

HEADQUARTERS
JTF/MNF - PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

JOINT TASK FORCE/MNF-PACIFICA OPORD (OPERATION PACIFIC STRIKE) 0002-2XX1

REFERENCES:

- (a) Maps and Charts: ANNEX M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy)
- (b) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 25 Feb 95
- (c) Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 Mar 94
- (d) Joint Pub 1-03, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions
- (e) Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations
- (f) USCINCPAC OPORD 99-X1, Issuing HQ: HQ, USPACOM, Effective DTG: 18 Mar 2XX1.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

1. SITUATION.

a. General.

(1) Pacifica is currently embroiled in civil war. This war pits rebel army units on Luzon and ethnic insurgents operating principally in the southern islands against the elected government in Manila. Surranian armed forces have also been introduced in Pacifica on behalf of the rebels. In January 2XX0, SPM (Surranian Peoples Movement), PRA (Pacifcan Rebel Army) united under the PPF (Pacifcan Peoples Front) and attempt to march on Manila. Pro-government forces met them and a civil war ensued. By the end of June the situation on Luzon had reached a stalemate along the Lingayen plain north of Manila. Both sides accepted a UN brokered cease-fire and IAW the agreement the UN established a peacekeeping force on Luzon designated as UNFORPAC. A UN brokered Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the Pacifcan Peoples Front (PPF) and the Government of Pacifica (GOP) forces was established on 31 July 2XX0.

(2) The Surranian Peoples Movement (SPM) insurgents in the southern islands took advantage of the Pacifcan Army's preoccupation with events in Manila to

begin insurgent activity in Palawan, Mindanao and Negros. In July 2XX0 encouraged by Surranian promises of support, the Pacifican Peoples Front (PPF) declared themselves the “rightful” government of Pacifica, and announced establishment of the independent “Republic of Tuguegado” in North Luzon. Surran responded with arms, technical advisors and diplomatic support.

(3) On 01 February 2XX1, Surran began landing forces in Pacifica. The UN condemned the Surranian intervention and issued UNSCR 763 (5 Feb 2XX1 which called for the withdrawal of Surranian forces from Pacifica. UNSCR 794 (01 March 2XX1) further authorized member states to take military action to compel Surranian compliance on 21 Apr 2XX1 if Surran has not withdrawn their forces. Provisions for establishment of an exclusion zone were also established. Currently, Surran has projected two modernized Infantry Armies (8th and 10th), a T-72 equipped tank division and the 3d Airborne Division to North Luzon. Additionally, Surran has continued to move smaller insurgent training forces to Mindanao. Surranian air forces and theater ballistic missiles have been deployed to the southern islands. The Surran-PPF coalition possesses sophisticated air, land and naval forces and are capable of conducting a robust defense of the area North of the cease fire line.

(4) US policy goals in the AOR, as documented in NSDD 5202 from 01 Jan 2XX1, are as follows:

- (a) Restore territorial integrity of PACIFICA.
- (b) Support the democratically elected government of PACIFICA.
- (c) Protect the lives and property of US citizens.
- (d) Protect free and equitable international access to the benefits of the EAST Sulu Sea oil and mineral area.
- (e) Ensure secure passage for international commerce in the Straits of Malacca.
- (f) Meet our regional treaty obligations.
- (g) Demonstrate US resolve to support important national interest in the region.

(5) United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (UNSCR 794) gives SURRAN a 50 day period, ending at 2400 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) 21 April 2XX1, in which to withdraw all of its forces from PACIFICA. The resolution authorizes, “use [of] all necessary means to take all measures necessary to evict SURRANIAN forces from PACIFICA should they not withdraw within the period specified”. The resolution also authorizes the establishment of an air and maritime exclusion zone around the sovereign nation of Pacifican Archipelago effective: 212400 EST, April 2XX1 with the purpose of preventing further movement of Surranian forces or supplies into Pacifica.

(6) USCINCPAC Estimate dated, 15 Feb 2XX1 in addition to the above provided the following strategic intent and objectives for MNF PACIFICA:

- (a) Restore territorial integrity of Pacifica.

- (b) Degrade Surranian force projection capability.
- (c) Establish secure environment in Pacifica which facilitates government and other international organization activities.
- (d) Protect lives and property of US citizens.
- (e) Protect free and equitable international access to E. Sulu Sea oil and mineral area.
- (f) Meet regional treaty obligations.
- (g) Support democratically elected governments of Pacifica

(7) The following prohibitions are in effect:

- (a) US conventional ground operations are restricted to LUZON.
- (b) US force strength on PACIFICA will not exceed 75,000.
- (c) US forces will not operate within 25 NM of EAST ISLE.
- (d) Submarine action in SURRANIAN territorial waters requires USCINCPAC approval.


b. Area of Concern.

(1) Area of Responsibility. The JOINT OPERATION AREA PACIFICA includes the soil, adjacent sea, air and space of SURRAN and PACIFICA. It approaches to within 12 NM of EASTLAND and INDONESIA land masses as well as within 25 NM of EAST ISLE. (See Annex Y, TBI)

(2) Area of Interest. Surrounding PACIFICA, SURRAN, and the adjacent geographical territory. (See Annex Y)

(3) Area of Operations. (See Annex Y).

Areas of Operation Within JOA Pacifica




c. Deterrent Options. Not applicable.


d. Enemy Forces. See Annex B.

- (1) Description. The PPF has ten brigades (six Light Infantry, four Mech Infantry), seven long range cannon battalions, two MRL battalions, one SSM battalion, and limited AT/ADA/GRD ATU aircraft. In addition, two non-aligned infantry brigades can be expected to join PPF forces. Surranian forces in Pacifica include the 8th and 10th Infantry Armies equipped with T-72, BMP-2 and BRDM-2s. Additionally, Surran will deploy the 37th Tank Division (282 T-72U equipped) and the 3d Infantry (Airborne) Division. Surran homeland defense forces include the 39th Marine Corps and numerous other ground forces. Surran Air Forces consist of over 900 aircraft and recon drones dispersed throughout Surran, N. Luzon and Pacifica. Surran can be expected to leave two air groups (2nd and 4th) in defense of their homeland and will forward deploy the 3rd Air Group with over 300 aircraft, to Luzon. Surran will support power projection efforts with their 1st Air Group based generally out of Surran. The Surranian Navy consists of 12 missile frigates, 10 diesel (SSK-209) submarines, 48 fast attack missile boats, 6 ADA missile frigates, 6 WWII era destroyers, 5 replenishment ships and offensive mining capabilities. Surran will support their power projection efforts with 32 LST's and both air and naval forces listed above.
- (2) Post Deployment Projected Locations. See following.

