

LESSON 15 (Optional) CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

Lesson Introduction

This lesson is optional. The resident Command and Staff College provides each student with a campaign analysis model for purposes of teaching the curriculum. This model might be useful as a reference or for looking at historical case studies. The importance of campaign analysis for operational problems is that it embraces the big picture in terms of the total forces involved, including the Joint actions of air, ground, and naval forces as well as the play of coalition forces. Campaign analysis considers many of the most important determinants of the outcome of an operation, such as timing and tempo, phasing, and the correlation of military forces. At the campaign level one can start to gain insight into *how much military force is enough* because all theater forces and their synergy are evaluated.

Provided in this lesson is a short case study on Gallipoli. You can use this study as a subject for analysis, using the model described below. Again, this lesson is optional and will not be evaluated on the final exam.

Components of Campaign Analysis

The Campaign Analysis provides a roadmap for analyzing a campaign. It offers a considerable enhancement as one reads through a specific campaign. The model described below will provide valuable assistance to you as you attempt to gain insight into how a campaign unfolds, from its planning through its execution.

General

I. Strategic Situation

- a. What were the war aims of the belligerents? Were strategic end states or outcomes established for both sides?
- b. What strategic missions or direction did both opposing commanders receive?
- c. What was the geo-political situation at the time, and what impact did it have on both sides?

II. Operational Situation

- a. How did geography affect campaign planning? Were there any geographical, decisive points?
- b. Did either side have an advantage in operational approach by having central position or by operating on interior or exterior lines?

- c. Had either side conducted a previous campaign or major operation, the outcome of which influenced events in this campaign?
- d. What constituted the theater of war or operations, and what was its relationship to other theaters? Was this the theater of focus or an economy of force theater? Did the belligerents define the area of conflict differently? If so, did this have an effect?

III. Limiting Factors

- a. What were the opposing combatant commanders required to do? (constraints, restraints)
- b. What were the opposing combatant commanders prohibited from doing? (constraints)
- c. What physical limitations existed that prevented the opposing combatant commanders from doing what they wanted to do? (restrictions)

IV. Strategic Advantages

- a. What strategic advantages (including all elements of power) did either side have? Did either side have the strategic initiative?
- b. How did each side seek to achieve strategic advantage?

V. Enemy Forces

- a. Describe the enemy's state in terms of location, disposition, vulnerabilities, training, doctrine, morale, leadership, equipment, weaponry, logistics, intelligence, etc.
- b. What were the command relationships for Joint and combined operations? Were there land, sea, air, or special component commanders? What were the allied/coalition relationships?
- c. Determine the strategic and operational centers of gravity and vulnerabilities.
- d. What were the primary lines of operation?

VI. Friendly Forces (same as above for enemy forces)

VII. Assumptions

- a. Describe the specified planning assumptions identified by both sides.
- b. Describe the implied planning assumptions identified by both sides.
- c. Describe any risks taken by either commander. Were these risks prudent?

Other: Describe any other differences in the opposing side's situation that had an impact (for example, any psychological differences, any advantages or disadvantages in operational intelligence).

Mission/Objectives

- a. What were the theater strategic objectives that would enable both commanders to accomplish their national strategic objectives? Did either commander define a military end state?
- b. Who selected the operational objectives (higher political leadership or the theater commander)?
- c. What were both commanders' conflict termination objectives?

