 1974) p. 323.

3. A. A. Vandegrift, "*Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders*," (Third Marine Division, 1944) p. 7.

4. "War is nothing but a duel [*Zweikampf*, literally 'two-struggle'] on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his *immediate* aim is to *throw* his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance." Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75. See also Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* (Winter 1992/1993) pp. 66–67.

5. Clausewitz, p. 121.

6. Ibid., p. 595.

7. For a first-hand description of human experience and reaction in war, read Guy Sajer's *The Forgotten Soldier* (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1988), a powerful account of the author's experience as a German infantryman on the eastern front during the Second World War.

8. "Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst . . .

"This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile—even wrong—to try to shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality." Clausewitz, pp. 75–76.

9. For an insightful study of the reaction of men to combat, see S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1961). Despite criticism of his research methods, Marshall's insights on this point remain valuable.

10. *The American Heritage Dictionary* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1983).

11. In his often-quoted maxim, Napoleon assigned an actual ratio: "In war, the moral is to the material as three to one." Peter G. Tsouras, *Warrior's Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotations* (London: Cassell, 1992) p. 266.

The Theory of War

1. Clausewitz, p. 87.

2. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. S. B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 85. Like *On War, The Art of War* should be on every Marine officer's list of essential reading. Short and simple to read, *The Art of War* is every bit as valuable today as when it was written about 400 B.C..

3. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis,* vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923) p. 5. The passage continues: "Nearly all battles which are regarded as masterpieces of the military art, from which have been derived the foundation of states and the fame of commanders, have been battles of manoeuvre in which the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. In many battles the losses of the victors have been small. There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten. It is because military leaders are credited with gifts of this order which enable them to ensure victory and save slaughter that their profession is held in such high honour . . .

"There are many kinds of manoeuvre in war, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are manouevres far to the flank or rear. There are manoeuvres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose."

4. Clausewitz, pp. 69 and 87. It is important to recognize that military force does not replace the other elements of national power but supplements them. Clausewitz' most complete expression of this famous idea is found on page 605: "We maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different."

5. Ibid., pp. 87–88.

6. The term *annihilation* implies for many the absolute physical destruction of all the enemy's troops and equipment. This is rarely achieved and seldom necessary. Incapacitation, on the other hand, is literally what we mean to convey: the destruction of the enemy's military capacity to resist. See Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History*, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., especially vol. 4, chap. IV (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975–1985).

7. *Strategy of erosion* is known as *strategy of attrition* in classical military theory. The concepts are the same. We use the term erosion to avoid confusion with the tactical concept of attrition warfare. See Delbrück, especially vol. 4, chap. IV.

8. **Strategic level of war:** "The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multina-

tional military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans." (Joint Pub 1-02)

9. **National strategy**, also referred to as grand strategy: "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

10. **Military strategy:** "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." (Joint Pub 1-02)

11. **Tactical level of war:** "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

12. **Operational level of war:** "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

13. Clausewitz, p. 357.

14. Ibid., p. 528.

15. For an excellent discussion of the attrition-maneuver spectrum and additional historical examples of attrition and maneuver, see Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987) pp. 91–112.

16. **Combat power:** "The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation, can apply against the opponent at a given time." (Joint Pub 1-02)

17. Clausewitz, p. 194.

18. Tempo is often associated with a mental process known variously as the "decision cycle," "OODA loop," or "Boyd cycle" after John Boyd who pioneered the concept in his lecture, "The Patterns of Conflict." Boyd identified a four-step mental process: observation, orientation, decision, and action. Boyd theorized that each party to a conflict first observes the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients; that is, he makes an estimate of the situation. On the basis of the orientation, he makes a decision. Finally, he implements the decision—he acts. Because his action has created a new situation, the process begins anew. Boyd argued that

the party who consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy's reactions become increasingly slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events. "A Discourse on Winning and Losing: The Patterns of Conflict," unpublished lecture notes and diagrams, August 1987.

19. Clausewitz, p. 198.

20. Ibid, p. 190.

21. See Clausewitz, pp. 485 and 595–596. **Centers of gravity:** "Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." (Joint Pub 1-02)

Preparing for War

1. Hans von Seeckt, *Thoughts of a Soldier*, trans. G. Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930) p. 123.

2. FMFRP 12-46, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* (August, 1992) p. 41. FMFRP 12-46 is a historical reprint of Operation Plan 712 written by Maj Earl H. Ellis in 1921.

3. **Force planning:** "Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments and Services." (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. **Doctrine:** "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (Joint Pub 1-02)

5. Field Manual 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations*, published by the War Department (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939) p. 31.

6. "In a commander a bold act may prove to be a blunder. Nevertheless it is a laudable error, not to be regarded on the same footing as others. Happy the army where ill-timed boldness occurs frequently; it is a luxuriant weed, but indicates the richness of the soil. Even foolhardiness—that is, boldness without object—is not to be despised: basically it stems from daring, which in this case has erupted with a passion unrestrained by thought. Only when boldness rebels against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an exressed command, must it be treated as a dangerous offense; then it must be prevented, not for its innate qualities, but because an order has been disobeyed, and in war obedience is of cardinal importance." Clausewitz, pp. 190–191.

The Conduct of War

1. Sun Tzu, p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 134.

3. Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1956) pp. 550–551.

4. **Maneuver:** "Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission." (Joint Pub 1-02)

5. Boyd introduces the idea of implicit communication as a command tool in "A Discourse on Winning and Losing: An Organic Design for Command and Control."

6. Hence the terms *area of influence* and *area of interest.* **Area of influence:** "A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control." **Area of interest:** "That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission." (Joint Pub 1-02)

7. George S. Patton, Jr., *War As I Knew It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 354.

8. In the context of command and control, also called *mission command and control.* Mission tactics involves the use of *mission-type orders.* **Mission-type order:** "Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished." (Joint Pub 1-02)

9. David Hillel Gelernter, *Mirror Worlds, or, The Day Software Puts the Universe in a Shoebox: How It Will Happen and What It Will Mean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 51–53. If "*insight* is the illumination to be achieved by penetrating inner depths, *topsight* is what comes from a far-overhead vantage point, from a bird's eye view that reveals *the whole*—the big picture; how the parts fit together."

10. **Mission:** "The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor." (Joint Pub 1-02)

11. Hence the terms *reconnaissance pull* and *command push*, respectively. See William S. Lind's *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 18–19.

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 1

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Griffith, Samuel B., trans., *The Art Of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Comment:

This is a highly regarded, significant, and insightful work on the subject of war. The volume consists of concise, pithy statements of practical advice on subjects such as the commander and his style of leadership, the importance of psychological elements in war such as deception and surprise, and the use of various "propaganda" sources to gain support from the local populace. Many consider this volume as valuable today as when it originally was written.

When you read Griffith's edition of Sun Tzu's writings, pay close attention to the political and military situations in the Warring States Era (453-221 B.C.)

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LESSON 2

WAR IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA (1648-1789)

One consequence of European warfare from the Renaissance to World War II was an increase in the size and power of central governments.... The machinery of the modern state is derived historically from the organizational demands of warfare, and states as we know them today trace their origins and development in large measures to the crucible of past wars. In the classic formulation of Charles Tilly, "War made the state, and the state made war."

-- Bruce D. Porter

War and the Rise of the State (1994)

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson will help you understand the

- Shift in the character of Western warfare
- Role of war in the rise of the state

Why Study War in the Early Modern Era?

This period

- Had a profound effect on later events, especially the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era
- Is important to Marine Corps officers due to the effect it had on the development of Western warfare

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson introduces concepts that will be discussed in later lessons, such as limited and unlimited war (lesson 4) and the relationship between the state and its Armed Forces (lesson 3).

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Major Shift in Character	Understand the major shift in the character of Western warfare that occurred in the late 17th century. [JPME Areas 3b, 3d, and 5a]
Balance of Power	Understand • The concept of the "balance of power" • The balance of power's significance for the state system [JPME Area 3d]
Role of War in Forming Modern States	Examine the role of war in the evolution of the modern state system. [JPME Areas 3d, and 3e]
Influencing Factors	Assess the social, political, economic, and cultural forces that influenced the establishment and composition of standing professional armies in early modern nation states such as Prussia and France. [JPME Area 3d]
Age of Limited Warfare	Explain why the 18th century has been called the age of limited warfare and identify the factors and considerations that caused it to be interpreted as such. [JPME Area 3d]
Frederick's Military Forces	Describe how military forces were employed and supported during the 18th century, as represented by Prussia. [JPME Area 3d]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/0.5 3/d/1.0 3/e/0.25 5/a/0.25

Historical Background

Military Revolution: 17th Century

The evolution of warfare in the early modern era--that is, from the end of the Thirty Years' War (1648) to the outbreak of the French Revolution (1789)--underwent drastic and fundamental changes. In fact, the 17th century underwent what Professor Michael Roberts, in his classic and influential "Military Revolution" inaugural lecture in 1956, has termed a *military revolution* that affected four areas:

- **Tactics** (from individuals to trained and disciplined units)
- **Strategy** (with larger military forces, more ambitious policies could be pursued, including seeking a decisive battle)
- **Scale of war** (scale of war increased in Europe)
- **Impact of war** (impact of war on society increased)

All these changes in military affairs tended to reinforce the power of central, dynastic governments and helped give rise to modern nation-states in Europe. The following example of France will serve to illustrate this point.

The Case of France

Dr. John Lynn of the University of Illinois has analyzed this for France and noted the following during the early modern period:

- In the second half of the 15th century, the King of France (Francis I) could muster a theoretical peacetime army of 14,000 men and one of approximately 45,000 for war.
- In the late 17th century (1678-88), Louis XIV's peacetime army of 165,000 would rise to a peak strength of 420,000 men for the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97).

By the end of the 17th century, the King of France was primarily recruiting men from within his own realm, and Louis XIV's "government equipped the common soldier, fed him, and paid him while he learned and practiced his profession." (John Lynn, "Recalculating French Army Growth during the *Grand Siecle*, 1610-1715," *French Historical Studies*, Fall 1994, pp. 881-906.) (The quotation is on page 905.)

Continued on next page

The Character of Warfare in Early Modern Europe

In Europe, the character of war changed during this period. The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was very different from the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) of the early 17th century. Despite the increase in both the size and effectiveness of armies during this era, the period after the end of the Thirty Years War was characterized by LIMITED warfare with LIMITED objectives. The introduction of this type of warfare was brought about by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years War. This treaty established a "**balance of power**" relationship between Europe's dynastic states; one that would be maintained until the French Revolution.

Frederick the Great

Further developments in the evolution of warfare owe much to the 18th century King of Prussia, Frederick the Great. Frederick synthesized technological developments, tactical innovations, and his own personal experiences of war into a military system that allowed his infant state of Prussia to hold its many enemies at bay. Under his rule, Prussia expanded its borders and repelled invasions of stronger European powers--primarily France, Russia, and Austria--for a period of 25 years, resulting in King Frederick and his Prussian armies becoming the epitome of martial effectiveness until the time of Napoleon.

Frederick's Tactical Contributions

Frederick's fame did not result from any original discovery in the art of war, although his use of the oblique order and his invention of horse artillery were startling innovations in his day. His success in combining the best in 18th century strategic, tactical, and technological advancements and his astute generalship ensured his inclusion as one of the great captains of history.

Writings on Military Art

Frederick's lasting contribution to the evolution of warfare in the modern era was his effort to assimilate and, through his prolific writing on military art, to disseminate the lessons learned in his campaigns and in his lifelong study of military history. Using several published treatises on war, instructions to his princes and his generals, and new regulations and manuals to his army, Frederick brought a pragmatic and experienced point of view to the study of war. His writings retain their relevance despite the passage of time.

Required Readings

On War

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 587 (para. 3) to 594 (top), of Chapter 3, Book 8. While you read this chapter about the ideas of Clausewitz, be aware that during this period almost every state had evolved into an absolute monarchy; the privileges and influence of the estates had gradually disappeared.

Makers of Modern Strategy

Palmer, R. R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 91 to 119. Palmer first contrasts two styles of warfare, a pre-French Revolution type of limited warfare and a post-Revolution style, which has marked most conflicts ever since. This transition period from "pre-to-post" is reflected in the three men that Palmer discusses. This chapter includes an excellent summary of the book's two preceding chapters that address both Machiavelli and the military revolution of the 17th century.

Rothenberg, Gunther. "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 32 to 37 (top). In this reading you will learn how Maurice of Nassau approached building and disciplining his forces. Then, see how Gustavus Adolphus adopted and modified the Dutch model to implement his grand stratagem in central Germany.

European Armies and the Conduct of War

Strachan, Hew. "The Age of Marlborough and Frederick," *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 8 to 22.

(Note: Reading total includes three full page maps.) In this reading you will learn how Marlborough and Frederick used similar strategies in the Battle of Ramillies (1706) and the Battle of Leuthen (1757). Remember the formations and approaches used with the cavalry and infantry.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

Reed, Browning. *The War of the Austrian Succession*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955.

Lynn, John A. *Giant of the Grand Siecle: The French Army, 1610-1715*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Parker, Geoffrey. "The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660 ---- A Myth?" *Journal of Modern History*. Volume 48, Number 2 (June 1976), pp. 2-19.

Rogers, Clifford J. *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Modern Europe*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Showalter, Dennis E. *The Wars of Frederick the Great*. New York: Longman, 1996.

Handel, Michael I., *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought.*

Issues for Consideration

Constraints	What were the constraints on land warfare as an instrument of national policy in the 17th and 18th centuries? How did the rulers in Europe balance the effect of economic constraints with their ability to wage war?
Social, Political and Cultural Forces	What were the social, political, and cultural forces prevalent in dynastic monarchies that influenced the development of standing professional armies in European states during the early modern era?
Centralized States	In regard to the revolution of the 17th century, what is the role of warfare and organized armies on the development of the modern state system.
17th Century Military Revolution	What were the four major changes that were brought about by the "military revolution" of the 17th century? What was the impact of each of these changes, both on the conduct of warfare and on the development of European nation states and their central governments?
Composition of Armies	What was the composition of an 18th-century army such as Frederick's? Why was such a composition favored or necessary? Of what kind of people or what population groups was it composed?
Impact of Technology	What was the effect on mobility, maneuver, and tactical objectives that technology and the composition of the 18th-century army caused?
Reasons for Limited Warfare	Why is the 18th century called the "age of limited warfare"? What type and scope of political and military objectives did the dynastic monarchies of this period normally pursue? What considerations influenced the scope of these objectives?

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Employment of Frederick's Armies

How were the military forces of Frederick the Great employed?

- How was the idea of the division of one's forces viewed during this period?
- How were forces generally moved?
  - Were they concentrated on a single avenue or route?
  - Were they dispersed on a wide frontage along parallel routes?
- How were these forces generally employed on the battlefield?
  - Were armies divided or concentrated en masse?
  - What formations were used?
  - Were the various combat arms--infantry, cavalry, artillery--arrayed and employed in combined arms units or were they employed separately?
  - Were exploitation and pursuit applied aggressively?

Support of Frederick's Military Forces

How were military forces supported during Frederick's time?

- How important were magazines to the logistical support of military forces?
- What effect did the availability (or lack) of well stocked magazines have on the reliability of military forces of this period?
- How was the army supported when on the move?
- Did the composition of the army limit its use of requisitioning/foraging activities?
- What effect did the reliance on magazines for logistical support have on the range of offensive military operations?

Course:	Theory and Nature of War
Course Book:	8801
Lesson:	2
Subject:	Required Readings
Title:	Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 587 (para. 3) to 594 (top), of Chapter 3, Book 8.
Comment:	While you read this chapter about the ideas of Clausewitz, be aware that during this period almost every state had evolved into an absolute monarchy; the privileges and influence of the estates had gradually disappeared.

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

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 2

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Palmer, R. R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 91 to 119.

Comment:

Palmer first contrasts two styles of warfare, a pre-French Revolution type of limited warfare and a post-Revolutions style, which has marked most conflicts ever since. This transition period from "pre-to-post" is reflected in the three men that Palmer discusses. This chapter includes an excellent summary of the book's two preceding chapters that address both Machiavelli and the military revolution of the 17th century.

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

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 2

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Rothberg, Gunther. "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 32 to 37 (top).

Comment:

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

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 2

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. "The Age of Marlborough and Frederick," *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 8 to 22. (Note: Reading total includes three full page maps.)

Comment:

In this reading you will learn how Marlborough and Frederick used similar strategies in the Battle of Ramillies (1706) and the Battle of Leuthen (1757). Remember the formations and approaches used with the cavalry and infantry.

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LESSON 3
WAR IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (1789-1815)

XLVII. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without each other. They should always be so disposed in cantonments as to assist each other in case of surprise.

-- Napoleon I:
The Military Maxims of Napoleon

Wellesley departed on 25 July. Five days later one of the French generals in Portugal, Loison, massacred the whole insurgent population of Evora--men, women, children--thus making sure that any Portuguese disagreements with the British should be totally obliterated by Loison's cruelty.

--Elizabeth Longford
Wellington: The Years of the Sword

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson

- Focuses on the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era. It shows the close interconnection among society, political structure, military institutions, wars, and the economy.

- Helps you understand the impact that the methods of raising, maintaining, and using an army have on its ability to fight.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Why War in a Revolutionary Age?

As a military officer, you need to understand the impact that the method of raising and maintaining an army has on its ability to fight.

- Napoleon took advantage of the sweeping social changes during his time to fundamentally change the manner in, and the purpose for which, wars were fought.

- This had a profound impact on later political and military events. Napoleonic warfare also served as the foundation for theorists whose theory of war has had an impact on warfighting through the present.

Relationship to Other Instruction

- This lesson presents a contrast to 18th century warfare and sets the stage for further discussions of Clausewitz in lesson 4 and Jomini and the legacy of Napoleonic warfare in lesson 5.

- Many of the concepts introduced here--such as sustainment, operational movement, conventional versus unconventional forces, and the relationship between military and diplomatic elements of power--reappear throughout the CSCDEP, 8800 Program.

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Nationalism's Impact	Explain nationalism's impact on the method of raising, maintaining, and utilizing military forces during this era. [JPME Area 3d]
Change in War Objectives	Understand why and how the objectives of war changed during this era from those of the preceding period. [JPME Areas 3b, 3d, and 3e]
Napoleon's Legacy	Assess the legacy of the Napoleonic era in terms of the Western military tradition. [JPME Area 5b]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/0.5 3/d/0.5 3/e/0.5 5/b/0.5

Historical Background

French Revolution

A major step in the evolution of warfare coincided with the French Revolution during the final decade of the 18th century. This major evolutionary "step" resulted from the social and political upheavals that the French Revolution caused and that Napoleon Bonaparte used. As a young general (1793), then First Consul (1799), and later Emperor of France (1804), Napoleon adroitly combined the social, political, and technological developments of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Under Napoleon, the Grand Army--composed of citizens, not subjects--conducted operations from Spain to Russia.

National *Levee en Masse*

Napoleon could defeat his enemies and secure political strength by skillfully employing the armies of republican France, forces that had been created by a series of revolutionary governments that followed the convening of the Estates General in 1789. As they grew more radical, these governments eventually built a citizen army of unprecedented size through a national *levee en masse*--a policy, not a military institution--to defend France and its revolution.

Napoleonic Improvements

Napoleon improved the armies of republican France by organizing these forces into large corps and divisions of all arms and developing a command and control system capable of coordinating them. This system increased both his mobility and his ability to concentrate overwhelming superiority at a critical point from a central position. In this way, Napoleon ensured his success against the numerous coalitions that were arrayed against him.

Spreading Revolution

Coupled with the revolutionary (and later imperial) fervor of his soldiers, Napoleon's tactical genius allowed him to become the master of continental Europe. He also became the target of an unprecedented effort of allied nations in Europe. Before his final defeat, Napoleon gained unprecedented military successes against six of the seven coalitions arrayed against him. The emperor also provoked an unprecedented counter-effort by the other states of Europe in which the traditional ruling classes turned the forces of nationalism and popular participation--the hallmarks of revolutionary France--against France.

The French Army also provoked a counter effort, both by spreading the ideals of the revolution and by becoming, in many parts of Europe, a parasitic and foreign occupying power.

French Overextension: Defeat

- Ultimately, Napoleon overextended himself and bled France dry through his imperial delusions of grandeur, which led to his ultimate defeat and the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in the person of Louis XVIII.

- Nevertheless, Napoleon still deserves serious study by military professionals for his tactical successes, his blending of political and military means to accomplish his goals, and his masterful harnessing of a nation's total effort in war for the first time in history.

Napoleonic Legacy

Napoleonic warfare had a profound effect on subsequent military thought. From the experiences of the Napoleonic era arose the foremost theorists of war in the 19th century--Jomini and von Clausewitz--as well as the foundations of the great Prussian military reform of the mid-19th century.

Required Readings

Theory and Nature of War Readings

Bittner, Donald F. "Careers Open to Talent: A Field Marshal's Baton in Every Soldier's Knapsack--The Marshals of Napoleon France" (1966). This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. A-3 to A-11. The matrix in this reading helps you analyze the social backgrounds and careers of Napoleon's 26 marshals--careers open to talent. Bittner discusses both the myth and reality of the French Revolution in this regard.

Luvaas, Jay. "Napoleon on the Art of Command," *Parameters*, Summer 1985. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. A-13 to A-19. While reading this chapter, you will learn Napoleon's approach on leadership and disciplining. He believes in a combination of two kinds of qualities in leadership; the qualities of intellect, which are trained and cultivated; and those of temperament, which can be improved by determination and self-discipline. Good military leadership is a blend of the two, and rarely, according to Napoleon, do you find all of the qualities that produce a great general in a single individual.

Makers of Modern Strategy

Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution in War." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 123 to 142. Paret presents an incisive analysis of the "Emperor of the Revolution" and the French armies he led. The topic is covered in broad scope and includes Napoleon as a man, politician, and military leader, and the aspects of the French army that made it such a dynamic force. This chapter touches on Napoleon's brand of politics, and has numerous examples that demonstrate the "hows" and "whys" of the strategy which confounded most of the leading military strategists of that time.

European Armies and the Conduct of War

Strachan, Hew. "Napoleonic Warfare." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 38 to 59. (Note: Reading total includes five full-page maps.) In studying Napoleon, remember that when campaigning, he was both head of state from 1799 and a military commander; and that he was fighting almost continuously from the mid-1790s to 1815, a lengthy period that took its toll on him as ruler, commander, and person--as well as his major subordinate commanders and troops.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Brown, Howard G. "Politics, Professionalism, and the Fate of Army Generals After Thermidor." *French Historical Studies,* Volume 19, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 133-52.

- Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon.* New York: Macmillan, 1966.

- Ibid. *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars.* New York: Macmillan, 1979.

- Ibid. ed., *Napoleon's Marshals.* New York: Macmillan, 1987.

- Connelly, Owen. *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns.* Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1987.

- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* New York: Random House, 1987. Read chapter 3, section 4, "The Winning of Wars, 1763-1815", pp. 115-139.

Further, the following two works offer a broad, comparative analysis of revolution as a distinct historical phenomenon and its impact on the existing society.

- Brinton, Crane. *The Anatomy of Revolution.* New York: Vintage Books, 1965.

- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Issues for Consideration

Introduction

In this lesson you will focus on wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. The lesson also shows the close interconnection of society, political structure, military institutions, wars, and the economy. Since the French Revolution brought about fundamental changes in all of these areas, it is not surprising that French armies were far different, offering a sharp and clearly-defined contrast, from their predecessors. Keep this in mind as you address the following issues for consideration.

Levee en masse

What was the national *levee en masse* and what advantage did it have over the traditional manning of an 18th-century army? Why had the French kings been unable to use this method to raise mass armies before Napoleon?

French Mobility

How was Napoleon able to overcome the difficulties of mobility experienced by other 18th century commanders?

Corps and Divisional Organization

Why were Napoleon's corps and divisional organization so effective against his enemies? What advantages did his use of all (or combined) arms formations provide?

Napoleon's Employment of Forces

How did Napoleon employ his military forces?

- Was he willing to divide his forces?
- Were forces generally moved or were they concentrated on a single avenue or route, or dispersed on a wide frontage along parallel routes?
- How were these forces generally employed on the battlefield?
- What formations and tactics were used?
- How were the various combat arms--infantry, cavalry, artillery--arrayed and employed?
- Were exploitation and pursuit applied aggressively?

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Napoleon's Logistical Support

How could Napoleon overcome the difficulties of resupply that plagued most 18th century commanders?

- How important was requisitioning/foraging to the logistical support of French military forces?
- How did foraging affect the possible range of offensive military operations?
- What factors made foraging a more useful option for Napoleon than it had been for Frederick?
- Were Napoleon's soldiers more willing to endure logistical privation than the soldiers of Frederick's day?
- Did Napoleon's method of support promote more operational flexibility than Frederick had enjoyed?

Uniqueness of Napoleonic Warfare?

Did Napoleon do things on the battlefield that were new and dramatically different from his predecessors, or was the difference primarily a matter of doing them at a strategic as well as a tactical level?

If his actions were primarily a matter of level, why could he expand the scale of his actions above that of his predecessors (consider organization, and command and control methods)?

Napoleon at War

What kind of war did Napoleon fight, and for what kind of objectives?

- Did Napoleon's style of war and objectives differ from Frederick the Great's?
- Did Napoleon truly understand what political options other than war were available, or were his goals achievable only through war?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 3

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Bittner, Donald F. "Careers Open to Talent: A Field Marshal's Baton in Every Soldier's Knapsack - - The Marshals of Napoleon France" (1966). *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex A, pp. A-3 to A-11.

Comment:

The matrix in this reading helps you analyze the social backgrounds and careers of Napoleon's 26 marshals - - careers open to talent. Bittner discusses both the myth and reality of the French Revolution in this regard.

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CAREERS OPEN TO TALENT:
A FIELD MARSHAL'S BATON IN EVERY SOLDIER'S KNAPSACK -
THE MARSHALS OF NAPOLEONIC FRANCE
(Compiled by Dr. Donald F. Bittner)

1. **General**. Prior to 1815, the Marshals of France derived from three sources. The first was the medieval kingdom, whereby the marshal was one of the chief military figures of the royal household. The second stemmed from the Royal Army of the early modern (pre-Revolution) era; this was the highest honor an officer could receive. Famous examples were Marshals Saxe, Turenne, and Vauban; a fictional one is D'Artagnan, the eventual "fourth" musketeer in Alexandre Dumas' ***The Three Musketeers*** (1844), who received his baton just prior to his death in ***Twenty Years After*** (1845). The third were the Napoleonic marshals, with the initial 18 made on 19 May 1804. After 1815, the tradition has continued through the ensuing regimes. The most famous in the period since 1815 were Marshals Joffre, Gallieni, Foch and Petain, who earned their batons in World War I; Marshal Lyautey, of the French colonial period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and Marshals LeClerc and Lattre de Tassigny of World War II .

2. **Myth and Reality**. There is part myth and reality to the now familiar adage of a potential "Field Marshal's baton in every soldier's knapsack." The French Revolution did open military careers to individuals who, prior to 1789 in the middle-to-late 18th century, even if they could obtain an officer's commission, could not achieve the highest award that could be accorded to officers in the Royal Army of France.

3. **The Napoleonic Marshals (*Marechal de l'Empire*)**. An examination of the backgrounds of the 26 Napoleonic marshals reveals the extremes (two sons of an hereditary prince and noble, and two sons of a tanner and brewer), but most were of middle class social origins. "Careers open to talent" did illustrate one of the major changes in who served in what position in the French Army and what held the key to advancement. Of course, one of the Napoleonic ironies was this: the Emperor created a new Napoleonic nobility -- for he was both the child of the revolution and of the ancient regime, fusing elements of both into his Empire and the evolution of the French state and society. All total, the Emperor created 26 marshals; note that this was not a military rank, but an appointment, a personal title of honor, for the highest permanent military rank remained "General de Division" (Major General). The numbers and years of creation were: 1804 - 18; 1807 - 1; 1809 - 3; 1811 - 1; 1812 - 1; 1813 - 1; and 1815 - 1.

4. **Officer Corps**. Stated another way, the social origins of the officer corps had changed. After 1789, the pendulum has swayed back and forth on the issue of the social base of the French Army's officer corps through two empires, five republics, and two restorations with two dynasties. Despite conservative reactions, the system would not return to that which existed prior to 1789.

5. **References**. For further reading on this subject, see David G. Chandler, ***A Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars*** (New York: Macmillan, 1979); David G. Chandler, ed., ***Napoleon's Marshals*** (New York: Macmillan, 1987); and John R. Elting, ***Swords Around the Throne*** (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

CAREERS OPEN TO TALENT "A FIELD OFFICER'S BATON IN EVERY SOLDIER'S KNAPSACK"

NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
AUGEREAU, Pierre Francis Charles	1757-1816	Lower class ("humble parents - father either or both a domestic servant or fruit merchant)		Royal Army: 1774-1776: Regiment de Clare Irlandais; several other regiments, to include the Prussian Army; Parisian National Guard (1790)	Captain: of Hussars, 26 June 1793; General de Division - 23 December 1793	Cavalry	19 May 1804	In 1815, did not rally to Napoleon; lived on estates in obscurity	Duc de Castiglone (19 March 1808); "Course and brutal"; Nickname: "child of the people." 1814: Created Chevalier of St. Louis by Louis XVIII; Served on the Council of War which refused to convict Marshal Nez; Deprived of emoluments.
BERNADOTTE, Jean Baptiste Jules	1763-1844	Middle class (son of a lawyer)		1780: Enlisted in the Regiment de Brassac; 1788: Sergeant Major, Regiment Royal-Marine	November 1791: 36th Regiment; General de Division - 22 October 1794	Infantry	19 May 1804	King of Sweden (Charles XIV - 1818)	Prince of Ponte Corvo (June 1806); Initially an ardent republican; Elected crown prince of Sweden: 1810; Ambassador to Vienna (1798) and Ambassador Designate to the United State, 1803; Married Desiree Clary, 1798.
BERTHIER, Louis Alexander	1753-1815	Aristocracy (Nobility of the Robe - son of a geographical engineer ennobled by Louis XV)		Engineer branch	1766; Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Army, 1789; General de Division - June 1795	Engineer	19 May 1804	1815: Escorted Louis XVIII to Ghent; Died on 1 June 1815 from a fall from a window in Bamberg	Prince de Neuchatel (1806) et de Wagram (1809); 1781: On the staff of Marshal Rochambeau in America; 1796: Chief of Staff to Napoleon; later Chief of Staff of the Grande Armee; Skill: As a senior staff officer; 1799-1800 and 1800-07: Minister of War; Napoleon I gave him the chateau of Chambord in the Loire Valley; Louis XVIII created him a peer of France and a Commander of theOrder of St. Louis.
BESSIERES, Jean Baptiste	1768-1813	Middle class (son of a surgeon)		Grenadier Captain, National Guard, then the Constitutional Guard; finally - a common soldier	Recommissioned, 1793; General de Division - September 1802	Cavalry	19 May 1804	Killed in action: 1 May 1813, by a cannon ball, at Rippach, near Weissenfals	Duc d' Istrie (28 May 1809); 10 August 1792: fought with the Swiss guard at the Tuiliers palace protecting the royal family; Commanded the cavalry of the guard in Russia, and rescued Napoleon from Cossacks near Gorodnia.