(a) North Luzon:



(b) JOA less North Luzon:



(3) Enemy Operational Centers of Gravity. Surran's navy and air power are the centers of gravity during initial seizure/landing operations as they provide the means to project power forward into the region. Upon completion of deployment, with two-plus Army sized formations in Pacifica, Surran's operational center of gravity becomes the ground forces on Luzon. Critical requirements at the operational level are the mechanized force in the ground forces, C2, linkage between SR and PPF forces, and air and naval sustainment and combat support.

a. Enemy Forces. Ref (b) and ANNEX B.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) USCINCPAC Mission: When directed, MNF Pacifica reestablishes Pacifican territorial integrity, defeats PRA forces within Pacifica, and destroys Surranian force projection capability to threaten and destabilize the regional environment in Pacifica in order to provide a peaceful and stable environment to our national interests and those of our friends.

(2) USCINCPAC Intent:

Purpose. To expel the Surranian forces from Pacifica, destroy Surranian force projection and defeat the PRA forces in Pacifica.

Method. I intend to contain the current instability in Pacifica through lethal means (exclusion zone) and non-lethal means (use of information operations). We will defeat Surranian forces in Pacifica through exploitation of our dominant strategic, operational and tactical mobility to overwhelm and destroy the cohesiveness of Surranian forces, giving them no alternative but to withdraw from occupied Pacifican territory or be destroyed. We will apply force with precision, limiting collateral damage and risk to the force by conducting decisive operations through the area of interest and emphasizing velocity and tempo of operations over mass. We will seek to isolate Surran by encouraging active engagement and support of our operations by other nations in the region and by discrediting Surranian leadership and emphasizing Surranian ties to transnational criminal organizations. During all phases of the operation we will protect Manila and the critical facilities necessary for its continuous and safe operation. Concurrently, we will be vigilant in protecting our forces both within and outside the JOA from terrorist and other asymmetrical threats.

Endstate. The desired endstate is the expulsion of all Surranian forces from Pacifica and the restoration of Pacifican territorial integrity, elimination of Surranian power projection; rapid, safe and efficient redeployment of U.S. forces.

2. MISSION. On order, MNF-Pacifica conducts operations to reestablish Pacifican territorial integrity, defeat PRA forces within Pacifica, and destroy Surranian force projection capability to threaten and destabilize the regional environment in Pacifica in order to provide a peaceful and stable environment conducive to our national interests and those of our friends.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander's Intent.

Purpose: To expel Surranian forces from Pacifica, destroy Surranian force projection and defeat the PRA forces in Pacifica.

Method: My intent is to deploy and posture U.S. and multinational forces to deter further Surranian aggression and then to defeat the Surranian forces that have already invaded Pacifica.

With respect to Surran:

- Surran's most likely course of action is to continue to reinforce its forces on Luzon with the ultimate goal of capturing the Pacifican capital of Manila.
- Surran's most dangerous course of action will be to initiate an immediate attack south down the western plain prior to the completion of the deployment of JTF forces to Luzon.
- We will prevent this with JTF air, offensive, and defensive operations to halt Surran's further reinforcement of Pacifica in general and Luzon in specific, while we position ARFOR, MARFOR and other multi-national forces to prevent Surranian forces from attacking to the south on Luzon.
- After halting further reinforcement of Surranian forces in Pacifica and Surranian advances on Luzon, I intend to attack those forces occupying Pacifica in order to either force them to withdraw from Pacifican territory or be defeated and destroyed in place.
- Additionally, I further intend to concurrently defeat the PRA reducing its unit military capability down to the company-sized level.
- After the expulsion or destruction of Surranian forces in Pacifica, I intend to restore the territorial integrity of Pacifica and the lawful government of that nation.

Endstate: The restoration of the international borders and sovereignty of Pacifica, defeated Surranian forces, reduction of PRA forces to units below company level, Surran unable to project a credible regional conventional force, and Pacifican (or other forces) assume responsibility for maintaining a secure and stable environment.

c. Concept of Operations. JTF/ MNF Pacifica will execute major operations in support of Phases 2 and 3 of ref (f).

- (1) **Phase I. Pre-hostilities and Lodgement.** JTF Pacifica will deploy to the JOA and establish lodgement as well as assimilation of UNFORPAC forces in anticipation of the commencement of combat operations.
- (2) **Phase IIA. Shape the Battlespace.** Once ARFOR and MARFOR have reached sufficient force levels to be declared combat ready, conduct operations to shape the battlespace.
- (3) **Phase IIB. Decisive Maneuver.** When directed, conduct offensive operations as directed through decisive maneuver.
- (4) **Phase III. Follow Through.** JTF/MNF air, land and sea forces conduct offensive operations to establish territorial control and, achieve and maintain a secure environment in accordance with USPACOM/JTF/MNF objectives.
- (5) **Phase IV. Posthostilities and Redeployment.** (TBD)

d. Specified Tasks

(1) **ARFOR (II Corps)**

(a) Commander, II Corps is ARFOR.

(b) Phase IIA

- 1 Seize and defend key terrain along the Zone of Separation (ZOS) within ARFOR AO to maintain Highway 5 as an essential Line of Communication (LOC).
- 2 Conduct JSEAD with artillery and MLRS attacks in support of air operations.
- 3 Conduct deep attacks to set conditions for future simultaneous offensive operations in coordination with MARFOR.

(c) Phase IIB

- 1 Continue to deploy and stage assigned forces into JOA.
- 2 Defend along FEBA to secure Highway 5, maintain critical ground Lines of Communication (LOCs), and contain PRA forces north and west of the FEBA.
- 3 On order, attack to defeat Surranian forces in Central Corridor of Luzon.

(d) Phase III

1. Continue offensive operations against Surranian forces in northern Luzon to destroy or force their withdrawal from Luzon.
2. Continue operations to eliminate resistance and restore Pacifican territorial integrity. Upon destruction or withdrawal of Surranian forces from Luzon, conduct operations in support of MNF forces defeat of PRA forces on Pacifica.
3. Commence transition to stabilization operations on Luzon.

(2) **MARFOR (I MEF)**

(a) CG I MEF is MARFOR.

(b) Phase IIA

1. Continue to deploy and stage assigned forces into JOA.
2. Establish defensive positions along the Zone Of Separation within the MARFOR AO in order to protect Lines of Communication and Manila.
3. Defeat PRA Forces in zone.
4. Destroy Surranian 10th Army power projection capability.
5. Conduct JSEAD with artillery in support of air operations.
6. Conduct deep attacks to set conditions for future simultaneous offensive operations in coordination with ARFOR.