I. Operations

- a. What were the theater strategies selected by both sides and the reasons for their selection? Were there feasible, alternative courses of action?
- b. Briefly describe the campaign, the management of operations, the principal phases, and critical events.
 1. Discuss the timing or tempo of the campaign. Did it favor one side or the other? Were operations simultaneous or sequential?
 2. Did either side conduct forcible entry operations?
 3. Did either side gain dimensional superiority on land, sea, air, or in information?
 - i. Did either side gain and exploit air superiority or supremacy?
 - ii. Did either side obtain sea control or conduct power projection from the sea?
 - iii. Did either side use deception or other elements of information operations effectively?
- c. How and why were campaign plans changed and did the execution of the operation alter the plan? Did the opposing commanders anticipate the unexpected? Was force balance maintained?
 1. How did both commanders ensure that their subordinates understood their intent? Was a main effort designated?
 2. Were branches and sequels planned for or used?
 - i. What forms of operational maneuver were used (turning movement, penetration, frontal attack, envelopment, mobile defense, retrograde, etc.)? Were opposing centers of gravity attacked directly or indirectly?
 - ii. How was Joint firepower employed (tactical air support, air interdiction, naval strike operations, or other deep supporting fires)?
 - iii. Discuss the use of combined arms and Joint forces. Was synergy or leverage achieved with symmetrical or asymmetrical actions? Were these actions mutually supporting? Were allied forces employed? Was synchronization of Joint elements achieved? Was synchronization and simultaneity of close, deep, and rear operations achieved? Why or why not?
 - iv. Did either side plan for the protection of forces and functions?

- v. Were strategic or operational reserves established? Was their employment timely and effective? Did they have operational mobility?
- vi. Were there any significant special, Service, or collateral operations?

II. Logistics

- a. What was the concept for logistics for both sides? Were both campaign plans based on logistical reality?
- b. Were there plans for operational sustainment? Was there an arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases?
- c. Did either side reach a culminating point or exceed its operational reach? If so, was it anticipated and accommodated in the plan?
- d. How did both opponents establish logistical priorities or deal with logistical limitations?
 - 1. Describe the opposing and friendly forces logistical organizational infrastructure.
 - 2. Discuss the lines of communications for both forces from their theater bases to the front. Were these support bases or lines of communications threatened? Were advanced bases established?
 - 3. Did either side conduct large-scale reconstitution?

III. Command and Signal

- a. Command
 - 1. How was unity of command and effort maintained by both sides?
 - 2. Where were both commanders located during the campaign?
- b. Signal
 - 1. Did communications have an impact on either side?
 - 2. Did communications have any adverse impact on either side?

IV. Applications

- a. Analyze the relevant or applicable principles of war.
- b. Examine other applicable concepts from military theorists or doctrine (for example, Clausewitz and “friction”). What were the immediate results of this campaign? Were any significant insights learned?

Optional: Campaign Analysis of an Actual Case Study

In order to enhance your capability to examine campaigns, we have provided a brief campaign analysis using the Gallipoli campaign as a guide. All objectives, issues and readings are included in the analysis. As you read through the Gallipoli campaign, refer to the campaign analysis provided in order to enhance your knowledge of how to analyze a campaign.

The analysis for the Gallipoli campaign examines the design and execution of this ill-fated British disaster in the Dardanelles from March through August 1915. The importance of analyzing this campaign is that it embraces the big picture in terms of the total forces involved, including the Joint actions of air, ground and naval forces, as well as the play of coalition forces. As you read through the Gallipoli campaign, note that this analysis considers many of the most important determinants of the outcome of an operation, such as timing and tempo, phasing, and the correlation of military forces. At the campaign level, one can start to gain insight into *how much military force is enough* because all theater forces and their synergy are evaluated.

Campaign analysis is also used to study the interaction of strategy, force allocation, and system capabilities; thus, these points will be clearly illustrated as you read through the Gallipoli campaign.

“Force and time in this kind of operation amount to almost the same thing, and each can to a very large extent be expressed in terms of each other. A week lost was about the same as a division. Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have captured it after March 18. Seven were insignificant at the end of April, but nine just might have done it. Eleven might have sufficed at the beginning of July. Fourteen were to prove insufficient on Aug 7.”

—Sir Winston S. Churchill

From the above comment by Churchill, you have more than likely concluded that the campaign failed; thus the focus on the analysis is to learn what went wrong. Was there a coordinated strategy? Was there a unity of command? Were the principles of war followed? Why, and what led the Allies to undertake a campaign in the Dardanelles?

