

## LESSON 5 CAMPAIGNING AND THE OPERATIONAL ART

*“The plan of operations must always be made by the commander and must not be forced on him by his staff, or by circumstances, or by the enemy. He has got to relate what is strategically desirable with that which is tactically possible with the forces at his disposal; if this is not done he is unlikely to win.”*

—Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein  
*The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958*

### Introduction

This lesson introduces the concepts used in designing and planning a campaign. The operational level of war connects the strategic and tactical levels of war through campaign planning, an intellectual process whereby the commander receives his strategic guidance, makes an estimate of the situation, and prepares a vision for the campaign that reflects his commander’s intent. The campaign plan is the expression of that vision and intent. Joint Pub 1-02 defines a campaign as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Throughout this lesson you will see terms like strategic and operational objectives, operational design, campaign design, campaign planning, and operational art. The diagram below attempts to put these terms and the campaigning process into some sort of organized perspective.


### Campaigning and Operational Art



Three sources guide national strategy through development of the campaign plan. National strategy originates with the President and the Secretary of Defense. Strategic development then proceeds through the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commander (formerly CINC) who translates the direction into *intent*—a broad vision of what is to be accomplished (end state) and a comprehensive campaign plan to achieve the national strategic objectives.

Traditionally, campaign plans establish objectives and seek to synchronize operations within a theater of war. Campaign plans become the basis for subordinate campaign plans by Joint forces and supporting plans for component forces. There is a definite art and professional skill in designing a succinct plan or campaign that translates the theater commander’s strategic vision into a concept of operation and necessary tasks for subordinate forces.

Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or occurs during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both processes. Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict (once the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident), but the basis and framework for successful campaigns are laid by peacetime analysis.



After consideration of strategic direction and elements of operational logic, the next step is the task of linking major operations in order to achieve strategic objectives. JFCs employ operational art in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders in

developing campaigns and operations. Later in this lesson, you will learn about the facets of operational art and how they apply to campaign planning and execution.

## Student Requirements by Educational Objective

### Requirement 1

Objective 1. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning from the design phase to operations. [JPME Area 2(a), 4(a)(b)(e)]

Objective 2. Understand the differences between a campaign's conceptual, functional, and detailed designs. [JPME Area 4(a)(e)]

Read:

- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning*, Chapter 2, "Designing the Campaign," pp. 33 to 60 (25 pages)

The process of creating a broad scheme for accomplishing our goal is called *conceptual planning*. To translate the campaign concept into a complete and practicable plan requires both functional and detailed planning. *Functional planning*, as the name implies, is concerned with designing the functional components necessary to support the concept, the subordinate concepts for command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. Functional planning ensures that we work through the feasibility of the campaign concept with respect to every functional area. *Detailed planning* encompasses the specific planning activities that we work through in order to enhance the feasibility of the campaign concept with respect to every functional area. Detailed planning further encompasses the specific planning activities necessary to ensure the coordination of the plan: specific command relationships, movements, landing tables, deployment or re-supply schedules, communications plans, reconnaissance plans, control measures, etc. Detailed design should not, however, become so specific that it inhibits flexibility.

No amount of subsequent planning can reduce the requirement for an overall concept. While conceptual planning is the foundation for functional and detailed planning, the process works in the other direction as well. Our concept must be adaptable to functional realities. Functional planning, in turn, must be sensitive to details of execution. The operational concept (conceptual concern) should be used to develop the deployment plan (functional concern). However, the realities of deployment schedules sometimes dictate employment schemes. Campaign design thus becomes a two-way process aimed at harmonizing the various levels of design activity.

The further we project, the less certain and detailed should be our design. We may plan the initial phase of a campaign with some degree of certainty, developing extensive functional and detailed plans. However, since the results of that initial phase will shape the phases that follow, subsequent plans must be increasingly general. The plan for future phases will be largely

conceptual, perhaps consisting of no more than a general intent and several contingencies and options.