(c) Phase IIB

1. Continue to deploy and stage assigned forces into JAO.
2. Continue to defend along FEBA to establish blocking positions to the north and along coastal highway, maintain control of critical ground, LOC and contain PRA forces north of the FEBA.
3. On order, attack to defeat Surranian forces in western coastal plain of Luzon.

(d) Phase III

1. Plan for and be prepared to conduct link up with and receive TACON of 1st MEB.
2. Continue offensive operations against Surranian forces in northern Luzon to destroy or force their withdrawal from Luzon.
3. Continue operations to eliminate resistance and restore Pacifican territorial integrity.
4. Upon the destruction or withdrawal of Surranian forces from Luzon, conduct operations to support MNF defeat of PRA forces on Pacifica.
5. Commence transition to stabilization operations on Luzon.

(3) **JFMCC (SEVENTH FLEET)**

(a) Commander, Seventh Fleet is JFMCC

(b) Phase IIA

1. Establish naval superiority in the JOA.
2. Establish maritime exclusion area.
3. Prepare to execute amphibious operations in AOA.
4. Execute air operations, naval gunfire and missile attacks into AOA to interdict the 10th Army, diminish combat capability, and prevent its link-up with PRA forces.
5. Conduct presence operations and amphibious demonstrations off of Surran, vicinity Bandar Seri Begawan, and northern coast of Luzon, Pacifica.
6. Be prepared to conduct an NEO within the JOA.

(c) Phase IIB

1. Maintain naval superiority in JOA.
2. Maintain and enforce maritime exclusion area.
3. Continue conduct of offensive operations at sea to degrade Surranian naval forces and force projection capabilities.

4. Continue shaping operations in AOA to interdict and attrit, 10th Army forces and prevent 10th Army link-up with PRA forces vicinity Lingayen.

(d) Phase III

1. On order, execute amphibious assault in AOA on western Luzon to defeat the 10th Army.
 1. Be prepared to pass 1st MEB TACON to MARFOR.
 2. Continue to maintain sea superiority in JOA.
 4. Conduct air and naval operations in JTF AO to degrade Surranian and SPM forces in southern Pacifica and set the conditions for the JTF to defeat remaining Surranian and SPM forces.
 5. Continue to conduct air and naval operations to degrade Surranian force projection capabilities.

(4) **JFACC (13th AIR FORCE)**

- (a) Commander, 13th Air Force is JFACC, AADC, and ACA

(b) Phase IIA

- 1 Conduct OCA/DCA to establish and maintain air superiority.
- 2 Maintain and enforce air exclusion zone.
- 3 Conduct strategic air attack to destroy Surranian Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) assets forward deployed in Pacifica; interdict and attrit elements of the Surranian forces, and degrade Surranian force projection capabilities.
- 4 Accept TACON of TMD assets and protect priority facilities to include Pacifican Government /MNF C2 nodes, APODs/SPODs, logistics bases, JTF/MNF air bases, and ARFOR and MARFOR unit assembly areas.

(c) Phase IIB

- 1 Conduct OCA/DCA to maintain air superiority.
- 2 Maintain and enforce air exclusion zone.

- 3 Conduct air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS) in northern Luzon in support of ARFOR and MARFOR destruction of Surranian forces and in JTF AO to support JTF destruction of Surranian and SPM forces.
- 4 Conduct strategic air attack to degrade Surranian force projection capabilities; and, destroy Surranian Weapons of mass Destruction (WMD) R&D, production, and storage facilities in the JOA.

(d) Phase III

- 1 Conduct OCA/DCA to maintain air superiority.
- 2 Maintain and enforce air exclusion zone.
- 3 Conduct air interdiction and close air support in northern Luzon in support of ARFOR and MARFOR destruction of Surranian forces and in the JTF AO in order to destroy Surranian and SPM forces in support of the JTF.
- 4 Conduct strategic air attack to degrade Surranian force projection capabilities and destroy Surranian Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) R&D, production, and storage facilities in the JOA.

(5) **JSOTF.**

- 1 Conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, coalition support, FID, and counter insurgency operations in support of JTFP operations in the JOA. Annex C (Operations).
- 2 Provide liaison support to JTF/MNF throughout the JOA, as appropriate.
- 3 JTFP/MNFP is mission approval authority for SOF, SR, and DA missions.

(6) **JPOTF.** Conduct psychological operations in ARFOR and MARFOR AO in support of JTF/MNF objectives.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day, H-Hour: 21 April 2XX1, 1300 Local.
- (2) Direct liaison with Multinational Forces is authorized.

- (3) Targets published separately. Updated using Joint Integrated Priority Target List.
- (4) Targeting of bridges, power grids, dams, rail facilities, major highways, ferry centers, and airports in Pacifica require CJTF/MNF approval.
- (5) Anticipated duration of the operation is less than 180 days.
- (6) Minimize collateral damage to Pacifican and Surranian infrastructure and civilian populations.
- (7) Rules of Engagement (ROE): Reference Annex C (OPERATIONS), Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement).
- (8) Reports: See Annex K (C31 Systems).
- (9) OPSEC: Take necessary steps to protect information. Refer to Annex C, Appendix 3, Tab OPSEC.
- (10) JTFP deploys with capability to detect, monitor, and defend against Biological and Chemical threats.
- (11) NBC: ARFOR and MARFOR responsible for detection, decontamination, monitoring for land area. NAVFOR responsible for detection, decontamination, monitoring for sea areas.
- (12) Components establish MOPP levels.
- (13) Components secure captured ammunition and report to JTFP/MNFP.
- (14) Combat Identification and Anti-Fratricide Measures:
 - (a) Ground vehicles ID measures (NPTT) Glint tape in V shape.
 - (b) Ground vehicles ID measures. Orange VS-17 panels on rear.
 - (c) SHORAD weapons status: TBP.
 - (d) Aircraft transponders: Squawk codes from ATO.
 - (e) Deviation from air routes: Coordinate with ACA.
 - (f) English is the JTFP/MNFP official language.
- (15) Components BPT support Other Government Agencies (OGAs). Establish Executive Steering Group NLT 10 April 2XX1 to coordinate interagency

policy and direction. Requires senior representation JTFP, MNFP, functional components, OGAs, Government of Pacifica (GOP), and UN.