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
BRUNE, Guillaume Marie Anne	1763-1815	Middle Class (Son a judge; uncles a canon, a doctor, and a cavalry officer)	Clerk and printer	Captain, National Guard of Paris	General de Division - November 1797		19 May 1804	Killed by a royalist mob in Avignon while enroute to Paris, and his body thrown into the Rhone River (August 1815)	Ardent republican; Ambassador to Turkey, 1802-1804; Supported Napoleon, but fell out of favor; receiving neither a title orther favors; In 1814, shifted to the Bourbon cause, but in 1815 rejoined Napoleon and held Toulon until July
DAVOUT, Louis Nicolai	1770-1823	Aristocracy (son of a cavalry officer; family from Burgundy)			1788: Commissioned into the Royal Champagne Cavalry; General de Division - 3 July 1800	Cavalry	19 May 1804	Died of consumption; Supported the Restoration, then rejoined Napoleon; Deprived of honors, and then reinstated to his rank (1817) and readmitted to the peerage (1819) by Louis XVIII	Duc d'Auerstadt (1808) and Prince d'Eckmuhl (1809); Held Hamburg for one month after Napoleon's initial abdication; During the 100 Days, Minister of War and made a peer of France.
JOURDAN Jean-Baptiste	1762-1823	Middle class (son of a surgeon)	Grocer	1778: Enlisted in the Regiment d' Auxerrois	1789: Elected Captain, National Guard, Limonges; General de Division - July 1793	Infantry	19 May 1804	Supported the Restoration; Governor of Les Invalides, 1831-33 until his death in Paris on 23 November 1823	Created Comte (Count) and a Peer of France by Louis XVIII (1819); 1779 - Served in the West India and Georgia during the American Revolution; Established commander prior to Napoleon's rise to power; Rallied to Bourbons, 1814, supported Napoleon in 1815, and then shifted again to the Bourbons; Presided over the court which tried and found Marshal Ney guilty of Treason, 1815.
KELLERMANN, Francois Etienne Christophe	1735-1820	Petty bourgeoisie (family - Saxon; father a tailor who became a tax collector)		1752: Volunteer cadet in the Lowendahl Regiment	1753: Ensign, Regiment Royal-Bavarie; 1788: Major General in the Royal Army; 1792: Lieutenant General		19 May 1804	Died in Paris, 13 September 1820	Due de Valmy (1808); Veteran - The Seven Years War; October 1793 - Arrested, restored in June 1795; Never held field command as a Marshal of France 1814/1815 - Peer of France by both the Bourbons and Napoleon; Skills in administration

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
LEFEBVRE, Francois Joseph	1755-1820	Lower class (Son of a former trooper in the Berecheny Hussars, then a miller and town constable)		1773: Enlisted in the Gardes Francaise (French Guards); rose to the rank of sergeant	1789: Appointed National Guard of Paris; 1792: Captain of Light Infantry; General de Division - January 1794	Infantry	19 May 1804	Died in Paris; Loyalty shifted from Napoleon to the Bourbons back to Napoleon; 1819, returned to favor by Louis XVIII and peerage restored	Duc de Danzig (1807); Rescued Napoleon during the Coup de Brumaire; Both Louis XVIII and Napoleon created him a peer of France; Wife a former laundry maid.
MASSENA, Andre	1758-1817	Petty Bourgeoisie (father a trader and shop keeper)	At age 13, a cabin boy at sea; later, both a fruit trader and smuggler	1755: Enlisted in the Regiment Royal-Italien; 1777: Sergeant 1784: Sergeant major; 1789: Discharged	1792: LtColonel, Volunteers of Var; General de Division - December 1793		19 May 1804	Died in Paris, 4 April 1817	Duc de Rivoli (March 1808), an Prince d'Essling (January 1810); Tendency to plunder and greed, with a passion for women; Failure in Spain led to limited furthe employment; Unwillingly rallied to Napoleon in 1815; Military Governor of Paris until replaced by Louis XVIII.
MONCEY, Bon Adrien Jannot de	1754-1842	Middle class (son of a lawyer)		1769: Enlisted in Regiment de Champagne-Infanterie; later, Gendarmes Anglais.	1779: Lieutenant in the Corps d'infanterie de Nassau-Siegen; General de Division - June 1794		19 May 1804	1833: Appointed Governor of Les Invalides by King Louis Philippe; Died in Paris, 1842	Duc de Conegliano (July 1808); Created peer of France by Louis XVIII in 1814, and by Napoleon in 1815; Refused to preside over the Court Martial of Marshal Ney, and temporarily imprisoned and fell from favor; restored to rank and honors in 1816.
MORTIER, Adolphe Edouard Casmir Joseph	1768-1835	Petty bourgeoisie (son of a cloth merchant); half English by birth	Student: English College at Douai	1789: National Guard of Dunkirk	1791: Elected Captain, Volontaires du Nord; General de Division - October 1799	Infantry	19 May 1804	Restored to favor, Bourbon and Orleanists; Assassinated during a review of the Paris National Guard, July 1835	Duc de Trevise (July 1808) 1812 - Governor of Moscow, refused to destroy the city when retreat began; Reconciled to Bourbons; escorted Louis XVIII from Lille to border; Unwillingly served on the court martial of Marshal Ney, declared elf invalided; disgraced, but restored to honors in 1816; 1830 and 1832: Appointed ambassador to Russia; Served Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis Philippe.

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MORTIER, Adolphe Edouard Casmir Joseph	1768-1835	Petty bourgeoisie (son of a cloth merchant); half English by birth	Student: English College at Douai	1789: National Guard of Dunkirk	1791: Elected Captain, Volontaires du Nord; General de Division - October 1799	Infantry	19 May 1804	Restored to favor, Bourbon and Orleanists; Assassinated during a review of the Paris National Guard, July 1835	Duc de Trevise (July 1808) 1812 - Governor of Moscow, refused to destroy the city when retreat began; Reconciled to Bourbons; escorted Louis XVIII from Lille to border; Unwillingly served on the court martial of Marshal Ney, declared elf invalided; disgraced, but restored to honors in 1816; 1830 and 1832: Appointed ambassador to Russia; Served Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis Philippe.
MURAT, Joachim	1867-1815	Petty bourgeoisie (son of an innkeeper)	Intended for the church	1787: Enlisted in the cavalry; 1792: Louis XVI's Constitutional Guard	1792: Sous Lieutenant, 12th Chasseurs; General de Division - August 1799	Cavalry	19 May 1804	After 100 Days, returned to Italy; captured, tried, condemned, and executed, 13 October 1815	Prince (February 1805) and King of Naples (15 July 1808); Initially an extreme Jacobin; Married Caroline Bonaparte; Took role as prince and king in Naples seriously; uperb cavalry commander.
NEY, Michel	1869-1815	Working class (son of a master barrel-cooper)	Civil Servant: Notary; later an Overseer of Mines and Forgers	1787: Enlisted in Colonel-General des Hussars Regiment	October 1792: Sous- Lieutenant, 5th Hussars; General de Division - March 1799	Cavalry	19 May 1804	Tried for treason and executed, 7 December 1815	Prince de la Muskowa (25 March 1813), and Duc d'Elchingen (6 June 1808);Nickname: 'Bravest of the brave"; Saved army during the retreat from Moscow; Spokesman for the marshals at Fontainbleau - demanding that Napoleon abdicate (1814); 1815: High favor with Louis XVIII, Commander-in-Chief of the Cavalry and made a peer of France; Upon Napoleon's return from Elba, promised to bring the Emperor back to Paris "in a cage; at Auxerre, rejoined the Emperor; one of the major commanders at Waterloo; 31 August 1815: arrested for treason; 4 December 1815: tried by a Court of his peers; 6 December 1815: found guilty; 7 December 1815: executed by firing squad, and given the honor of giving the command to "fire."

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
PERIGNON, atherine Dominique	1754-1818	Gentry in southwestern France			1780: Sous-lieutenant: Regiment du Lyonnais; 1789: LtColonel; General de Division: December 1793		19 May 1804	Reconciled with the Bourbons; created Marquis de Perignon, and awarded Grand Cross of St. Louis, 1817; died in Paris, aged 74	Least known of the marshals; Ambassador to Spain, 1795-97; 1808: made a Comte d'Empire by Napoleon I; 1813: Rallied to Bourbons, and chairman of a commission to examine the situation of former officers; 1815: Napoleon struck his name from the list of Marshals, but restored by Louis XVIII.
SERURIER Jean Mathieu Philipbert	1742-1819	Gentry (minor nobility, i.e., owner of a small manor near Verins)		1755: Commissioned in the militia of Laon; 1759: Transferred to a line regiment	Ensign: Regiment d'Infanterie d' Aumont; 1762: Lieutenant; General de Division - June 1795	Infantry	19 May 1804	Reconciled to the restoration; January 1819 restored to his honor of Marshal of France; Died, December 1819	1808: Comte d'Empire ; Veteran of the Seven Years War; Considered retiring in 1789, then a major in the Medoc infantry; 1804-1814: Governor of Les Invalides; 31 March 1814: destroyed the trophies of Frederick the Great and other captured colors (1,417) as the allies approached Paris; Made a Peer of France by Napoleon and Louis XVIII.
SOULT, Nicolai Jena de Dieu	1769-1851	Petty bourgeoisie (son of a notary)	Goal: Own on bakery	1785: Enlisted in Regiment Royal Infanterie; 1791: Sergeant	July 1792: aptain of volunteers; General de Division: - April 1799	Infantry	19 May 1804	Reconciled to Bourbon and Orleanist regimes; 1847: Appointed Marechal-General de France; 1851: Died at St. Amans-Labastide	Duc de Dalmatia (June 1808); Served in Spain, 1808-1813; Minister of War, December 1814-March 1815; 1815: Rallied to Napoleon, and Chief of Staff, "L'Armee du Nord" Exile: 1816-1819, living in Dusseldorf; 1820: Rank restored, and in 1827 made a peer of France; Minister of War, 1830-34 / 1840-45, and Foreign Affairs (1839) President, Council of Ministers: 1832-34 and 1840-47.

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
VICTOR, Claude Victor-errin	1764-1841	Petty bourgeoisie (son of a bailiff and notary)	1791: Left Army to marry and become a grocer	1781: Enlisted in the Grenoble Artillery Regiment; 1791: National Guard, and then volunteers	1793: LtColonel; General de Division March 1797	Artillery	13 July 1807	Reconciled to the Restoration; Accompanied Louis XVIII into exile in Ghent, 1815; Peer of France and Major General, Royal Guards; Died in Paris, 1841	Duc de Bellune (Belluno) September 1808; Between 1791-1794, rose from sergeant to general; Minister of War, 1821-23; One of two former marshals who voted for execution of Marshal Ney; A former ardent Republican, became a staunch royalist, who was especially favored in the Restoration period for his loyalty to Louis XVIII during the "100 Days."
MACDONALD, Jacques Etienne Joseph Alexander	1765-1840	Father a Scottish Jacobite exile, who later joined Ogilvy's Scottish Regiment (based near Sedan)	Intended for the priesthood, but decided to be a soldier.	1784: Legion Irlandais; 1785: Lieutenant in Maillebois's Regiment (Dutch service); 1786: Regiment de Dillon (Volunteers)	1789: Sous-lieutenant; General de Division - November 1794		12 July 1809	Reconciled to Restoration (Bourbon) and the July Monarchy (Orleanists); Died at Courcelles-le--Roi, 25 September 1840	Duc de Tarante (Tarentum) - December 1809; Eclipse, 1804-07; Appointed Marshal on the battlefiel at Wagram; 1814: Joined Marshals Ney, Lebfebvre, and Moncey in recommending Napoleon abdicate; and appointed negotiator on terms of abdication; Escorted Louis XVIII to Belgium;1815: Appointed Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour.
MARMONT, Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de	1774-1852	Son of a royalist officer		1790: Volunteer in the garrison at Chartres; 1792: Entered the Artillery School, halon-sur-Marne	1792: Gazetted Lieutenant, 1st Foot Artillery; General de Division - September 1800	Artillery	12 July 1809	Supporter of the Bourbon Restoration; In exile after the Revolution of 1830; Died in Venice, 1852	Duc de Raguse (April 1808) Upset, not one of the initial marshals despite favor and ability; 5 April 1814: surrendered his corps; Napoleon never forgave; 1815: Refused to join Napoleon during the 100 Days, and accompanied Louis XVIII to Ghent; Voted the death penalty for Ney.

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
OUDINOT, Nicolai Charles	1767-1847	Petty bourgeoisie (son of a brewer)	Father wanted him to study bookkeeping	1784-1787: Enlisted in Medoc Regiment at Peripignam	1789: Elected Captain of a company of Bar-le-Duc volunteers; General de Division - April 1799	Cavalry	12 July 1809	Reconciled to Bourbon and Orleanists regimes; Louis XVIII: Peer of France and Chevalier of St. Louis, Major General of the Royal Guard; and Member of the Privy Council; Louis Philippe Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, and between 1842-47 Governor of Les Invalides; Died: Les Invalides (Paris), 13 September 1847	Duc de Reggio (April 1810); Wounded in Action: 22 times; 1808: Made Comte d'Empire; Present at Fontainbleau when the marshals recommended that Napoleon abdicate; Member of the commission to arrange the armistice; Under Louis XVIII, commander of the Royal Corps of Grenadiers; Upon the return of Napoleon, tried to keep the troops loyal to LouisXVIII; Failed, and exiled to estates; In 1823, commanded a brigade in Spain which helped suppress disturbances in that country; Governor of Madrid.
SUCHET, Louis Gabriel	1770-1826	Middle class (son of a silk manufacturer)	Training for a commercial career	1789: Lyons National Guard; 1792: Volunteer, company in the 4th battalion of the Ardeche	1792: Elected Lieutenant Colonel of the 4th battalion; General de Division - Jul 1799	Infantry	8 July 1811	Reconciled to restoration; Restored to favor; 1819: named new peer of France by Louis XVIII; Died at his chateau near Marseilles, 3 January 1826	Duc d'Albufera (January 1812); Married the daughter of Joseph Bonaparte's sister-in-law, 1791; 1808: made Comte d'Empire; 1808-1814: In Spain; Marshal's baton awarded for his capture of Tarragona; Supported Napoleon during the "100 Days," in 1815 his name was struck from the list of peers of France.
SAINT CYR, Lauren Gouvion	1764-1830	Working class (son of a tanner and butcher)	Artist	1770s: "Free listener" - artillery school a Toul; 1792: Volunteer, 1st Battalion of Chasseurs Republicains	1792: Elected Captain of 1st battalion of Chasseurs Republicains; General; de Division - Ju 1794		27 August 1812	Reconciled to Bourbon restoration; 1817: Created marquis by Louis XVIII; 1815 and 1819: Minister of War Died of heart attack at Hyeres 17 March 1830	1808: Made Comte d'Empire; 1801-1803: Ambassador to Spain; 1812: Won battle of Polotsk, and awarded his marshal's baton; As Minster of War (1817-19), made reforms which were the basis of the French Army until the late 1860s; 1817: Created a marquis and awarded the Grand Cross of the Military Order of St. Louis.

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NAME	DATES BIRTH /DEATH	SOCIAL ORIGINS	CIVILIAN OCCUPATION	INITIAL MILITARY EXPER	FIRST COMMISSION	BRANCH	MARSHALL	FATE	COMMENT
PONIATOWSKI, Josef Anton (Prince)	1763-1813	Aristocracy (hereditary prince of Bohemia and Poland)	Polish patriot, enlightened reformist nobleman		1780: Commissioned in the 2nd Carabineers (Austrian Army); 1786: LtColonel;	Cavalry	16 October 1813	Killed in action (semi-suicide) - 19 October 1814: Battle of Leipzig	Killed three days after being awarded his marshal's baton; ide de camp to the Austrian Emperor, Francis II; Uncle - King of Poland; 1807: Commanded the Polish Legion in service to France; 9 October 1819: Wounded in action at the battle of Leipzig, and rode into river, rescued once and then drowned in the River Elster.
GROUCHY, Emmanuel (Marquis de)	1766-1847	Aristocracy (hereditary noble)		Artillery School, Strasbourg	1781: Sous-Lieutenant, Foot Artillery; 1784: Transfer to the cavalry; 1786: transfer into the Scottish Company, Gardes du Corps du Roi; General de Division: June 1795	Artillery/cavalry	15 April 1815	Eventually returned to (passive) favor, after years of exile; 1831: Restored to rank of Marshal of France; died while returning from Italy, 29 May 1847	Last Napoleonic Marshal of France; Although an hereditary noble, espoused the revolution an helped repress the royalist revolt in the Vendee (1793); 1815: Rallied to Napoleon and created a Marshal of France; discord between Napoleon and him a key factor in the battle of Waterloo; Proscribed by the second Bourbon, restoration, in exile until 1820, living for some years in Philadelphia; 1831: Louis Philippe, of the,Orleanists dynasty, restored his marshal's baton, and in 1832 made a peer of France.

NOTE: Contrary to belief, Major General de Division Jean Andoche Junot, Duc d'Abrantes (1771-1813) was **not** a Marshal of France (Marechal de l'Empire). As David Chandler has written, "It is often claimed that Junot became a Marshal. Despite his close association with Napoleon for many years, this was not the case." (David G. Chandler, ed., ***Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars***, p. 221.)

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 3

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Luvaas, Jay. "Napoleon on the Art of Command." *Parameters,* Summer 1985. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex A, pp. A-13 to A-19.

Comment:

While reading this chapter, you will learn Napoleon's approach on leadership and disciplining. He believes in a combination of two kinds of qualities in leadership; the qualities of intellect, which are trained and cultivated; and those of temperament, which can be improved by determination and self-discipline. Good military leadership is a blend of the two, and rarely, according to Napoleon, do you find all of the qualities that produce a great general in a single individual.

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NAPOLEON ON THE ART OF COMMAND

by

JAY LUVAAS

"My son should read and meditate often about history," Napoleon asserted to one of the generals sharing his last days on St. Helena: "this is the only true philosophy. And he should read and meditate about the wars of the Great Captains; that is the only way to study war."[1]

Although much has been written about Napoleon as a general, analyzing in elaborate detail his tactical and strategical maneuvers from the Italian campaign of 1796 to the repulse of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, surprisingly little attention has been paid to what Napoleon thought and *wrote* about leadership. His 78 maxims, which were extracted from his dictations on St. Helena several years after his death, contain practical advice on what a general should do in planning marches, fighting battles, and conducting sieges, but only three or four maxims have to do with leadership per se, ending with the startling revelation that "generals in chief are guided by their own experience or genius."[2]

When Napoleon advised his son to study the campaigns of the Great Captains, it was not so much to discover the principles of war as it was to see how these had been applied. Only by imitating these great models, that is, by understanding the basis for their decisions and studying the reasons for their success, could the modern officer hope to approach them.

Had Napoleon wished to instruct his son on the fine points of military leadership, however, he could have found no better way than to make available a selection of his own letters and papers, which contain a wealth of information and insights on the art of command. His letters to his brother Joseph and his stepson Eugene are especially revealing, for here Napoleon clearly was trying to educate members of his family to become good military leaders. To his marshals and other subordinates he said in effect, "do it," and sometimes when he was impatient of delay, Napoleon would invoke a convenient "principle" to lend infallible authority to his wishes. (This may be one reason why Napoleon often was ambivalent about the so-called "principles of war," asserting that genius acts by inspiration, that what is good in one case is bad in another, and that when a soldier becomes accustomed to affairs he tends to scorn all theories.)[3] To his brother and stepson, however, Napoleon went to great lengths to explain *why* and *how* they should execute his wishes, in the process revealing many of his secrets of leadership.

Although he did not express himself in the analytical terms of the famed Prussian theorist on war, Karl von Clausewitz, Napoleon would have agreed that good leadership was a combination of two kinds of qualities—qualities of the intellect, which are trained and cultivated; and those of temperament, which can be improved by determination and self-discipline. Good military leadership therefore is a blend of the two, the product of superior insight and will, and rarely, according to Napoleon, do all of the qualities that produce a great general

combine in a single individual. When this happy combination does occur, the result is a military genius, "a gift from heaven."[4]

Of those intellectual qualities essential for high command, Napoleon would probably have placed calculation at the head of his list. "I am used to thinking three or four months in advance about what I must do, and I calculate on the worst," he explained to Joseph. "In war nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its details yields no result."[5] "If I take so many precautions it is because it is my custom to leave nothing to chance."[6] A plan of campaign was faulty in Napoleon's eyes unless it anticipated everything that the enemy might do and provided the means for outmaneuvering him.[7] Napoleon recognized, of course, that in all affairs one must leave something to circumstances: the best of plans can fail as a result of what Clausewitz called friction, that is, "the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper," those "countless minor incidents" a general never could foresee.[8] Conversely, sometimes even poor plans succeeded through a freak of fortune.[9]

To be a good general, Napoleon once commented to one of his military entourage on St. Helena, "you need to know mathematics. That is useful in a thousand circumstances to correct ideas. Perhaps I owe my success to my mathematical ideas; a general must never make a picture for himself. That is the worst thing of all."[10] Toward the end of his career Napoleon sometimes was guilty of "making pictures," but in his early days he had the ability to penetrate to the heart of a question and to see the entire situation clearly.

If there were two intellectual qualities that set Napoleon apart from most men, it was his prodigious memory and his infinite capacity for mastering detail. "A very curious thing about me is my memory," he told Gourgaud. "As a young man I knew the logarithms of more than thirty to forty numbers. I knew, in France, not only the names of the officers of all the regiments, but the places where the regiments were recruited and had gained distinction.[11]

Napoleon constantly fretted in letters to his generals about the need for them to pay strict attention to their muster rolls.

> The good condition of my armies comes from the fact that I devote an hour or two every day to them, and when I am sent the returns of my troops and my ships each month, which fills twenty large volumes, I set every other occupation aside to read them in detail in order to discern the difference that exists from one month to another. I take greater pleasure in this reading than a young lady would get from reading a novel.[12]

Napoleon kept a critical eye on every detail of military intelligence, the movement and supply of troops, and army organization and administration. Woe to the subordinate general who failed to provide the date, place, and even the hour where a dispatch had been penned, or who did not provide information in sufficient detail. "The direction of military affairs is only half the work of a general,"[13] Napoleon insisted. Obviously, the other half involved a detailed knowledge of all parts of the military machine. In large measure, Napoleon's own mastery over men was possible because of his mastery of information, for as he explained to one of the generals sharing his captivity: "All that I am, everything that I have been I owe to the work habits that I have acquired from my boyhood."[14] There can be no doubt that

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Napoleon, had he been spared to supervise the military education of his own son, would have driven this point home time and again, and with all the forces at his command.

In Napoleon's case, a trained memory was reinforced by an absorbing interest in the minutiae of military activity. One cannot read his dictations on St. Helena without being impressed by the facts at his fingertips—how much dirt a soldier could dig in a specified time; minute details of tactics, and organization, and logistics; the smallest facts from his own campaigns and those of the other Great Captains. When asked one day how, after so many years, he could recollect the names and numbers of the units engaged in one of his early combats, Napoleon responded: "Madam, this is a lover's recollection of his former mistresses."[15]

Brilliance was not essential for a general, at least not so far as Napoleon was concerned. "Too much intellect is not necessary in war," he once reminded his brother Jerome. What was essential was precision, a strong personality, and the ability to keep things in a clear perspective.[16] Probably the most desirable attribute of all, or so he told Las Cases, "is that a man's judgment should be . . . above the common level."[17] Success in war depends on prudence, good conduct, and experience.[18]

By prudence Napoleon did not mean that a good general should be cautious in the conduct of operations. *Au contraire*: a good general "must be slow in deliberation and quick in execution."[19] Whenever Napoleon used the term prudence, what he intended to convey was careful management and presence of mind.

We have now slipped over into what Clausewitz called "moral qualities," and what Napoleon undoubtedly had in mind at the time he urged that his son should read and re-read the campaigns of the Great Captains. "But all that . . . he will learn will be of little use to him," Napoleon warned, "if he does not have the sacred fire in the depths of his heart, this driving ambition which alone can enable one to perform great deeds."[20]

The moral quality that Napoleon most admired was boldness; here again, he would have agreed with Clausewitz, who asserted that "a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable."[21] Napoleon saw boldness as *the* common denominator among the Great Captains. Alexander succeeded because "everything was profoundly calculated, boldly executed, and wisely managed."[22] Hannibal was bolder still,[23] and Caesar was "a man of great genius and great boldness."[24] Napoleon did not consider Gustavus Adolphus in a league with the others, if only because his early death meant that he must be judged on the basis of only a few campaigns, but he was impressed by the "boldness and swift movements" of the Swedish king's last campaigns.[25]

Clausewitz in one of his more discerning passages observed that "boldness grows less common in the higher ranks . . . . Nearly every general known to us from history as mediocre, even vacillating, was noted for dash and determination as a junior officer."[26]

Napoleon probably would have concurred, for he once described Turenne as "the only general whose boldness had increased with the years and experience." Napoleon, it should be added, preferred Turenne for another, more personal reason. "I like him all the more because he acts exactly as I would have done in his position . . . . He is a man who, had he come near me at Wagram, would have understood everything at once." From St. Helena he mused: "If I had had a man like Turenne to assist me in my campaigns, I would have been master of the world."[27]

In Napoleon's comments about Prince Eugene, we again read of a "very bold march crowned by the most brilliant successes,"[28] and while he often criticized the tactics and strategy of the Great Frederick, he had only praise for the "bold resolutions" that had enabled Frederick to survive the Seven Years' War and emerge with his state—and his army—intact.[29]

> Frederick possessed great moral boldness . . . . What distinguishes him most is

> not the skill of his maneuvers, but his boldness. He carried off what I never dared attempt. He abandoned his line of operation and often acted as if he had no knowledge of the military art. Always superior to his enemies in numbers at the beginning of a campaign, he is regularly inferior to them on the field of battle.

"I may be daring," Napoleon concluded, "but Frederick was much more so."[30] He was especially great "at the most critical moments," which was the highest praise that Napoleon could bestow.[31]

A general was expected to be brave, but Napoleon insisted that bravery be tempered by good judgment. If courage was the predominating quality of a general, he would be apt to "rashly embark in enterprises above his conceptions." On the other hand, if a general lacked character or courage he probably would not venture to carry out his ideas.[32]

Marshal Ney, "the bravest of the brave," was a case in point. "He was good when it came to leading 10,000 men," Napoleon acknowledged, "but beyond that he was a real fool." Always the first under fire, Ney was inclined to forget those troops who were not under his immediate supervision.[33] Murat was another who was brave in action but in other respects had "neither vigor nor character."[34] Napoleon distinguished between the bravery that a commander must display and that required of a division commander, and neither, he wrote, should be the same as the bravery of a captain of grenadiers.[35]

When he mentioned courage, Napoleon had also in mind moral courage—what he liked to call "two o'clock in the morning courage." When bad news comes to a person at that hour, it is dark, he is alone, and his spirits are at low ebb; it requires a special brand of courage at such a time to make the necessary decision. Such courage is spontaneous rather than conscious, but it enables a general to exercise his judgment and make decisions despite the unexpected or the unfortunate surprises.[36]

Firmness—what Clausewitz would call perseverance—was another requisite for good generalship. "The most essential quality of a general is firmness of character and the resolution to conquer at any price."[37]

> The foremost quality of a commander is to have a cool head, receiving accurate impressions of what is happening without ever getting excited, or dazzled, or intoxicated by good or bad news. The successive or simultaneous sensations that the commander received during the course of a day are classified in the mind and occupy only as much attention as they deserve, for good sense and judgment flow from the comparison of several sensations taken into equal consideration. There are men who, by the moral and physical composition, distort a picture of everything. No matter how much knowledge, intellect, courage and other good qualities they might have, nature has not called them to command armies or to direct the great operations of war.[38]

The worst error a general can make is to distort what he sees or hears. Merely because some partisan has captured an enemy picket is no reason for the general to believe that the entire army is on hand. "My great talent," he told Gourgaud, "the one that distinguishes me the most, is to see the entire picture distinctly."[39]

Because of the variety of intellectual and moral factors, Napoleon recognized that "in the profession of war, like that of letters, each man has his style." Messena might excel in sharp, prolonged attacks, but for defensive purposes Jourdan would be preferable.[40] Reynier, a topographical engineer, was known as a man of sound advice, but he was a loner, cold and silent by nature and not very communicative. Obviously, he was no man to electrify or dominate soldiers. Lannes was "wise, prudent and bold," a man of little formal education but great natural ability and a man of imperturbable *sang froid*. Moreau was personally brave but knew nothing of grand

tactics. Desaix, on the other hand, understood *la grand guerre* almost as well as Napoleon—or so Napoleon claimed after he had been sent into exile.[41]

It follows, therefore, that generals were not to be treated as interchangeable parts. Each was particularly well suited for some kinds of tasks, but as Napoleon wrote on more than one occasion, a great general—by which he may well have meant a complete general—"is no common thing."[42]

Because Napoleon never bothered to write a book of practical advice to his son, of the kind written by several contemporaries in France and England,[43] we can only surmise some of the things he might have said. Nevertheless, many of his strong convictions snap to attention and salute as one reads his published correspondence. The following excerpts probably should be considered for promotion to the level of maxims, to serve as pithy aphorisms on the art of command.

> There are no precise or determined rules; everything depends on the character that nature has given to the general, on his qualities, his shortcomings, on the nature of the troops, on the range of firearms, on the season and on a thousand other circumstances which are never the same.[44]

> War is a serious sport, in which one can endanger his reputation and his country: a rational man must feel and know whether or not he is cut out for this profession.[45]

> The honor of a general consists in obeying, in keeping subalterns under his orders on the honest path, in maintaining good discipline, devoting oneself solely to the interests of the State and the sovereign, and in scorning completely his private interests.[46]

> In war one sees his own troubles and not those of the enemy.[47]

> In war the commander alone understands the importance of certain things. He alone, by his will and superior insight, can conquer and overcome all difficulties.[48]

> Hold no council of war, but accept the views of each, one by one . . . . The secret is to make each alike . . . believe that he has your confidence.[49]

> Take nobody into your confidence, not even your chief of staff.[50]

> Soldiers must never be witnesses to the discussions of the commanders.[51]

> Generals always make requests—it is in the nature of things. There is not a one who cannot be counted upon for that. It is quite natural that the man who is entrusted with only one task thinks only about it, and the more men he has the better guarantee he has for success.[52]

> One always has enough troops when he knows how to use them.[53]

> Once you have made up your mind, stick to it; there is no longer any *if* or *but* . . . .[54]

> War is waged only with vigor, decision and unshaken will; one must not grope or hesitate.[55]

> It is at night when a commander must work: if he tires himself to no purpose during the day, fatigue overcomes him at night . . . . A commander is not expected to sleep.[56]

> Give your orders so that they cannot be disobeyed.[57]

> It is not enough to give orders, they must be obeyed.[58]

> In military operations, hours determine success and campaigns.[59]

> The loss of time is irretrievable in war: the excuses that are advanced are always bad ones, for operations go wrong only through delays.[60]

> You must be slow in deliberation and quick in execution.[61]

Intelligent and fearless generals assure the success of affairs.[62]

I may be accused of rashness, but not of sluggishness.[63]

It is by vigor and energy that one spares his troops, earns their esteem, and forces some of it on the reprobates.[64]

You must not needlessly fatigue troops.[65]

You must avoid countermanding orders: unless the soldier can see a good reason for benefit, he becomes discouraged and loses confidence.[66]

Pay no attention to those who would keep you far from fire: you want to prove yourself a man of courage. If there are opportunities, expose yourself conspicuously. As for real danger, it is everywhere in war.[67]

In war the foremost principle of the commander is to disguise what he does, to see if he has the means of overcoming the obstacles, and to do everything to surmount them when he is resolved.[68]

True wisdom for a general is in vigorous determination.[69]

In war everything is perception—perception about the enemy, perception about one's own soldiers. After a battle is lost, the difference between victor and vanquished is very little; it is, however, incommensurable with perception, for two or three cavalry squadrons are enough to produce a great effect.[70]

If one constantly feels humanity he cannot wage war. I do not understand war with perfume.[71]

An army of lions commanded by a deer will never be an army of lions.[72]

Whether these or other maxims still apply today is for others to determine. The point is, they applied in Napoleon's day. At least they reflected his experience, and for that reason alone they reveal much about Napoleon and his philosophy of command.

NOTES

1. "Extraits des récits de la captivité," *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* (32 vols.; Paris: 1858-70), XXXII, 379.
2. There are many editions of Napoleon's maxims: this quotation is from the translation by L. E. Henry, *Napoleon's War Maxims* (London: 1899), p. 39. In *The Mind of Napoleon*, J. Christopher Herold includes a conversation recorded by Las Cases and a letter from Napoleon to one of his generals on the subject of command, and additional insights can be inferred from extracts of Napoleon's views of the Great Captains. (See Ibid., pp. 220-21, 224-30.) The comprehensive collection of Napoleon's thoughts on military topics assembled by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Picard devotes only three out of 575 pages to the heading "Qualities of Command." *Préceptes et jugements de Napoléon* (Paris: 1913), pp. 214-17.
3. Napoleon to Joseph, 4 May 1807, *Corres.*, No. 12530, XV, 188; General Gourgaud, *Sainte-Hélène, Journal inédit* (2 vols.; Paris: 1899), II, 20.
4. Comte de Montholon, *Récits de la captivité de l'empereur; Napoléon a Sainte-Hélène* (2 vols.; Paris: 1847), II, 240-41; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 190-92.
5. Napoleon to Joseph, 18 September 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10809, XIII, 210; XII, 442.
6. Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 14 March 1808, *Corres.*, No. 13652, XVI, 418.
7. "Ulm-Moreau," *Corres*, XXX, 409.
8. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 119.
9. To Vice Admiral Decres, 16 June 1805, *Corres.*, No. 8897, X, 529; "Notes sur l'art de la guerre," XXXI, 417.
10. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 460.
11. Ibid., p. 109.
12. Napoleon to Joseph, 20 August 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10672, XIII, 87.
13. Napoleon to Eugene, 20 June 1809, *Corres.*, No. 15388, XIX, 140; to Berthier, 28 June 1805, No. 8957, X, 571; to Murat, 12 October 1805, No. 9372, XI, 316.
14. Montholon, *Récits*, I, 321.
15. Count de Las Cases, *Memoirs of the Life, Exile and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon* (4 vols.; London: 1836), II, 349.
16. Napoleon to Jerome, 2 May 1804, *Corres.*, No. 8832, X, 474; to Jerome, No. 12511, XV, 178.
17. Las Cases, *Memoirs*, I, 251.
18. "Note sur la situation actuelle de l'Espagne," 5 August 1808, *Corres.*, No. 14245, XVII, 429.
19. Napoleon to Eugene, 21 August 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10681, XIII, 9.
20. *Corres.*, XXXII, 379.
21. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 21.
22. Las Cases, *Memoirs*, IV, 140-41.
23. "Notes sur l'art de la guerre, *Corres.*, XXXI, 349.
24. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 162.
25. "Notes sur l'art de la guerre," *Corres.*, XXXI, 354.
26. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 191.
27. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 135-37.
28. "Notes sur l'art de la guerre," *Corres.*, XXXI, 355.
29. "Précis des guerres de Frédéric II," *Corres.*, XXXII, 238-39.

30. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 17, 20, 33-34.
31. "Précis des guerres de Frédéric II, *Corres.*, XXXII, 238.
32. Las Cases, *Memoirs*, I, 250-51.
33. "Campagne de 1815," *Corres.*, XXXI, 206-07; Gourgaud, *Journal*, I, 585.
34. Napoleon to Murat, 26 January 1813, Léonce de Brotonne, *Lettres inédites de Napoléon Ier* (Paris: 1898), No. 1033, p. 423.
35. "Campagne de 1815," *Corres.*, XXXI, 207.
36. Las Cases, *Memoirs*, I, 251.
37. Montholon, *Récits.*, II, 240-41; Gourgaud, Journal, II, 426.
38. "Précis des guerres de Frédéric II," *Corres.*, XXXII, 182-83.
39. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 460.
40. Napoleon to Joseph, 6 June 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10325, XII, 440.
41. "Notes-Moreau," *Corres.*, XXX, 496; "Notes sur l'art de la guerre," Ibid., XXXI, 380; Montholon, *Récits*, I, 176.
42. Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 423-24.
43. See *A Series of Letters recently written by a General Officer* to his son . . . (2 vols.; Salem: 1804). This American edition was from the second English edition, which bears a striking resemblance to M. le Baron D'A . . . , *Conseils d'un Militaire a son Fils* (Paris: 1874).
44. "Notes sur l'art de la guerre," *Corres.*, XXXI, 365.
45. Napoleon to Eugene, 30 April 1809, *Corres.*, No. 15144, XVIII, 525.
46. Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 8 June 1811, *Corres.*, No. 17782, XXII, 215.
47. Napoleon to Eugene, 30 April 1809, *Corres.*, No. 15144, XVIII, 525.
48. "Observations sur les campagnes de 1796 et 1797," *Corres.*, XXIX, 341.
49. Napoleon to Joseph, 12 January 1806, *Corres.*, No. 9665, XI, 535.
50. Napoleon to Jerome, 26 May 1812, *Corres.*, No. 18727, XXIII, 436.
51. Napoleon to Marshal De Moncey, 31 March 1805, *Corres.*, No. 8507, X, 279.
52. Napoleon to Joseph, 4 March 1809, *Corres.*, No. 14846, XVIII, 308.
53. Napoleon to Joseph, 26 June 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10416, XII, 489.
54. Napoleon to Marshal Marmont, 18 February 1812, *Corres.*, No. 18503, XXIII, 229.
55. Napoleon to General Bertrand, 6 June 1813, *Corres.*, No. 20090, XXV, 363.
56. Napoleon conversation with Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 159.
57. Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 29 March 1811, *Corres.*, No. 17529, XXI, 521.
58. Napoleon to Eugene, 11 June 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10350, XII, 270.
59. Napoleon to Admiral Mazarredo, 20 March 1800, *Corres.*, No. 4689, VI, 199.
60. Napoleon to Joseph, 20 March 1806, *Corres.*, No. 9997, XII, 204.
61. Napoleon to Eugene, 21 August 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10681, XIII, 96.
62. Napoleon to Marshal Mortier, 29 November 1806, *Corres.*, No. 113255, XIII, 588.
63. Napoleon to the Executive Director, 6 May 1796, *Corres.*, No. 337, I, 237.
64. Napoleon to Joseph, 28 July 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10558, XIII, 9.
65. Napoleon to Eugene, 29 July 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10563, XIII, 13.
66. Napoleon to Eugene, 5 August 1806, *Corres.*, No. 10699, XIII, 38.
67. Napoleon to Joseph, 2 February 1806, *Corres.*, No. 9738, XI, 573.
68. Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 9 April 1810, *Corres.*, No. 16372, XX, 284.
69. "Précis des guerres de Frédéric II," *Corres.*, XXXII, 209.
70. Napoleon to Joseph, 22 September 1808, *Corres.*, No. 14343, XVII, 526.
71. Napoleon conversation with Gourgaud, *Journal*, II, 449.
72. "Campagnes d'Egypte et de Syrie," *Corres.*, XXX, 176.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 3

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution in War." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 123 to 142.

Comment:

Paret presents an incisive analysis of the "Emperor of the Revolution" and the French armies he led. The topic is covered in broad scope and includes Napoleon as a man, politician, and military leader, and the aspects of the French army that made it such a dynamic force. This chapter touches on Napoleon's brand of politics, and has numerous examples that demonstrate the "hows" and "whys" of the strategy which confounded most of the leading military strategists of that time.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 3

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. "Napoleonic Warfare." *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 38 to 59. (Note: Reading total includes five full-page maps.)

Comment:

In studying Napoleon, remember that when campaigning, he was both head of state from 1799 and a military commander; and that he was fighting almost continuously from the mid-1790s to 1815, a lengthy periods that took its toll on him as ruler, commander, and person - - as well as his major subordinate commanders and troops.

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LESSON 4

CLASSICAL THEORISTS (II): CLAUSEWITZ

War is a mere continuation of politics by other means.

--Clausewitz, *On War*

War develops directly from the political conflicts of States... It is, therefore, impossible to appreciate correctly the nature of war in all its relations and effects if we view it outside the political reasons which brought it about... If war is resolved upon, the military object takes the place of the political purpose... The "military object" may be imagined and termed, as it were, the equivalent of the "political purpose.

--General Friedrich von Bernhardi,
How Germany Makes War (1914)

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson introduces you to one of the most influential military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz.

Who was Clausewitz?

Many, particularly those having a Western cultural perspective, view the Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) as the unrivaled philosopher of war.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Why is Clausewitz Important?

Clausewitz is important for three reasons:

- No one else has had his scope and influence. Clausewitz's work is relevant at the political, strategic, operational, and historical levels of policy and study.

- No other theorist has had a comparable impact on recent U.S. military doctrine. Both the Army's FM 100-5 *Operations* (1993) and the Marine Corps's MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997) are heavily influenced by the ideas in *On War*.

- Clausewitz has many intellectual descendants, for example, the British naval theorist Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. You must understand the famous Prussian theorist before you can understand the works of these Clausewitzian successors. It is difficult to appreciate what most of Clausewitz's critics and competitors are saying unless you understand his theory.

Relationship to Other Instruction

- Clausewitz's concepts are found throughout the U.S. military doctrine, and in various ways they permeate military thought and writing throughout the modern world.

- The relationship between a nation's military, its political life, and its policies will be explored in *Strategic Level of War* (8802) and *Operational Level of War* (8803) of the CSCDEP (8800). These concepts also will be covered later in the case studies of *Operations Other Than War* (8809).

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 5.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Purpose of War	Examine Clausewitz's approach to the development and purpose of a theory of war. [JPME Areas 3b and 4b]
Interrelationship of Factors	Explain Clausewitz's theory on the relationship between politics, policy, and war. [JPME Areas 3e and 4b]
Trinity of War	In identifying Clausewitz's "remarkable" or "paradoxical" trinity of war, explain the interrelationships of its elements. [JPME Area 3b]
Effect on U.S. Doctrine	Explain Clausewitzian concepts that affect U.S. military doctrine, including for example • Centers of gravity • Culminating point • Critical vulnerabilities • Relationship between the offense and the defense [JPME Area 3b]
MCDP 1 and Clausewitz	Understand how the Marine Corps' MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997) incorporates Clausewitzian concepts. [JPME Area 3b]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/2.5 3/d/1.0 3/e/0.5 4/b/0.5

Historical Background

Clausewitz's Impact

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) has been raised to a level approaching idolatry as an unrivaled military thinker. He is one of a number of theorists that wrote during the early 19th century. He has been credited with being the first to analyze the true nature of war. His treatise *On War* provided the world with a theory to explain past, present, and future wars. Clausewitz's writings had a profound impact on many of the great captains of history, and his *On War* has retained its importance both at the operational and strategic levels of war and in the political and historical areas of study. Particularly since the end of the Vietnam War, Clausewitz has dominated U.S. military thought.

Major Views

Although even Clausewitz admitted that *On War* was incomplete, his writings are still considered the most profound on the art of war. He clearly subjugates military effort to the policies of the state and lays the foundation for understanding the nature of war as a continuation of policy. By viewing war as a continuation of policy, one gains an appreciation for why opposing sides take up arms with fervor.

Required Readings

European Armies and the Conduct of War

Strachan, Hew. "Clausewitz and the Rise of Prussian Military Hegemony." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 90 to 107. Discussed in this chapter is one of the foremost contributors to western military thought, Clausewitz. His inspiration can be viewed more clearly in the proper context of his times. Because *On War* (*Vom Kriege*) was never completed by Clausewitz, Strachen bridges the inconsistencies and expounds on valuable points.

On War

Clausewitz, Carl, eds./trs. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *On War*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Read the following:

Book 1, Chapters 1 to 8, pp. 75 to 123
Book 6, Chapter 25, pp. 469 to 478
Book 7, Chapter 22, pp. 566 to 573
Book 8, Chapters 2, pp. 579 to 581
Book 8, Chapters 4 to 6, pp. 595 to 610

If you find *On War* difficult, examine the book more closely. At its end, Bernard Brodie has written a section titled "A Commentary: A Guide to the Reading of *On War*." Brodie gives guidance on, and synopses of, the key points in each chapter of each book of *On War*. You might find it helpful to read the appropriate "guide" for each assigned chapter.

Warfighting

United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1, *Warfighting,* United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, 1997, Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 3 to 49. This reading is located immediately following this lesson. Using this doctrinal publication, trace the evolution of Clausewitizian thought. This manual is not intended to be a guide to actions in combat, but rather a guide for thought processes.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

Essays in the Translation

In the Howard and Paret translation of *On War*, you will find three introductory essays by the two editors Michael Howard and Peter Paret and by commentator Bernard Brodie. You might want to review them before beginning your required reading in *On War*.

- "The Genesis of *On War,*" by Peter Paret, pp. 3 to 25.
- "The Influence of Clausewitz," by Michael Howard, pp. 27 to 44.
- "The Continuing Relevance of *On War*," by Bernard Brodie, pp. 45 to 58.

Additional Readings

- Strange, Joe. "Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerability: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language." *Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting,* No. 4. Marine Corps University, 1997.

- Giles, Kevin Phillip (Major) and Galvin, Thomas P. (Captain). *Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application*. U.S. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996.

- Paret, Peter. "Clausewitz." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 186 to 213.

- Watts, Barry D. *Clausewitzian Friction and the Future of War. McNair Paper 52*. National Defense University: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996.

Issues for Consideration

War as Continuation of Politics

How do you interpret the famous phrase *War is a continuation of [policy or politics] by other means*?

- How many different interpretations can you draw? What are the advantages of and dangers in the various interpretations?

- The word *continuation* is important here. What possible interpretations can you give to this concept? Do you see how the total interface implied by Clausewitz's definition of continuation can create difficulties when defining the total scope of a war?

Characterizing War

Look at the following quotation on Clausewitz by Peter Paret from Chapter 7, p. 199 of *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*:

> *The thesis of total war as the ideal war is followed by the antithesis that war, even in theory, is always influenced by forces external to it.*

- What does this quotation express about Clausewitz's concept of the nature/characteristics of war?
- Is the nature of war fixed or multisided? Why?
- How might you interpret Clausewitz's theory on the nature of war?
- What kind of meanings does his concept give to violence?

The Trinity

What does Clausewitz mean by his concept of the trinity?

- How does this concept apply to the military tradition of the United States?
- What is the difference between politics and policy?
- Have we seen evidence of this difference in the military history of the United States?

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Culminating Point

Review Clausewitz's concept of the culminating point of the offensive.

- How does this concept apply to Napoleon's Russian campaign?
- How does this concept apply to Napoleon in Spain? Were Napoleon's difficulties in Spain only military in nature? Or were there other factors?
- Is culminating point applicable in the contemporary era? If so, how?
- Consider if (then how) culminating point applies at each of the three levels of war? Can you give examples if it does indeed apply?

Center of Gravity

- What does Clausewitz mean by the phrase center of gravity?
- What is the difference between a center of gravity and the doctrinal concept of a critical vulnerability?
- Consider the importance of dependence in this concept. Can there be more than one center of gravity?
- Are there centers of gravity at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war?

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 4

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. "Clausewitz and the Rise of Prussian Military Hegemony." *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 90 to 107.

Comment:

Discussed in this chapter is one of the foremost contributors to western military thought, Clausewitz. His inspiration can be viewed more clearly in the proper context of his times. Because *On War (Vom Kriege)* was never completed by Clausewitz, Strachen bridges the inconsistencies and expounds on valuable points.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 4

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Clausewitz, Carl, eds./trs. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *On War.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Comment:

Read the following:

- Book 1, Chapters 1 to 8, pp. 75 to 123
- Book 6, Chapter 25, pp. 469 to 478
- Book 7, Chapter 22, pp. 566 to 573
- Book 8, Chapter 2, pp. 579 to 581
- Book 8, Chapters 4 to 6, pp. 595 to 610

If you find *On War* difficult, examine the book more closely. At its end, Bernard Brodie has written a section titled "A Commentary: A Guide to the Reading Of *On War.*" Brodie gives guidance on, and synopses of, the key points in each chapter of each book of *On War*. You might find it helpful to read the appropriate "guide" for each assigned chapter.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 4

Subject: Required Readings

Title: United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1, *Warfighting,* United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, 1997, chapters 1 and 2, pp. 3 to 49. (Note: Please refer to Lesson 1 in this course for that reading.)

Comment:

Using this doctrinal publication, trace the evolution of Clausewitizian thought. This manual is not intended to be a guide to actions in combat, but rather a guide for thought processes.

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LESSON 5

CLASSICAL THEORISTS (III): JOMINI

Why did and does Jomini have an appeal? There are six reasons, with some more important than others: He wanted to write, he sold himself, he targeted his audience, he wrote in French, he told a story,... and he had something to say.

--Dr. Carol Reardon, Penn State University
Address to the Command and Staff College
15 August 1996

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson introduces you to the theorist Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) and his basic theories and approaches to warfighting. His most famous book is *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* (1838).

Why Study Jomini

- The influence of Jomini on the U.S. armed forces was immediate and direct. As late as the second decade of the 20th century, the influence was still apparent in the principles of war adopted by the armed forces of the United States.

- These principles have been codified in nine doctrines. Over time, their wording and phraseology have varied, but the concepts have generally remained constant. Today, U.S. armed forces' doctrinal publications contain both the doctrine and appropriate commentary.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson covers the last of the three classical theorists studied in *Theory and Nature of War* (8801). Jomini had a major influence in the 19th century.

You will encounter his theories again in studies pertaining to

- The American Civil War (lesson 6)
- Sea power and the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan (lesson 8)

His views on wars of opinion, national wars, and civil and religious wars are also relevant to

- Revolutionary war theorists (lesson 12)
- *Operations Other Than War* (8809)

Many of his concepts have been indirectly incorporated into the principles of war that are an inherent part of U.S. military doctrine.

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Theories and Approach	Describe Jomini's basic theories and his approach to warfighting. [JPME Area 3e]
Jomini's Legacy	Understand the legacy of Jomini as a theorist in the profession of arms. [JPME Area 3e]
Nature of Policy and War	Explain Jomini's view on the nature of policy and war. [JPME Area 3b]
Jomini and Clausewitz	Compare and contrast the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz on the theory and nature of war, especially in regard to the political-military relationship. [JPME Area 3e]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/2.0 3/e/0.5

Historical Background

Background

In the decades after the defeat of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration in France, a period of peace among the major powers prevailed in Europe.

- During these years, a time in which the powers controlled their ambitions and maintained a balance of power, military theorists conducted a major analysis of what had happened between 1789 and 1815.

- Antoine-Henri Jomini, one of the best of these theorists, knew that what is now called a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) had its origins not in technology, but in the political, social, and economic changes that occurred initially in France and then spread throughout the continent.

Use of Theory

Theories and principles of war are useful aids in studying conflict. They provide structure to the chaotic nature of war. Jomini, interpreting Napoleonic warfare in his *Art of War*, developed a body of theory and principles to explain the nature of war. This early attempt at reducing war to a set of principles is useful as a point of departure for studying the nature of war.

Jomini's Impact

Jomini drew widespread acclaim for his military wisdom when Clausewitz was a virtual unknown. Since that time, Jomini's writings have been discarded to some degree and proclaimed inaccurate. Nevertheless, he had an enormous impact on military thinking and deserves intellectual discussion. His writings brought Napoleonic warfare into the military thought of the American Civil War and certainly affected Prussian military thinking.

Jomini and Clausewitz

Conceptually, Jomini and Clausewitz are rooted in a common base. Their differences revolve around points of theory and technique. Although the works of Jomini can never displace, on a purely intellectual level, those of Clausewitz, Jomini still has much to offer to a student of the theory of war.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Jomini's Appeal

Realizing that men of his era knew that war was a fundamental element of life and statecraft, Jomini addresses a number of pressing problems of his times, some of which may apply to the present.

- The issue was how to control the major upheavals and costs of wars like the French Revolution and the Napoleon Wars while at the same time ensuring victory.

- Jomini also provided a means of educating the officer corps of states that had either a very rudimentary professional military education or training system or none at all.

- He offered solutions to an activity fraught with danger that both civilian and military leaders sought to control.

Additionally, he was a superb writer, addressing subjects that interested his audience.

Required Readings

European Armies and the Conduct of War

Strachan, Hew. "Jomini and the Napoleonic Tradition." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 60 to 75. Strachan views Jomini through the sum of his works not just his *Art of War*. Jomini's greatest contribution was in the realm of strategy. He saw military planning according to mathematical and geographical formulas.

Theory and Nature of War Readings

Baron de Jomini. "The Art of War." This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. B-3 to B-28.

- Summary of the Art of War; Definition of the Art of War
- Chapter I, Statesmanship in its Relation to War
- Article VII, Wars of Opinion
- Article VIII, National Wars
- Article IX, Civil and Religious Wars
- Chapter III, Strategy
- Article XXI, Zones and Lines of Operations
- Conclusion

These selections from Jomini's *Art of War* provide a good sample of his views on, and approach to, the theory of war and the factors that must be considered in its formulation. They address the principles that remained a constant theme throughout Jomini's writings and provide an elaborate explanation of his view of strategy.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed here are **not** required; they are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Shy, John. "Jomini." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 143 to 185.

- Johnson, William T., et. al. *The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Consideration*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

- Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (1995), pp. III-1 to III-9.

- Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (1995), *Appendix A,* pp. A-1 to A-3.

- FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993) Appendix A, pp. 2-4 to 2-6.

- Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare* (1994), pp. 43 to 49.

- Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (1992), Vol. I and Vol. II, pp. 9 to 15.

Issues for Consideration

Introduction

After 1815, Jomini and Clausewitz produced both histories and theoretical writings. They knew of each other's work. One issue among military intellectual historians is how they influenced each other. Nonetheless, both were and are still widely read.

Jomini's Principles

In his attempt to interpret Napoleonic warfare, Jomini developed a body of theory and attempted to reduce war to a set of principles.

- What were the general principles of war that became a central theme of his writings?
- Do Jomini's principles of war have a place in modern war?

Political Control

How does Jomini treat the issue of the subordination of the military to political control? Does his view differ from that of Clausewitz?

Views on Strategy

Jomini attempted to isolate strategy from its political and social context. Why? What effect did this have on his interpretation of Napoleon's greatness and of the role of the French Revolution?

Comparing Clausewitz and Jomini

There are some similarities between von Clausewitz and Jomini, but also great differences that marked each author's perception of war. How does Jomini's theory compare with von Clausewitz's?

Jomini's Influence

Evidence of Jomini's influence during and after the 19th century is impressive. What has been the effect of Jomini's writings on the world's armies? On later theorists?

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 5

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. "Jomini and the Napoleonic Tradition." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 60 to 75.

Comment:

Strachan views Jomini through the sum of his works not just his *Art of War*. Jomini's greatest contribution was in the realm of strategy. He saw military planning according to mathematical and geographical formulas.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 5

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Baron de Jomini. "The Art of War." *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex B, pp. B-3 to B-28.

Comment:

- Summary of the Art of War; Definition of the Art of War
- Chapter I, Statesmanship in its Relation to War
- Article VII, Wars of Opinion
- Article VIII, National Wars
- Article IX, Civil and Religious Wars
- Chapter III, Strategy
- Article XXI, Zones and Lines of Operations
- Conclusion

These selections from Jomini's *Art of War* provide a good sample of his views on, and approach to, the theory of war and the factors that must be considered in its formulation. They address the principles that remained a constant theme throughout Jomini's writings and provide an elaborate explanation of his view of strategy.

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SUMMARY
of
THE ART OF WAR.

Definition of the Art of War.

THE art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,—viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed *Diplomacy in its relation to War*. Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:—

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics.

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to

be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.

CHAPTER I.

Statesmanship in its Relation to War.

UNDER this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war.

A government goes to war,—

To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;

To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;

To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power;

To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them;

To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;

To defend the threatened independence of the state;

To avenge insulted honor; or,

From a mania for conquest.

It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war, as,—

1. A state may simply make war against another state.

2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each other.

3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.

4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.

5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.

6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.

7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous.

8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy.

9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.

For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.

To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.

ARTICLE VII.

Wars of Opinion.

Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.

Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior without being intestine or civil.

Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it desires to crush,—in both cases leading to intervention. Although originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.

The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.

The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France, had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may, however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the dogma for which the

war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.

The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.

After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and the immemorial traditions of the French.

In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is supported by a

large majority of the people, of what avail will be the support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do for the Coalition in 1793?

History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and, again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. Experiment alone could have determined it.

The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its independence or the integrity of its territory.

The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national war, and a civil war,—while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of opinions

without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous difference in the results.

Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulême was well carried out. Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of strength of their enemies,—which they could safely do, since they were sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that of 1807.

Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of Cadiz.

If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,—a striking lesson, by which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated from all factions, and based upon a disciplined

army as well as upon the general interests of the country,—a monarchy capable of rallying to its support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who were in the best position to know it.

ARTICLE VIII.

National Wars.

National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.

The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions of the state and directed by the government.

This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most dear.

The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.

The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive forests.

The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer time than those of the plains,—which is due as much to the difference in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of the countries.

Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals, admits of a formidable defense.

The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary struggle of La Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain, Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of Queen Christina, are still more striking illustrations.

The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step.

These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest

paths and their connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time.

In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo, Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the companies of the train—men and horses—disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as this. All the gold of Mexico could not have

procured reliable information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them fall more readily into snares.

No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?

The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!

If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will be most likely to insure it,—viz.: make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, are models of their kind, which may be employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the success of their enterprises.

The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the

people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole population—men, women, and children—of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces, who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?

I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the whole of Germany in 1813.

I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,—as at Fontenoy,—preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.

ARTICLE IX.

Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.

Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most deplorable.

We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a state of brutality.

To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the

soil, and afterward to reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with ambitious views.

Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to subject France to his influence, or to dismember it.

CHAPTER III.

Strategy.

DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

THE art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation and handling of a great army.

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.

The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction; namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The temporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this front of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.

When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be confounded.

To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.

If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the result.

The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.

If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more important objective point. If this point be

distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large streams, it will construct *têtes de pont*; and, if the bridges are within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.

Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.

When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and energy to attain prompt success.

Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while discussing combinations which result from these operations.

Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:—

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations.

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army.

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.

12. Points for intrenched camps, *têtes de pont*, &c.

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

These points are principally of importance in the determination of the first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.

It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of pitched battles the above definition holds good.

Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the following objects:—

1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.

2. The offensive in a defensive battle.

3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the attack of the enemy's line.

4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.

5. Surprises of armies in the open field.

6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.

7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.

8. *Coups de main.*

All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war,—a principle which must be followed in all good combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:—

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces.

3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.

This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in recognizing those points.

This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all necessary explanations for its applica-

tion upon the field. In Article XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending strategy.

The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three zones,—the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each line of battle, has the same subdivisions,—two extremities and the center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary to carry out any combinations previously arranged.

We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.

OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.

ARTICLE XVI.

Of the System of Operations.

War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is attacked, it is an *invasion*; if a province only, or a line of defense of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the *initiative*. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the *morale* of his army, and generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,—particularly when he feels that the independence of his country is threatened.

In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek a speedy termination of the contest.

For a single operation, which we have called the taking the *initiative*, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this it will be neces-

sary to take the initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel him.

Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.

The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are about equally balanced.

Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become defensive before it ends.

A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to his progress.

An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon the alert

to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and may have strategical as well as tactical advantages. It combines the advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.

During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive war.

ARTICLE XVII.

Of the Theater of Operations.

The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres,—as has happened in contests between France and England since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the German States take part therein.

Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the second case each army will have its own independent theater of operations. The *theater of operations* of an army embraces all the territory it may desire to invade

and all that it may be necessary to defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields. If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common object.

Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:—

1. Of a fixed base of operations.
2. Of a principal objective point.
3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.
4. Of zones and lines of operations.
5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.
6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the enemy.
7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, either for the offensive or defensive.
8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective point and the primary base.
9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.

For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.

In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.

It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations *par excellence*. Now, as such a line must possess two or

three roads to move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.

It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover, was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses separately.

Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.

Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war, inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his foot."

Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the decisive points,—the junctions of the large valleys.

These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many points that admit of discussion.

The most important topographical or artificial features which

make up the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Bases of Operations.

A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.

The base of operations is most generally that of supply,—though not necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.

When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a vast difference between those parts of the country without military positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those other portions where these military resources are found; and these latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth upon the Loire.

These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may

become necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good base on Béfort or Besançon, on Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian army after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces. These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.

The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more retired.

A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There should be a *tête de pont* upon each of its unfordable streams.

All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.

The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military Operations:—

"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and, consequently, upon the direction of the bases.

"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign, may hold one of these faces,—perhaps two,—while the enemy occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely different combinations. To illustrate,

we will cite the theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1 below. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces, the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for them, by maneuvers,

Fig. 1.



to gain the side B D to be masters of the four faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.

"The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented by the side A B. The result is well known.

"The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended

position, and the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena.

"When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it. The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the shortened side,—as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806, with the side

Fig. 2.



B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of Franconia."

The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor. Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.

If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications and line of retreat.

It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,—as was done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions having already rejoined him.

In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and

Main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.

If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in Article XX.

Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the case of the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.

Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon the front farthest *from* the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the base were established upon the coast.

An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the

same principle, viz.: *to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat.*

A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.

However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army (even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.

Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have terminated with the first campaign.

Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.

ARTICLE XIX.

Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operations.

Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE strategic points.

Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical strategic point.

A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily decisive points.

Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided as follows,—viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance belong to the decisive points* of the theater of war, and those which have value merely because they connect two strategic points.

To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic

* I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,—since a line cannot be a *point*, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that *objective* points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of expression used to designate the object which an army desires to attain.

lines in their relations to maneuvers,—confining ourselves here to what relates to the *decisive and objective points* of the zone of operations upon which enterprises occur.

Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the second.

I think the name of *decisive strategic point* should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first rank among them.

The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel to that sea.* Similarly, the valley of the Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.

Those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a country are also *decisive geographic points*. For instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would not be a *decisive* point unless well fortified or possessing an extended camp with *têtes de pont*. Leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the communica-

* This only applies to continental armies, and not to the English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.

tions of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,—if a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive point.

All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government.

In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in 1800.

The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.

When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason of the march of Mélas upon Nice.

It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.

If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed separately.

The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,—

1. The features of the ground.

2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.

3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.

These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.

OBJECTIVE POINTS.

There are two classes of objective points,—objective *points of maneuver*, and *geographical objective points*. A geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. *Objective points of maneuver*, in contradistinction to *geographical objectives*, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses.

In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,—which might be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.

As to the objective points of *maneuvers*,—that is, those which relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces,—their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army,—since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces,—such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very best.

When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they are made in

harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states.

The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines of operations.

As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of the two parties.

In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,—such as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did Napoleon.

The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by success.

There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be called *political objective points.*

Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799—likewise due to the views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on Belgium—was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke Charles from Zurich upon

Manheim,—a step quite contrary to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These illustrations prove that political objective points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been attained.

This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this kind are generally included in grand diversions,—to be treated of in a separate article.

ARTICLE XXI.

Zones and Lines of Operations.

A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.

A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single *line of operations*, either on account of the configuration of the country, or of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. Generally, however, a zone presents several *lines of operations*, depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.

It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a *line of operations*,—though doubtless it may happen that any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.

The term *zone of operations* is applied to a large fraction of the general theater of war; the term *lines of operations* will designate the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term *strategic lines* will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. *Lines of com-*

munications designate the practicable routes between the different portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of operations.

For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden, Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the forces. This zone had three *lines of operations* leading to Leipsic as an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic; the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.

If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided into different classes, according to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by the commander.

Simple lines of operations are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.

Double lines of operations are those of two independent armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and for long intervals of time.*

* This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of *maneuver-lines*, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or radii, but the operation was not double.

Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force.*

Exterior lines lead to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.

Concentric lines of operations are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the base.

Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army.

There are also *deep lines*, which are simply *long lines*.

The term *maneuver-lines* I apply to momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be confounded with the real *lines of operations*.

Secondary lines are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support,—as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration was secondary to that of Barclay.

Accidental lines are those brought about by events which

* Some German writers have said that I confound central positions with the line of operations,—in which assertion they are mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have done better to use the term *radii of operations* to express the idea of double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.

change the original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great and active mind.

There may be, in addition, *provisional* and *definitive lines of operations*. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines of operations.

These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of operations.

The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large depots are immediately behind the river,—certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different proposed enterprises.

1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in the interval which separates them from it. Even if Mélas* had possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy occupied the line of the Po.

2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided his forces into two masses, giving

* This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct; for Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.

them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to could unite.

Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it has no line of operations.

CONCLUSION.

I AM constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be regarded as fundamental in war. War in its *ensemble* is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs,*—in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war,—will have a permanent influence on its results.

Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When the application of a

* The well-known Spanish proverb, *He was brave on such a day*, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.

rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in its favor?

The *morale* of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.

Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or of the zone of operations.

Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which I use the term.

A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed of military *coup-d'œil*, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits he will lose his army.

The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,* he will undoubtedly see his fine

* The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.

hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost unavoidable defeat.

No system of tactics can lead to victory when the *morale* of an army is bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling. Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.

These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success.

The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however, leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible.

If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of opera-

tions, that he may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, depending upon its first successes.

The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.

Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain always,—the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you may be successful in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.

If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning."

Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by

actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.

LESSON 6

MID-19TH CENTURY WARFARE: AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-1865)

This has been a war of missed opportunities. We have let them get away before. I do not wish to make that mistake again. We cannot continue to lose men...good officers.... We cannot trade casualties with an enemy that has much greater numbers and much greater resources. If we are to win this war, we must strike the decisive blow...force him to admit defeat.

-- General Robert E. Lee
Gods and Generals (pp. 353-354)

We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as the organized armies.

-- Memoirs of General William T. Sherman
Vol. II, p. 227

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson covers the American Civil War, sometimes called the War Between the States. You will learn about the character and the impact the Civil War had on the American military tradition.

Why Study the Civil War?

The Civil War was the bloodiest war in the history of the United States. While that alone would be justification for military professionals to study it, the Civil War also was possibly the most significant event in the social and political development of the Nation.

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson builds on previous instruction provided on the evolution of the profession of arms and the conduct of war from the 17th to 19th centuries (lessons 2 and 3). It is a lead-in to lessons on conventional warfare in the 20th century (lessons 8 and 9). Topics and concepts introduced will reappear in the *Strategic Level of War* (8802) and *Operational Level of War* (8803) courses.

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Character	Understand the character of the U.S. Civil War. [JPME Areas 3b, 3d, and 3e]
Past and Future Links	Comprehend how the character of the U.S. Civil War was linked to past wars and the ways in which it was a harbinger of future wars. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/0.5 3/d/2.0 3/e/0.5

Historical Background

Background

- The Civil War was the world's major conflict in length, cost, and casualties in the period between the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon and the First World War.

- The War Between the States also was a transitional conflict, one linking the Napoleonic era with the total wars of the 20th century; hence, it had elements of the previous era and was a precursor of what was to come. By 1865, over 3,900,000 slaves had been freed, and roughly 179,000 African Americans had served in the armed forces of the United States.

Costs

An estimated 600,000 died from many causes, including

- Union casualties: 110,070 battle deaths and 199,720 from disease
- Confederate casualties: 74,524 battle deaths and 59,297 from disease

Required Readings

The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* New York: MacMillan Publishing Company; reprinted, Indiana University Press. Read Chapters 6 and 7, "Napoleonic Strategy: R. E. Lee and the Confederacy," and "A Strategy of Annihilation: U.S. Grant and the Union," pp. 92 to 152. In the two required chapters, you get a glimpse of the character of the conflict. Chapter 6 initially compares the American Civil War with the American War of Independence. Weigley's view of Lee's style of generalship puts it in Napoleonic terms and axioms.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Fellman, Michael. *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Goodrich, Thomas. *Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Hartwig, D. Scott. *A Killer Angels Companion*. Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 1996.
- Katchner, Philip. *The Civil War Source Book*. New York: Facts on File, 1992.
- McPherson, James M. *What They Fought For, 1861-1865*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Ibid. *The Causes and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Ibid. *Battle Cry of Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Ibid. *Drawn with a Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Roland, Charles P. *The American Iliad: The Story of the Civil War*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991.
- Shaara, Jeff. *God and Generals: A Novel of the Civil War*. New York: Ballantime Books, 1996.
- Shaara, Michael. *The Killer Angels*. New York: Random House, 1974.
- Symonds, Craig L. *A Battlefield Atlas of the Civil War*, 3rd ed. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983.

Issues for Consideration

Introduction

Be sure to focus on the key concepts as you analyze and interpret each reading; the time you have available probably does not permit you to do a detailed study of the American Civil War.

Keep in mind the Civil War revealed the problem of subjugating a "people in arms," even if they were an embryo nation that no one recognized.

Causes of the War

What caused the American Civil War and why did men of both sides flock to their respective colors? For what reason did men join, risk their lives, and die?

Character of the War

At the political level, Lincoln's forcing the South to initiate hostilities deprived it of many of the advantages of a moral defense.

- How would you characterize the American Civil War? Was it a limited or an unlimited war?
- Did its character change, and, if so, why and how?
- How did the Civil War reflect the military institutions of the nation in the mid-19th century?
- How does the Civil War reflect the American approach to war?

Theater(s) of Wars

- Military professionals study the Civil War with a primary focus on the eastern theater between 1861-63, where campaigns and battles of mobility had beginnings, climaxes, and ends.
- Why do those campaigns and battles of 1864 and 1865, as well as those in the west, tend to receive a less glamorous treatment?