## **Requirement 2**

Objective 3. Comprehend how national security strategy, policy, and national level assets affect a combatant commander's theater strategy and related campaign planning. [JPME Area 4(a)(b)]

Objective 4. Understand how theater combatant commanders translate national strategic direction into theater strategies and guidance in the development of the campaign plan through the strategic estimate process. [JPME Area 4(a)(e)]

Objective 5. Understand the key fundamentals of campaign plans. [JPME Area 4(e)]

Objective 6. Understand the characteristics of a military campaign and the theater commander's theater strategy. [JPME Area 3(c), 4(a)(e)]

Objective 7. Comprehend how to use doctrinal information on the relationship between campaign planning and Joint operations; be able to summarize the considerations for employing Joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(a)(c), 4(e)]

Read:

- Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, pp. III-1 to III-9 (stop at 5. Operational Art) and pp. B-1 to B-3 (9 pages)

View:

- DOCNET segment, *Planning Joint Operations*, "Campaign Planning." Look at the case study. (15 minutes). Refer to Joint Pub 5-0, *Joint Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995, pp. II-18 (Start at Section F. Campaign Planning) to II-21 (Stop at Section G. Multinational Planning)

Theater strategy is a collective of strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance policy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or interagency actions within a theater. As you progress through the readings and, in particular, the Joint publications, you will discover specific examples of how the theater strategy is designed to meet those national or alliance objectives. Characteristics of theater strategy include the following:

- Provides guidance for the entire area of responsibility (AOR).
- Is written in terms of ends, ways, and means.
- Protects national and alliance interests.
- Outlines concepts for prosecution of regional and smaller conflicts.
- Addresses resolution of conflict or war termination.
- Directs support for security assistance, treaties and agreements, and good relations with friendly non-aligned nations.

- Provides for expansion of U.S. influence.
- Inputs to mid-term national military strategy (NMS).
- Supports current national military strategy (the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan).
- Outlines deterrence measures.
- Provides strategic direction for operational planning.

The strategic estimate process is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operations plans. Listed below are characteristics of the strategic estimate. Appendix B of Joint Pub 3-0 lists the format of the estimate. Combatant commanders develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions.

## **STRATEGIC ESTIMATE**

- Assigned objectives from national authorities.
- Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant command or theater.
- Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives.
- Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.
- Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans.
- Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned objectives.

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Two of the most important aspects of the campaign plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment. Theater campaign

plans are time sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending on the mission and forces available. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown below.

### **FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS**

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the national Command Authorities.

### Requirement 3

Objective 8. Understand how to apply Joint doctrine to the campaign design and planning process—to provide strategic direction and operational focus through the application of the fundamentals of theater strategic and operational design. [JPME Area 2(a), 3(e), 4(a)(b)(e)]

Objective 9. Comprehend the actions that are inherent in designing a succinct plan or campaign that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation and assigns tasks necessary for subordinate forces to carry out. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 2(a), 3(c), 4(a)(e)]

Read:

- Joint Pub 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, 25 January 2002, pp. I-1 to I-8, II-1 to II-20, and C-1 to C-8 (36 pages)
- “Key Aspects of the Campaign Planning Process,” *USMC Command and Staff College Syllabus, Operational Level of War, Part I, AY 2002-2003* (6 pages)

There are three key questions the commander must ask him or herself when attempting to enter the operational dimension or when the development of campaign plans becomes paramount. These questions are:

- What military conditions will achieve the strategic goal?
- What sequence of actions will produce these conditions?
- How do I apply the resources to accomplish this sequence?

These three questions get to the essence of operational design, which is defined as, the key considerations used as a framework in the course of planning for a campaign or major operation. The result of this process should be an operational design that provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. Key elements of operational design include:

- Understanding strategic guidance (determining desired end state and military objectives)
- Identifying critical factors such as, principal adversary strengths, including the strategic centers of gravity (COGs), and weaknesses
- Developing an operational concept that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

This translates into:

- Identifying strategic objectives
- Visualizing a theater in multi-dimensions
- Determining what sequence of military actions delivers strategic objectives

After all, the intent of the campaign planning process is to focus all efforts on the established theater strategic aim in order to produce a decisive defeat on the enemy by breaking his will to fight and paralyzing his ability to resist. Stated in terms consistent with operations other than war, one might say...the intent is to produce a decisive and positive result on the adversarial situation by the most effective means available in the shortest amount of time.