- (16) Liaison Instructions: TBP.
- (17) Command relationship special instructions: App 1 to Annex J.
- (18) JFACC assumes responsibility for Joint Rescue Coordination Center. Components responsible for service SAR. JRCC to coordinate augmentation of component SAR as required.
- (19) Components BPT provide support/LNO to JSRC.
- (20) BPT provide DART to components in their AO.
- (21) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) (Initial):
 - (a) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI):
 1. Location of POD's
 2. RSOI clusters, routes, and TAA's.
 3. C4I node locations.
 4. Logistical node locations.
 5. Scheme of Maneuver for combat operations.
 - (b) Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR):
 1. Loss of Aircraft.
 2. Damage or loss of friendly vessel.
 3. Closure in JOA of minimum essential forces for mission.
 4. Closure in JOA of all forces.
 5. Issuance of diplomatic information and coalition agreements, UN mandates or resolutions.
 - (c) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR):
 1. Indications of Surranian ground force offensive operations on Luzon.

- 2. TBM/WMD location/activity.
 - 3. Surranian sea/air transportation activity, location, and basing.
 - 4. Surranian ground force movement on Luzon.
 - 5. Location of Surranian submarine forces that can range JTF Forces within 72 hours.
 - 6. Eastland air/naval activity within JOA.
- (22) All components provide location of aircraft basing.
 - (23) JFMCC provide vessel basing locations in JOA.
 - (24) No ground forces of any type on Surranian territory.
 - (25) Surface naval forces within 12 NMs of Surranian territory require CINCPAC approval.
 - (26) UN Zone of Separation specified in USCINCPAC MSG ID 022100H FEB 2XX0/OPREP-3PCA.
 - (27) JTFF/MNFP enforce restrictions in ZOS specified under General Framework Agreement for Peace in Pacifica.
 - (28) Effective 210500Z APR 2XX1, PRA limit of advance is forward edge of UNPKF security zone (ZOS). Limit of advance of friendly forces is not to exceed 2KM distance from northern edge of the security zone (ZOS) except by platoon size or smaller reconnaissance forces within the zone until further notice.
 - (29) Plan branches for:
 - (a) Requirement to increase combat support to PJF during Phases IIA/IIB.
 - (b) Destroy or force withdrawal of Surranian forces on Luzon while restricted from attacking strategic or force projection targets on Surran.
 - (c) Accomplishing mission should MNF forces (except PA) be withdrawn or precluded from supporting the operation.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (See Annexes D and E).
- a. Concept of Support. Logistics will be a national responsibility throughout this operation, unless otherwise directed to support coalition partners external to JTF.

Each component is responsible its own Title 10 support requirements and for executing its wartime executive agent and common user logistics lead service responsibilities. The Army will provide common logistics support on Pacifica for classes I, II, III, IV and VI as well as water distribution. The 110th TSC will operate VIC Manila with ISBs in Guam and Okinawa and will be OPCON to JTFP/MNFP. The TSC will provide common user logistics support for all US forces on Pacifica. (See Annex D)

- (1) Phase 1 (Pre-hostilities and Lodgement): Logistical forces establish the logistics structure and stockage objectives to support RSOI of deploying forces. Host Nation Support will be used to prepare and sustain forces until lines of communication are established. Limited pre-positioned war reserve stocks will be available to support theater opening forces. Each nation will be responsible for its own logistical support. Engineer support will be necessary to reinforce road network prior to RSO&I of deploying forces.
 - (2) Phase IIA and IIB (Shape the Battlespace and Decisive Combat Operations): Logistical forces focus on sustainment of forces engaged in combat and stabilization operations. Limited humanitarian and civic assistance may be necessary to ensure MSRs are not congested with displaced civilians and refugees. Priority of support will be to US ground forces, US air forces and coalition forces.
 - (3) Phase III (Follow Through): Initial primary support will be to support the JFMCC in the execution of the amphibious landing and will continue until the transfer of the Landing Force TACON to MARFOR. Primary support will then be to reconstitution of follow through forces while preparing to transition to support of humanitarian operations and the restoration of civilian infrastructure. Priority of support will be to US ground forces, US air forces, and coalition forces.
 - (4) Phase VI (Post Hostilities): Logistics forces will focus on the redeployment of US forces while continuing to support humanitarian assistance operations.
- b. Logistics. The theater stockage objective for the PACOM AOR is 30 days. The stockage objective for the JOA is 15 days for all items, less Class III(B) and Class V. The stockage objective for Class III(B) and Class V is 5 days in the JOA. Normal resupply will be from the ISBs in Okinawa and Guam.
- c. Personnel. All units will deploy with at least 90 per cent fill of personnel. Personnel services will remain a service responsibility. Each service will limit personnel support functions on the island of Luzon to only those critical to support combat operations. Routine or less critical functions will be performed in the PACOM AOR in accordance with established service procedures. (See Annex E for additional details).

- d. Public Affairs. A Joint Information Bureau (JIB) will be established to coordinate all media inquiries and media escort duties. The public affairs effort will be consolidated to maximize limited resources. The media pool will be the primary means of providing access to forces and operations. Whenever possible, credentialed/approved media will be provided support to include transportation, food, water, and protection. See Annex F.
 - e. Civil Affairs. See Annex G.
 - f. Environmental Services. N/A.
 - g. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. None.
 - h. Medical Services. Medical support will be provided primarily via service support with common user support base on METT-T. Medical support will be provided to US contractors in the JOA in accordance with existing contractual specifications (See Annex Q for additional details). ARFOR and MARFOR will provide CASEVAC from Luzon to USN hospital ships afloat. JFACC will provide intra-theater CASEVAC. Mortuary services will be accomplished through the Concurrent Returns Program in Phase II/III. The Current Death Program will be in effect during Phase I.
- (5) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
- a. Command Relationships. CJTF/MNF Pacifica is USCINCPAC supported operational commander for Operation PACIFIC STRIKE. Parallel command chains exist in the MNF/Pacifican C2 arrangements, with the US as lead nation in the multi-national effort. Deputy CINCPAC is MNFC and USCJTF with a Pacifican Lieutenant General as deputy MNFC. JTF/MNF is organized into both the Functional Components of JFACC, JFMCC, JPOTF, and JSOTF as well as service component commanders ARFOR and MARFOR. D/MNFC exercises national command authority over Pacifican forces TACON to the MNF. Troop Contributing Nation forces of Chosun, Malaysia, and Thailand are TACON to the MNF component and functional components with ultimate national command authority ties to their parent nations. Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC) is Deputy MNF Commander. See Annex J.
 - b. Command Posts.
 - (1) JTF/MNF HQ is located in Manila during Phases I-IV. HQ JTF/MNF rear is located at Naha, Okinawa and is the alternate command post. If compelled to do so, CJTF/MNF will establish his HQ afloat on the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19).