Using the operational concepts of center of gravity and decisive point, critique the assault at Gallipoli and the early portions of the campaign. What factors led the Allies to assault at Suvla Bay? Understand the concept of the defense of a theater to the Turkish operational defense of Gallipoli. Using the concept of operational art for analysis, determine how the British could have performed better at Gallipoli.

Clausewitz defines the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” In many cases, this means the armed forces, but it could also mean the state’s capital or perhaps something more conceptual such as the will of the people. At the operational level, the center of gravity would normally be an armed force. At the strategic level, it could be the armed forces or something else. As you read through the Gallipoli reading, determine if the British ever identified either an operational or strategic center of gravity.

To further enhance your ability to analyze the Gallipoli Campaign, refer to the campaign analysis at the beginning of this lesson, and as you read through the included readings (and accompanying maps), examine Gallipoli carefully from the strategic and operational perspectives... to determine why the campaign failed.

Read:

- *USMC Command and Staff College Gallipoli Case Study*, readings and maps included

In reference to the concept of the defense of a theater, understand how the Turks looked at the operational defense of Gallipoli. When Clausewitz states that the defense is the stronger form of battle, the military professional is inclined to think of the common defense-attack ratio of 1:3. This ratio implies that the defense has the advantage of fortification and a fixed position while the offense requires at least three times as much force structure for a successful attack against such a position. However, Clausewitz's argument is not focused at the tactical level of war where the 1:3 defense-attack ratio applies. His argument is at the operational level of war, where the defense frequently has the advantage of interior lines, the occupation of friendly and known territory, which should provide better intelligence and security than the attacker moving over the same terrain. Furthermore, if the defender falls back or withdraws, he normally reduces the length of his lines of communication as the enemy's lines of communications are extended. Clausewitz argues also that the nature of the defense includes a counterattack whenever possible; thus, it has an offensive component exercised from a position of advantage. He further states that if the defense does not include a plan for counterattack, the defense lacks a proper purpose.

At Gallipoli, the Turkish Army did not have the bulk of its forces defend forward during the Allied amphibious phase (except at the very tip of the peninsula) but concentrated them to be able to attack in response to the landing. The resulting meeting engagement did not offer the defender the tactical 1:3 advantage. However, the Turks had all the other advantages of interior lines, known and friendly terrain, and shorter lines of communication. The Turks attacked repeatedly throughout the campaign.

In regards to Clausewitz's concept of the strategic attack involving Allied operations at Gallipoli, is he referring to what we define as the operational level of war rather than the strategic?

For those who recall Clausewitz from earlier lessons, he focuses on the operational level of war, even though that phrase was not used during his time, rather than strategy. His focus on the attack states that "an attack cannot be completed in a single steady movement: periods of rest are needed during which the attack is neutralized, and defense (for the attacker) takes over automatically." Gallipoli is a campaign conducted at the operational level of war. It has a strategic objective...opening the straits to allow the Navy to get to Istanbul.

During the Allied landing, the assault phase quickly turned into a defensive phase from which the Allies never really recovered. This was not merely a function of what Clausewitz referred to as "a period of rest," but it was a major loss of Allied momentum resulting from limited resources, inadequate aggressive leadership, and a well led counterattack by the Turkish Army.

In using the concept of operational art for analysis, how could the British have performed better at Gallipoli?

Command and control could have been greatly enhanced by establishing a Joint command for Allied naval and ground forces. Intelligence support for the operation was fragmented and slow. This might have been corrected by establishing a Joint staff section to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. A Joint staff would have enhanced sustainment through better coordination between naval assets providing support to ground units ashore. Firepower could have been enhanced through a more developed communication plan. More aggressive actions by the British commander could have exploited maneuver and mobility through early employment of reserve forces to support the initial success during the main attack. All the above would have influenced force protection, yet Joint commands and staffs were not a feature of the Allied forces of this era. Gallipoli offers an excellent illustration of how this absence led to operational failure, thus an argument for Jointness.