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Clausewitz and the Civil War Length

- Why did it take the North so long to win? Or, why did it take the South so long to lose?
- Can you relate the military problem(s) of the Civil War to Clausewitz's discussion of the trinity in warfare and his concepts of policy and politics?

Technology

Leaders on both sides threw their armies into suicidal charges across open fields into massed musketry. Examples include Bragg at Shiloh (the hornet's nest) and Grant at Cold Harbor. Can you give other examples?

- What was the role of technology in the war?
- What role did technology have in enhancing the north's ability to wage war against the Confederacy?
- Did it also increase the North's vulnerability at this level of war?
- Did Grant's initial Vicksburg campaign illustrate this vulnerability, and if so, how? How did he resolve this dilemma?

Many Civil War leaders first experienced combat in the Mexican War. Had the defense become more powerful than the offense with the adoption of the *rifled* musket?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 6

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* New York: MacMillan Publishing Company; reprinted, Indiana University Press. Read Chapters 6 and 7, "Napoleonic Strategy: R. E. Lee and the Confederacy," and "A Strategy of Annihilation: U.S. Grant and the Union," pp. 92 to 152.

Comment:

In the two required chapters, you get a glimpse of the character of the conflict. Chapter 6 initially compares the American Civil War with the American War of Independence. Weigley's view of Lee's style of generalship puts it in Napoleonic terms and axioms.

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LESSON 7

LATTER 19TH CENTURY WARFARE: PRUSSIA

Introduction

Purpose	This lesson will introduce you to 19th century Prussian Army reorganization.
Why Study Prussian Reform and WW I?	The Prussian Army reorganization continues to have an impact on United States armed forces' planning and organization today.
Relationship to Other Instruction	This lesson focuses on matters central to the evolution of modern warfare in the latter part of the 19th century and into the First World War.
Lesson Topics	This lesson focuses on Prussian 19th century military institutional developments, especially the general staff and its approach to war.
Study Time	This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Moltke's Influence	Understand the significance of the Prussian Army's reorganization and the accomplishments of the General Staff under Moltke. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
Professionalism	Understand the ramifications of the concept of a "professionalization" race. [JPME Area 5a]
German General Staff Model	In examining the continuing impact of the German General Staff model, analyze its • Successes • Failures • Relevance to the military organizational problems of the United States. [JPME Area 1e]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	1/e/0.5 3/b/0.5 3/d/1.0 5/a/0.5

Historical Background

European Reaction to Napoleonic Warfare

Napoleon's campaigns presented European rulers and their military leaders and theorists with a style of warfighting that they found difficult to understand and defend against. A large, highly motivated army that had rapid mobility and substantial firepower completely overpowered the mercenary armies of Europe.

Most Germans found it difficult to understand Napoleon's system. It combined his exceptional individual gifts with the social, administrative, and psychological achievements of the French Revolution. Most theorists found it even more difficult to recognize that Napoleonic strategy and tactics were historical phenomena that were subject to change rather than representing the ultimate in the conduct of war.

In Prussia, men of vision saw Napoleonic warfare as a product of the political, social, and economic changes wrought by the French Revolution. Instead of attempting to return to the status quo, as other European nations did in the general conservative reaction following the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Prussian military adapted their army to this new type of warfare.

19th Century Prussian Military Revolution

During the years following the Peace of Vienna, while avoiding active participation in European wars, the Prussian army was transformed into the most powerful force on the continent. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, mentors of Clausewitz, played significant roles in establishing both the new Prussian school of military thought and the Prussian general staff. Beyond the creation of a highly skilled officer corps and general staff, a key aspect of this "Prussian Military Revolution of the 19th century" was the inclusion of planning for war **before** a conflict began and then executing such plans.

Dr. Ted Ropp of Duke University coined the phrase "the Prussian military revolution of the 19th century." This military revolution

- Led to quick, unexpected Prussian victories over Austria and France in three wars. This led to the creation of a unified Germany out of a German confederation that had consisted of 37 separate states.

- Provided a model for other European states that is still studied extensively by military professionals and scholars.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Professionalization Race

A key to understanding the Prussian approach to institutionalizing war-making within the state was what has become known as the "professionalization race." This "race" was going on throughout most of the national states of Europe during the 19th century. A general outline of this concept consists of the following:

- Cadre-conscript armies consisting of
  - Cores of professionals and short service conscripts, backed by reserves
  - General staffs
- Professional standards for the military
- Pre-war mobilization and war plans

Prussian Military Model

Helmut von Moltke's Influence

Prussian General Helmut von Moltke, as chief of staff of Germany's armies from 1857 to 1887, was given the task of bringing the armies together. He

- Considered the army an instrument of the sovereign who, to Moltke, represented the state
- Began his restructure of the Prussian military system by developing a very refined selection system for staff officers

Officer Selection

Only 12 from an annual graduating class of 40 officers from the prestigious *Kriegsakademie* were selected to become staff officers. Since only the most promising officers were admitted into the Kriegsakademie, the General Staff came to represent the military (and often the social) elite of Prussia.

Moltke's Military Educational Framework

Moltke infused this select group of officers with his perspectives and military methodology and established a military education system including

- Instruction and practical training in all arms of the service
- Rotation between staff and line assignments to keep these staff officers in contact with field units troops and prevent an overly theoretical orientation

Operational Training

Moltke instilled Prussian officers with a geographical perspective appropriate to the operational level of war through

- Large-scale maneuvers
- Frequent and elaborate map exercises
- Carefully laid out staff rides

Moltke's Approach

By 1870, many brigade and division commanders had personally studied under Moltke. The important personal focus of Moltke's approach was at the side of every corps and army commander stood a chief of staff, who, along with his superior, was held directly responsible for the performance of his organization.

The result was a remarkable uniformity of doctrinal belief within senior command circles.

Required Readings

Makers of Modern Strategy

- Holfborn, Hajo. "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, pp. 281 to 295. This chapter traces the rise of the Prussian general staff and battle experiences leading to the development of Moltke's school of strategy in mid-to-late 19th century Germany.

- Rothenberg, Gunther E. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," Ibid., pp. 296 to 325. This chapter examines more elements of Moltke's strategy and how changing technology and circumstances caused Schlieffen to build upon, as well as break with, these elements to plan for envelopment of enemies rather than frontal attack.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Echevarria, Antulio II. "Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies." *Parameters*, Spring 1996.

- Turner, L. C. F. "The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan." *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*, edited by Paul Kennedy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979.

Issues for Consideration

Prussian Military Revolution	What is meant by the term "The Prussian Military Revolution of the 19th Century"?
Professianaliza-tion Race	Could the Prussian approach to war be institutionalized? Confined to only one state? Or could others copy it, and with what consequence?
Moltke	How did Helmut von Moltke apply Prussian traditions, Clausewitzian theory, and his own strategic thought to create the most powerful army in Europe?
Civil-Military Relationships	What was the civil-military relationship in the Prussian kingdom and later German empire? What were its strengths and weaknesses? How does this compare and contrast with historic civil-military relations in the U.S.?

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 7

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Holfborn, Hajo. "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret, pp. 281 to 295.

Comment:

This chapter traces the rise of the Prussian general staff and battle experiences leading to the development of Moltke's school of strategy in mid-to-late 19th century Germany.

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Course:	Theory and Nature of War
Course Book:	8801
Lesson:	7
Subject:	Required Readings
Title:	Rothenberg, Bunther E. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," Ibid., pp. 296 to 325.
Comment:	This chapter examines more elements of Moltke's strategy and how changing technology and circumstances caused Schlieffen to build upon, as well as break with, these elements to plan for envelopment of enemies rather than frontal attack.

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LESSON 8
MODERN THEORISTS (I): NAVAL--MAHAN AND CORBETT

Moreover, from the middle of the Pacific War onward, this carrier air power had been increasingly directed against enemy land targets -- airfields, naval bases, ports, refineries--rather than primarily against enemy naval forces at sea. This development was in line with the strategic concept (often misunderstood by continental powers) that the purpose of powerful navies was not to oppose other navies, but instead to gain and maintain control of the seas in order to influence events on land.

-- Jeffrey G. Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals* (1995)

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson

- Examines how two maritime strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, influenced maritime strategy in the early 20th century
- Considers what aspects of their theories continue to affect strategic thinking today

Importance of the Study

As a Marine officer, you need to be familiar with

- Two leading thinkers on naval theory and strategy
- Theoretical transitions that accompanied the transformation of U.S. strategies from an "island nation" to a global perspective

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Relationship to Other Instruction	• This lesson builds on your study of the classical theorists (lessons 1, 4, and 5) and complements the earlier study of land warfare. • Maritime strategy is a vital component in American national security policy and will be discussed further in *Strategic Level of War* (8802) and *Operational Level of War* (8803).
Study Time	This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Mahan and Corbett Theories	Compare the basic theories on maritime strategy of Mahan and Corbett, and describe the influence that earlier theorists may have had on their development. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
Forward... From the Sea	Assess *"Forward... From the Sea"* and relate it to the theories of Mahan and Corbett. [JPME Area 3e]
Use of Sea Power	Explain the use of sea power as an element of military force employed to achieve national policy. [JPME Area 3b]
Six Elements	Identify the six elements that Mahan viewed as influencing the sea power of nations. [JPME Area 3b]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/b/1.5 3/d/0.5 3/e/0.5

Historical Background

Maritime Strategy and Theory

As an officer in a maritime service, you need to be aware of an important subset of the theory of war: **maritime strategy**. Just as there were conflicting theories on land warfare, there were conflicting thoughts on naval warfare. To truly understand and develop a theory of war, you need to incorporate all strategies, including maritime thinking. Naval strategy has evolved in much the same manner as land warfare. In many instances, they developed independently and in conflict with one another.

Two Maritime Theorists

Two maritime theorists, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Briton Sir Julian S. Corbett, emerged as the leading thinkers on naval strategy. Like Jomini and Clausewitz, Mahan and Corbett agreed on a central theme. Their differences are much the same as those of Jomini and Clausewitz. To a degree, Jomini influenced Mahan while Clausewitz was held in high esteem by Corbett.

Development of Maritime Strategy

This lesson examines the development of the theory of sea power as it emerged at the end of the 19th century and introduces the works of these two classic theorists of naval strategy and tactics. Through his historical studies, Mahan achieved greatness as both a strategic theorist and an evangelist for sea power in its broadest sense. Corbett, a naval strategist, developed a theoretical framework fundamental to an understanding of naval warfare.

Mahan

Importance of Mahan and Corbett

Mahan and Corbett stand out as the leading thinkers on naval theory, strategy, and history during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The readings for this lesson will introduce you to their basic theories.

Mahan and Jomini

The American Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), a career Naval officer, was primarily a Jominian. His ideas were based on what he considered to be a scientific historical analysis of the rise of Britain to global colonial and imperial prominence. He then applied these ideas to the United States.

Strategic Concerns of Mahan

Mahan was conscious of the growing power of the United States. He thought it had almost unlimited resources and potential. In the context of quickly changing geopolitical realities for the United States, Mahan

- Argued for a large fleet of capital ships whose purpose would be to destroy the enemy battle fleet in a decisive fleet engagement (*guerre d'escadre*), thus achieving total command of the sea
- Assumed there was no foreign enemy capable of attacking CONUS with a large land army
- Called on the United States to acquire key overseas possessions to act as coaling stations for America's large fleet of capital ships
- Was one of America's foremost proponents calling for the U.S. to build a canal in Panama or Nicaragua.

Corbett

Corbett and Clausewitz

The Briton Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854-1922) wrote in the Clausewitzian tradition. Having a legal and academic background, he based his ideas on a wide view of history, applicable to any nation, island, or continent, but his strategic concern was Britain.

Strategic Challenge for Britain

- Corbett worried about a turn-of-the-century Britain faced with a declining naval dominance, limited budget, and limited manpower resources.
- Corbett was specifically concerned with the possibility of a seaborne invasion of Great Britain by a continental land power like France or Germany, but he was confident that British seapower could provide an effective defense.

Other Strategic Concerns

Corbett was also interested in

- Achieving local (or theater) command of the sea as opposed to an exclusive focus on total command of the seas
- Exploiting the possibility of limited wars with limited objectives
- Using amphibious operations

Required Readings

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988, reprint of the 1911 edition, pp. 77 to 106 (26 pages), Part II (Theory of Naval War) Chapter 1, "Theory of the Object--Command of the Sea." This reading is located immediately following this lesson. While you read this excerpt from Corbett's writing, focus on his theory about the fundamental principles which underlie command of the sea. Look for the consistency of his thought with these principles.

Makers of Modern Strategy

Crowl, Philip A. "Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Naval Historian." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 444 to 477. This historical essay acknowledges Alfred Thayer Mahan as one of the leading military theorists of his age. Crowl's comprehensive approach provides an excellent basis to examine Mahan's approach to theory and maritime strategy and his views on the fundamentals of sea power.

Theory and Nature of War Readings

Department of the Navy. *Forward... From the Sea*. Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 1 to 12. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. C-3 to C-12. This selected reading is a white paper from the Secretary of the Navy. It provides the foundation for the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), a concept for projecting naval power ashore.

Look for the ways in which the concept emphasizes the importance of

- Littoral areas
- More intimate cooperation between forces afloat and forces ashore
- Naval expeditionary force

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed here are **not** required; they are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War.* MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. Collier-MacMillan Canada Ltd., 8 1973. Read the following chapters:

- Chapter 9, "A Strategy of Sea Power and Empire: Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan" (pp. 167 to 191). How did Jomini influence Luce in the historical context of the years between the Civil War and the 20th century?

- Chapter 12, "A Strategy for Pacific Ocean War: Naval Strategists of the 1920s and 1930s" (pp. 242 to 265). How did politics between the Democrats and Republicans and key strategists affect development of naval strategies before and during World Wars I and II?

- Chapter 12, "The Strategic Tradition of A. T. Mahan: Strategies of the Pacific War" (pp. 269 to 311). What was the scope of Mahan's influence during and after the World Wars?

Issues for Consideration

Introduction

The theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett have greatly influenced U.S. naval strategy during the past one hundred years. You have been encouraged to see how

- Mahan was influenced by Jomini
- Corbett was influenced by Clausewitz
- Their ideas continue in current policy as described in *Forward... From the Sea.*

Jomini and Mahan

How did Jomini's influence manifest itself in Mahan's writing? How did Clausewitz' influence manifest itself in Corbett's writing? Look for specific examples.

Concept of "Seapower"

What was Mahan's concept of "seapower"? Did he think it could be an instrument of war? How?

Guerre d' escadre

Why did Mahan argue for a large fleet of capital ships whose purpose was to destroy the enemy battle fleet in a decisive fleet engagement (*guerre d' escadre*), thus achieving total command of the sea?

Navies vice Armies

According to Mahan, were navies better instruments of national policy than were armies? Why? Was this especially true of the U.S.? Why?

Mahan's Changing Views

Look for

- Ways Mahan's views on employment of the fleet changed as his perception of U.S. roles and needs changed
- Examples of his impact on today's naval policy as reflected in *Forward... From the Sea.*

Continued on next page

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Six Critical Elements

One of the important issues in Mahan's views is the six geopolitical elements of seapower. Look them up in your reading(s) and think about how they related to the geopolitical perspective from which Mahan was writing and from today's global perspective.

Corbett's Basic Premise

What premise did Corbett base his theories on?

Balanced Fleet Concept

- What did Corbett mean by his concept of balanced fleet and what kinds of warfare could be waged with the capability the term implies?
- What kind of capabilities did Corbett want to see in a fleet? Why? How were these capabilities related?

Land Vice Naval Warfare

According to Corbett what is the fundamental difference between land and naval warfare? What restriction exist for land warfare? What kind of balance did Corbett propose between maritime and land forces? What part did he believe maritime strategy should play in national strategy?

Guerre de Course

Corbett argued that *guerre de course*, commerce-raiding warfare, was no longer appropriate for his time. What was his reason?

Course:	Theory and Nature of War
Course Book:	8801
Lesson:	8
Subject:	Required Readings
Title:	Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988, reprint of the 1911 edition, pp. 77 to 106 (26 pages)
Comment:	While you read this excerpt from Corbett's writing, focus on his theory about the fundamental principles which underlie command of the sea. Look for the consistency of his thought with these principles.

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JULIAN S. CORBETT

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

With an Introduction and Notes by
Eric J. Grove

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS Annapolis, Maryland

ture."[6] If, then, there are cases in which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all wars are not of that character.

Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited methods. But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere bludgeon play.

Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has pointed out,[7] was far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it would never be possible for a weaker Power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause whatever—a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. That the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if conditions are suitable for its use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered, distinctly lays it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent employing the higher form a great physical or moral superiority or a

6. Von der Golz, op. cit., p. 17.

7. *Development of Strategical Science.* (Author's note. The full title is *The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century,* translated into English by K. von Donat and published in London in 1905. Rudolf von Caemmerer was a German lieutenant general. There is evidence of Corbett's reading of Caemmerer elsewhere in *Some Principles,* e.g., in the biographical material on Clausewitz.)

great spirit of enterprise—an innate propensity for extreme hazards. Jomini did not go even so far as this. He certainly would have ruled out "an innate propensity to extreme hazards," for in his judgment it was this innate propensity which led Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. So entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to support the idea of the one answer, that it would seem that even in Germany a reaction to Clausewitz's real teaching is beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer says, "Since the majority of the most prominent military authors of our time uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be directed to their utmost limits and that a deliberate employment of lower means betrays more or less weakness, I feel bound to declare that the wideness of Clausewitz's views have inspired me with a high degree of admiration."[8]

Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this—that when the conditions are not favourable for the use of the higher form, the seizure of a small part of the enemy's territory may be regarded as a correct alternative to destroying his armed forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only as a make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his considering that there might be cases where the object was actually so limited in character that the lower form of war would be at once the more effective and the more economical to use. In continental warfare, as we have seen, such cases can hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly when the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent.

The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited form has always been as clearly marked as is the opposite tendency on the Continent. To attribute such a tendency, as is sometimes the fashion, to an inherent lack of warlike spirit is sufficiently contradicted by the results it has achieved.

8. Caemmerer, op. cit., p. 123.

There is no reason indeed to put it down to anything but a sagacious instinct for the kind of war that best accords with the conditions of our existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has led us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object of the war was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases in which its correctness was less obvious. As has been explained in the last chapter, we have applied it, and applied it on the whole with success, when we have been acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited object—where, that is, the common object has been the overthrow of the common enemy.

The choice between the two forms really depends upon the circumstances of each case. We have to consider whether the political object is in fact limited, whether if unlimited in the abstract it can be reduced to a concrete object that is limited, and finally whether the strategical conditions are such as lend themselves to the successful application of the limited form.

What we require now is to determine those conditions with greater exactness, and this will be best done by changing our method to the concrete and taking a leading case.

The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest form is without doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. Here we have a particularly striking example of a small Power having forced her will upon a much greater Power without "overthrowing" her—that is, without having crushed her power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of Japan. So manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the Continent, where the overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war, the action of the Japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as madness. Only in England, with her tradition and instinct for what an island Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to have any reasonable chance of success.

The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that the

real object of the war was in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in the Far East. Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all the aspect of what the Germans call "a trial of strength." Such a war is one which above all appears incapable of decision except by the complete overthrow of the one Power or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty[9] had isolated the struggle. If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force of the two belligerents it would seem to have been this one. After the event we are inclined to attribute the result to the moral qualities and superior training and readiness of the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if Japan had tried to make her war with Russia, as Napoleon made his, she could have fared even as well as he did? She had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as a condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her enemy—the employment of unlimited war.

Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the employment of such extreme means. The political and geographical conditions were such that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into the Russian Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future development. Her power to maintain Korean integrity would be the outward and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystallised into a concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the

9. Of 1902; each promised to come to the other's aid if she was at war with two or more powers.

Western Powers[10] with Russia in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of Sebastopol.

In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz attached the greatest importance—that is to say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason is plain. Owing to the wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. Strategically the integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means we were there almost uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars waged on a limited basis, in none of them were

10. Britain and France.

the conditions so favourable for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them did our main offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. Canada was as eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an unlimited counter-stroke.[11]

Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war from the outset matters little. The main considerations are that with so favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its most formidable

11. The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to prevent a counter-stroke—that is, its main function in our war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention. (Author's note. It is being argued by Dr. Andrew Lambert in his forthcoming book on the Russian War that the conflict may have been brought to an end by the threat of direct naval action against the Russian capital; the British were indeed building a specialized fleet, the Great Armament of 1856, to attack St. Petersburg. It was displayed on St. George's Day, 23 April 1856, and made a considerable impact. The aim, however, still seems to have been limited pressure, not an attempt at complete "overthrow," but Dr. Lambert considers that Corbett is "a long way off the mark" in his discussion of the Russian War, both here and in the final chapter, as he stated in a letter to the editor in December 1986. He suggests that Corbett was overanxious to find recent examples that involved British forces to support his argument.)

shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines, and that it was entirely successful. Without waiting to secure the command of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation of Korea. As she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the arrest of your offensive action. But in this case such arrest was neither necessary nor possible, and for these reasons. To render the conquest secure not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must be permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction of the Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur by military means. Here, then, in the second stage Japan found herself committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, Port Arthur and the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in Manchuria—a thoroughly vicious situation. So fortunate, however, was the geographical conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct. By continuing the advance of the Korean army into Manchuria and landing another force between it and the Port Arthur army the three corps could be concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned to good account.[12] They could be combined in such a way as to threaten an enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian offensive concentration could be completed. Not only was Liao-yang the Russian point of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for de-

12. Actually, there were four Japanese army corps of which three advanced into Manchuria: the 1st Army came from Korea, the 4th landed at Takushan, and the 2nd advanced from the Peninsula. The 3rd Army was left besieging Port Arthur. See Westwood, op. cit., p. 120.

fending Korea and covering the siege of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese all the advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust themselves in offensive operations which were beyond their strength. Nor was it only ashore that this advantage was gained. The success of the system, which culminated in the fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval defensive and so to force the final naval decision on Russia with every advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour.

By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by sea, and the position of Japan in Korea was rendered as impregnable as that of Wellington at Torres Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the third stage and demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation that had been set up was more to her advantage than the further attempt to break it down. This the final advance to Mukden accomplished, and Japan obtained her end very far short of having overthrown her enemy. The offensive power of Russia had never been so strong, while that of Japan was almost if not quite exhausted.

Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. It presents the normal three phases—the initial offensive movement to seize the territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an attenuated offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is a return to the offensive "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired."

It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be always clearly defined. Strategical analysis can never give exact results. It aims only at approximations, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always leave much to the

judgment. The three phases in the Russo-Japanese War, though unusually well defined, continually overlapped. It must be so; for in war the effect of an operation is never confined to the limits of its immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea had the secondary defensive effect of covering the home country, while the initial blow which Admiral Togo[13] delivered at Port Arthur to cover the primary offensive movement proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of isolating the conquest. In the later stages of the war the line between what was essential to set up the second phase of perfecting the isolation and the third phase of general pressure seems to have grown very nebulous.

It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been most severely criticised, and it was just here they seem to have lost hold of the conception of a limited war, if in fact they had ever securely grasped the conception as the elder Pitt understood it. It has been argued that in their eagerness to deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to devote sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the case rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether it was due to miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a most costly set-back. For not only did it entail a vast loss of time and life at Port Arthur itself, but when the sortie of the Russian fleet in June[14] brought home to them their

13. Admiral of the Fleet Marquis Heihachiro Togo (1847–1934). One of the first officers of the modern Japanese Navy, he was trained in HMS *Worcester* in England. After taking a prominent part in the war with China in 1894, Togo was commander in chief of the Japanese fleet in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905.

14. The 23 June sortie by the Russian fleet did indeed take the Japanese by surprise, but the Russian commander, Witgeft, outnumbered in all but battleships, avoided action and threw away a good chance of escape from eventual destruction. (Westwood, op. cit., pp 76–78.)

error, the offensive movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the opportunity passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's concentration ashore.

This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may perhaps be attributed at least in part to the continental influences under which their army had been trained. We at least can trace the unlimited outlook in the pages of the German Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of operations it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on Liao-yang, "which was kept in view as the first objective of the operations on land." But surely on every theory of the war the first objective of the Japanese on land was Seoul, where they expected to have to fight their first important action against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their second was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they expected to reduce with little more[15] difficulty than they had met with ten years before against the Chinese. Such at least was the actual progression of events, and a criticism which regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate importance as mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be explained by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly protested. It is the work of men who have a natural difficulty in conceiving a war plan that does not culminate in a Jena or a Sedan. It is a view surely which is the child of theory, bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in question and affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth is, that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited war, as laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly deducible from our own

15. In the original this was "less." A hostile reviewer in the *Edinburgh Review* pointed out the non sequitur in the argument and Corbett wrote in the margin, "An obvious misprint." (Corbett Papers, Box 5.)

rich experience, they progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as they departed from them and suffered themselves to be confused with continental theories they were surprised by unaccountable failure.

The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. Yet no other has been found to condense the ideas of limited object and limited interest, which are its special characteristics. Still if the above example be kept in mind as a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be mistaken. It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that our primary objective must always be the enemy's armed forces is liable to carry with it a false inference that it also rejects the corollary that war means the use of battles. Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form of war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old fallacy of attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms alike demand the use of battles. By our fundamental theory war is always "a continuation of political intercourse, in which fighting is substituted for writing notes." However great the controlling influence of the political object, it must never obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our end.

It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older method of conducting war, in which armies were content to manoeuvre for strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of bad generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. Its conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that instead of having to destroy our enemy's whole power of resistance, we need only overthrow so much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object.

The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavour to determine what the force will amount to. It

will depend, firstly, on the importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the initial operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here lies the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of force we shall have to encounter. The most favourable circumstances and the only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the more or less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and such isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the enemy's naval forces.

Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now leave behind us the theory of war in general and, in order to pave the way to our final conclusions, devote our attention to the theory of naval warfare in particular.

PART TWO

THEORY OF NAVAL WAR

CHAPTER ONE

THEORY OF THE OBJECT—COMMAND OF THE SEA

THE OBJECT of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.

The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an end.

This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that

if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it—a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further support than it ever receives.

And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is a negation both of practical experience and of the expressed opinion of our greatest masters. We ourselves have used the defensive at sea with success, as under William the Third[1] and in the War of American Independence,[2] while in our long wars with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could not get command, and for years were unable to carry out our war plan without serious interruption from her fleet.

So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, or even the mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, it is of course inherent in all war, and, as we have seen, the paramount questions of strategy both at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter into our plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of defence, which result from inevitable arrests of offensive action, than they can be avoided on land. The defensive, then, has to be considered; but before we are in a position to do so with profit, we have to proceed with our analysis of the

1. William, Prince of Orange (1650–1702), declared king of England, Scotland, and Ireland in 1689.

2. Britain's name for the war caused by the rebellion of Britain's North American colonies in 1775–1776. The colonists were joined by France in 1778, Spain in 1779, and the Netherlands in 1780. The war was brought to an end by treaties signed in Paris in 1783–1784.

phrase, "Command of the Sea," and ascertain exactly what it is we mean by it in war.

In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in its strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You cannot argue from the one to the other, as has been too commonly done. Such phrases as the "Conquest of water territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our frontier" had their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded on false analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a theory of war.

The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter materially into the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot, as lawyers say, "reduce it into possession," because you cannot exclude neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that command of the sea is analogous to conquest of territory is unscientific, and certain to lead to error.

The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure for ourselves, and what it is we can deny the enemy by command of the sea. Now, if we exclude fishery rights, which are irrelevant to the present matter, the only right we or our enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in other words, the only positive value which the high seas have for national life is as a means of communication. For the active life of a nation such means may stand for much or it may stand for little, but to every maritime State it has some value. Consequently by denying an enemy this means of passage we check the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind of way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far the analogy holds good, but no further.

So much for the positive value which the sea has in national life. It has also a negative value. For not only is it a means of communication, but, unlike the means of communication ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning command of the sea we remove that barrier from our own path, thereby placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure upon ourselves.

Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of communications, but they are communications in another sense. The phrase refers to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider communications which are part of the life of the nation.

But on land also there are communications of a kind which are essential to national life—the internal communications which connect the points of distribution. Here again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. Land warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view admit, cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The destruction of your enemy's forces will not avail for certain unless you have in reserve sufficient force to complete the occupation of his inland communications and principal points of distribution. This power is the real fruit of victory, the power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until this is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in the war, will consent to make peace and do your will. It is precisely in the same way that the command of the sea works towards peace, though of course in a far less coercive manner, against a continental State. By occupying her maritime

communications and closing the points of distribution in which they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other. Thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of territory is in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost practical importance, for on it turns the most burning question of maritime war, which it will be well to deal with in this place.

It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the passage of both public and private property upon the sea. Now the only means we have of enforcing such control of commercial communications at sea is in the last resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. Such capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our enemy for attempting to use the communications of which he does not hold the control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is the ultimate sanction of the interdict which we are seeking to enforce. The current term "Commerce destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea. To make the position clear we should say "Commerce prevention."

The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more connection with the old and barbarous idea of plunder and reprisal than orderly requisitions ashore have with the old idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war indeed causes so little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. It is more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or execution of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military operation. Once, it is true, it was not so. In the days of privateers it was accompanied too often, and particularly in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with lamentable cruelty and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was the

real reason for the general agreement to the Declaration of Paris[3] by which privateering was abolished.

But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was a survival of a primitive and unscientific conception of war, which was governed mainly by a general notion of doing your enemy as much damage as possible and making reprisal for wrongs he had done you. To the same class of ideas belonged the practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They disappeared indeed as a general practice before the world had begun to talk of humanity. They were abolished because war became more scientific. The right to plunder and ravage was not denied. But plunder was found to demoralise your troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the occupied country by means of regular requisitions for the supply of your own army and the increase of its offensive range. In short, the reform arose from a desire to husband your enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly wasting them.

In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating effect upon our own regular force. It greatly increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached cruiser commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at the expense of the modern military spirit which made for direct operations against the enemy's armed forces. It was inevitable that as the new movement of opinion gathered force it should carry with it a conviction that for operating against sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be so efficient as an organised system of operations to secure a real strategical control of the enemy's maritime communications.

3. Of 1856 at the end of the Russian War.

A riper and sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial blockade—that is, the blockade of ports—could be extended to and supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. In moral principle there is no difference between the two. Admit the principle of tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn the principle of strategical or distant blockade. Except in their effect upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two.

Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be rejected at sea if the same thing is permitted on land? If on land you allow contributions and requisitions, if you permit the occupation of towns, ports, and inland communications, without which no conquest is complete and no effective war possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where it causes far less individual suffering? If you refuse the right of controlling communications at sea, you must also refuse the right on land. If you admit the right of contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme rights of war and leave to the maritime Powers no effective rights at all. Their ultimate argument would be gone.

In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian, and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position as a commercial maritime State, let it be honourably dealt with. But so far as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to be based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by depriving yourself of the power of offence and resting on defence alone, and the other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or fleets. It ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end—that is, to exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "After shattering the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, "we still have the

forcing of a peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task . . . to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight that the desire for peace will prevail. This is the point in which Napoleon failed. . . . It may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words, all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army."[4]

If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous means at sea, the object for which we fight battles almost ceases to exist. Defeat the enemy's fleets as we may, he will be but little the worse. We shall have opened the way for invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can laugh at our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at sea, the only legitimate means of pressure within our strength will be denied us. Our fleet, if it would proceed with such secondary operations as are essential for forcing a peace, will be driven to such barbarous expedients as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile coasts.

If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting were abolished both on land and sea there would be this argument in favour of the change, that it would mean perhaps for civilised States the entire cessation of war; for war would become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in it. It would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with which the people had little concern. International quarrels would tend to take the form of the mediaeval private disputes which were settled by champions in trial by battle, an absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely legal procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, humanity would have advanced a long stride. But the world is scarcely ripe for such a revolution. Meanwhile to

4. *Conduct of War,* pp. 19–20.

abolish the right of interference with the flow of private property at sea without abolishing the corresponding right ashore would only defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent, the most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce and finance which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. If commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish the right, and this deterrent disappears; nay, they will even stand to win immediate gains owing to the sudden expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities will entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the needs of the armed forces will create. Any such losses as maritime warfare under existing conditions must immediately inflict will be remote if interference with property is confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious except in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters upon war expecting defeat. It is in the hope of victory and gain that aggressive wars are born. The fear of quick and certain loss is their surest preventive. Humanity, then, will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil it has as yet no power to kill.

In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the right of private capture at sea as still subsisting. Without it, indeed, naval warfare is almost inconceivable, and in any case no one has any experience of such a truncated method of war on which profitable study can be founded.

The primary method, then, in which we use victory or preponderance at sea and bring it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the capture or destruction of the enemy's property, whether public or private. But in comparing the process with the analogous occupation of territory and the levying of contributions and requisitions we have to

observe a marked difference. Both processes are what may be called economic pressure. But ashore the economic pressure can only be exerted as the consequence of victory or acquired domination by military success. At sea the process begins at once. Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in maritime wars has been the capture of private property at sea. In a sense this is also true ashore. The first step of an invader after crossing the frontier will be to control to a less or greater extent such private property as he is able to use for his purposes. But such interference with private property is essentially a military act, and does not belong to the secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, and the reason why this should be so lies in certain fundamental differences between land and sea warfare which are implicit in the communication theory of naval war.

To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime communications, which are the root of the idea of command of the sea, are not analogous to military communications in the ordinary use of the term. Military communications refer solely to the army's lines of supply and retreat. Maritime communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical values not to military lines of supply, but to those internal lines of communication by which the flow of national life is maintained ashore. Consequently maritime communications are on a wholly different footing from land communications. At sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own territory. The strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown ashore. Since maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot attack those of the enemy without defending our own. In military operations the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our enemy's communications tends to expose their own.