- (2) Combined Coordination Center. CJTF/MNF Pacifica, in conjunction with Pacifican Joint Forces will establish the Combined Coordination Center (CCC) vicinity Manila to coordinate and deconflict JTF/MNF operations and facilitate requests for mutual support. Organization for the CCC is outlined in Annex J.
- c. Succession to Command. Should CJTF/MNF Pacifica become incapacitated, interim command will pass to Deputy Commander CJTF/MNF and then to the ARFOR Commander.
 - d. Command, Control, and Communications Systems. (See Annex K).
 - (1) JTFP/MNFP and it's functional components will install communications and information management systems in accordance with Annex K. Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A), and GCCS-Corps systems will carry national, CINC and theater information.
 - (2) JTF/MNF Pacifica functional components will operate web pages designed for efficient management of information.
 - (3) Current COMSEC and JTFP/MNFP SOI in effect in accordance with Annex K, APPENDIX 1.
 - (4) JTF/MNF Pacifica will operate the Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC) for control of all joint and combined networking.

C. W. BROSSY
General, USA
Commander, JTF/MNF

Annexes:

- A – TASK ORGANIZATION
- B – INTELLIGENCE
- C – OPERATIONS
- D – LOGISTICS
- E – PERSONNEL (TBI)
- F – PUBLIC AFFAIRS (TBI)
- G – CIVIL AFFAIRS
- H – ENVIROMENTAL SERVICES (OMMITTED)
- J – COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
- K – COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (TBI)
- L – OPSEC (TBI)
- M – MAPPING (OMMITTED)
- N – SPACE OPERATIONS (TBI)
- P – WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT
- Q – MEDICAL SERVICES (TBI)
- R – REPORTS (TBI)
- T – AIR OPERATIONS (TBI)
- X – EXECUTION CHECKLIST
- Z – DISTRIBUTION (TBI)

OFFICIAL:

D.B. BERTRAM
Major General
Director, J-3

HEADQUARTERS
JTF/MNF-PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

**ANNEX A TO JTF/MNF PACIFICA OPORD 0001-2XXX
TASK ORGANIZATION**

JOINT TASK FORCE PACIFICA (JTFP)

Det, PACOM JIB
JCSE
NIST
Det, JC2WC
PACOM PSYDET
1 Corps HQs
417th Sig Bde (Theater)
CA CMD CAPP Team
110 TSC

JFACC

- 13TH AIRFORCE
1st AE
2d AEF

JSOTF

8th SF Gp (Abn)(US)
1-72 Ranger (Bn (US))
160th SOAR
312 Spec Opns Commo Bn
438th Spt Bn, Spec Opns
495th CA Bn (FID/UW)
Naval SW Task Group 11
16th SOW
193rd SOG
95th Ranger Regt (PA)(TACON)
6th SF Grp (Abn)(PA)(TACON)

JPOTF

27th PSYOP Grp
2772 Psyop Tactical Spt Bn

JFMCC

CVBG Stennis (CTG 70.1)

CVBG Vinson (CTG 70.2)
CVBG Lincoln (CTG 70.3)
Amphib Forces (CTF 76)
I MEB
RLT-3
MAG 70
HMM 268 (12 x CH-46D)
HMM 163 (12 x CH-46D)
HMM 165 (12 x CH-46D)
VMA-211 (12 x AV-8B)
VMA-214 (12 x AV-8B)
1st MSSG
MPS Squadron – 1
MPS Squadron – 2
Army Prepositioned Afloat (Diego Garcia)
Surface Action Group (CTG 71.1)
Submarine Group (CTG 74.1)
Underway Replenishment Group (CTF 73)
Maritime Patrol Squadrons (CTF 72)
USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
USNS Mercy (T-AH19)
USNS Curtiss (T-AVB 4)
ARFOR

II Corps

II Corps HQs
4th ID(M)
21st ID (I) (-)
47th AASLT Div
2d Corps Avn Bde
2d Corps Artillery
2d ADA Bde
419th ADA Bde
42d Cml Bde
63d Engineer Bde
316 Eng Bde
22d MI Brigade
22d MP Bde
419 MP Bde
72d Signal Bde
2d COSCOM
301st Civil Affairs Bde
80th Med Bde
2d Finance Grp
645th Pers Grp
80th Med Bde

644th Pers Gp
Malaysian Bde
Thailand Bde
S. Chosun Bde
2d Bde, 1st ID
1st Bde, 4th ID
2d COSCOM
14th ID

MARFOR

I MEF

I MEF HQ Grp
9th Comm Bn
1st Intel Bn
1st Mar Div
5th Mar Regmt
7th Mar Regmt
11th Mar Arty Regmt
1st Chosun Marine Bde
1st Tank Bn
3rd LAR Bn
1st CEB
1st Recon Bn
1st FSSG
H&S Battalion (-)
1st Support Battalion (-)
1st Maintenance Battalion (-)
1st Medical Services Battalion (-)
1st Supply Battalion (-)
7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (REIN)
3d MAW
MACG 38
MAG 11
MALS-11
VMFA 121 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
VMFA 225 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
VMFA 232 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
VMFA 242 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
VMFA 314 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
VMFA 323 (12 x F/A-18 C/D)
MAG 13
MALS 13
VMA-311(12 x AV-8B)
VMA-513 (12 x AV-8B)
MAG-16

MALS-16
HMH 361 (12 x CH-53E)
HMH 462 (12 x CH-53E)
HMH 465 (12 x CH-53E)
HMH 466 (12 x CH-53E)
HMM 166 (12 x CH-46D)
MAG 39
MALS 39
HMLA 164 (12 x AH-1W/UH-1N)
HMLA 267 (12 x AH-1W/UH-1N)
HMLA 303 (12 x AH-1W/UH-1N)
HMLA 367 (12 x AH-1W/UH-1N)
HMLA 369 (12 x AH-1W/UH-1N)
HMM 269 (12 x CH-46D)

C. W. BROSSY
General, USA
Commander, JTF/MNF

OFFICIAL:

Von MOLKTKE
Major General, USA
Director, J-3

HEADQUARTERS
JTF/MNF-PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

**ANNEX B TO CJTF/MNF PACIFICA OPORD 0002-2XXX
INTELLIGENCE**

- Refs: (a) ANNEX M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy)
(b) Joint Expeditionary Warfare Support Product – Pacific Strike
(c) Pacific Strike – Road to War
(d) CJSI 3900.01, 21 March 1994, “Position Reference Procedures.”
1. Situation
 - a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. See reference (b).
 - b. Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic and Weather. See reference (b).
 - c. Estimate of Enemy Capabilities. See reference (b) and current INTSUMs.
 2. Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations
 - a. Mission. Provide predictive, timely, mission-specific, all-source intelligence which support operations of JTF/MNF.
 - b. Concept of Intelligence Operations
 - (1) The JTF/MNF Director for Intelligence (J-2) exercises primary staff responsibility for intelligence operations. Intelligence operations will integrate all-source national, theatre, and organic JTF/MNF intelligence capabilities to:
 - (a) Provide early warning and assessment of enemy threats to JTF/MNF components.
 - (b) Assess enemy capabilities and intentions.
 - (c) Identify enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
 - (d) Estimate potential enemy courses of action.
 - (2) Component commands will conduct intelligence operations in support of their commands. In addition, they will assist in satisfying JTF/MNF

intelligence requirements and participate in intelligence collection efforts to the maximum extent possible.