Several notable characteristics of a campaign include:

- Possesses broad scope
- Possesses large forces in theaters of war/operations
- Conducts unified, Joint, combined activity
- Combines series of actions (phases)
- Achieves strategic objectives (aimed at enemy centers of gravity)

#### **Requirement 4**

Objective 10. Understand the facets of operational art. [JPME Area 3(a)(b)]

Objective 11. Understand the relationship between campaign planning and operational art. [JPME Area 3(a)(b)(e)]


Read:

- “A CINC’s View of Operational Art,” *Military Review* (September, 1990) by General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret.) (12 pages)

View:

- DOCNET segment, *Operational Art*. Look at all the case studies (48 minutes). Refer to Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001, pp. III-9 (Start at 5. Operational Art) to III-25 (Stop at 6. Key Planning Considerations)

Operational art is the skillful employment of military forces in order to attain strategic and operational objectives within a theater through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates theater strategy and design into operational design, which links and integrates the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won, achieve the strategic aim (see diagram below). Tactical battles and engagements are of relatively short duration and are fought and won to achieve operational results. Operational art is the domain of the campaign, a series of battles occurring over a longer duration. Strategy, in comparison, is the domain of war which encompasses the protracted level of conflict among nations, armed or unarmed.




No specified command is concerned solely with operational art. In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitments to or withdrawal from battle and the sequencing of successful battles and major operations in order to attain major objectives.

Operational art/the operational level of war seeks to ensure that the commanders use personnel, materiel, and time effectively to achieve strategic aims through campaign design. Such a design provides a framework to help the theater and operational commanders develop an orderly process in order to ensure the objectives are met.

Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would become a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

The 14 facets of operational art are depicted in the following chart. Operational art is the art of applying these facets within a campaign.



### Requirement 5

**Objective 12.** Examine the commander’s intent during the Desert Storm Campaign and understand how it contributed to the campaign planning process. [JPME Area 3(c), 4(e)]

Read:

- “CINCCENT’s Intent,” from *It Doesn’t Take a Hero* (see below).

“We will offset the imbalance of ground combat power by using our strength against his weakness. Initially execute deception operations to focus his attention on defense and cause incorrect organization of forces. We will initially attack into the Iraqi homeland using air power to decapitate his leadership, command and control, and eliminate his ability to reinforce Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq. We will then gain undisputed air superiority over Kuwait so that we can subsequently and selectively attack Iraqi ground forces with air power in order to reduce his combat power and destroy reinforcing units. Finally, we will fix Iraqi forces in place by feints and limited objective attacks followed by armored force penetration and exploitation to seize key lines of communication nodes, which will put us in a position to interdict supply lines and remaining reinforcements from Iraq and eliminate forces in Kuwait.”

“CINCCENT’s Intent,” 25 August 1990... This briefing was early on during the planning, and it included a single-corps-only ground campaign.

Read:

- The combatant commander’s strategic vision, which clearly outlines how he envisioned the upcoming campaign in the Kuwaiti Theater to evolve (see below)

My written orders from Washington are still to deter Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia. But there is no doubt about the fact that we are getting ready to go on the offensive. That’s what we are here to talk about today. Forget the defensive bull\_\_\_\_; we are now talking offensive. And we’re going to talk offense from now until the day we go home.

I walked them through my analysis of Iraq’s forces and our own, curtly noting what we were up against: “There are a whole hell of a lot of them—450,000 right now in the Kuwaiti Theater, twenty six divisions” worth, and their divisions are the same size as ours. So they’ve got mass on their side. Another strength I would say is their chemical capability. They have used it in the past and there is no doubt in my mind they’re going to use it on us.... I reminded the commanders of our military strengths. Finally I laid out our battlefield goals. “The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word decapitate, so I think I’ll use the word attack, leadership and go after his command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy—not attack, not damage, not surround—I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force any more. I don’t want them to exist as a military organization.” For the benefit of the Vietnam vets—practically the whole room—I emphasized that “we’re not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine with us. That’s bull\_\_\_\_! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.” If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

I anticipated, I said, a four-pronged ground assault. Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of U.S. Marines and a Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam’s forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in Boomer’s direction, I said, “I’ll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.” I’d reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqi, house-to-house if necessary.