The theory of common communications will become clear by taking an example. In our wars with France[5] our communications with the Mediterranean, India, and America ran down from the Channel mouth past Finisterre and St. Vincent; and those of France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were identical for almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the identity was even closer.[6] Even in the case of Spain, her great trade routes followed the same lines as our own for the greater part of their extent. Consequently the opening moves which we generally made to defend our trade by the occupation of those lines placed us in a position to attack our enemy's trade. The same situation arose even when our opening dispositions were designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks upon our colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up to those ends always lay on or about the terminal and focal points of trade routes. Whether our immediate object were to bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to exercise economic pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy were equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or focal areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished to avoid a decision, the best way to force him to action was to occupy his trade routes at the same vital points.

Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure, at least in the modern conception of war, should only begin after decisive victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. Indeed such pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will appear more clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental difference between land and sea warfare.

Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic

5. Between 1689 and 1815 Britain fought a series of seven major wars with France that have sometimes together been called "the second hundred years' war."

6. The three Anglo-Dutch wars fought between 1652 and 1674.

pressure from the commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as we have seen, that it is an economy of means to use our defensive positions for attack when attack does not vitiate those positions, and it will not vitiate them if fleet cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that interference with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting the secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. It has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade.

It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however closely we may concentrate our efforts on the destruction of our enemy's armed forces as the direct means to his overthrow, it would be folly to stay our hands when opportunities occur, as they will automatically, for undermining his financial position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea communications and the confiscatory operations it connotes are in a sense primary operations, and not, as on land, secondary.

Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive in our attempt to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to give it precision as the control of common communications. Their concrete value will appear when we come to deal with the various forms which naval operations may take, such as, "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence of trade, and the safeguarding of combined expedi-

tions. For the present it remains to deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow from the communication idea.

If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able to control the whole of the common communications as the result either of great initial preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong to do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that is, our control may be general or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs emphasising, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is all one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our control of any special sea area.

It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical expression, used to emphasise the high mobility of fleets as contrasted with that of armies and the absence of physical obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would be as wise to hold that in war you must never risk anything.

It would seem to have been the evil influence of this travestied maxim which had much to do with the cramped and timorous strategy of the Americans in their late war with Spain. They had ample naval force to secure such a local and temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have justified them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into Cuba to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war plan. They had also sufficient strength to ensure that the communications with the expeditionary force could not be

interrupted permanently. And yet, because the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at sea somewhere, they hesitated, and were nearly lost. The Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control of the line of passage, they were in a position to deny effective control to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. There are cases in plenty where the results promised by a successful military blow oversea, before permanent command had been obtained, were great enough to justify a risk which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by judicious use of our favourable geographical position, and of a certain system of protection, which must be dealt with later.

For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, it must be taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of which has its special possibilities and limitations. It may be general or local, and it may be permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses an effective naval force.

Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never in practice be absolute. No degree of naval superiority can ensure our communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk destruction. Even after Hawke's[7] decisive victory at

7. Admiral of the Fleet Edward, first Baron Hawke (1705–1781), Britain's most important and successful operational fleet commander of the Seven Years' War. For a biography see R. Mackay, *Admiral Hawke* (Oxford, 1965).

Quiberon[8] had completed the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was captured between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard,[9] while Wellington's complaints in the Peninsula of the insecurity of his communications are well known.[10] By general and permanent control we do not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy. In other words, it means that the enemy can no longer attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he cannot use or defend his own.

To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an unstable equilibrium. It may be that the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. Such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the inter-relation of naval positions and the comparative convenience of their situation in regard to the object of the war or campaign. By naval positions we mean, firstly,

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8. British victory gained on 20 November 1759 in Quiberon Bay, one hundred miles southeast of Brest. In bad weather Hawke's fleet chased a French fleet into dangerous waters, leading to the immediate loss of six French vessels and the neutralization of the remaining twenty-five. Two British ships were wrecked the following day.

9. The promontory on the Cornish coast between Falmouth and Land's End and the furthest southern point of Great Britain.

10. In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures into a serious interruption. (Author's note.)

naval bases and, secondly, the terminals of the greater lines of communication or trade-routes and the focal areas where they tend to converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape, Singapore, and many others.

Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will depend in a general way the extent to which our plans will be governed by the idea of defence or offence. Generally speaking, it will be to the advantage of the preponderating side to seek a decision as quickly as possible in order to terminate the state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by minor operations, the chances of war, or the development of fresh strength, to turn the balance in its favour. Such was the line which France adopted frequently in her wars with us, sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to such an excess as seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led to a hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker Power is an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the fundamental principles of war. It is idle to exclude the use of an expectant attitude because in itself it cannot lead to final success, and because if used to excess it ends in demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The misconception appears to have arisen from insistence on the drawbacks of defence by writers seeking to persuade their country to prepare in time of peace sufficient naval strength to justify offence from the outset.

Having now determined the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of Command of the Sea, we are in a position to consider the manner in which fleets are constituted in order to fit them for their task.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY OF THE MEANS—THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS

IN ALL ERAS of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each class was designed to serve. These groupings or classifications are what is meant by the constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. It may be so, but such a classification has been by no means constant. Other ideas of fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if we wish to arrive at sound doctrine.

The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is true that few ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets.

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Course:	Theory and Nature of War
Course Book:	8801
Lesson:	8
Subject:	Required Readings
Title:	Crowl, Philip A. "Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Naval Historian." *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 444-477.
Comment:	This historical essay acknowledges Alfred Thayer Mahan as one of the leading military theorists of his age. Crowl's comprehensive approach provides an excellent basis to examine Mahan's approach to theory and maritime strategy and his views on the fundamentals of sea power.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 8

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Department of the Navy. *Forward...From the Sea.* Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 1 to 12. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex C, pp. C-3 to C-12.

Comment:

This selected reading is a white paper from the Secretary of the Navy. It provides the foundation for the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), a concept for projecting naval power ashore.

Look for the ways in which the concept emphasizes the importance of

- Litoral areas
- More intimate cooperation between forces afloat and forces ashore
- Naval expeditionary force

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Department of the Navy
Washington

FORWARD
...FROM THE SEA

In 1992 the Navy-Marine Corps paper **...FROM THE SEA** defined the strategic concept intended to carry the Naval Service—the Navy and Marine Corps—beyond the Cold War and into the 21st century. It signaled a change in focus and, therefore, in priorities for the Naval Service away from operations on the sea toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world—those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces.

The purpose of U.S. naval forces remains to project the power and influence of the nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. **FORWARD ...FROM THE SEA** updates and expands the strategic concept articulated in our 1992 paper to address specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts. **FORWARD ...FROM THE SEA** amplifies the scope of our strategic concept while confirming the course and speed for the Naval Service as defined in the original document.

John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy

Admiral J. M. Boorda, USN
Chief of Naval Operations

General Carl E.Mundy, Jr., USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps

INTRODUCTION

With the publication of **...FROM THE SEA** in September 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps announced a landmark shift in operational focus and a reordering of coordinated priorities of the Naval Service. This fundamental shift was a direct result of the changing strategic landscape—away from having to deal with a global maritime threat and toward projecting power and influence across the seas in response to regional challenges.

In the two years since **...FROM THE SEA** became our strategic concept, the Administration has provided expanded guidance on the role of the military in national defense. A major review of strategy and force requirements resulted in a shift in the Department of Defense's focus to new dangers—chief among which is aggression by regional powers—and the necessity for our military forces to be able to rapidly project decisive military power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends and allies. In defining our national strategy for responding to these new dangers, the review emphasized the importance of maintaining forward-deployed naval forces and recognized the impact of peacetime operational tempo on the size of Navy and Marine Corps force structure. In addition to recognizing the unique contributions of the Navy and Marine Corps in the areas of power projection and forward presence, it restated the need for the Navy to support the national strategic objectives through our enduring contributions in strategic deterrence, sea control and maritime supremacy, and strategic sealift.

FORWARD ...FROM THE SEA addresses these naval contributions to our national security. Most fundamentally, our naval forces are designed to fight and win wars. Our most recent experiences, however, underscore the premise that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be *engaged* in forward areas, with the objectives of *preventing* conflicts and *controlling* crises.

Naval forces thus are the foundation of peacetime forward presence operations and overseas response to crisis. They contribute heavily during the transitions from crisis to conflict and to ensuring compliance with terms of peace. At the same time, the unique capabilities inherent in naval expeditionary forces have never been in higher demand from U.S. theater commanders—the regional Commanders-in-Chief-as evidenced by operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and Bosnia, as well as our continuing contribution to the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE

The vital economic, political, and military interests of the United States are truly global in nature and scope. In many respects these interests are located across broad oceans, and to a great extent they intersect those of current and emergent regional powers. It is in the world's littorals where the Naval Service, operating from sea bases in international waters, can influence events ashore in support of our interests.

Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is necessarily a transoceanic one. Our vital interests—those interests for which the United States is willing to fight—are at the endpoint of "highways of the seas" or lines of strategic approach that stretch from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. Not surprisingly, these strategic lines and their endpoints coincide with the places to which we routinely deploy naval expeditionary forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean Sea. Reductions in fiscal resources, however, dictate that we must refocus our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges, even within these areas of historic and vital interest to the United States.

Naval forces are particularly well-suited to the entire range of military operations in support of our national strategy. They continue the historic role of naval forces engaged in preventive diplomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas. Moreover, forward-deployed naval forces—manned, equipped, and trained for combat—play a significant role in demonstrating both the intention and the capability to join our NATO and other allies, as well as other friendly powers, in defending shared interests. Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict erupts, naval forces provide the means for immediate sea-based reaction. This could include forcible entry and providing the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on forces which will be deployed, supported, and sustained from the continental United States.

In short, forward-deployed naval forces will provide the critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of a developing crisis or major regional contingency.

PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS

Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign policy. From conducting routine port visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long-standing regional security interests, such as with UNITAS exercises in South America, U.S. naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives overseas. Indeed, the critical importance of a credible overseas presence is emphasized in the President's 1994 National Security Strategy:

...presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.

In peacetime U.S. naval forces build "interoperability"—the ability to operate in concert with friendly and allied forces—so that in the future we can easily participate fully as part of a formal multinational response or as part of "ad hoc" coalitions forged to react to short-notice crisis situations. Participation in both NATO Standing Naval Forces and in a variety of exercises with the navies, air forces, and land forces of coalition partners around the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean basin provide solid foundations for sustaining interoperability with our friends and allies.

Additionally, the outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries in the NATO Partnership for Peace program will further build solidarity and interoperability. We have already made solid progress in expanding and intensifying our cooperation with the navies in Eastern Europe with exercises such as BALTOPS 94 and BREEZE 94, which included units from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

U.S. forward-deployed naval forces have also contributed to humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts—from the Philippines to Bangladesh to Rwanda—with similar, very positive, results.

Although naval presence includes a wide range of forward-deployed Navy *and* Marine Corps units afloat and ashore in friendly nations, our basic presence "building blocks" remain *Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups* — with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings — and *Amphibious Ready Groups* — with special operations-capable Marine Expeditionary Units. These highly flexible naval formations are valued by the theater commanders precisely because they provide the necessary capabilities forward. They are ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and are available to participate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability.

We have also turned our attention to examining the naval capabilities that could contribute to extending conventional deterrence. In this regard, forward-deployed surface warships—cruisers and destroyers—with theater ballistic missile defense capabilities will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missiles by extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries. By maintaining the means to enhance their security and safety, we may reduce the likelihood that some of these nations will develop their own offensive capabilities. Our efforts will thereby slow weapons proliferation and enhance regional stability.

In addition, even as we have shifted our emphasis to forward presence and power projection from sea to land, the Navy continues to provide a robust strategic nuclear deterrent by maintaining strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea. As long as it is U.S. policy to ensure an adequate and ready strategic nuclear deterrent, our highly survivable strategic ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security.

U.S. naval forces are designed to fight and win wars, as are all elements of our military arsenal. To successfully deter aggressors, we must be capable of responding quickly and successfully in support of U.S. theater commanders. Forces deployed for routine exercises and activities undergirding forward presence are also the forces most likely to be called upon to respond rapidly to an emerging crisis. The potential for escalation dictates that presence forces must be shaped for missions they may encounter. This provides theater commanders with credible crisis-response capabilities in the event normal conditions or outcomes do not turn out as we expect.

Building on normally deployed forces, we can mass, if the situation requires, multiple Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project our naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such a massing of naval units can be complemented by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required.

A U.S. warship is sovereign U.S. territory, whether in a port of a friendly country or transiting international straits and the high seas. U.S. naval forces, operating from highly mobile "sea bases" in forward areas, are therefore free of the political encumbrances that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations in forward theaters. The latter consideration is a unique characteristic and advantage of forward-deployed naval forces. In many critical situations, U.S. naval forces alone provide theater commanders with a variety of flexible options—including precise measures to control escalation—respond quickly and appropriately to fast-breaking developments at the operational and tactical levels.

Whether surging from adjacent theaters or from continental U.S. deployment bases, naval forces are uniquely positioned, configured, and trained to provide a variety of responses in the event of an unexpected international crisis. Their operational flexibility and responsiveness are a matter of record. The most recent examples of crisis-response operations are summarized here.

Naval forces make a critical contribution in a major regional contingency during the transition from crisis to conflict. Forward naval forces deployed for presence and reinforced in response to an emerging crisis can serve as the transition force as land-based forces are brought forward into theater.

Using a building-block approach, U.S. naval forces can be "tailored" with specific capabilities. The resulting naval expeditionary force—conceptually built around fleet operational forces and a forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Force—can provide a highly flexible force for a wide range of missions, including long-range strike operations and early forcible entry to facilitate or enable the arrival of follow-on forces.

Focusing on the littoral area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend advanced bases—ports and airfields—to enable the flow of land-based air and ground forces, while providing the necessary command and control for joint and allied forces. The power-projection capabilities of specifically tailored naval expeditionary forces can contribute to blunting an initial attack and, ultimately, assuring victory. The keys to our enabling mission are effective means *in place* to dominate and exploit littoral battlespace during the earliest phases of hostilities.

Moreover, the unique capabilities inherent in naval tactical aviation operating from our sea bases or expeditionary airfields, as well as the capability to contribute to sustained land combat operations, provide theater commanders with flexibility in the conduct of littoral operations. Throughout the 20th century, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, placed ashore initially as enabling forces, have fought and contributed decisively in every major ground conflict. Similarly, naval tactical aviation has made pivotal contributions when the nation's air power was needed in combat.

In the event of a future regional conflict, U.S. naval forces will assume critical roles in the protection of vital sealift along the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict, including the air- and sea-ports of debarkation. Our success in a major regional contingency will depend upon the delivery of heavy equipment and the resupply of major ground and air elements engaged forward. Sealift is the key to force sustainment for joint operations, and we are committed to a strong national capability.

JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

No single military service embodies all of the capabilities needed to respond to every situation and threat. Our national strategy calls for the individual services to operate jointly to ensure both that we can operate successfully in all warfare areas and that we can apply our military power across the spectrum of foreseeable situations—in peace, crisis, regional conflict, and the subsequent restoration of peace.

The enhanced combat power produced by the integration of all supporting arms, which we seek to attain through joint operations, is inherent in naval expeditionary forces. For example, the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group integrates and focuses diverse technologies and combat capabilities to assure the dominance of the air, surface, and sub-surface battle space necessary for the prosecution of subsequent campaigns. Further, Marine Expeditionary Forces, employing Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combined-arms doctrine, are the most versatile expeditionary forces in existence. Established by law to be "forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components," MAGTFs are expeditionary, rapidly expandable air-ground formations, capable of operating from sea bases, ashore, or both, simultaneously. They are the model for the joint air-ground task forces evolving as conflicts grow smaller and the forces available grow fewer.

Naval expeditionary forces have long operated as integral elements of joint forces acting with other joint or allied sea, land, air, and space forces. Just as the complementary capabilities of Navy and Marine Corps forces add to our overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of other services and those of our allies will yield decisive military power.

Department of the Navy Budget History



Department of the Navy Support of Littoral Warfare



MAINTAINING OUR NEW DIRECTION

The new direction for the Naval Service remains focused on our ability to project power from the sea in the critical littoral regions of the world. We remain committed to structuring our naval expeditionary forces so that they are inherently shaped for joint operations, with the emphasis on operations forward from the sea, tailored for national needs. Recent Department of the Navy budget decisions, which resulted in a real increase in spending on littoral warfare and the means for power projection, are illustrative of the shift in priorities we have undertaken since the publication of **...FROM THE SEA**. As we continue to improve our readiness to project power in the littorals, we need to proceed cautiously so as not to jeopardize our readiness for the full spectrum of missions and functions for which we are responsible.

In the two years since **...FROM THE SEA** was published, we have expanded on and capitalized upon its traditional expeditionary focus. "Expeditionary" implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to be deployed forward and to respond swiftly. Our new direction provides the nation:

* Naval Expeditionary Forces
* Shaped for Joint Operations
* Tailored for National Needs
* Operating **FORWARD ...FROM THE SEA**

CONCLUSION

FROM THE SEA was the initial step in demonstrating how the Navy and Marine Corps responded to the challenges of a new security environment. Our strategy and policies continue to evolve as we learn from our recent experiences and prepare for the new challenges and opportunities of this highly dynamic world. Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence. We will continue to carry out these roles to protect vital U.S. global interests, citizens, allies and friends, wherever they may be at risk.

The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership and commensurate military capability endures. Many of our most vital interests remain overseas where the Navy and the Marine (Corps are prepared for new challenges—*forward* deployed, **ready** for combat, and **engaged** to preserve the peace.

C-12

LESSON 9

THE 20TH CENTURY: THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR (I)-- THE CHARACTER OF WORLD WAR I

Losses sustained in the war were unprecedented. In approximate figures of military battle deaths, Germany lost more than 1.8 million, Russia 1.7 million, France 1.3 million, Austria-Hungary 922,000, Italy 460,000, the United States 50,000, Bulgaria 75,000. Statistics for the British Empire included Britain 888,000, Canada 65,000, Australia 62,000, New Zealand 18,000, India, 72,000, and South Africa 9,300. Except for India and South Africa, these figures were approximately 50% greater than for the Second World War, and in Britain's case 230 per cent greater.... Numbers of wounded always exceeded those of dead by between two and four to one.

--Philip J. Haythornthwaite
The World War One Source Book (1992)

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson introduces you to the causes, character, and outcome of World War I.

Why Study WW I?

You need to study World War I because few modern conflicts have had the far reaching impact on nation-states and post-war events than has World War I.

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson

- Focuses on matters central to the evolution of modern warfare in the early part of the 20th century
- Sets the stage for lesson 10, "The 20th Century: The Age of Total War (II)--The Character of World War II"

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require 2.5 hours of study.

Educational Objective

World War I	Comprehend the causes, character, and outcome of World War I, the first of the great world struggles of the 20th century. [JPME Areas 3d, 3e, and 5a]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	3/d/0.5 3/e/0.5 5/a/0.5

Historical Background

Overview

The First World War was the first major conflict in Europe since the Napoleonic Wars, nearly a century earlier. This war shattered the century-long period of relative peace between the major European powers established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The war turned out to be far more costly, both in terms of lives (as seen in the quote on the first page of this lesson) and national treasure, than any of the combatant nations ever could have imagined.

Causes of World War I

There were a variety of factors that led to the advent of the First World War: rising nationalism, economic competition, disputes regarding the colonial empires of the major European powers, a military "arms race" (reflected best in the race to build *dreadnaughts*, or battleships), and a complex system of treaties and alliances that were designed to ensure that a **balance of power**--the one that had been maintained for nearly a century--continued to exist on the European continent.

System of Alliances

War broke out in Europe in 1914, when coupled with the increased lethality of the mass of weapons and munitions that could be produced by fully-industrialized nations, it was the very effectiveness of this balance of power system - pitting two European alliances of roughly equal military strength and national resources - that contributed significantly to both the length of the war and the immense carnage that it wrought. The two alliances were the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) and the Triple Alliance (Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire).

World War I Fronts

The war began with movement. The governments and their General Staffs of all the major warring continental powers executed pre-war mobilization and operational plans. Later it became a war of stalemates--characterized by trench warfare--on the Western and Italian fronts and one of continuing movement on the Eastern front.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Expanding Government Controls: Propaganda

In ways that would have surprised Clausewitz, traditional governments increased centralized control over their societies, economies, and cultures to a degree that would have been thought impossible in the years just before the conflict. War aims expanded in ways that ultimately prevented a settlement.

- Foes became dehumanized and were given stereotyped images for popular consumption. Huns, the destroyers of culture, was one of many derogatory terms applied to the Germans.

- On the other hand, the Allied Victory Medal was awarded to all soldiers of the victorious powers with the words: *The Great War for Civilization.*

Governments and the Economy

To support the massive logistical requirements of the warring armies, European governments--those of the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance--took steps to effect much greater control over their economies.

Especially on the Western front, the national economies of the warring sides were hard pressed to manufacture and deliver enough artillery shells; their armies used them up more quickly in enormous artillery barrages than they could be made.

Results of the War

When the U.S. and the Triple Entente eventually won this most bloody and terrible war, it imposed a harsh peace on the losing side (especially Germany) at the Treaty of Versailles. Germany lost its colonies and some of its territory, while the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were dismantled in their entirety.

Required Readings

European Armies and the Conduct of War	Strachan, Hew. "First World War." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 130 to 149. (Note: Reading total includes three full page maps.) This chapter is a detailed, in-depth analysis of World War I tactical problems leading up to the first great battles of attrition which eventually destroyed Germany.
Makers of Modern Strategy	Howard, Michael. "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 510 to 526. With the increased lethality of weapons, military experts debated the relative changing human costs of the offense and defense in terms of lives, and also, morale. Find out how this debate was resolved by General Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Touchstone (1994). Read the following:
  - Chapter 2, "The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson," pp. 29 to 55.
  - Chapter 8, "Into the Vortex: The Military Doomsday Machine," pp. 201 to 217.
- Moran, Daniel. *The Fog of Peace: The Military Dimensions of the Concert of Europe*. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Turner, L. C. F. "The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan." *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*, edited by Paul Kennedy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979.

Issues for Consideration

Conditions for WWI	What were the conditions leading up to World War I?
Causes	What were the causes of World War I?
Continuation of the War	At the political level, why did the powers continue to engage in this costly conflict?
Evolution	Once the war started, how could the leaders of the European powers have prevented it from evolving into a self-destructive bloodbath? Who finally won the way?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 9

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. "First World War." *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 130 to 149. (Note: Reading total includes three full page maps.)

Comment:

This chapter is a detailed, in-depth analysis of World War I tactical problems leading up to the first great battles of attrition which eventually destroyed Germany.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

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Lesson: 9

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Howard, Michael. "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 510 to 526.

Comment:

With the increased lethality of weapons, military experts debated the relative changing human costs of the offense and defense in terms of lives, and also, morale. Find out how this debate was resolved by General Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff.

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LESSON 10
THE 20TH CENTURY: THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR (II)-- THE CHARACTER OF WORLD WAR II

I ordered the entire male population of the place to be evacuated...up to today, midday, a further 3,600 have been executed, so that the total of executions carried by the Reit Brigade up to now amounts to 7,819. Thus the figure of executions in my area now exceeds the 30,000 mark.

Decoded message sent by a German police chief recounting events that took place after fire on German army units had been received from the town of Pazyc on the Russian front. This message was decoded on 7 August 1941 at the British Government Code and Cypher School (a then-classified installation) at Bletchley Park, a country estate 50 miles from London. These events were reported in an article titled, "Nazi Police Competed Over Execution 'Score'" in *The* [*London*] *Times*, 20 May 1997.

...Klaus von Bismarck said that he and most other members of the 4th Infantry Regiment in which he rose to command, lived on an "island of self-deception" believing they could "remain upright soldiers in a war that had criminal ends."

Obituary of Klaus von Bismarck, great-great-nephew of the Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, *The* [*London*] *Daily Telegraph*, 27 May 1997.

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson helps you understand the

- Causes, character, and outcome of the World War II
- Immediate and continuing impact the war had on Western society and the world political order.

Why Study World War II?

The World War II had, and continues to have, an enormous impact on the contemporary era. As Marine officers, you must understand World War II in its historical context and realize how many of today's complex political issues can be traced to World War II.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson

- Focuses on the relationship of World War II to the evolution of modern warfare in the 20th century.
- Sets the stage for the remainder of the *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) course, especially lesson 12, "Modern Theorists (III): Revolutionary War."

You must understand the issues associated with World War II to comprehend the *Strategic Level of War* (8802) and *Operational Level of War* (8803) courses and related instruction in *Warfighting From the Sea* (8804 through 8808).

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 4 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Causes, Character, and Outcome	Discuss the causes, character, and outcome of World War II. [JPME Areas 3d, 3e, and 5a]
Historical Perspective	Place World War II in a larger historical context so that you can evaluate the war's place in the evolution of warfare. [JPME Areas 1b, 3d, 3e, and 5a]
Impact of World Wars	Understand the immediate and continuing impact of World Wars I and II on Western society and the world political order. [JPME Areas 3d and 3e]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	1/b/0.5 3/d/1.5 3/e/0.5 5/a/0.5

Historical Background

Impact of Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War, called for sweeping changes to the political, social, and economic map of the European continent. Further, despite President Wilson's best efforts to the contrary, the treaty imposed crushing economic demands - in the form of war reparations - upon the defeated Central Powers. Specifically, the Treaty of Versailles dismantled the Ottoman Empire in its entirety, leaving its rulers to exert power only in Turkey. On the European continent itself, the treaty carved up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, establishing new nation-states--Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and others--throughout Eastern Europe. Other lands were taken from both Germany and Russia to form other nations, most notably Poland, Finland, and the Baltic Republics.

Rise of the Axis Powers

It was hoped that these newly-established states would be modeled on the liberal democracies of Western Europe. As it turned out, many of the democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe were short-lived affairs that were soon replaced by a number of military-based dictators of varying ideological roots; of these, the most prominent were Adolph Hitler (National Socialism in Germany) and Benito Mussolini (Fascism in Italy). These two nations would join with a militaristic Japan to form the principal Axis powers that would drag the world into its second global conflict of the century.

Hitler's Policies

Hitler and his National Socialists came to power in 1933, intent on making Germany the preeminent power on the European continent. To achieve this goal, Hitler often had to establish policies--reestablishing a German Navy, building up German land forces, reoccupying the Rhineland (1935)--that would put Germany in direct conflict with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. More ominous to European stability was Hitler's goal of establishing a proper "living space" (*lebenstraum*) in Eastern Europe; within the expanded territories of this "Greater Germany," both German culture and the German people could expand and flourish. Hitler's demand (and receipt) in 1938 of Czechoslovakia's German-speaking Sudetenland was a part of Germany's expansionist plans.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Japan

In Asia, Japan was also involved in a long-term policy of conquest and expansion of its imperial domain. During the 1930's, much of Japan's aggression (and subsequent expansion) was directed at China. With the advent of World War II, Japan's further expansion came through its conquest of European (and American) colonial possessions. Japan's militarism was based on a unique blend of Eastern ideology and culture with European modernism.

World War II: Character

Noncombatant Deaths

World War II made less distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Noncombatants were directly attacked, both by strategic bombing and, in occupied Europe, by secret police and extermination troops.

Governmental Controls

Governmental controls on all aspects of society continued to increase. One example of this was the marshaling of the mass entertainment media in support of the American war effort--from popular commercial films (still seen often on cable television in this country) to Frank Capra's *Why We Fight*, to USO tours and canteens for soldiers.

Genocidal Policies

Genocidal policies in Europe, based on theories of racial and ethnic superiority, represented a big change during World War II, one recognized by the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. In the Pacific, Japanese troops also committed numerous atrocities against other Asian peoples and POWs, based (like the Nazis) on theories of racial and ethnic superiority.

Geographic Range of the War

Unlike the First World War, World War II was truly global in character and scope. Although World War I had seen fighting outside of Europe (in the Middle East and parts of Africa), the armies in the World War II battled throughout Europe, Russia, North Africa, the Far East, and the islands of the Pacific, with naval and air forces fighting over an even larger geographic area.

Results of the War

World War II resulted in

- The division of Europe into a Communist Eastern Europe dominated by the Soviet Union and a democratic West protected by the U.S. and its NATO allies.
- A shift of power from Europe to the U.S. and Soviet Union
- European powers losing their overseas empires.
- U.S. not returning to a policy of isolationism, permanently stationing troops in Europe and Asia.
- International relations governed largely by Cold War considerations.

Required Readings

Theory and Nature of War Readings

Biddiss, Michael. "Victor's Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal," *History Today*, May 1995. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. D-3 to D-11. This article is a detailed examination of how the victorious Allies dealt with the prosecution of genocide and mass murder atrocities by the Nazi leadership. It illustrates some of the weaknesses and strengths of the proceedings and also raises the question of how little the world community has built upon the positive aspects of this great event.

Makers of Modern Strategy

Clayton, James D. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 703 to 732. This chapter analyzes the national and military strategies of Japan and America not only during the war years, but also during the four decades preceding them.

European Armies and the Conduct of War

Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 150 to 187

- Chapter 10, "Blitzkrieg" This is a chronological account of how military strategies and capabilities developed from World War I through World War II with emphasis on examples of general failure to plan in depth and of the specific failure of Germany, relying on "Blitzkrieg," to face its practical limitations in a long war.

- Chapter 11, "Total War" This chapter expands upon Germany's failure to plan strategically and logistically for World War II. These pages include two full page maps.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Bartov, Omer. "The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare," *The Journal of Modern History*, Supplement, December 1992, pp. S32 to S45.

- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Touchstone, 1994. Read the following (pp. 288 to 422):

  - Chapter 12. "The End of Illusion: Hitler and the Destruction of Versailles," (pp. 288 to 331)
  - Chapter 13, "Stalin's Bazaar," (pp. 332 to 349)
  - Chapter 14, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact," (pp. 350 to 368)
  - Chapter 15, "America Re-enters the Arena: Franklin Delano Roosevelt," (pp. 369 to 393)
  - Chapter 16, "Three Approaches to Peace: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in World War II," (pp. 394 to 422)

- Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 677 to 702.

- Spector, Ron. *Eagle Against the Sun*: *The American War Against Japan*. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

- Weinberg, Gerhard L. *The World at Arms*: *A Global History of World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Issues for Consideration

World Wars I and II	Some claim that World War II was just a repeat of World War I, separated by a 20-year armistice. Is this true? Or, did this conflict reveal something fundamentally different? If so, what had changed?
Character of World War II	What was the character of World War II? What were the goals of the powers involved? How were operations basically conducted? How did the character differ from World War I and previous wars?
Axis Successes and Defeat	Why were Germany and Japan so successful initially? Why did they ultimately fail?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 10

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Biddiss, Michael. "Victor's Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal," *History Today,* May 1995. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex D, pp. D-3 to D-11.

Comment:

This article is a detailed examination of how the victorious Allies dealt with the prosecution of genocide and mass murder atrocities by the Nazi leadership. It illustrates some of the weaknesses and strengths of the proceedings and also raises the question of how little the world community has built upon the positive aspects of this great event.

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HISTORY TODAY
Volume 45, Number 5 May 1995

VICTORS' JUSTICE?

THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL

By

Michael Biddiss

Michael Biddiss looks at how the victorious Allies dealt with the unprecedented prosecution of genocide and mass atrocities by the Nazi leadership and how fair the proceedings were to those in the dock.

(Course Director's Note: Spelling and punctuation are "British" English since this article came from a British journal).

Fifty years on, the Nuremberg Trial continues to haunt us. This is not simply a matter of the Nazi horrors revealed or confirmed in the courtroom. It is a question also of the weaknesses and strengths of the proceedings themselves. The undoubted flaws rightly continue to trouble the thoughtful. Yet, equally, we remain disturbed by the fact that, over the subsequent half-century, the world community has done so little to build upon the positive features also attaching to this great event.

The enormity of the murderous terror unleashed by the Third Reich is now so evident to us that the mounting of some full-scale trial of its defeated leaders might well seem, in retrospect, entirely inevitable. The path to Nuremberg was, however, much more torturous than that. The Moscow Declaration of November 1943 certainly made plain the aim of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill to punish, by some form of joint action, those major Nazis whose offences could not be regarded as limited to any particular geographical location. Yet, as Germany's defeat approached, there was urgent need for the Allies to become less vague about actual procedures.

During the Tehran Conference at the end of 1943, Stalin had toasted 'the justice of the firing squad' and mentioned the need for 50,000 shootings. Roosevelt and Churchill seem to have been shocked by the number, even while sympathising with the method. In any case, the Soviet leader was probably jesting -- something suggested by the fact that his regime (itself well-versed in the propagandist value of political trials) remained thereafter consistent in its demand for some form of detailed judicial enquiry. Conversely, it was the American and British governments that continued in 1944 to focus chiefly on schemes of summary process and prompt execution. Not until early 1945 did Roosevelt become fully converted to the 'Bernays Plan', devised during the previous September within the US Department of War. Once this proposal concerning comprehensive legal proceedings had won the day in Washington, Churchill found himself facing combined American and Soviet pressure to mount a major trial conducted by some specially constituted international tribunal.

In London there was particularly stout resistance from the head of the judiciary, Lord Chancellor Simon. He stood by the advice which he had previously given to the Cabinet:

> I am strongly of the opinion that the method by trial, conviction, and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge, and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate *is a political, not a judicial, question*. It could not rest with judges, however eminent or learned, to decide finally a matter like this, which is of the widest and most vital public policy.