3. Intelligence Activities
 - a. Planning and Direction. The JTF/MNF Director for Intelligence (J-2) will provide direction to component Intelligence Officers in order to integrate collection, processing, reporting, production and dissemination activities. National support will be coordinated by the JTF/MNF J-2 through USPACOM.
 - b. Priority Intelligence Requirements. See Appendix 1.
 - c. New Requirements. Communicate intelligence requirements not listed in Appendix 1 to the JTF/MNF J-2 by a Request for Information (RFI).
 - d. Collection. The JTF/MNF J-2 will establish a collection plan that employs all available collection assets.
 - e. Processing and Evaluation. TBI.
 - f. Production. JTF/MNF will establish a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). The JISE will provide intelligence production support for JTF/MNF. USPACOM will reinforce the JTF/MNF JISE with additional production capabilities.
 - g. Dissemination. TBI.
4. Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. TBI.
5. Command, Control, and Communications. Annex K.
6. Miscellaneous Instructions. None.
7. Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. None.

C.W. BROSSY
General, USA
Commander, JTF/MNF

Appendixes:

- 1 – Priority Intelligence Requirements
- 2 – Signals Intelligence (Omitted)
- 3 – Counterintelligence (Omitted)
- 4 – Targeting (TBI)
- 5 – Human Resource Intelligence (Omitted)
- 6 – Intelligence Support To C2W (Omitted)

- 7 – Imagery Intelligence (Omitted)
- 8 – Measurement and Signature Intelligence (Omitted)
- 9 – Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) (Omitted)
- 10 – National Intelligence Support Team (Omitted)

OFFICIAL:
GREGOR
Major General, USAF
Director, J-2

APPENDIX 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to JOINT TASK FORCE/MNF-PACIFICA OPORD (OPERATION PACIFIC STRIKE) 0002-2XXX

References: See Base OPORD.

Time Zone Used throughout the Estimate: ZULU

1. MISSION. JTF/MNF synchronizes all available ISR assets and leverages assets at higher echelons to achieve information dominance in support of JTF/MNF mission.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather.

1) Existing Situation. The AOR has a tropical maritime climate characterized by distinct wet and dry seasons at most places, and by general climate uniformity in other aspects. The seasonal character of the weather is largely determined by the degree of exposure to persistent air streams, which invade the country at different times of the year. The northeast monsoon and northeast trade winds together dominate the circulation in December through April, whereas the southwest monsoon dominates in July through September.

2) Temperatures. The location of the AOR in tropical latitudes and the surrounding warm oceanic waters produce consistent climatic elements. Mean daily maximum temperatures are generally between 29 deg C and 33 deg C throughout the year. Average daily minimums are between 21 deg C and 25.5 deg C. Temperatures are somewhat lower at higher elevations. The coolest temperatures occur in January and February, while the hottest temperatures occur in April or May just before the thick cloudiness of the southwest monsoon sets in.

3) Humidity. Similarly, relative humidity ranges from 85 to 95 percent in the morning to about 60 to 80 percent in the afternoon during all months. The combination of high temperatures and high humidity is devitalizing, especially to those unaccustomed to such conditions. Cloudiness is fairly extensive in all months, averaging mostly between 50 and 90 percent, and cumulus clouds are the most abundant cloud type. March through May is usually the least cloudy period, especially near the west coast of Luzon and Sumatra. Visibility is generally adequate for most activities; the greatest restrictions occur during periods of heavy rain showers and when clouds enshroud the higher mountains. Surface winds are usually light except during thunderstorms or tropical cyclones.

4) Rainfall. Rainfall is generally abundant, but there is considerable variation caused by terrain and the seasonal wind patterns. The eastern sides of Sumatra, Luzon, Catanduanes, Samar, Leyte, and Mindanao Islands have their heaviest rain during the northeast monsoon or easterly trade wind period. Monthly rainfall often exceeds 50 cm during the rainy season. The rest of the islands get their heaviest rainfall during the southwest monsoon season. Most locations along the west coast of the AOR get 63 cm or more of rain during the months of July and August at the peak of the south west

monsoon. Mountainous locations of western Luzon such as Baguio get phenomenal rainfall during the southwest monsoon.

5) Cyclones. Tropical cyclones are a year-round threat. Although weak tropical cyclones have occurred from January through April, there is not enough data to prepare statistical tracks. Tropical cyclones rarely reach south of 100 deg N and have never been noted south of 80 deg N. The stronger storms cause major flooding, mud slides, wind damage, and along the exposed coastlines, storm surge damage.

6) Severe Weather. Severe weather takes the form of thunderstorms, hail and ice, and cyclones. Thunderstorms occur frequently through the AOR during April and May and again in September and October. Thunderstorm activity is far less frequent at other times. Icing is not a problem for low-altitude aviation since the freezing level rarely reaches below 4,900 meters except for over northern Luzon from December to February. Aircraft will encounter icing above this freezing level. This is especially true during the southwest monsoon when dense cumulus extends to approx. 8,200 meters. Turbulence is almost always associated with thunderstorms or the strong winds of a tropical cyclone crossing mountainous terrain.

7) Light Data. See Tab C.