Meanwhile, from the west would come the U.S. Army's power punch. Looking at Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. "I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep," I said, showing how I wanted Luck's divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard's last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured, I told him he would hook his forces east, ready to join the main attack on the main body of the Iraqi army.... Finally I turned to Fred Franks. "I think it's pretty obvious what your mission is going to be," I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait. "Attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard." I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, then go in and wipe them out. I couldn't resist adding, "Once they're gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad because there isn't going to be anything else out there." I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary because, by then, the war would have ended.

—From *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, written with Peter Petre, pp. 382-383

## Requirement 6

Objective 13. Compare and contrast the methods and results of the campaign design of CENTCOM's Operation Desert Storm. [JPME Area 2(c), 3(c), 4(e)]

Objective 14. Compare and contrast the methods and results of campaign planning for CENTCOM's Operation Desert Storm. [JPME Area 2(c), 3(a)(c), 4(e)]

Read:

- *The Generals' War*, Chapters 4, 6, and 7, (59 pages)

These three chapters in *The Generals' War* demonstrate a somewhat disorganized methodology for campaign design and development. Most of what you have read indicates that the Joint force commander (JFC) must be intimately involved in the design of his campaign and that the staff must assist in putting more details to the strategic concept. The following synopsis shows how the campaign for Operation Desert Storm evolved.

Air Force Colonel John Warden developed the Air Force's first plan called Instant Thunder. Instant Thunder was a focused, intense air operation designed to incapacitate Iraqi leadership and destroy key military capability in a short period of time. General Charles A. Horner felt Warden's C2 analysis needed work and tasked Lt Gen Buster Glosson to develop the air operations plan. A compartmentalized planning group known as the Black Hole did Glosson's planning. Glosson felt the initial plan did not explain how air power should be used if the six-day war did not produce victory; he further felt that it lacked provisions for attacks against the Republican Guard. Glosson and Lt Col Deptula presented the reworked plan to Horner on 26 August and were asked for a 24-hour ATO that could be quickly executed.

Navy counterparts disagreed on the plan from the start; they felt that simultaneous target attack would result in high losses, that U.S. forces did not understand Iraqi air defenses, and that battle damage assessment (BDA) would not be timely enough to allow for day 3-4 retargeting. Vice Admiral Mauz, Commander of Navy Forces, argued for a traditional rollback campaign that would optimize the Navy's role.

Schwarzkopf approved the plan 3 September, and Powell was briefed 12 September. The "stand-alone" airpower option stayed under wraps until Air Force Chief of Staff General Dugan told reporters, "The cutting edge would be downtown Baghdad... We are looking for centers of gravity...and Hussein ought to be at the focus of our efforts." Powell was outraged at the suggestion that the Air Force could single-handedly win the war and felt secrets had been divulged to the press. Defense Secretary Cheney requested Dugan's resignation.

Lt Col Joseph Purvis was chosen to head up a special team that would plan the ground offensive to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. It was a self-contained group, without Marine involvement, and it had no direct contact with Colin Powell's staff in Washington. The only direction Schwarzkopf gave was that American forces were **not** to go into Kuwait City. The code name for the land offensive was Eager Anvil.

On October 10<sup>th</sup> a briefing with Cheney, Powell, and the Service Chiefs of Staff did not go well, at least for the ground plan. Marine Corps Commandant General Al Gray objected vehemently to the plan, which had been prepared without consulting the Marines. The October 11<sup>th</sup> White House meeting was a defining moment in the evolution of the ground and air operations plans. Glosson ran through the air operation target list, which included attacks on Saddam's residences and Iraq's political institutions. President Bush liked the air operations plan and only requested that Powell make doubly sure that no sites of religious or historic significance were on the target list. The discussion shifted to the ground offensive. Purvis briefed the plan to attack through the Iraqi defenses. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft questioned why the Army was attacking into the strength of the Iraqi defense. Needless to say, the ground plan was unacceptable. This White House meeting was a turning point that foreshadowed all the key decisions in planning the war. Bush concluded that military action was necessary to end Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and also accepted Powell's argument that airpower was insufficient to do the job. The planners' one-corps plan was unacceptable, and Bush had pointed the way to a two-corps plan attacking in the west.