There was some justification for Simon's anxiety about unavoidably protracted proceedings. He was deeply concerned lest an international public should come to see them simply as a 'put-up job' designed by the Allies to validate a series of pre-judged punishments. Were the precedents for this kind of trial so weak as to prompt the condemnation that it amounted to nothing more than 'victors' justice'? And was there not great danger that, at certain

points in such a process, Hitler and his colleagues might manage to reverse the arguments so as to embarrass the Allied case?

Only in May 1945 -- by which time the Führer himself was dead, and victory in Europe had been assured -- did the British government finally yield to the American and Soviet policy of full-scale trial. Under the new Truman presidency a US delegation, headed by Justice Jackson of the Supreme Court, was principally responsible for driving the project forward in such a way that by August 8th (ironically, the same week as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings), a series of ground-rules had been settled through the so-called London Agreement. With France now included among the signatories, the resulting Charter created a four-power International Military Tribunal. To this each government would appoint one judge plus a deputy, as well as supplying the court with prosecuting staff. The members of the Tribunal soon chose the senior British nominee, Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence, to preside over hearings that eventually stretched from November 1945 to October 1946. His alternate, Sir Norman Birkett, was surely right to believe that they were embarking on 'the greatest trial in history'.

Meanwhile, the Allies had been debating the roster of potential defendants. Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and Heydrich were the principal figures who had not survived even to be indicted. As for Bormann, he could not be found either alive or dead, and thus was tried in absence. Any critical reading of the trial transcripts has to take account of the tendency for most of the other twenty-one defendants (see Table), all of whom did appear in the Palace of Justice at Nuremberg assisted by their own defence counsel, to shift responsibility for wrongdoing towards those leading Nazis who were not present. The accused had been chosen largely to ensure representation of all the major administrative groupings within the Reich, and thus to reflect the American emphasis on establishing the criminality of these organisations through judgements that

Table
Defendants, Charges, Verdicts and Sentances
This listing of defendants follows the order of the indictment, G=Guilty; NG= Not Guilty

Defendant	Count 1	Count 2	Count 3	Count 4	Sentance
Hermann Göring	G	G	G	G	Hanging
Rudolf Hess	G	G	NG	NG	Life
Joachim von Ribbentrop	G	G	G	G	Hanging
Wilhelm Keitel	G	G	G	G	Hanging
Ernst Kaltenbrunner	NG	-	G	G	Hanging
Alfred Rosenberg	G	G	G	G	Hanging
Hans Frank	NG	-	G	G	Hanging
Wilhelm Frick	NG	G	G	G	Hanging
Julius Streicher	NG	-	-	G	Hanging
Walther Funk	NG	G	G	G	Life
Hjalmar Schacht	NG	NG	-	-	Acquitted

Defendant	Count 1	Count 2	Count 3	Count 4	Sentance
Karl Dönitz	NG	G	G	-	10 Years
Erich Raeder	G	G	G	-	Life
Baldur von Schirach	NG	-	-	G	20 Years
Ftitz Sauckel	NG	NG	G	G	Hanging
Alfred Jodl	G	G	G	G	Hanging
Martin Bormann (absent)	NG	-	G	G	Hanging
Franz von Papen	NG	NG	-	-	Acquitted
Arthur Seyss-Inquart	NG	G	G	G	Hanging
Albert Speer	NG	NG	G	G	20 Years
Constantin von Neurath	G	G	G	G	15 Years
Hans Fritzsche	NG	-	NG	NG	Acquitted
Total Guilty	8	12	16	16	
Not Guilty	14	4	2	2	

could be treated as immune from further challenge during later denazification proceedings. Yet, perhaps inevitably, lawyers and public alike came to focus mainly on the human dimension to Nuremberg, as a trial of humiliated Nazi bosses (including the closest surviving associates of the Führer) and as a record of their victims' suffering.

The prisoners themselves were not readily reducible to any single stereotype of Fascist leadership. In the case of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, latterly Chief of the Security Service, and of Hans Frank, the butchering Governor-General of occupied Poland, a stark brutality was plain. This also characterised the virulently anti-Semitic Julius Streicher, but here -- as with Hitler's former deputy, Rudolf Hess -- queries about insanity too were at issue. Seeking to maintain a certain distance from all these were four senior officers, Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel of the army, together with Eric Raeder and Karl Dönitz from the navy. This quartet centered its defence on necessities of military obedience which the Allies were deemed incompetent to challenge. Similar indignation at the impropriety of summons before the Tribunal marked the bearing of the old conservatives, Franz von Papen and Constantin von Neurath, as well as that of Hjalmar Schacht, the banker who had helped to put Hitler's Reich on the road to economic recovery. As the trial proceeded, certain other defendants became increasingly revealed as over-promoted mediocrities: among them were Joachim von Ribbentrop of the Foreign Office, the self-styled 'philosopher' Alfred Rosenberg who had enjoyed formal responsibility for the Eastern Occupied Territories, and the painfully inarticulate Fritz Sauckel who had run the programme of slave labour.

These same helot battalions had been most directly exploited by Albert Speer, a far more impressive figure within the Nuremberg dock. Just as the former Armaments Minister had once

used his great organisational talents to maintain Germany's war effort, so now in the courtroom he deployed the skills needed to save his own skin. The projection of Speer's stoical moralism depended on conceding a measure of 'responsibility', but hardly of criminal 'guilt'. How, he implied, could the Tribunal condemn a young architect who had simply been ensnared by the charismatic Führer's flattery, and fallen victim to that ethical tunnel-vision so pervasive among devoted technocrats?

This was a line of argument sufficiently insidious to prompt the British deputy prosecutor, Maxwell-Fyfe, into wondering privately whether Speer might be at heart a decent man who had been merely misled. Indeed, as things turned out, the plea succeeded in saving this prisoner from sentence of death. Such forensic resourcefulness was equaled only by Hermann Göring, albeit in circumstances where his status as the most prominent Nazi survivor made similar leniency unthinkable. From him especially, the familiar courtroom claim to have been ignorant of the Reich's genocidal practices rang utterly hollow. Yet, weaned from drugs, he did manage to rekindle at Nuremberg much of that shrewdness and intelligence which for long had made him Hitler's most powerful accomplice. At no point was this clearer than in March 1946, when, during Göring's cross-examination, it seemed to be he rather than Jackson, now the American chief prosecutor, who had the greater mastery over the documentary evidence and held the upper hand in much of their oral contest.

More than half of those accused were charged under all four headings of the indictment submitted to the Tribunal. This document, encapsulating the prosecution's overall strategy, needs to be assessed with one eye on Simon's qualms. The American team concentrated on Count One concerning a 'common plan or conspiracy', while the British focused on 'crimes against peace' under heading Two. Counts Three and Four, covering 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity', fell to the Soviet and French lawyers who divided their labour according to the geographical emphasis of such offences in Eastern and Western Europe respectively. Attacks on the legitimacy of the Nuremberg proceedings are least convincing in regard to this latter pair of headings. We need to note particularly that, on the basis of massive documentary and photographic evidence concerning Nazi involvement in genocide and in the kind of atrocities thereafter symbolised by the names of such places as Lidice and Oradour, all but one (Streicher) of those eventually condemned to death were found guilty under Three and Four together.

Amongst all charges, that of 'war crimes' had the strongest base in precedent. It built on the Hague Rules and the Geneva Conventions so as to deal with violations of law and custom during the actual conduct of hostilities. Thus Count Three explicitly condemned 'murder or ill-treatment' of civilians or prisoners of war, as well as 'killing hostages, plunder of private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not caused by military necessity'. The reference to 'crimes against humanity' under Four was more of an innovation. It reflected the prosecutors' need to adapt the war-crimes concept to conditions of total conflict in which barbarism had become systematised on a scale previously unimagined. The offence was defined as embracing 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts' and 'persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal'. Furthermore, international law was here extended to

cover such acts even when they were committed against fellow-nationals -- including in this case the wrongs which Germans had inflicted on Germans, whether Jewish or otherwise.

The Allies could have got most of what they wanted, and could have done so in a morally less dubious way, by limiting their prosecution solely to 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity'. However, as Simon had foreseen, the Americans were especially keen on a logic that emphasised how these actions had stemmed directly from the offence alleged under Count One -- that of 'conspiring', not least to unleash hostilities in the first place. Like the German defence counsel, the Soviet and French prosecutors made heavy weather of this concept. The judges eventually ruled that it could be pursued only when linked to 'crimes against peace', and to events starting from November 1937 when some of Hitler's ideas about annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia had been recorded in the 'Hossbach memorandum'.

Yet this notion of conspiratorial plotting continued to influence all the proceedings. It encouraged the accusers to exaggerate the coherence of policy-making within Nazi Germany. Conversely, it spurred the prisoners into stressing the kind of organisational confusion that might assist their claims to have been ignorant about the worst horrors of the regime. Here the Nuremberg Trial heavily influenced future writing about the Third Reich. If the prosecutors tended to prefigure those 'intentionalist' historians who have seen the practice of Nazism as the relatively simple unfolding of certain deep-laid ideas, the defence provided a first sketch for some elements within those 'structuralist' or 'functionalist' interpretations which have put greater stress on constant improvisations of policy and on confusions of responsibility.

That point is reinforced by the wrangles over Count Two. It condemned 'the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances'. Thus the accusation knotted together many legal and historical complexities. It was easier to show the general aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policies from 1933 to 1939 than to prove either that these sprang from what Jackson called a 'master blueprint' or that they were incontrovertibly criminal in substance. This was an area in which, as Simon had again warned, the law looked weak and the precedents seemed vague. In the absence of any international statute-making body, the accusers would have to rely heavily upon evidence that the states beyond Germany had actually behaved during the 1930s as though they already believed themselves to be confronting a criminal regime.

Here the Allied prosecutors faced numerous problems. For example, the Nazis' contempt for the League of Nations was doubtless deplorable. Yet Nuremberg's depiction of the organisation as a legal linchpin seemed merely hypocritical, granted that the USA had never joined it and that the USSR had even been expelled from it after attacking Finland in 1939. Nor was there anything too convincing about the prosecution's frequent invocations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Did this not attract such wide formal support for its aim of renouncing war as an instrument of policy precisely by avoiding any actual definition of 'aggression' or any stipulation about penalties? Then, again, passages from Hitler's writings and speeches would be quoted in the courtroom so as to berate the defendants for their failure to see the criminal intent of his foreign policies, but no prosecutor ever directed the same harsh questions to those Allied 'appeasers' who had proved similarly blind. Concerning the 1930s, Schacht was surely entitled to

enquire in his later memoirs: 'How were the German people supposed to realise that they were living under a criminal government when foreign countries treated this same government with such marked respect?' This was a point the E.L. Woodward, historical adviser to the British Foreign Office, was still making to the trial-planners on the eve of the Nuremberg proceedings, when he observed: 'Up to September 1st, 1939, His Majesty's Government was prepared to condone everything Germany had done to secure her position in Europe.'

This reluctant complicity by the Allies regarding certain Nazi policies that had been deemed criminal only in retrospect was not the worst potential flaw in the accusers' case. With reference to the indictment as a whole, it was understandable that those in the dock should also take every chance to register even more direct charges of *tu quoque* -- that is, to stigmatise the unwillingness of the prosecuting powers to relinquish the privileges of 'victors' justice' by confessing to the crimes which they themselves had allegedly committed while fighting Hitler. The anxiety in Whitehall lest the defence should complicate Count Two by examining the Cabinet papers of 1939-40 that dealt with pre-emptive action over Norway (as an option possibly to be pursued even against any Norwegian resistance thereto) was a relatively minor matter. Far more serious was the vulnerability of the British, and the Americans, to counter-charges under heading Three. These involved allegations about 'wanton destruction' inseparable from those modes of aerial warfare against civilian targets which, even in the 1990s, continue to render controversial the name of 'Bomber' Harris, and indeed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the atomic explosions detonated at the end of the conflict with Japan. This was one theme from the initial indictment which the prosecution soon found it prudent to soft-pedal, while another related to the waging of unrestricted submarine warfare in circumstances where Anglo-American practices turned out to be broadly similar to German ones.

The gravest difficulties stemmed, however, from the involvement of the USSR at Nuremberg. Such was the war extent of its human losses in the war (on a scale being hugely revised upwards even today) that by 1945 any absence of Soviet prosecutors and judges had become even more unthinkable than their presence. Yet, as the representatives of one totalitarian system waxed eloquent in their condemnation of the vanquished leaders of another, there was every prospect of the USSR's participation severely weakening the moral and legal integrity of the proceedings. The cogency of the of Count Two, for example, was scarcely enhanced by the Nazi-Soviet Pact that Molotov had signed with defendant Ribbontrop on August 23rd, 1939. Indeed, the charge was substantially weakened by growing (and accurate) suspicion that the agreement must have carried some form of secret protocol granting the USSR an entitlement to launch its own acts of aggression against eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Finland.

Nor did Nuremberg benefit from the Soviet prosecutors' insistence upon specifying the massacre of Poles in the Katyn forest as a Nazi atrocity. By the close of the trial it was becoming plainer than the crime belonged not to 1941, as alleged, but to 1940 when the area was still under the control of the Red Army. By excluding from the final judgement all reference to this matter, the Western members of the Tribunal were paying silent and embarrassed testimony to the fact that in Eastern Europe, before as well as after Germany and the USSR became open enemies in June 1941, both the Nazi and the Stalinist regimes had pursued their irreconcilable goals with comparable ruthlessness.

On August 31st, 1946, the defendants made their closing statements before the court, some showing defiance, others mere resignation at their expected fate. Over the next few weeks the members of the Tribunal completed their private deliberations, guided more by Lawrence's practical wisdom than by any flights of jurisprudence theory. From what we now know of these sessions, it is clear that, while some horse-trading between the judges became virtually unavoidable, they generally showed due care and fairness within the sometimes compromising framework of the Charter. The public reading of their findings began on September 30th. It ended the following afternoon with the announcement of their verdicts and sentences, which had been settled by simple majority vote whenever disagreement occurred. Acting probably on direct instruction from Moscow, the senior Soviet judge (General Nikitchenko) registered a last-minute dissent from the decision not to hang Hess, as well as from the Tribunal's selective approach towards deciding which Nazi organisations should be deemed criminal. In the early hours of October 16th - with seven defendants having been condemned to imprisonment, and with Bormann still missing -- ten of the eleven remaining captives were duly hanged at Nuremberg. It was Göring who escaped the noose, by taking his own life via a cyanide capsule late on the previous evening. His corpse was simply added to the others roughly laid out in the prison gymnasium for the purposes of photographic record. All the bodies were then promptly transported to some unknown destination for a cremation and secret dispersal of ashes.

So concluded an enterprise which, even amidst the vengeful passions so understandable in 1945-46, had endeavored to subject the Nazi tyranny to the cooler analysis of reason and of law. If political considerations too could not be entirely expunged from the proceedings, at least they were never permitted to become dominant. Soon the trial was providing a broad model for the legal action instituted by eleven Allied nations against Japanese leaders which started at Tokyo in May 1946, as well as for some later prosecutions in Germany conducted by individual occupying powers -- most notably, by the Americans at Nuremberg itself until 1949.

The International Military tribunal had proved largely successful in attaining its immediate objectives. True, the USSR had criticised what it saw as a lapse into leniency at the end, and elsewhere there was, in and beyond 1945-46, considerable public disquiet about those weaknesses which we have noted within the prosecutors' case. Even so, though the latter imperfections could be exploited by those keen to purvey neo-Fascist myths and legends, far fewer fantasies developed in Germany than had followed the defeat of 1918 -- and far fewer than would have flourished henceforth had the option of summary execution really been pursued. Who could ignore, above all, the contrast between the Tribunal's extended hearings and the peremptory conduct of 'justice' in the Nazi courts, let alone in the death-camps where even the pretence of legal process had been so murderously abandoned? In sum, the Nuremberg Trial played a very positive role in publicising the vicious origins, course, and consequences of Nazism, and thus in creating better prospects for democratic stability within the Federal Republic that would soon emerge from the zones of occupied Germany controlled by the Western Allies.

Yet those who organised the Tribunal placed no less store by their even broader aspirations for the decades ahead. Here the lack of success is something to which, half a century later, the state of our own world gives sad and ample testimony. Though by the end of 1946 the new United Nations had affirmed that the Nuremberg Charter and the concluding judgement

should be entrenched as fundamental elements of international law, very little progress was made thereafter towards building on those strengths so as to establish a permanent court for the trial of relevant crimes. If Count Two depended on a dubious reading of the past, it had also represented an effort to mould a better law for the future. Another outbreak of world-wide conflict was certainly avoided during the long superpower confrontation of the Cold War, yet that perilous peace owed far more to mutual nuclear deterrence than to any lasting conversion to the rules promulgated at Nuremberg. Meanwhile, albeit on a sub-global scale, many 'crimes against peace' have been occurring -- only for these aggressions to be left judicially unpunished.

As for the actual conduct of war once begun, much of the world's experience since 1945 suggests nothing more than utter disregard for the principles proclaimed by the Tribunal. Above all, the horrors of genocide -- in such places as Bosnia, Rwanda and the Kurdish lands -- have been bulking ever larger on our international agenda. Under those circumstances, as Ronnie Landau recently argued (*History Today*, March 1994):

> Occasional references to war-crimes trials add up to little more than empty political rhetoric, designed to salve our consciences, while having no effect whatsoever on the belligerent parties. Our role as 'peace-seekers' is one behind which we hide our passivity.

The weakness of action is especially evident from the international community's lack of sustained commitment to tackling perhaps the central difficulty. This is the fact that proceedings of the type pursued against the Nazis in 1945-46 are attractive to those who govern only when the identity of conquerors and conquered is conveniently settled in advance. We have urgent need of the political will to begin overcoming this problem, by developing a permanent international tribunal for the trial of war crimes -- one which must be effective in putting at risk potential winners as well as losers. Failing this, even the best of any future proceedings which might be cobbled together -- merely on an occasional basis, and normally after the completion of hostilities -- will not escape that taint of 'victors' justice' which still leads us to moderate our admiration for the pioneering efforts of those who planned and conducted the Nuremberg Trial.

FOR FURTHER READING:

Ann and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial* (MacMillan, 1984); Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg* (André Deutsch, 1977); Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (Bloomsbury, 1993); Gustav M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary* (London, 1948); Hilary Gaskin, *Eyewitness at Nuremberg* (Arms & Armour Press, 1990); Airey Neave, *Nuremberg* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1978); Werner Maser, *Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial* (Allen Lane, 1979); Robert K. Woetzel, *The Nuremberg Trials in International Law* (Stevens, 1922).

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 10

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Clayton, James D. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 703 to 732.

Comment:

This chapter analyzes the national and military strategies of Japan and America not only during the war years, but also during the four decades preceding them.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 10

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 150 to 187

Comment:

- Chapter 10, "Blitzkrieg." This is a chronological account of how military strategies and capabilities developed from World War I through World War II with emphasis on examples of general failure to plan in depth and of the specific failure of Germany, relying on "Blitzkrieg," to face its practical limitations in a long war.

- Chapter 11, "Total War." This chapter expands upon Germany's failure to plan strategically and logistically for World War II. These pages include two full page maps.

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LESSON 11

MODERN THEORISTS (II): AIR--STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL

As a fundamental proposition Aviation is either an Independent Arm, or is an auxiliary arm of the Army and of the Navy. I do not believe that anyone claims it to be an Independent Arm, that is, claims that Aviation acting alone is able successfully to combat and to defeat an Army or a Fleet. It is able to inflict heavy damage, or to offer invaluable assistance; but it cannot alone capture and hold ground or control the sea. Therefore, it is not an Independent Army but is one of the components of an Army or of a Fleet.

-- Captain Roy S. Geiger, USMC
10 January 1920

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson introduces you to air power theories and the ideas of its most prominent theorists:

- Giulio Douhet
- Billy Mitchell
- Roy S. Geiger

Importance of Air Power Theories

Air power theories provide you with a strong theoretical and practical background for employing air power.

Relationship to Other Instruction

Air power first was used in World War I and was employed much more extensively during Word War II. Therefore, an examination of the air power theories developed during this period is a natural progression in the study of warfare.

This lesson provides a foundation for all the courses that follow *Theory and Nature of War* (8801) including *Strategic Level of War* (8802), *Operational Level of War* (8803), and *Warfighting From the Sea* (8804 through 8808).

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

History and Development of Air Power	Understand the history behind the development of airpower and the factors that influenced the development of air power strategy in the pursuit of national policy. [JPME Areas 3d, 5a, and 5d]
Strategic Bombing Theorists	Understand the thinking of strategic bombing theorists and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments. [JPME Areas la, 3b, 3d, 5a, and 5d]
Nonstrategic Airpower Theorists	Understand the ideas of nonstrategic air power theorists and relate their ideas to nonstrategic military operations. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
WWII Theories	Compare the air power theories and practices of the major participants in World War II.
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	1/a/0.5 3/b/0.5 3/d/0.5 5/a/0.5 5/d/0.5

Historical Background

Early Views on Air Power

In some instances, the theory of air power has been raised to a status equal with the theory of war. In point of fact, many students of war claimed that air power could rewrite the theory of war and its actual conduct. This was based primarily on the belief that war would become obsolete with the rise of air power. Although that premise has not come to pass, theories of air power are necessary to determine the impact of this technology on modern warfare.

Interwar Years

In the years between the world wars, the differing approaches to air warfare in the various theories and among the major powers of the world were not derived from commonly accepted principles of air power. Despite the efforts of Douhet and Michell, neither proved to be a Mahan or Jomini from whom air power enthusiasts could draw the secrets of the third dimension in warfare.

"National" Theories of Air Power

- Application of air power was a product of separate choices of each major nation.
- These choices reflected an effort to integrate the unique capabilities of aircraft in support of land and sea forces or in independent operations in a manner that was both affordable and attuned to the achievement of national objectives.
- A secondary driving force, especially in the United States, was the effort to create an independent air arm, one that would be able to perform a unique mission that could not be achieved by any of the other services. (*Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 635)

Importance of Air Power Theory

The initial use of aviation assets and their subsequent modernization has influenced and continues to influence the conduct of war. As with other technological developments, the impact of air power has been reduced by the defensive measures developed to counter its use. Because air power constitutes a vital component of joint warfighting doctrine and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a knowledge of its origin and development is important.

World War II: Theories of Air Power

Great Britain	Bomber Command would have the priority mission--strategic bombing to destroy materiel and moral resources.
United States	Priority mission and funding went to high altitude strategic bombers; large bomber formations would rely on their own firepower for defense; no fighter escort would be required. The intention was to conduct precision daylight bombing of key strategic (industrial) targets. Naval air and its attendant carriers were two of the Navy's top priorities.
Japan	Power projection and naval air power were top priorities; they were influenced by geography. With no enemy close enough for strategic bombing in either direction, there was no need for strategic bombers. There was limited emphasis on air defense; the key role of aviation was to destroy enemy fleet and ports.
Germany	Tactical air-land armored warfare was the focus. Blitzkrieg tactics with coordinated air support led the attack. A key interpretive issue still debated was the influence of J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart on German doctrine.

Required Readings

Makers of Modern Strategy

MacIsaac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 624 to 647. When you read MacIsaac's essay, concentrate on what he said about Mitchell's concept on air power, what he said about the airplane's application, and the implication of creating an independent air arm in the United States.

Theory and Nature of War Readings

- Geiger, Roy S. (Major), USMC. "Relation of the Army and the Navy Air Components in Joint Operations." Memorandum for the Commandant, The Army War College, 29 April 1929, pp. 122 to 126. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. E-3 to E-16. The conceptual focus is the use of air power, command relationships, joint operations, and the unity of command of U.S. air forces. A strong opponent of the need for a separate air service, Geiger proposes more intense education and training of each respective air corps is needed along with the establishment of a joint air staff school.

- Warden, John A. III, (Colonel), USAF. "The Enemy as a System." *Airpower Journal*, Spring 1995, pp. 228 to 242. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. E-17 to E-31. As in any system, such as a cell, the human body, or the solar system, there are four basic components: central leadership/direction, organic essentials, infrastructures, and population. The author parallels those components to organizations and states and forms a basis by which to identify centers of gravity of a strategic entity and to develop campaign plans. The important point here is that in strategic warfare, whose ultimate goal is to apply pressure to the enemy's command structure, it is pointless to deal with enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or technology.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed here are **not** required; they are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Cohen, Eliot A. "A Revolution in Warfare." *Foreign Affairs*. March-April, 1996, pp. 37 to 54.

- Douhet, Giulio. "Air Warfare." Translated by Mrs. Dorothy Benedict with the assistance of Captain George Kenney, Air Corps Tactical School, 1933. *Theory and Nature of War Reader*, pp. 142 to 184.

- Freeman, Lawrence. "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 735 to 779.

- Gray, Colin S. "The Second Nuclear Age: Insecurity, Proliferation, and the Control of Arms." *Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, 1995-1996,* pp. 135 to 154.

- Tilford, Earl H. *The Revolution in Military Affairs*: *Prospects and Cautions*. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, pp. 1 to 20.

- Weigley, Russell F. "A Strategy of Air Power: Billy Mitchell." *The American Way of War*. New York: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 223 to 241.

Issues for Consideration

Douhet and Mitchell

During the interwar period, strategic and non-strategic theorists studied the concept of bombing an enemy's materiel and moral resources. This emphasis was based on the ideas of Douhet and Mitchell. What were their basic ideas? On what assumptions did their ideas rest? What is the relevance of these ideas today?

Comparison of the Air Power Countries

Compare the air power theories and practices of the major participants in World War II while

- Those countries prepared for war
- They fought the war

Geiger's View of Air Power

General Geiger presented another view of air power in his research paper at the Army War College. What were his basic ideas? How did they differ from those of Douhet?

Warden's Ideas on Air Power

Colonel John Warden is considered by many to be a contemporary air theorist. His ideas on air power are partly based upon the experiences of the Gulf War. How do you assess his theories?

Influence on Strategy

In 1936, Fighter Command started developing radar, enhanced communications, and fighters into an integrated air defense system. How was Britain's strategy influenced by Douhet on bombing and by Mitchell on fighters?

How was U.S. strategy influenced by Douhet on strategic bombing and by Mitchell on the vulnerability of ships to air attack?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 11

Subject: Required Readings

Title: MacIssac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 624 to 647.

Comment:

When you read MacIssac's essay, concentrate on what he said about Mitchell's concept on air power, what he said about the airplane's application, and the implication of creating an independent air arm in the United States.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 11

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Geiger, Roy S. (Major), USMC. "Relation of the Army and the navy Air Components in Joint Operations." Memorandum for the Commandant, The Army War College, 29 April 1929, pp. 122 to 126. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex E pp. E-3 to E-16.

Comment:

The conceptual focus is the use of air power, command relationships, joint operations, and the unity of command of U.S. air forces. A strong opponent of the need for a separate air service, Geiger proposes more intense education and training of each respective air corps is needed along with the establishment of a joint air staff school.

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RELATIONS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS IN JOINT OPERATIONS

Or

A "NAVAL AVIATOR'S" VIEW ON AVIATION AND AIR POWER"

GENERAL ROY S. GEIGER, USMC

(1) 1920 - When a Captain stationed in Port au Prince, Haiti

(2) 1928-29 - When a Major at the U. S. Army War College

From: Geiger Personal Papers Collection
PC 311, Box 1
Marine Corps Historical Center
Building 58
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C.]

Course Director's Notes: (1) Grammar, to include spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, and writing style are as in the original documents.
(2) Attention is drawn to Geiger's conceptual focus, and commentary on the use of air power, command relationships, joint oprations, and unity of command.
(3) Special recognition to Major Tim Quagge, USMC, Command and Staff College, 1995-96, who found these papers while researching his Masters of Military Studies paper on General Roy Geiger.

Squadron "E", Marine Aviation Force
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti
January 10, 1920

My dear Captain Craven:

Replying to your letter of December the 15th, 1919, regarding a Separate Air Force for the United States, I wish to offer you my views on the subject as follows:

As a fundamental proposition, Aviation is either an Independent Arm, or is an auxiliary arm of the Army and of the Navy. I do not believe that any one claims it to be an Independent Arm, that is, claims that Aviation acting alone is able successfully to combat and to defeat an Army or a Fleet. It is able to inflict heavy damage, or to offer invaluable resistance; but it cannot alone capture and hold ground or control the Sea. Therefore, it is not an Independent Arm; but is one of the components of an Army or of a Fleet.

From sound judgement and from all past experiences, it is found that all elements of a Fleet as well as all elements of an Army must be under a single Head for the purposes of equipment, training and operations or discord and failure will result. Admitting the above to be true, it follows that if Aviation which is to serve with the Fleet is taken from under the control of the Navy Department and placed in the hands of other authority, success for Aviation cannot be expected, and the services of a most important Arm will be lost to the Fleet.

My practical experience has caused me to firmly believe that the personnel of Aviation should be <u>seamen</u> first. I mean Naval Aviation. As a matter of fact, I believe that their duties require them to be the <u>best</u> seamen in the Navy. This training can be given by one branch of the service only and that is the Navy. Unless the Aviation personnel is trained thoroughly and in full accord with the Fleet personnel, and unless they have a mutual confidence and a thorough understanding of the habits, capabilities and problems of each other, success cannot be expected. They must learn to speak the same language.

I believe the same applies to the Army.

A Separate Air Service with duties to furnish Aviation for the Army, for the Navy and for the Postal Department, etc. would end up in a conglomerate organization with a divided purpose and a laxity of discipline which could only result in the final formation of <u>three</u> Corps within the Air Service.

The Navy knows its needs and the Army knows its needs as far as Aviation is concerned better than any other Department. All the advantages that are claimed for a Separate Air Service can be had by the formation of an Advisory Board, by a proper system of laison, and by inter-exchange of officers especially at experimental and training stations. No experimental work need be duplicated. By this method of Government will save considerably finantially [sic] and the Services will not sacrifice their internal coordination and efficiency.

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My belief is that all this agitation for a Separate Air Service emanates from disgruntaled officers, who, during the War, held high rank and position and who are now using every endeavor to create similar positions for themselves.

To conclude: Theoretically, I think a Separate Air Service is unsound; practically, I think it would be a failure and a source of friction and discord throughout both the Army and the Navy.

Yours very truly,

Roy S. Geiger,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps

Captain T.T. Craven,
U.S. Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COURSE AT THE ARMY WAR COLEGE, 1928-1929.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANT,
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

SUBJECT:

RELATION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY AIR COMPONENTS IN JOINT OPERATIONS

Prepared by

Major Roy S. Geiger, U.S.M.C.

April 29, 1929

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The Army War College
Washington, D.C.
April 30, 1929.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANT

Subject: Relation of the Army and Navy Air Components in Joint Operations.

I. Papers accompanying.
1. Bibliography.

II. The study presented.
1. The functions of the Army and the Navy air components overlap. This study is made for the purposes of investigating our air policy , determining the extent to which components are mutually supporting, and examining means whereby closer coordination may be obtained.

III. Facts bearing upon the study.
1. Air policy of the United States. The development of our air policy has been influenced mainly by our geographic position, by our scheme of national defense and by our system of government. It subordinates all air forces to either the Army or the Navy, allows each to develop its own air arm as dictated by military or naval needs, and it places all commercial aviation under a civil branch of the government. "Our national policy calls for the establishment of the air strength of our Army primarily as an agency of defense," (1) based on the assumption that the United States is in no danger by air attack from any potential enemy of menacing strength. (2) Our policy is to maintain Naval Aviation in due relation to the fleet, the strength of the latter being determined by international agreement. (3)

The general policy of coordination between the three divisions of aviation, Army, Navy and Commerce, is assumed to be effected by exchange of ideas and mutual agreements. (4)

The capabilities of aircraft are such that they are able to operate over both the land and the sea. These elements traditionally have been limited to operations of the Army and Navy respectively. This peculiarity of the Air Arm, enabling the Army to perform nominal naval functions, and vice versa, has intensified the problem of coordination between the Army and the Navy. To effect this coordination, to eliminate duplication, and to avoid placing restrictions on either air arm which will retard its proper development for performing all functions in a manner most suitable to itself, are problems now confronting the Army and Navy air components. To

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(1) Aircraft in National Defense, Message from the President to the 69th Congress, Document No. 18, page 10.
(2) Ibid, page 11
(3) Ibid, page 10
(4) Ibid, page 19; Hearings, Committee on Naval Affairs, Senate, 69 Congress, First Session, 1926, page 75.

solve these problems, the War and Navy Departments have established joint agencies by mutual agreement. (5)

2. Air Policy of other powers. Most of the military powers of Europe including Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia have established independent air departments coequal with their armies and their navies. An examination of the Air Departments of these countries show that they include commercial aviation. This relationship between a military and a commercial activity has no precedent in the United States and is repugnant to our governmental policy. "The historic tradition of the United States is to maintain military forces for defense and to keep those forces subordinate to the civilian government." (6) A further examination shows that these countries assign squadrons to the Army, other squadrons to the Navy and maintain additional squadrons to act independently, or to be placed under the control of the Army or of the Navy as needs may require. (8) The United States accomplishes the same result by having air forces assigned Q.H.Q. act independently when occasion arises for such a procedure.

3. Comparison of systems.

a. Reasons. The reasons most frequently advanced in England for a separate Air Ministry are:

"(1) The people of this country are nervous of air attack and it has been agreed by the Committee of Imperial Defense that the risk of an air attack has increased, while that of seaborne invasion has decreased. This has undoubtedly created an impression on the public mind. Both the public and the press are jealous with any interference with the Air Ministry.

"(2) If the air is divided as an auxiliary to the two older services, air development will be arrested to some degree.