8) Impact on Military Operations.

a) Without countermeasures, high temperatures and humidity of this region will cause loss of stamina and incapacitation among US military personnel. Temperatures at the higher mountain elevations are somewhat less, but never cold. Acclimatization of personnel should be performed to the maximum extent possible. Adequate clothing should be available to permit frequent clothing changes. Sunscreen is advisable to attenuate the effects of the sun. Personnel should consume adequate fluids to prevent dehydration. Prolonged daytime operations may result in heat injuries to personnel. Further, several of the islands have active volcanoes, and the entire region is subject to destructive earthquakes.

b) The hot, humid climate in this region will result in increased rates of materiel and equipment deterioration. Insect infestations, mildew, and fungi will be common findings. Heavy rains during the long monsoon season will require additional protection of supplies to prevent deterioration and contamination. Flooding and high water tables will require above ground storage and careful facilities site selection.

c) Weather Effects on Ground operations: In general, weather conditions for ground operations are poorest in late April and May and again in September and October. During this period thunderstorms can cause flooding, mud slides, and wind damage to personnel and equipment. Roads constructed of gravel and dirt are likely to wash out and become impassable, except for tracked vehicles. Off road conditions are

d) Weather Effects on Air Operations: In general, weather conditions in all air approaches are poorest in late May through October, when the intertropical convergence zone and southwest monsoon affect the approach zones. Weather conditions are somewhat improved in November through March or April in all approaches, primarily because of reduced thunderstorm activity. Mean cloudiness continues in the same pattern, amount and distribution during this period but vertical development is quite often limited. The single, most dangerous hazard to flight operations is the migration of tropical cyclones through the approaches, mainly north of 1100N. These cyclones should be avoided in all cases, especially those of typhoon

intensity (winds above 115KMH). Upper winds are light to moderate all year in the southern approaches and during June through November in the northern approaches.

9) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Monsoon conditions will restrict offensive operations to periods of driest weather.

10) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Combination of altitude and weather will decrease the carrying capacity of coalition helicopters increasing the transportation and logistical support requirements associated with air assault operations. Substantial rainfall will reduce effectiveness of night vision systems. Cloudiness may hamper air and space reconnaissance and identification of close air support targets. Air, naval and marine operations will be limited during periods of monsoon storms and severe weather. The combination of heat, humidity and tropical weather will degrade air operations. Air operations will be stressed during the monsoon season from late May through October. Additional stresses will be placed on personnel and equipment during this time due to high humidity and rainfall. Air to Air and Air to Ground operations will be maximized during the non-monsoon months from mid-October to mid-May. Other operations will be hampered due to typhoon conditions and haze during the day.

b. Terrain

1) General. The JTF/MNF Area of Operation (AO) consists of the northern part of the island of LUZON (approximately from the city of MANILA to the northern tip of the island).

2) Evaluation of Terrain's Effects on Military Operations.

a) The Central Luzon Plain region is generally well suited for ground operations, except for a period of 3-5 months between mid-May and Mid-December when rice fields are flooded and streams are highest. Movement would be fairly easy on the main roads, but sustained heavy traffic would cause rapid deterioration of road conditions. During and after rains, movement would be slowed in places by miry and slippery surfaces, washouts, and flooding. In addition, the many narrow wooded bridges, ferries, and fords are potential bottlenecks. Conditions for off-road dispersal are generally good only in the areas where roads are not bordered by wetland rice fields. During dry periods cross-country movement would be fairly easy in most of the region. Throughout the region during the southwest monsoon, movement would be severely slowed or precluded by boggy ground and, at times, by extensive flooding. Obstacles to movement in local areas are steep-sided ravines, deep, and soft-bottomed streams, permanently soft ground, dikes, irrigation canals, and drainage ditches. Construction of new roads would be moderately easy in most places when the ground is dry. Roads could be built with long tangents and gentle curves, and only light grading and clearing would be required; however, numerous culverts and bridges (many with raised approaches) would have to be constructed. At times, construction would be severely hindered or even halted for short periods when rain causes soft ground and flooding.

b) Conditions are favorable for airborne and air assault operations throughout most of the region, and there are numerous potential airdrop zones and sites for helicopter landings. The wet conditions of rice fields make them poorly suited for such operations between mid-May and mid-December, but during the remainder of the year they present excellent landing sites.

c) This region is favorable for amphibious operations. The long curving shores are predominantly sand, except along the northern part of Manila Bay

where the shore is muddy and overgrown with mangrove. Close behind the sandy shores, or for short distance inland, meandering rivers and streams, lagoons, marshes, and swamps obstruct movement in many places. Approaches are restricted to Lingayen Gulf and Manila Bay and are lightly obstructed by scattered dangers, mainly shoal and wrecks. High surf on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf is most prevalent about 20 percent of the time during the northeast monsoon. In Manila Bay, high surf is most prevalent about 10 percent of the time during the southwest monsoon. Outside the gulf and the bay, heavy sea and swell occur most often during the northeast monsoon. Tides are mixed; the diurnal range is 75 cm in Lingayen Gulf and .9 to 1 m in Manila Bay. Exits from the beaches are predominantly cross-country or by tracks to all-weather roads several hundred meters to several kilometers inland.

d) Conditions for unconventional force operations range from unsuited to fair throughout the Central Luzon Plain. Concealment generally is poor from both air and ground observation, but possibilities exist year round for operational use of small forests and built-up areas and seasonally for use of tall grasses and sugar cane fields. Small groups could move cross-country throughout the year, but they would be slowed frequently by miry ground, deep streams, and widespread flooding.

c. Transportation.

1) Roads and Highways. Pacifica has an extensive road network but most of the roads and bridges are in poor repair. The highways are by far the most important mode of land transport as the development of railroads has been limited because of the multiplicity of the islands. The highway network totals over 75,000km of roads of which approx. 4,000 km are concrete, 3,000 km bituminous, 7,000 bituminous treatment, 39,000 gravel or crushed stone, and approx. 23,000 km earth roads. Most of the network is in poor condition. Surface widths vary considerably. On the main highways width generally ranges from 3 - 9 meters.

2) Railroads in PACIFICA are inadequate and their capability to support military operations is minimal. Railroads in PACIFICA consist of two government-owned, common carrier systems, The Pacifican National Railway (PNR) and the Pacifican Railway Company (PACRAYCO). The two systems have a total of approx. 6,050 route km of narrow (3 ft 6 in) gauge track. This track is restricted to two islands, Luzon and Panay. The largest of the trackage is electrified. In addition, there are approx. 19 industrial lines of four different gauges totaling approx. 2,000km. Most are short lines, usually of very narrow gauge.