Secretary Cheney formed a planning group led by LTG Vessey. This group developed the "Western Excursion Plan," whose advantages were as follows:

- Possessed shock effect
- Was a threat to Baghdad
- Brought about an Iraqi regime collapse
- Enabled an occupation of the western Iraqi desert for negotiations
- Provided an easy air assault against potential Iraqi counterattacks
- Cut off the Jordanian logistics support line
- Allowed for the attack of scuds

- Kept Israel out of the war

Even though this plan was eventually killed, it had challenged the military to accept the plan or to develop a more imaginative one. When the ground war started, the left hook was so far left that the French and 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne were out of the action. Even the VII Corps encountered only a marginal number of Iraqi units; however, they still were not far enough west to interfere with the SCUD launches against Israel or to threaten Baghdad, both elements of Secretary Cheney's original plan. CENTCOM belatedly sent Special Operations Forces into the western desert to deal with the scuds, acknowledging the correctness of Cheney's plan. Now, only the Marines' role needed to be defined.

### **Requirement 7**

Objective 15. Comprehend the campaign plan key points and understand the major objectives for the conduct of offensive operations against Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). [JPME Area 3(a)(c)]

Read:

- *The Generals' War*, Chapters 8 and 9 (42 pages)

**Note:** Key points to consider during your examination of the objective above are as follows:

- Commander's intent
- USCINCCENT mission statement
- Phasing
- Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities
- Deception

Chapters 8 and 9 are continuations of Chapters 4, 6, and 7. All five chapters demonstrate how CENTCOM, primarily the various Service components for CENTCOM, conducted planning. Eventually, the Service component plans were blended into the overall campaign plan. The narration below shows some of the friction and miscommunications that occurred among the CENTCOM planners and the Service component planners.

While the Army's flanking attack was falling into place, the Marine mission was up for grabs. The Marines had been the first ground forces to get any substantial combat power in country and on the ground. They had, in effect, covered for the Army. Now that CENTCOM was looking to go north, the CENTCOM planners had concluded that the most important contribution the Marines could make was to support the Army's left hook. There was one complication. The CENTCOM planners had never consulted the Marine high command about this role. CENTCOM planners were treating the Marines as an adjunct of the Army. While CENTCOM planners were plotting the attack, the Marines had been struggling to come up with their own offensive plan. LtGen Walter Boomer, MARCENT component commander, was furious that Schwarzkopf's planning cell had been preparing a land offensive for two months without the

Marines' knowledge, let alone participation.

Believing airpower was CENTCOM's best hope to hold down American casualties, if and when the ground war was launched, General Schwarzkopf made the goal a fundamental assumption of CENTCOM's plan. Tying air and land plans together, the OPLAN was not designed to be an open-ended bombing campaign to bring about the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The Army's left-hook portion of the campaign was ultimately designed to accomplish that feat.

It was agreed that the air-war commanders would have first crack at Iraq and would mount a sustained fight; however, the air operation's main focus was unresolved.

### Lesson Summary

This lesson illustrates the definite art and professional skill in designing and planning a campaign that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation. As you read through the lesson and accompanying readings, you learned that campaign design is a logical result of the theater commander's strategic estimate process. Additionally, this lesson has introduced a critical element for understanding how Joint forces presently conduct operational design and how it was conducted during Operation Desert Storm.

## Campaigning and Operational Art



This lesson further illustrates how the campaign plan becomes the medium for the combatant commander to present his broad vision of what is to be accomplished, his intent, and how all available assets will be synchronized and phased in order to achieve the strategic objective. As you read through *The Generals' War*, it should become apparent how CINCCENT, along with his component commanders, began developing the campaign plan that became Operation Desert

Storm. This lesson should have given you knowledge and understanding about the various characteristics of a campaign, such as those listed below, as well as some insight into the fundamentals of campaign plans.

- Possesses broad scope
- Possesses large forces in theaters of war/operations
- Conducts unified, Joint, combined activity
- Combines series of actions (phases)
- Achieves strategic objectives (aimed at enemy centers of gravity)

This lesson does an excellent job of linking what you have learned about the strategic level of war, strategy, and policy in the 8802 or 8802A course and how those elements affect the manner in which the U.S. military conducts war at the operational level. Additionally, this lesson provides a linkage to the tactical level of war you will experience in the 8804 through 8808 courses.

**JPME Summary**

AREA 1					AREA 2				AREA 3					AREA 4					AREA 5			
A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D
	X			X	X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X			X				