"(3) It was the practical experience of war which gave birth to the Air Ministry, and if it had not been for the war, it probably would have remained divided between the other two services." (9)

The same author states: "We do not get much guidance from other countries. Our task is so different from that of other nations. No other nation is at the same time subject to serious air attacks from a neighboring country, dependent for its supplies from overseas, and responsible for possessions in every quarter of the globe." (9)

b. Our policy sound. A search has failed to reveal any logical grounds for a separate department, other than those mentioned above. An analysis of those reasons show that they have

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(5) Joint action of the Army and Navy, 1927.

(6) Aircraft in National Defense, Message from the President to the 69th Congress, Document No. 18m page 6.

(7) Ibid, page 6.

(8) Monthly Information Bulletin, Office of Naval Intelligence, Jan. 1929, page 80. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Feb. 1926. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th Ed. Vol 29, page 67.

(9) Major General Sir J.H. Davidson in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, February 1926.

but small application in the organization of the air forces of a country situated as is the United States. The first reason given is not pertinent, as it is physically impossible for any country now having an appreciable air force to attack this country other than by means of sea borne forces. "Until airplanes, loaded with bombs, can fly back and forth with impunity across the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, as they can do now across the English Channel and other inland seas, the problem of coast defense against hostile air raids will remain a much simpler one for the United States than it is for European powers." (10). The third reason given is likewise inapplicable as the United States did not find it necessary to establish a Department of the Air during the war, although it was found necessary to coordinate procurement. The second reason advanced is open to discussion as it applies to the air forces of the United States as well as to those of other countries. It is not unreasonable to assert that the Air Arm will develop more rapidly if made independent of the Army and Navy. On the other hand an Air Arm so developed will not necessarily be the most efficient in national defense. As a matter of fact the growth of our Air Forces depends primarily upon the amount of funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose together with its intelligent expenditure. While the effectiveness of our Air Forces depends upon its ability to perform its role in coordination with the other arms, this coordination can be obtained only by the closest association of all arms. A separate air department does not lead to such results. It is therefore believed that our air policy is sound.

4. Functions. Having determined that the air forces of the United States should be incorporated in the Army and in the Navy, it follows that the air component of each derives its functions from that of the Army or the Navy according to which it forms a part. The Army Air Corps is primarily concerned with operations over the land and naval aviation with operations over the sea. The air force has not added a new function to the Army or the Navy, but it has given to each a means whereby its range of action has been increased by several hundred miles, and added a corresponding responsibility in defending against like weapons. This increase in range is not restricted by land or water features. Previous to the use of aviation, it was logical to make the coast line the boundary between the activities of the Army and the Navy. With aviation such a boundary becomes purely artificial. There are no land or water features which can be designated to mark this boundary. The functions of the organization to which the air component belongs determines the characteristics of the aircraft, training, armament, equipment and bases. These factors in turn determine the tasks which the air units are capable of performing.

The functions of the air components meet and overlap at the seacoast. It is here that the maximum air power is required to repel invasion or to initiate overseas operations. Properly coordinated, our greatest air power should be developed here, uncoordinated, our weakest will be. In "Joint action of the Army and the Navy" (11) neither air component is given the function of coast defense, but each derives so much of this function as belongs to its parent service. Our system recognizes the necessity for joint air action and has made provisions for them. An examination of the characteristics of the two components will make clear the extent to which they are inter-changeable or of rendering mutual support.

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(11) Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1927.

5. Characteristics.

a. Training. Air units properly trained and equipped can perform missions either military or naval. To so qualify all classes of aviation in times of peace would be a gigantic undertaking. In times of war it would be impracticable, if desirable. The training of the air components is bound to be different. Each has a base for its training the indoctrination, tradition, and method of thought of its mother service. Moreover, each is trained to operate with and as a part of its mother service. Thus we find Army aviators students of and familiar with the phases of land warfare, and naval aviators equally well qualified in naval warfare. An army aviator, as such, is incompetent of conducting naval warfare; and a naval aviator need have no knowledge of land warfare. Air forces operating over the water whose personnel is unacquainted [sic] with and unable to recognize the situation existing on the surface may well become a menace to their own navy.

Aircraft operating over the water must have the cooperation of seacraft. This is necessary in times of peace for purposes of training and rescue. It is necessary in times of war for obtaining continuous observation and security. Army air units operating over the sea must either have the support of naval seacraft or procure surface vessels from other sources. This illustrates the fact that proper coordination may involve elements other than the air units concerned.

b. Bases. To provide suitable bases from which to operate airplanes is a relative simple matter for the Army Air Corps. Floating bases have been the greatest problem which the Navy has had to solve in connection with aviation. The solution has produced the tender, the catapult and the carrier, all of which are inferior to land bases for operating airplanes. The carrier has made possible the use of land airplanes with the Fleet while at sea. The Navy is taking advantage of this condition by using land airplanes with their superior military characteristics for all purposes practicable. This is resulting in giving to naval aviation great mobility as it can operate from a land base or from a floating base or from both. This advantage together with the fact that it is a policy of our people to maintain our Navy always in a state of full readiness for war, furnishes reasonable argument for supporting the contention that our aerial coast defense should be a primary function of the Navy. (12). In times of war the Navy can be expected to base all types of its aircraft at land bases when their function can be performed from such bases.

c. Aircraft.

(1) Pursuit (Fighting). The missions, training and equipment of pursuit aviation in both services are such that this class of aviation can participate equally as well in both land and naval aerial warfare; except that a few fighting seaplanes now carried on combatant vessels cannot hope to compete successfully with land airplanes, and Army pursuit cannot operate from floating bases without alterations to airplanes and special training.

(2) Bombardment. Some missions and equipment are practically the same while others are quite different. Armament of the Navy includes both torpedoes and depth charges, the latter for use against submarines. The training differs to the extent that a bombing operation over the land in connection with a battle should be controlled by a leader having knowledge of land warfare, i.e., an army aviator; and a bombing operation over the sea in connection with naval operations, must be controlled by a leader having knowledge of naval warfare, i.e., a naval aviator. When pursuit and attack are supporting bombardment, all should be controlled.

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(12) The Encyclopedia Britannica, page 69. Vol 29, 13th Edition.

(3) Attack. Attack aviation is in relatively the same status as is bombardment, except that the training features should receive greater emphasis especially in land operations.

(4) Observation. The missions performed, types of planes used, and the training of the two services in observation differ to such an extent that this type is interchangeable to a limited degree only. This applies to both close and distant reconnaissance army airplanes as well as to the Navy spotting, patrol and scouting squadrons.

d. Deduction. The capabilities of the air components of the two services to function together in a joint operation depends upon many factors, the most important being the training of the personnel, the bases used, the equipment required, the necessary coordination with other arms, and the nature of the operation undertaken. Of these the most important is the training of the personnel. With proper knowledge, other features lacking can often be improvised; but training does not permit of substitution. Pursuit, bombardment and attack aviation are capable of performing both military and naval functions in joint operations in importance relatively in the order as named; observation aviation is capable of interchange to a limited degree only for the performance of a small number of tasks.

6. Joint Operations. Joint operations will be considered under the headings of coastal operations and overseas operations.

a. Coastal operations. Coastal operations are of two kinds:

(1) Operations to repel minor attacks or raids by small forces.

(2) Operations to repel major attacks by large forces.

b. Minor Operations. The former are carried out jointly by the army forces assigned to frontier commands and by local naval defense forces assigned to Naval Districts. The air forces assigned for this duty will generally consist of observation, patrol and scouting squadrons. Reenforcements [sic] of all types of aviation may be furnished either by G.H.Q. the Fleet or both. Undue dispersion would result in assigning pursuit, bombardment and attack aviation to the Frontier, and naval local defense forces along the entire coast.

c. Major operations. The second class of operations will be conducted by one or more armies of the land forces and by all or a part of the Fleet. All classes of aviation of both the army and the navy may participate.

d. Tasks assigned the air forces in coastal operations. The following are tasks assigned the air forces.

Escorting convoys and protecting shipping.
Scouting, patroling and reconnaissance.
Attacking air craft.
Attacking sea craft.
Attacking enemy land bases.
Attacking enemy main landing force.

(1) Escorting convoys and protecting shipping. This task is so closely associated with naval activities that it would only be in rare cases that any but naval air forces would be so engaged. In all cases the air activities must be directed by the same authority which control the movements of seacraft within the same area.

(2) Scouting, patroling and reconnaissance. This task performed over the coastal waters and sea lanes is in support and supplementary to naval surface craft and submarines performing the same duty in the same water areas. It is necessary that the aircraft and seacraft work in close coordination and that each know where, when and what the other is doing, in order to accomplish sure results. Close in patrols over sea lanes and harbors must be maintained in order to detect enemy submarines and mine fields. Aerial reconnaissance should be maintained seaward daily to a distance at least as great as a hostile fleet can sail during the hours of darkness, in the absence of sufficient naval scouting seacraft. Naval Scouting and Patrol Squadrons are properly used for discovering and observing the enemy. The best results may be expected if this air activity is directed by a Naval Officer who naturally would have the least difficulty in coordinating it with the other naval activities.

Observation must be maintained over mine fields of the Coast Artillery and the defense prepared along the landing beaches. Observation and battle reconnaissance for the forces of the Army can be most efficiently given by the air units trained for that purpose. When the enemy approaches the coast, Army, Corps and division observation air units will play their part.

(3) Attacking aircraft. Enemy airplanes to attack from seaward must come from either a floating base or a land base. To attack enemy airplanes is the mission of all pursuit and fighting squadrons. All airplanes of these types should be combined for this purpose. Actual aerial fights are the functions of both services. Such an attack however should form a part of a continuing operation to destroy the enemy's base which, if not previously located, can be found by following the enemy airplanes. One officer should control the whole operation. The nature of the undertaking whether naval or army depends upon the character of the base. If the enemy base is floating, this is a naval undertaking and if land it is an army.

(4) Attacking sea craft. Assuming that the Navy carries out its functions properly, enemy seacraft will be discovered by naval scouting forces. The Navy will have various submarines and surface vessels within the area. Enemy vessels as well as our vessels will constantly change position. In order that an air attack against such enemy vessels may have the greatest chance of success, the closest coordination between the naval seacraft and the air forces must be maintained. In event our vessels are attacking, the air attack should be coordinated. This can best be done by the Naval Commander.

(5) Attacking Enemy temporary land bases. Land bases do not change their position. Naval air forces are at a great disadvantage in attacking them if operating from floating bases. Air attacks on such bases are army functions unless they are at such a distance that they cannot be reached by army planes, in which case, they become naval functions.

(6) Attacking enemy main landing force. An enemy is not to be expected to make a landing in force on our coast until he has gained a decided superiority both on the sea and in the air. During the phase of contesting this superiority, the operation is mainly naval and the air forces engaged should be controlled by the Navy. Should the enemy gain this decision, then the hostile transports are free to approach the shore and it becomes an Army task to repel them. In such case all of the air forces should operate under the Army.

e. Overseas operations. In an overseas operation there will be present air units of the Navy and air units of the Army expeditionary force. The joint plan will contain the strength and the schemes for the employment of all air forces within the theater of operation.

At the present time the only means of transporting the airplanes of the Expeditionary Force to the proposed theater of overseas operations, other than by flying them when the distance is not too great, is in cargo vessels. Of course they can be transported in airplane carriers, if the carrier immobilizes its aircraft during the voyage. They may be shipped crated or partly crated. A base on land is required before they can be operated. If the air units of the expeditionary force are required initially to support the landing, a temporary base for the operation of the units on land must be established previous to their landing, and the airplanes moved ashore, uncrated, set up and tested before they are ready for operation. This requires time running into days for a large air force. For safety in their establishment it may be necessary to prepare two temporary bases; the first beyond flying range of the defender's airplanes, and the second near the location of the proposed landing in order that the aircraft can be put in operation at the first base and flown prepared for combat into the zone of the defender's aerial activities to the second temporary base. This method might be used in a case where the Navy has not previously obtained air control.

The naval air forces will operate from floating bases, i.e. carriers, combat vessels and tenders until land bases have been established. They are at a disadvantage in the following particulars:

(1) Airdromes. The defender operates from land airdromes which can be as many and as large as desired. His airplanes can take off and be used as a unit in action with comparatively little delay. His airdromes remain stationary and there is no difficulty in pilots returning and landing. The attacking force if using carriers can take off only one to three airplanes per minute from each carrier. They are thereby delayed in assembling for action. On returning they must land at a greater interval on airdromes whose positions are constantly changing. This materially reduces the flying radius of their action. If airplanes of the attacking force are launched from catapults, more unfavorable conditions exist. To use seaplanes operating from a tender as a base, is possible only in sheltered waters and then is attended by numerous difficulties.

(2) The primary mission of the naval force is the protection of the convoy, hence the naval air forces have the same mission. No Naval Commander can permit his fighting squadrons to leave the vicinity of his fleet, when his ships are within range of hostile bombing planes. On the other hand, the pursuit and fighting squadrons of the defender are better situated to act on the offensive.

f. Air operations.

Scouting at sea.
Escorting convoys.
Reconnaissance and observation
Attacking enemy seacraft.
Attacking enemy aircraft.
Attacking enemy shore establishments.
Supporting the landing operations.

(1) Scouting and escort duty at sea. These are naval functions, and the Navy is the only service likely to have planes available for the duty.

(2) Reconnaissance and observation. Reconnaissance of the coastal waters for the purpose of locating mines and enemy craft and for examining beaches is a Naval function. The Army is also interested in the examination of beaches. In addition the Army is interested in the nature of the terrain and in the enemy's dispositions and establishments.

(3) Attacking enemy seacraft. This operation will be carried on in close coordination with naval seacraft and is a function of the Navy.

(4) Attacking enemy aircraft. This task falls equally to the Army and Navy aircraft present and prepared for operation.

(5) Attacking enemy shore establishments. The equipment and training of the Army Air Corps make it more efficient for attacking land establishments and such missions should be performed under its directions, as soon as it can operate from temporary bases.

(6) Supporting the land operation. There is a conflict of interest here. If the defender still has an air force to threaten the landing, then the primary use of our air force is to protect the vessels and the troops landing for which the Navy is responsible. On the other hand, if the defender air arm offers no threat, then all available air units should support the landing by initially taking the place of the Expeditionary artillery in support of naval gun fire and in performing other tasks similar to those performed in land warfare. In the latter case the Army has a primary interest in the air force, and its use should conform to the wishes of the Army Commander. Moreover, the air activities must conform to the operations of the troops on the ground and a more assured liaison can be maintained by having the former controlled by an Air Corps officer. In either case, spotting for naval gunfire is performed by naval observation and battle reconnaissance should be performed by army observation or, in the absence of the latter, by army observers in naval airplanes.

7. Other operations. Numerous situations can be conceived wherein naval aviation can be used to great advantage in supporting army aviation in purely military operations, and vice versa. In fact they are capable of acting together in any aerial operation excepting at sea beyond the range of land based airplanes.

8. Cooperation. The above discussion of joint operations show some of the numerous occasions where the air forces of the two services act tactically together. They show that the joint air forces will not only be called upon to perform army missions and naval missions; but that a single task may comprise both military and naval functions. When they act together, they must be coordinated to secure the best results, and this can best be obtained by placing them under a single command. It would be folly to let the Army furnish a commander for one mission, and the Navy furnish a commander for the following mission in accordance with the nature of the mission whether military or naval. The service designated to furnish a commander should retain this right until the operation as a whole is completed, or until the situation is so changed as to require a reorganization of the forces, regardless of the service which may have paramount interest at various times during the operation.

Naval air operations during the late war consisted mainly of patrol, scouting and convoy duty. Army air forces received valuable experience on the Western Front. The tactical doctrines of both air components are based on the lessons learned from the war as modified to fit the needs of its parent service, together with experiments and training had [sic] since the war. The army is further developing its air tactics at its service schools, while the navy is doing this in the fleet. While it would appear that the two services having, as they do, a common basis for development would be very much alike, yet there is a difference. This is seen on the surface in nomenclature, and it is, in reality, the same difference which exists between the Army and Navy throughout.

The means so far taken for coordination, effect procurement, planning and restrictions on the activities of the two air components; but they do not provide for testing the plans so made for practical training. (13) This country has always depended upon cooperation to obtain unity of action in joint operations. Unity of command is based on true logic but it is an experiment in so far as the United States is concerned. It is without the test of war and even has not been given a trial by peace maneuvers. There is no assurance at this time that proper coordination can and will be had in war. Three plans suggest themselves for assuring this air cooperation. First, by a separate air department which has already been considered and discarded. Second, by a reassignment of functions so that one service will be responsible for all air operations which are now joint, thereby reducing the necessity for cooperation to a minimum. Third, by education and training.

9. Reassignment of functions. A reassignment of functions of the air components to such an extent as here considered would place a restriction on either the Army or the Navy using all the means at its disposal for carrying out its missions. Neither would submit to being denied the use of its air forces for purposes considered to be desirable and necessary. Such a re-arrangement however, would be normally at the expense of the Army Air Corps, as most of the joint operations occur over the sea and require the cooperation of seacraft.

10. Education and Training.

a. Education. It appears that the only thing lacking to make our present system complete, is a plan for educating and training the personnel in joint operations. Only with a sympathetic understanding of the problems, methods and doctrines of each other, can the two services operate together with assurance of success. In order to provide a means to this end which will give to the officers of both services instruction and experience in solving all the problems of joint operations, a "Joint Air Staff School" should be established. Numerous problems would be presented in the inauguration of such an institution; but their solutions could be found, provided the two services are really sincere in the proposition of unity of command.

b. Training. A school is not sufficient to present all the problems and their solutions incident to joint operations. For this purpose maneuvers are the best means short of actual war. No other arm can be assembled with such ease, economy and celerity, as can the air forces. Joint maneuvers held yearly in connection with the school, in addition to the training furnished in all phases of joint air operations, would test the soundness of the instruction being given, as well as our doctrine of joint operations.

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(13) Joint action of the Army and the Navy, 1927.

IV. Conclusion.

1. Our air policy is sound.
2. Additional education and training is necessary to make our system complete.
3. A joint air staff school should be established, and joint air maneuvers should be held to provide the means necessary for additional education and training.

/s/ Roy S. Geiger
ROY S. GEIGER
Major, U.S. Marine Corps.

Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 11

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Warden, John A. III, (Colonel), USAF. "The Enemy as a System." *Airpower Journal,* Spring 1995, pp. 228 to 242. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* pp.126 to 141. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex E, pp. E-17 to E-31.

Comment:

As in any system, such as a cell, the human body, or the solar system, there are four basic components: central leadership/direction, organic essentials, infrastructures, and population. The author parallels those components to organizations and states and forms a basis by which to identify centers of gravity of a strategic entity and to develop campaign plans. The important point here is that in strategic warfare, whose ultimate goal is to apply pressure to the enemy's command structure, it is pointless to deal with enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or technology.

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

THE ENEMY AS A SYSTEM

COL JOHN A. WARDEN III, USAF

We were a different breed of cat right from the start. We flew through the air while the others walked on the ground.

—Gen Carl A. Spaatz

SPAATZ'S DICTUM is as accurate a description of airmen today as it was over a half century ago. Slightly modified, it also applies to strategic warfare because strategic warfare is a different animal from the warfare we have known throughout history. It is not easy to understand because we need to toss out many of our ideas about war. Furthermore, prosecuting it requires top-down thinking—thinking from the big picture to the small—rather

than the bottom-up thinking that serves us so well when we deal with tactical issues.

There are basically two ways to think—inductively and deductively. The first requires gathering many small facts to see if anything can be made of them. The second starts with general principles from which detail can be learned. The first is tactical, the second is strategic. In the Air Force, most of our early training involves us with inductive processes. To become good operational artists and strategists, however, we must learn to think deductively. A good example from the civilian world comes from a comparison of architects and bricklayers.

Architects approach a problem from the top down involving a place where people are going to live. First, they envision a town with its areas for schools, houses, and businesses. When they have the overall plan in mind, they begin to think about what kinds of buildings will go into each area. They decide on a style of house that they believe will meet the needs of the probable residents. They design a house starting with general ideas of space and appearance. At the very end of the process, they may specify brick facings and how many courses of bricks will be used. Each step progresses from the large to the somewhat smaller until they finally have reached that level of detail that they can leave to someone else.

Think how bricklayers would approach the same problem. Given their training, they would start with the idea of stacking bricks, but they wouldn't have any way to know how to integrate bricks with other materials or how one house would relate to another or how the town would be divided. In other words, you can't build a very well-organized town if you approach it from the bottom up.

The same thing applies to devising a campaign. If you start your thinking based on the bricks in the enemy camp, it is unlikely that you will produce a coherent plan. Conversely, if you approach it from the standpoint of large ideas about objectives and about the nature of the enemy, you have a good chance of developing something that will work.

We cannot think strategically if we start our thought process with individual aircraft, sorties, or weapons—or even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must focus on the totality of our enemy, then on our objectives, and next on what must happen to the enemy before our objectives become his objectives. When all of this is done rigorously, we can begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy—the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means we will use.

As strategists and operational artists, we must rid ourselves of the idea that the central feature of war is the clash of military forces. In strategic war, a clash may well take place, but it is not always necessary, should normally be avoided, and is almost always a means to an end and not an end in itself.

If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed of numerous subsystems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.

Finally, as twentieth-century strategists, we must demystify war to a considerable extent. Napoléon and Clausewitz were right when they talked about friction, fog, and morale. They were right, however, in a time when communications were almost nonexistent, weapons had little more range or accuracy than those of the Roman legions, most movement was at a walking pace, battles were won or lost depending on the outcome of tens of thousands of almost personal encounters between soldiers who could see each other when they fired, and war was largely confined to the clash of men or ships at a limited point in time and space.

Under these circumstances, morale was to the physical as three is to one. In fact, the

physical was largely the "physical" of the individual soldier and it was almost impossible to separate the intangibles like morale, friction, and fog from the physical. Today the situation is significantly different; the individual fighter has become a director of large things like tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, and ships. Fighters are dependent on these things, these physical things, to carry out the mission. Deprived of them, the ability to affect the enemy drops to near zero. Whether the equation has changed to make the physical to be to the morale as three is to one is not clear. That the two are at least coequal, however, seems likely. The advent of airpower and accurate weapons has made it possible to destroy the physical side of the enemy. This is not to say that morale, friction, and fog have all disappeared. It is to say, however, that we can now put them in a distinct category, separate from the physical. As a consequence, we can think broadly about war in the form of an equation:

(Physical) × (Morale) = Outcome

In today's world, strategic entities, be they an industrial state or a guerrilla organization, are heavily dependent on physical means. If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation. Looking at this equation, we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable. Conversely, the morale side—the human side—is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side.

Objectives are key to success in strategic war. When we go to war with a state or with any strategic entity,[1] we must (or certainly should) have objectives, and these objectives, to be useful, must go far beyond those such as merely beating the enemy or wrecking his military forces. (Indeed, the latter may be precisely what we don't want to do; remember, war at the strategic level is not the same as at the tactical level where defeat of the enemy's tactical forces is required almost by definition.) After all, we don't go to war merely to have a nice fight; rather, we go to war to attain something of political value to our organization.

The something that we want to attain may be as extreme as annihilation of the state or colonization of it. At the opposite pole, we may simply want our enemy not to annihilate us. In between is an enormous array of possibilities, a few of which follow: in the Gulf War, the US wanted Iraq out of Kuwait and wanted Iraq's power diminished to where it was no longer a threat to its neighbors; in Operation El Dorado Canyon, the US wanted Libya's Muammar Qadhafi to stop sponsoring international terrorism; in Indochina, the US wanted Vietnam to remain free of North Vietnamese and communist domination; in the American Revolutionary War, the Americans wanted to be free from Great Britain; in the War of 1898, the United States wanted to wrest Cuba and the Philippines away from Spain; and in World War II, Japan wanted to own her primary sources of raw material and energy.

At the strategic level, we attain our objectives by causing such changes to one or more parts of the enemy's physical system that the enemy decides to adopt our objectives, or we make it physically impossible for him to oppose us. The latter we call *strategic paralysis*. Which parts of the enemy system we attack (with a variety of weapons ranging from explosives to nonlethal computer viruses) will depend on what our objectives are, how much the enemy wants to resist us, how capable he is, and how much effort we are physically, morally, and politically capable of exercising.

A good place to start our examination of enemy systems is at the center. By definition, all systems have some kind of organizing center. The nucleus of an atom controls the orbits of the electrons just as the sun controls the motion of the planets. In the

Table 1

Systems

	Body	State	Drug Cartel	Electric Grid
Leadership	Brain • eyes • nerves	Government • communication • security	Leader • communication • security	Central control
Organic Essentials	Food and oxygen (conversion via vital orgrans)	Energy (electricity, oil, food) and money	Coca source plus conversion	Input (heat, hydro) and output (electricity)
Infra-structure	Vessels, bones, muscles	Roads, airfields, factories	Roads, airways, sea lanes	Transmission lines
Population	Cells	People	Growers, distributors, processors	Workers
Fighting Mechanism	Leukocytes	Military, police, firemen	Street soldiers	Repairmen

biological world, every organism has a directing mechanism ranging from the complex human brain to the nucleus of an amoeba. A strategic entity—a state, a business organization, a terrorist organization—has elements of both the physical and the biological, but at the center of these whole systems and of every subsystem is a human being who gives direction and meaning. The ones who provide this direction are leaders, either of the whole country or some part of it. They are the ones on which depends the functioning of every subsystem, and they are the ones who decide when they want their strategic entity to adopt—or not to adopt—a different set of objectives. They, the leaders, are at the strategic center, and in strategic warfare must be the figurative, and sometimes the literal, target of our every action.

The Five-Ring Model

To make the concept of an enemy system useful and understandable, we must make a simplified model. We all use models daily and we all understand that they do not mirror reality. They do, however, give us a comprehensible picture of a complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it. The best models at the strategic level are those that give us the simplest possible big picture. As we need more detail, we expand portions of our model so that we can see finer and finer detail. It is important, however, that in constructing our model and using it, we always start from the big and work to the small. The model that we have found to be a good approximation of the real world is the five-ring model. It seems to describe most systems with acceptable accuracy and it is easily expandable to get finer detail as required. Thinking about something as large as a state is difficult, so let us start our examination of the five rings with something somewhat more familiar to us—our own bodies (table 1).

At the very center—the personal strategic center—is the brain. The body can exist

without a functioning brain, but under such circumstances, the body is no longer a human being, or a strategic entity. (A strategic entity is anything that can function on its own and is free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do.) The brain provides the leadership and direction to the body as a whole and to all its parts. It, and it alone, is absolutely essential in the sense that there can be no substitute for it and without it the body, even though technically alive, is no longer operating at a strategic level. Included with the brain are the preceptors that allow it to gather and disseminate information internally and externally. The eyes and other organs fall into this category.

All systems seem to require certain organic essentials—normally some form of input energy and the facilities to convert it to another form. For human beings, the essential inputs are food and oxygen. Thus, next in order of priority are those organs we call vital, like the heart, the lungs, and the liver—the ones that convert or convey food and air into something the body can use. Without these organic essentials,[2] the brain cannot perform its strategic function, and without the brain, these organs don't get the commands they need to provide integrated support. Note here that a machine can substitute for all the vital organs; conversely, there is no machine that can take over strategic functions from the brain.

One might ask why the vital organs would not be more important than or equal to the brain. The reason is that without the integrating, directing function of the brain, these organs are without meaning. Conversely, the brain could theoretically be kept alive and in communication with the outside world through some form of life-support systems. Under such circumstances, it would still be a "person" and would still be capable of influencing the outside world. A heart without a brain, on the other hand, is a very expensive, complex pump without meaning or ability to act or to affect.

Next in order might be the infrastructure of bones, blood vessels, and muscles. This infrastructure is important, but there is a lot of it, and the body is capable of working around problems involving it.

Continuing our examination of the body, we might next list the tens of millions of cells that carry food and oxygen around the body. They also are important, but one can lose a fair portion and still survive.

So far, we have identified a complete system, a body that can do everything it is designed to do. In a perfect world, it would need nothing more. Unfortunately, the world is not perfect; rather, it is filled with nasty parasites and viruses that attack the body whenever they can. The body protects itself with specialized protective cells such as white blood cells. They constitute the fifth and last part of our universal system model.

As we think about human bodies, we think in terms of systems; although we can assign various levels of importance to the parts of the body, the parts really constitute a system. If any part of the system becomes incapable of functioning, it will have a more or less important effect on the rest of the body. Interestingly, each part of the body is in turn a system. The heart, as an example, has an internal control mechanism, uses incoming energy, has an internal network of vessels, has millions of cells to do necessary work, and has its own specialized protective cells. So we have a strategic entity or system—the body—which in turn is composed of many subsystems, each one of which tends to mirror the whole entity in terms of the way it is organized.

At the other end of the spectrum is the solar system. The sun is analogous to the brain. It is located in the center and its gravity keeps the planets in orderly orbit. Its organic essential is the fusion process that gives heat to the whole solar system and that maintains the sun at the appropriate size and mass. It sends its heat and gravity through the infrastructure of space itself and the planetary orbits. The planets themselves are analogous to the cells in a body or the peo-

ple in a state. The only thing the system lacks is the fifth component that protects the system from outside attack. Inorganic systems, unlike organic ones, have no self-protection capability.

If some group wanted to destroy the solar system, it could do so by attacking and destroying each planet—or, it could simply destroy the sun (or perhaps merely put a gravity shield around it if it wanted the sun for some other purpose). With the sun gone, or its gravity blocked, all the planets would fly off into outer space and the solar system would be history. It is useful to note that the effect on earth of the sun's destruction would not be evident for about nine minutes and that some life on earth would continue for some period of time thereafter. (One must always assume a delay between strategic events and subsequent tactical effect.) The earth, however, would be irrelevant if the sun, its strategic center—its "brain" were to disappear.

Between the human body and the solar system in size and complexity are such human artifacts as a large electrical grid. An electrical grid consists of a central controller, has organic essentials of energy input and conversion to create electricity, has an infrastructure of transmission lines, is populated by people who keep it functioning, and has repairmen to fix it when something breaks.

Having looked at different systems with which we have some familiarity, we recognize a similarity that carries across all of them. The model that unfolds before us and that seems to describe a reasonable number of different systems has four basic components: central leadership or direction, organic essentials, infrastructure, and population. In addition, all organic systems seem to have a fifth component that protects the system from outside attack or general degradation. In other words, we have a simple model that serves as a road map to help us understand very complex processes.

If we were to start from the bottom up to understand something like an electrical system, we would have to become experts in electricity, computers, mechanics, materials, and many other subjects. Unless that was to be our lifework, we would probably never get to the point where we really understood how everything comes together. And electrical systems are only one of a near infinite number of systems that are of interest to the strategic thinker and war planner. Since we can't possibly learn any of these systems in detail, we must present them in ways that allow us to gain sufficient understanding so that we can deal with them in the real world—and deal with them we must because they are our essence and the essence of our enemies.

The model built, we can look for additional similarities that apply to systems in general. One of great significance is the apparent applicability of the second law of thermodynamics. This natural law tells us that the inexorable movement of everything is from a state of order to a state of disorder. Our homes are good examples of the second law in action.[3] We all know that it takes great energy to make our homes orderly—and even more to slow the process of disordering. We know that our homes are in a constant state of deterioration, from the tendency of clothes and books to "migrate" from closets and shelves and clutter the house, to the calcification of the plumbing, to the chipping of the paint. The more complex a system, the more precarious its maintenance tends to be and the more likely that injections of energy in the wrong places will speed its natural movement toward disorder—and perhaps even to chaos.

Figure 1 presents the five rings in their simplest graphical form. Figure 2 is very similar, except it shows a variety of subsystems in orbit about the center. It may be helpful to some to think of these orbiting subsystems as electrons; if the electrons move into a different orbit or disappear completely, the atom changes its nature. Finally, figure 3 is another variation, but this time the circles have become ellipses. This variation helps to show that the model is depicting a dynamic system and that all sys-

tems are not going to have precisely the same relationship among the five rings. The five rings provide a model for systems at a macro level. They also describe centers of gravity for a strategic entity.

Let us now see how our models apply to a strategic entity like a state or a drug cartel and how we can use them to develop campaign plans. Before proceeding, however, it is imperative to understand that strategic war may have nothing to do with the enemy's military forces.

Strategic war is war to force the enemy state or organization to do what you want it to do. In the extreme, it may even be war to destroy the state or organization. It is, however, the *whole system* that is our target, not its military forces. If we address the system properly, its military forces will be left as a useless appendage, no longer supported by its leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, or population. This is not to say that we do not have to think about how to defeat an enemy military force directly. Indeed, there will be times when its defeat is the only way to get to the strategic centers it



Figure 1. The Basic Five-Ring Model



Figure 2. The Five-Ring Model with Subsystems



Figure 3. The Five Rings as Ellipses

guards; at other times, we may not have the wherewithal to attack the enemy's strategic centers. In these cases, however, we must still understand that even the enemy military is a system that is well described by the five-ring model. Key to our success is keeping in mind that strategists and operational artists start with the large entity, the enemy system, then work their way down to the small details as required.

Using the Five Rings for Strategic Warfare

The concept of centers of gravity is simple in concept but difficult in execution because of the likelihood that more than one center will exist at any time and that each center will have an effect of some kind on the others. It is also important to note that centers of gravity may in some cases be only indirectly related to the enemy's ability to conduct actual military operations. As an example, a strategic center of gravity for most states beyond the agrarian stage is the power-generation system. Without electric power, production of civil and military goods, distribution of food and other essentials, civil and military communication, and life in general become difficult to impossible. Unless the stakes in the war are very high, most states will make desired concessions when their power-generation system is put under sufficient pressure or actually destroyed. Even if they do not sue for peace, their loss of electric power will have a devastating effect on their strategic base, which in turn will make prosecution and support of the war extraordinarily difficult—especially if the power system is shut down quickly, in days rather than in months or years. Note that destruction of the power system may have little short-term effect at the front—if there is a front.

Every state and every military organization will have a unique set of centers of gravity—or vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, our five-ring model gives us a good starting point. It tells us what detailed questions to ask, and it suggests a priority for the questions and for operations—from the most vital at the middle to the least vital at the outside. These centers of gravity, which are also rings of vulnerability, are absolutely critical to the functioning of a state.

The most critical ring is the command ring because it is the enemy command structure, be it a civilian at the seat of government or a military commander directing a fleet, which is the only element of the enemy that can make concessions, that can make the very complex decisions that are necessary to keep a country on a particular course, or that can direct a country at war. In fact, wars through history have been fought to change (or change the mind of) the command structure—to overthrow the prince literally or figuratively—or, put in other words, to induce the command structure to make concessions or to make it incapable of leading.

Capturing or killing the state's leader has frequently been decisive. In modern times, however, it has become more difficult—but not impossible—to capture or kill the command element. At the same time, command communications have become more important than ever, and these are vulnerable to attack. When command communications suffer extreme damage, as they did in Iraq, the leadership has great difficulty in directing war efforts; in the case of an unpopular regime, the lack of communications not only makes it difficult to keep national morale at a sufficiently high level but also facilitates rebellion on the part of dissident elements.

When the command element cannot be threatened directly, the task becomes one of applying sufficient indirect pressure so that the command element rationally concludes that concessions are appropriate, realizes that further action is impossible, or is physically deprived of the ability to continue a particular course or to continue combat. The command element will normally reach

these conclusions as a result of the degree of damage imposed on the surrounding rings. Absent a rational response by the enemy command element, it is possible to render the enemy impotent—to impose strategic paralysis—by destroying one or more of the outer strategic rings or centers of gravity.

The next most critical ring contains the organic essentials. Organic essentials are those facilities or processes without which the state or organization cannot maintain itself. It is not necessarily directly related to combat; indeed, war-related industry may not be very important qua war industry in many cases. As an example, consider the effect on a drug cartel if its drug production comes to a halt. Just as nothing happens instantly to the earth if the sun disappears, the drug cartel will not instantly go up in smoke. It is quite clear, however, that the system must either change dramatically or perish.

On a state level, the growth in the size of cities around the world and the necessity for electricity and petroleum products to keep a city functioning have put these two commodities in the essential class for most states. If a state's organic essentials—whether generated internally or imported—are destroyed, life itself becomes difficult and the state becomes incapable of employing modern weapons and must make major concessions, which could be as little as forswearing offensive operations outside its own borders. Depending on the size of the state and the importance it attaches to its objectives, even minor damage to essential industries may lead the command element to make concessions. The concessions may come because

a. damage to organic essentials leads to the collapse of the system.

b. damage to organic essentials makes it physically difficult or impossible to maintain a certain policy or to fight.

c. damage to organic essentials has internal political or economic repercussions that are too costly to bear.

The number of organic-essential targets in even a large state is reasonably small and each of the targets in subsystems such as power production and petroleum refining is fragile.[4]

The third most critical ring is the infrastructure ring. It contains the enemy state's transportation system—the system that moves civil and military goods and services around the state's entire area of operations. It includes rail lines, airlines, highways, bridges, airfields, ports, and a number of other similar systems. It contains the majority of a state's industry because most of its industry does not fall in the organic-essential category. For both military and civil purposes, it is necessary to move goods, services, and information from one point to another. If this movement becomes impossible, the state system quickly moves to a lower energy level, and thus to a lesser ability to resist the demands of its enemy. Compared to organic-essential systems, there are more infrastructure facilities and more redundancy; thus, a greater effort may be required to do enough damage to have an effect.

The fourth most critical ring is the population. Moral objections aside, it is difficult to attack the population directly. There are too many targets, and, in many cases, especially in a police state, the population may be willing to suffer grievously before it will turn on its own government. Indirect attack on the population, such as North Vietnam used against the United States, may be especially effective if the target country has a relatively low interest in the outcome of the war. As the North Vietnamese showed, it is entirely possible to create conditions that lead the civilian population of the enemy to call on its government to change the state's policies. The North Vietnamese accomplished their aims by raising American military casualty levels higher than the American people would tolerate. Almost certainly there are actions that can be taken to induce any enemy civilian population to offer some degree of resistance to its govern-

ment's policies. It is tough to determine what those actions might be because humans are so unpredictable. As part of an overall effort to alter the enemy system, an indirect approach to the population is probably worthwhile; one should not, however, count on it.

Early air theorists such as Giulio Douhet thought that wars could be won by inflicting such casualties on the civilian population that morale would break with subsequent capitulation. Historically, of course, he was on solid ground; besieged cities have normally surrendered when the pain and suffering became too much for the civilians to bear. Many have argued, however, that the bombing of Britain and Germany in World War II actually stiffened civilian morale. While there is certainly no evidence to support such an improbable claim, the evidence is quite clear that neither British nor German civilian morale fell to the point where the respective governments were forced to surrender.

That morale did not collapse in Britain and Germany is no proof that a different approach wouldn't lead to different results in different places and times. As an example, Iraqi terror attacks on Iran certainly affected civilian morale and almost certainly led the Iranian government to agree to an armistice with Iraq. Again, let us reiterate that we hold direct attacks on civilians to be morally reprehensible and militarily difficult. That, however, will not keep someone else from trying it against us or one of our friends. It is something that has existed since time immemorial and isn't likely to go away in the near future.

The last ring holds the fielded military forces of the state. Although we tend to think of military forces as being the most vital in war, in fact they are means to an end. That is, their only function is to protect their own inner rings or to threaten those of an enemy. A state can certainly be led to make concessions by reducing its fielded military forces—and if all of its fielded forces are destroyed, it may have to make the ultimate concession simply because the command element knows that its inner rings have become defenseless and liable to destruction.

Viewing fielded forces as means to an end and not necessarily important in themselves is not a classical view—in large part because the majority of the classical writing and thinking on warfare has been done by continental soldiers who had no choice but to contend with enemy armies. Modern technology now, however, makes possible new and politically powerful options that in fact can put fielded forces into the category of means and not ends.

In most cases, all the rings exist in the order presented, but it may not be possible to reach more than one or two of the outer ones with military means. By the end of 1943, for example, the Germans in World War II were incapable of making serious attack on anything but the fourth and fifth rings (population and fielded forces) of their primary enemies; they did not have a useful long-range attack capability. The Japanese could attack only the fifth ring (fielded forces) of their primary enemies. Conversely, the United States and the Allies could attack every German and Japanese ring of vulnerability. The Iraqis in the 1991 Gulf War had an even more difficult problem: they could not reach any of their principal foe's strategic rings unless the United States chose to put its fielded forces in harm's way. For such states that cannot employ military weapons against their enemy's strategic centers, the only recourse is indirect attack through psychological or unconventional warfare.

It is imperative to remember that all actions are aimed against the mind of the enemy command or against the enemy system as a whole. Thus, an attack against industry or infrastructure is not primarily conducted because of the effect it might or might not have on fielded forces. Rather, it is undertaken for its direct effect on the enemy system, including its effect on national leaders and commanders who must assess the cost

of rebuilding, the effect on the state's economic position in the postwar period, the internal political effect on their own survival, and whether the cost is worth the potential gain from continuing the war. The essence of war is applying pressure against the enemy's innermost strategic ring—its command structure. Military forces are a means to an end. It is pointless to deal with enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or technology either in the defense or offense.

One additional point needs to be made about the five rings. They are in the order presented for several reasons: the most important is in the middle (World War II Germany continued to resist, however ineffectually, until Hitler died); there is an increase in numbers of people or facilities moving from the center to the fourth ring (one or two leaders, a few dozen organic essentials, many infrastructure facilities, and a large number of people); and the theoretical vulnerabilities decrease from the inside to the outside—largely due to numbers involved. The fifth ring is actually smaller in number than the fourth ring of population, but it is theoretically less vulnerable to direct attack simply because it is designed to be so. A relative handful of bombs around Qadhafi drove him to make concessions; that same number falling on his tanks would have been inconsequential.

Although we discussed earlier the idea that strategic war is different from our popular view of war, it is such a difficult concept to grasp that it bears another discussion. We can take ourselves back to a mythical, but logically plausible, early world where all men lived in peace. That is, they lived in peace until one group decided it wanted something that a neighboring community had and was going to take it. That something, of course, by definition lay within the four innermost rings; perhaps it was food, perhaps it was some part of the infrastructure, or perhaps it was the people themselves.

That first war was certainly successful because there was no fifth ring to defend the inner four. (Despite the lack of armed forces clashing, it was every bit as much a war as any that took place subsequently.) The attacked community, however, quickly remedied the situation and created a force, a fifth ring, to defend the inner four. Our point is simple: strategic war came first, and it was only after the widespread creation of fifth-ring military forces that we began to think about war as the clash of those forces. Logic, of course, says that the purpose of war, if it is to be anything more than a sideshow, is to do something to the enemy's inner rings or to prevent him from doing something to yours. If this is the case, then clearly our planning should be based on affecting or defending inner rings at the earliest and least costly opportunity. We should only deign to do classical battle if we have no choice.

Before continuing, we must ask ourselves if there exist states or organizations that do not have all five rings or centers of gravity. Our basic answer is no, simply because our five rings are merely a model of the real world of systems built around life-forms of any type. On the other hand, the relative importance of the outer four rings (the leadership ring is by necessity always of paramount importance) has changed over time. In addition, vulnerabilities of the rings clearly change from one societal system and one historical period to another.

As an example, when William the Conqueror developed his campaign plan for the conquest of England, he would not have identified organic essentials, infrastructure, or the population as centers of gravity against which he could hope to operate with decisive results. His target had to be the center ring—King Harold himself. He had neither the time nor the resources to deal with population, infrastructure, or organic essentials. Consequently, he aimed directly for Harold, who was protected by his fifth-ring army. (At that time in history, the leader and the army were frequently one and the same.) When Harold fell to a high-

trajectory arrow, William had accomplished his strategic objective. Today, the problem is more difficult because it is rarely possible to operate directly and successfully against a single organization leader. Therefore, it will normally be necessary to strike at several of the inner rings.

The utility of the five-ring model may be somewhat diminished in circumstances where an entire people rises up to conduct a defensive battle against an invader. If the people are sufficiently motivated, they may be able to fight for an extended period by using the resources naturally available to them. This occasionally happens when the invader is so terrible that people see no hope if they surrender. When people do fight to the last, they are fighting as individuals and in essence each person becomes a strategic entity unto himself. While such may be possible for the defense, it is not for the offense. It is a special case, and one definitely not to be confused with Maoist ideas on guerrilla warfare in which the guerrilla organization is well described by the five rings.

To this point, we have discussed centers of gravity that are strategic because they are principal parts of the enemy system. Ideally, a commander will attack centers of gravity as close as possible to the leadership ring of the five rings. He may, however, be forced to deal with the enemy's fielded military forces because he cannot reach strategic centers without first removing enemy defenses because enemy forces are threatening his own strategic or operational centers of gravity or because his political masters will not permit him to attack strategic centers. In these cases, he must view his enemy military forces as systems and go through the same analysis that he did when he was dealing with the enemy as a whole. What does one do when it is necessary to deal with the enemy's military forces for whatever reason?

Centers of gravity exist not only at the strategic level but also at the operational level—and, indeed, are very similar. At the operational level, the goal is still to induce the enemy operational-level commander to make concessions such as retreating, surrendering, or giving up an offense. Like the state command structure, however, the operational commander has rings of vulnerability—or centers of gravity—surrounding him. In fact, each major element of his command will also have similar centers of gravity.

At the operational level, the first ring or center of gravity is the commander himself. He is the target of operations either directly or indirectly because he is the one who will decide to concede something to the enemy. Included in his center ring is his central command, control, and communications system; without the ability to collect information and issue orders to his subordinates, the commander—and his command—are in peril. As at the strategic level, however, the likelihood of physically seizing or paralyzing the command ring is relatively small; thus, recourse to the operational rings, or centers of gravity, surrounding the operational-level commander may be necessary.

The next operational ring is the organic-essentials ring (which at the operational level may be thought of as logistics) because it contains the essentials of combat—the ammunition, the fuel, and the food without which modern war cannot be prosecuted. A cursory review of history quickly reveals the dire straits that operational-level commanders have encountered when their logistics ring suffered from enemy attack. Indeed, war in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was in large measure designed around isolating a commander from his logistics ring. Experience on both sides in the Gulf War, as well as in the study of operational-level petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribution in the Soviet army, shows that the problem of providing key logistics support for a large-scale offensive has become incredibly more difficult than ever in the annals of warfare. The difficulty and complexity, however, make attack of this center of gravity easier and more decisive than even in World War II, where much equipment was still moved by horse-drawn vehicles[5] and

where total requirements per man in the field were a fraction of what they are today.

An infrastructure is necessary to move the materiel found in the organic-essentials ring as well as fielded military forces themselves—and this infrastructure is the third operational ring. It consists of roads, airways, seaways, rails, communications lines, pipelines, and a myriad of other facilities needed to employ fielded forces.

None of the three inner rings will function without personnel to staff them, and these support personnel constitute the fourth operational ring. Like the population in the fourth strategic ring, however, these personnel present difficult targets and will rarely be appropriate for direct attack.

The fifth and last ring of the operational commander is his fielded forces—his aircraft, his ships, and his troops. The fifth ring is the toughest to reduce, simply because it is designed to be tough. As a general rule, a campaign that focuses on the fifth ring (either by choice or because no alternatives exist) is likely to be the longest and bloodiest for both sides. Nevertheless, it is sometimes appropriate to concentrate against the fifth ring, and sometimes it may be necessary to reduce the fifth ring to some extent in order to reach inner operational or strategic rings.

Parallel Attack

The most important requirement of strategic attack is understanding the enemy system. The system understood, the next problem becomes one of how to reduce it to the desired level or to paralyze it if required. Parallel attack will normally be the preferred approach, unless there is some cogent reason to prolong the war.

States have a small number of vital targets at the strategic level—in the neighborhood of a few hundred with an average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital target. These targets tend to be small, very expensive, have few backups, and are hard to repair. If a significant percentage is struck in parallel, the damage becomes insuperable. Contrast parallel attack with serial attack in which only one or two targets come under attack in a given day (or longer). The enemy can alleviate the effects of serial attack by dispersal over time, by increasing the defenses of targets that are likely to be attacked, by concentrating his resources to repair damage to single targets, and by conducting counteroffensives. Parallel attack deprives him of the ability to respond effectively, and the greater the percentage of targets hit in a single blow, the more nearly impossible his response.

Parallel attack has not been possible on any appreciable scale in the past because a commander had to concentrate his forces in order to prevail against a single vulnerable part of the enemy's forces. If he prevailed, he could reconcentrate and move on to attack another point in the enemy's defenses. The process of concentrating and reconcentrating was normally lengthy and one that the enemy worked hard to foil. This process, better understood when labeled "serial warfare," permitted maneuver and countermaneuver, attack and counterattack, and movement and pause. It also gave rise to the phenomenon known as the *culminating point* in campaigns—that point at which the campaign is in near equilibrium where the right effort on either side can have significant effect. All of our thinking on war is based on serial effects, on ebb and flow. The capability to execute parallel war, however, makes that thinking obsolete.

Technology has made possible the near simultaneous attack on every strategic- and operational-level vulnerability of the enemy. This parallel process of war, as opposed to the old serial form, makes very real what Clausewitz called the ideal form of war, the striking of blows everywhere at the same time. For Clausewitz, the ideal was a Platonian shadow on the back of the cave wall, never to be known by mortals. The shadow has materialized and nothing will be the same again.

Conclusion

Strategic warfare provides the most positive resolution of conflicts. To execute it well, however, we must reverse our normal method of thinking; we must think from the big to the small, from the top down. We must think in terms of systems; we and our enemies are systems and subsystems with mutual dependencies. Our objective will almost always involve doing something to reduce the effectiveness of the overall system, if you will, to make it more susceptible to the infectious ideas we want to become part of it. At the same time, we must take necessary action to ensure that the enemy does not do unacceptable damage to our system or any of its subsystems.

We must not start our thinking on war with the tools of war—with the airplanes, tanks, ships, and those who crew them. These tools are important and have their place, but they cannot be our starting point, nor can we allow ourselves to see them as the essence of war. Fighting is not the essence of war, nor even a desirable part of it. The real essence is doing what is necessary to make the enemy accept our objectives as his objectives. □

Notes

1. Strategic entities are really our subject matter with a nation-state being a type of strategic entity. A *strategic entity* is any organization that can operate autonomously; that is, it is self-directing and self-sustaining. A state is a strategic entity as is a criminal organization like the Mafia or business organizations like General Motors. Conversely, neither an army nor an air force is a strategic entity because they are neither self-sustaining nor self-directing. This is an important distinction in itself. Of most importance here, however, is that our discussion of strategic centers and strategic warfare is as applicable to a guerrilla organization as to a modern industrial state.

2 Those familiar with the five-ring model used to develop the initial Gulf War air campaign plan will recognize a name change at this point from key production to "organic essentials." It has always been clear that there were certain facilities or processes so important to a state that they required a specific label and class. Thus, we identified the production of electricity and petroleum products as "key production" because we believed that taking them away from a state which had them would transform the state into something quite different and far less powerful. Many people, however, had difficulty distinguishing between key production, normal production, and infrastructure. I believe the name change to *organic essentials* (meaning they are part and parcel of the system and essential to its survival in its current state) should help clear up this problem. In addition, as the similarity between many different types of systems becomes clearer, organic essentials seem to have more universal applicability.

3 With thanks to Stephen Hawking and his book *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988).

4 Superficially, Allied attacks on German industry in World War II would seem to contradict the idea that essential industry is fragile. In that conflict, however, bombing accuracy was not good; more than half of all bombs dropped missed their targets by well over a thousand yards. When accuracies are improved to where more than half of all bombs fall within a few feet of their target, as did the majority of those aimed at petroleum and electric targets in Iraq, it becomes clear that what took thousands of sorties and many tons of bombs can now be accomplished with orders-of-magnitude less effort.

5 Well over a third of German transport used on the offensive against the Soviets in 1941 was horse-drawn. Likewise, the supplies needed to keep Patton's entire Third Army on the offensive in 1944 would barely support a single corps today. The proliferation of motor vehicles, communications equipment, and doctrine demanding high rates of fire has perhaps created more problems than it has solved for an offensive army.

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LESSON 12
MODERN THEORISTS (III): REVOLUTIONARY WAR

When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognito. We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We saw him first as a communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist.

--Robert S. McNamara,
In Retrospect (1995), pp. 32-33

Introduction

Purpose

In this lesson you will study

- Different 19th- and 20th-century concepts of and approaches to revolutionary war including
  - Guerrilla warfare
  - Unconventional warfare
  - Revolution
- Ideas and movements of the most prominent theorists and practitioners of revolutionary warfare including
  - Karl Marx
  - Vladimir Lenin
  - Mao Tse-Tung
  - Frederick Engels

Why Study Revolutionary War?

Since revolutionary war has occurred in many countries during the 19th and 20th centuries, you need to study these influential theorists and the application of their theories to gain a strong foundation on revolutionary war.

Continued on next page

Introduction, Continued

Relationship to Other Instruction	This lesson helps you understand the conflicts and problems discussed in previous lessons and subsequent courses such as *Operational Level of War* (8803), *MAGTF Operations* (8807), etc.
Important Relationships	As part of your study of prominent theorists and their movements, you need to examine the relationships among the Ideological foundations of revolutionary warfare Concepts of revolutionary warfare Examples of revolutionary wars
Study Time	This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 2.5 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Theory of Revolutionary War	Understand the following: • Theories of revolutionary war • Factors that shape revolutionary war [JPME Area 3b]
Revolution vice Conventional War	Distinguish between the manner in which revolutionary war differs from conventional war. [JPME Areas 1a, 3b, and 3e]
Revolutionary and Guerrilla Warfare	Comprehend the relationship between revolutionary war theory and guerrilla warfare. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
Conventional Military and Revolutionary Warfare	Understand the ways in which a conventional military force must adapt to a revolutionary war. [JPME Areas 3b and 3d]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	1/a/0.5 3/b/0.5 3/d/0.5 3/e/0.5

Historical Background

Marx and Engels

While "rebellion" in the form of violent popular protests, uprisings, and resistance to imperial intrusion is as old as oppression and imperialism, the **idea** of "revolutionary warfare," considered as a set of problems with strategic solutions, began to take shape about a century ago. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were the first great ideological strategists of what we call revolution. They gave the term a philosophical context, a historical explanation, a program of action, and an outline for the future.

Marx's theories of the masses' uprising to sweep away the bourgeoisie never came to fruition while he was alive, but did set the stage for the further development and exploitation of his ideas by a number of leaders, such as Vladmir Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, who further developed and exploited these early concepts of revolution. These later ideas and interpretations included political and military ideas that conflicted with those of Marx and Engels.

Lenin and Mao

- Vladimir I. Lenin focused on the urban worker population.

- Mao concentrated on the rural masses. Mao's revolutionary style of warfare has continued to inspire imitators throughout the world, even those whose programs are radically different from his; however, remember that while Mao's imitators have been creative in adapting his techniques to different environments, they have also made mistakes. The triumph of the practitioners of revolutionary warfare is not inevitable.

Dilemma Posed by Revolutionary War

Revolutionary war often is called internal war because the people of a country find themselves fighting each other. The dilemma placed on a uniformed military force is that the opposition often is not uniformed, not fighting by conventional means, and not playing by the same rules. It becomes difficult to distinguish between members of the population who are not part of the revolutionary movement and true revolutionary forces. This type of war normally finds military forces ill-equipped and ill-trained to deal with what can be either limited engagements or all-out warfare.

Continued on next page

Historical Background, Continued

Post-World War II Changes

The post-World War II era produced massive changes in the international scene. Part of this process was the rapid dissolution of the European empires. To those living at that time, however, these empires in 1945 and the immediate years thereafter still appeared strong and vibrant.

Influence of Decolonization

Within several decades, only small remnants of the empires remained and the specter of revolutionary war loomed.

In the era of decolonization, the specter of "wars of national liberation" (a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist phrase) appeared to be a dangerous threat to the West. Initially the western powers engaged in these kinds of irregular conflicts, but near the end of the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era, other powers also confronted this kind of war.

Examples

Examples of such involvement are the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and Vietnam in Cambodia after the north Vietnamese triumph in that country's protracted civil and ideological war. **Regardless of which examples are cited, be aware that "revolutionary warfare" is more than just banditry or guerrilla warfare.**

Changing Interpretations

It is easy, but erroneous, to see many past and contemporary conflicts in purely Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terms: While the techniques contemporary movements use may be similar to those of recent wars of national liberation, the motivations of those conducting these contemporary "revolutions" may be quite different.

Required Readings

Theory and Nature of War Readings	Millett, Richard. "Millett's Laws [of Intervention]," Unpublished Summary of notes of Eleventh Holder of Command and Staff College Foundation's Chair of Military Affairs, ed. by Dr. Donald Bittner, September 1993. This reading is located immediately following this lesson, pp. F-3 to F-7. Millett's laws, much like a time honored chronicle of lessons learned from centuries of war and politics, give the reader wisdom for influencing expectations and the decisionmaking process. Residing on neither side of the political fence, Millet's laws draw their credibility from roots in history and seemingly unbiased reflections of social normalities.
Makers of Modern Strategy	Shy, John, and Collier, Thomas W. "Revolutionary War." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 815 to 862. *Revolutionary War*, defined as the seizure of political power by the use of armed forces, emerges only since the 1940s as a complex facet of the all-encompassing branch of strategic military thought. From Machiavelli to Hitler and from Mao to the Shah of Iran, this trend is homogenous to all "revolutionary acts" and continues to be an aspect of industrialism and imperialism.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

- Clausewitz. "The People in Arms." Book Six, Chapter 26, *On War*, pp. 479 to 483.

- McNamara, Robert S. "We Were Wrong, Terribly Wrong." excerpt from *In Retrospect*, in *Newsweek*, April 17, 1995.

- Porch, Douglas. "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 376 to 407.

- Strachan, Hew. "Colonial Warfare, and Its Contribution to the Art of War in Europe." *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983, pp. 76 to 89. (Note: Reading total includes two full page maps.)

- Wrigley, Russell F. "A Strategy of Partisan War: Nathaniel Greene," and "Annihilation of a People: The Indian Fighters." *The American Way of War*, pp. 18 to 39 and pp. 153 to 163, respectively.

- Tzu, Sun. "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung." *The Art of War*, pp. 45 to 56.

Issues for Consideration

Comparing Revolutionary Warfare and Coup d'etat

- What is revolutionary warfare?
- How does it differ from a *coup d'etat*?
- In what situations are these concepts synonymous?
- Is there a basic revolutionary warfare characteristic that is not usually found in a *coup d'etat*?

Conditions of Revolutionary Strategy

Revolutions are not usually made by states and their bureaucracies but by new organizations that develop from the dissatisfied elements in society. What conditions make a revolutionary strategy appropriate? Below are some of the elements inherent in a revolutionary movement. How do all of them relate to each other and come together to pose a threat to an existing state?

- Grievances
- Leadership
- Organization
- Action
- Plan
- Program

An important point in considering these elements is to think about how the existing government responds to them.

Revolutionary War Theory Vice Theories of Conventional War

Does modern revolutionary war theory conflict with the theories of war you have studied thus far? Or, does it simply require a change in frame of reference? Is revolutionary war "limited" or "unlimited"?

- Remember the "where, how, and why" (purposes) of the establishment and of the revolutionaries.

- Try to determine the basic premise of any revolutionary ideology. This will require some analysis and synthesis of the differing ideological approaches you cover in this lesson.

Again, the readings by Shy and Collier should help you in your study of this issue.

Issues for Consideration, Continued

Revolutionary and Guerrilla Warfare	How does revolutionary war relate to guerrilla warfare? Can modern revolutionary war exist without guerrilla war, or vice versa?
Conventional Military Force Vice Revolutionary War	How does a conventional military force adapt to a modern revolutionary war? How should it prepare for such a war?
European Colonialism	What was the experience of the European colonial powers in "colonial" wars? Did the situation change over time? Specifically, were post-World War II "wars of national liberation" different from 19th century and early 20th century colonial revolts and insurrections?

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 12

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Millett, Richard. "Millett's Laws [of Intervention]," Unpulished Summary of notes of Eleventh Holder of Command and Staff College Foundation's Chair of Military Affairs, ed. By Dr. Donald Bittner, September 1993. *Theory and Nature of War Readings,* Annex F, pp. F-3 to F-7.

Comment:

Millett's laws, much like a time-honored chronicle of lessons learned from centuries of war and politics, give the reader wisdom for influencing expectations and the decision making process. Residing on neither side of the political fence, Millett's laws draw their credibility from roots in history and seemingly unbiased reflections of social normalities.

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Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

SUMMARY OF MAIN THEMES
(OTHERWISE SELF-PROCLAIMED "MILLETT'S LAWS")

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7-13 SEPTEMBER 1993

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I. Committing the military to solve a problem may be a bad decision or solution, but not doing so may be worse.

II. Getting involved in someone else's political affairs is a bad idea; but not getting involved may be a worse one.

III. If an intervention occurs, the intervening state should not "go it alone."

IV. In an intervention occurs, the intervening force should not take sides; the dilemma is how not to become involved with one side or another.

V. Whenever an intervention in a foreign area occurs, the problems are massive, varied, and complex.

VI. The are no "solutions" to intervention problems, only steps to make them more manageable.

VII. The solution to any problem creates new ones.

VIII. Rational policy goals may be overwhelmed by local politics or priorities or actions, all of which may be counter to U.S. policy objectives or interests.

IX. Discontent and possible rebellion are not the same.

X Technology can be exported but values cannot.

XI. Domestic politics will often overwhelm rational foreign policy goals.

XII. Local politics may force outside interventions in the affairs of other states even if not in the national interests of the intervening state.

XIII. It is easier to send troops into a foreign state or area (i.e., intervention), than it is to get them out.

XIV. Once involved in an intervention, the intervening state will become involved in the politics of the local state.

XV. Once involved, political groups in the intervened state will draw the interventionist state into their political affairs.

XVI. No matter the "high" level of sophistication of the intervening state and the alleged "low" level of sophistication of the state in which intervention occurs, the involvement of the former in the political process of the latter will occur.

XVII. The objectives of an intervening state will change as the process of intervention occurs.

XVIII. When an intervention in the affairs of another state ends (i.e., withdrawal occurs), the final objectives or goals of the intervention bear little resemblance to the original ones.

XIX. For an intervening force to do well, it must adapt to the culture of the local society or state.

XX. Short term successes of an occupying force may be counter to the long term goals of the intervention.

XXI. That which works in the United States often will not work in a foreign state, society, or culture.

XXII. The creation of a military or police force in the U.S. image will upset the local balance of power; such a force may become a stepping stone to the seizure of power and the retention of it over a long period of time, and run counter to the long range goals of U.S. policy.

XXIII. Short term expediency (or success) will often overcome long range U.S. goals.

XXIV. "Common vocabulary" terms in communication does not equate to shared definitions and approaches to problems or goals.

XXV. Technology is not value free.

XXVI. U.S. value assumptions that "bigger is better", "modern is better", "change is progress", "technology can overcome human deficiencies", and "if a condition is bad, the alternative must be better", are not necessarily valid in intervention in third world states.

XXVII. In third world states, tremendous gaps exist between urban and rural areas.

XXVIII. When a corrupt police force is merged with a clean military, "you don't clean up the police but dirty the military".

XXIX. In many third world states, a growing gap exists between the police/armed forces and the general public.

XXX. In many third and second world states, the justice system exists not to dispense justice but to ensure the maintenance of the existing regime and the suppression of opposition.

XXXI. In a counter-insurgency situation, the collapse of the justice system is one of the initial casualties of the conflict.

XXXII. In a counter-insurgency situation, within the judicial system there may be a complete cessation of "murder trials" as all the dead are "casualties of war".

XXXIII. A success in one country or area does not transfer (i.e., guarantee success) in another.

XXXIV. If the military is called upon to do things that civilians cannot do, the result may be a military government.

XXXV. The goals of an intervention and an existing situation look different to the policy and decision makers in a capital in contrast to the actual situation on the ground and the forces trying to achieve the goals of an interventionist policy.

XXXVI. If an intervening force sides with an ousted or discredited regime, it will be hurt by this association and achievement of its goals will be hurt.

XXXVII. Do not make an analyst an operator, nor an operator an analyst.

XXXVIII. In an intervention or occupation in a foreign land, the less involved the intervening force is, the better the chance of success (i.e., achieving the goals).

XXXIX. An outside or created ideology cannot be imposed in a foreign land from the top down, especially by an intervening force.

XL. A nationalist or patriotic movement is not the same thing as a "freedom fighter".

XLI. In an intervention, presence will lead to goal redefinition.

XLII. A military force availability does not equal a force capability.

XLIII. An intervention force can achieve some of the goals assigned to it, but not all of the objectives.

XLIV. An intervening force must be "culturally sensitive," i.e., know and understand the society and culture of the land, area, country, or society in which it is committed.

XLV. Peacemaking is inherently a non-neutral mission; peacekeeping is a neutral one.

XLVI. In foreign interventions, with respect to the United States, U.S. forces can teach the technology but not American values.

XLVII. With respect to U.S. interventions, American methods applied to or in a culture with different value systems will result in failure.

XLIX. Short range interests may be contrary or undermine long term objectives.

L. Institutions are conservative and military institutions are more conservative than most.

LI. Nationalism in the world is declining; ethnicity is increasing.

LII. Nationalism seeks to bring diversity together.

LIII. Ethnicity separates peoples.

LIV. In the "Post Cold War" era, who is or how can the global community decide that a nation is not a viable entity? And once such an assessment is made, what then?

LV. Instant communications provide visual images; the televised and printed pictures can focus the attention of the public on an issue or locality, but they give little depth and analysis, and provide no answers.

LVI. Messages sent are rarely received.

LVII. Messages and images convey more than one interpretation.

LVIII. Guerrilla operations or counter-insurgency conflicts are nasty, and they brutalize everyone involved in them.

LIX. If central authority loses control of counter-guerrilla forces, a situation will only get worse.

LX. In guerrilla or insurgency situations, local issues become paramo:

LXI. Even when a guerrilla or insurgency situation ends, long term animosities remain.

LXII. In guerrilla or insurgency situations, the ability of regular forces to control or counter the opposing forces is limited.

LXIII. In military operations, there is both good and bad luck; both can affect one side in a battle or campaign.

LXIV. Command relationships before a battle or campaign will play a major role in success or failure in the ensuing operations.

LXV. Bad intelligence or poor interpretation of intelligence will have a major effect on military operations.

LXVI. A good commander may be able to counter the effect of poor subordinates, but the reverse is not true.

LXVII. A commander not following up success on the battlefield will negate the effects of a tactical victory.

LXVIII. Faulty execution will negate a brilliant plan.

LXIX. Unrealistic assumptions will cause the most brilliant of plans to fail.

LXX. In planning, an assessment of a commander and his staff will be made on the basis of their resolution of the dilemma posed when reality conflicts with plans resting on unrealistic assumptions.

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Course: Theory and Nature of War

Course Book: 8801

Lesson: 12

Subject: Required Readings

Title: Shy, John, and Collier, Thomas W. "Revolutionary War." *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* edited by Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 815 to 862.

Comment:

Revolutionary War, defined as the seizure of political power by the use of armed forces, emerges only since the 1940s as a complex facet of the all-encompassing branch of strategic military thought. From Machiavelli to Hitler and from Mao to the Shah of Iran, this trend is homogenous to all "revolutionary acts" and continues to be an aspect of industrialism and imperialism.

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