3) Airfields. (Note: Refer to AMC Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report (ASRR), 1 February 1998)

Aparri AB, **1821N; 12140E**
Length: 10500ft Width: 200ft
Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21
Daylight ops only, VFR only

Bacolad Afld, **1039N; 12256E**
Length: 7000 ft Width: 133 ft
Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Baguio, 1622N; 12037E

Length: 5512ft Width: 98ft

Suitable for C-130, C-17

Unsuitable for C-141B, C-5, KC-10, KC-135

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Basa, 1459N; 12029E

Length: 8359ft Width: 150ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-130, C-17, KC-10 (runway only), KC-135 (runway only), C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Calbayog Afld, 1204N; 12433E

Length: 5000 ft Width: 107 ft

Suitable for C-130

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Clark AB, 1511N; 12033E

Length: 10500ft Width: 200ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Claveria AB, 1836N; 12103E

Length: 9712ft Width: 148

Suitable for C-141B, C-130, C-17, C-9, C-21

Daet Afld, 1408N; 122259E

Length: 3800ft Width: 98 ft

Suitable for C-130

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Daniel Romualdez, 1113N; 12501E

Length: 7021ft Width: 98ft

Suitable for C-130, C-17

Unsuitable for C-141B, C-17, KC-10, KC-135

Dumaguete Afld, 0920N; 12318E

Length: 6000 ft Width: 129 ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

General Santos, 0606N; 12514E

Length: 5000 ft Width: 117 ft

Suitable for C-130

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Francisco Bangoy Intl (Davao), 0708N; 12539E

Length: 8202ft Width: 118ft

Suitable for C-130

Unsuitable for C-141B, C-5, KC-10, KC-135

Iloilo Afld, 1043N; 12232E

Length: 8000 ft Width: 146 ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Kalibo Afld, 1141N; 1222E

Length: 4200 ft Width: 100 ft

Suitable for C-130

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Legazpi Afld, 1309N; 12344E

Length: 8000 ft Width: 146 ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Mactan Intl (Lapu Lapu), 1018N; 12358E

Length: 8500ft Width: 150ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Mamburao (Mindoro Island), 1313N; 12036E

Length: 3937ft Width: 100ft

Suitable for C-130

Unsuitable for C-141B, C-5, KC-135, KC-10, C-9, C-21

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Naga Afld, 1335N; 12316E

Length: 4000 ft Width: 106 ft

Suitable for C-130

Daylight ops only, VFR only

Nino Aquino Intl (Villamore AB/Manila Intl), 1430N; 12101E

Length: 11004ft Width: 200ft

Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21

Puerto Princesa, 0944N; 11845E

Length: 9712ft Width: 148

Suitable for C-141B, C-130, C-17, C-9, C-21

Roxas Afld, 1136N; 12245E

Length: 7000 ft Width: 119 ft
Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21
Daylight ops only, VFR only

Sagay Afld, **1052N; 12324E**
Length: unknown
To be used for emergency operations only

Sangley Point, **1430N; 12054E**
Length: 8000 width: 150
Suitable for C-141B, C-130, C-9, c-21
Unsuitable for KC-10, KC-135
Daylight ops only, VFR only

Subic Bay Intl (Cubi Pt NAS/Radford Field), **1448N; 12016E**
Length: 9003ft Width: 147ft
Suitable for C-141B, C-5, C-130, C-17, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21
Daylight ops only, VFR only

Tuguegarao AB, **1738N; 12144E**
Length: 9712ft Width: 148
Suitable for C-141B, C-130, C-17, C-9, C-21

Virac Afld, **1335N; 12412E**
Length: 6000ft Width: 112 ft
Suitable for C-130
Daylight ops only, VFR only

Zamboanga Intl (Andrews AB), **0655N; 12204E**
Suitable for C-141B, C-130, KC-10, KC-135, C-9, C-21
Daylight ops only, VFR only

4) Ports

Aparri **Lat 18 deg 21 min N; Long 121 deg 38 min E.**
Situated near the mouth of the Cagayan River.

Accommodation: A 58 ha area, four finger piers with total berth length of 3732m providing docking for approx. 21 vessels. Avg depth of 10m. A further 20 vessels can be accommodated at the anchorage. Container traffic, breakbulk and RO/RO vessels can be handled. Additional six piers and total quay length of 3563m, catering for coast wise cargo and passenger vessels. Average depth 5-6m.

Storage: Open storage area on piers approx. 24000 sq meters. 15 warehouses available.

Cranes: Floating cranes of 25, 40, 60, and 75t available. Two gantry cranes available.

PORT IRENE, LUZON, **Lat 18 deg 23 min N; Long 122 deg 06 min E.**
Located 80km E of Aparri in Casambalangan Bay

Anchorages: Good holding ground with a mud bottom in depths between 13-14m.
Accommodation: Port area of 40,000 sq m . A wharf 15m wide, 189m long with depths ranging from 10-14 meters.
Storage: A warehouse with an area of 4500 sq m and open space of 4500 sq m.
Cranes: Four mobile cranes max cap 18t, and one 5t forklift.

BATANGAS, LUZON, Lat 13 deg 45 min N; Long 121 deg 3 min E

Anchorages: Anchorage for large vessels SE of Santa Clara pier in 27-33 m, good holding ground.
Accommodation: Three piers, No 1, 127m long, 15m wide with depths from 5m-15m. No 2, 105m long, 15m wide with depths from 5 m-9.5m. No 3, 84m long, 15m wide with depths ranging from 4m-7m.
Storage: Seven private warehouses with total area of 14193 sq meters.
Cranes: One 25t cap.

CAGAYAN DE ORO, MINDANAO Lat 8 deg 29 min N: Long 124 deg 39 min E

Anchorages: In Macajalar Bay, especially protected in the SE 0-5 mile from shore.
Largest Vessel: Max LOA 186m, max d 9m.
Accommodation: Concrete wharf 151m long with 10m depth at north end and 8m depth at south end.
Storage: Seven warehouses totaling 3000t cap.
Cranes: One level luffing crane of 25t cap.
Container Facilities: Containers can be handled
Bulk Cargo Facilities: Available

CLAVERIA, LUZON Lat 18 deg 37min N; Long 121 deg 05 min E.

Anchorages: Vessels may anchor 400m ENE of Taggat Pier in 37m or in the W end of the bay 700m N of Claveria town in depths of 18-27 m.
Accommodation: Taggat pier is 101m long and 5m wide.
Storage: Open storage.
Cranes: Two 18t mobile cranes.

DAVAO, MINDANAO Lat 7 deg 4 min N; Long 125 deg 37 min E

Anchorages: Three anchorage's are available.
Accommodation: Total port area of 17 ha. Four government wharves with from 4-10 minimum depth along side and lengths up to 900m. Eleven private berths with from 5-11 minimum depth alongside and lengths up to 400m.
Storage: Currently available and soon to be increased by warehousing and storage space being constructed on 10 ha of reclaimed land at Sasa Wharf.
Cranes: Available, caps of 20-60t.
Container and RO/RO Facilities: Three berths available for containers, Berth Nos 5-7 on Sasa Wharf with depth alongside of 11m. Total terminal area of 6 ha. Mobile cranes available with capacity ranging from 15t to 65t. Ro/Ro vessels can be accommodated at Berth No 5.

ILIGAN, MINDANAO Lat 8 deg 14 min N; Long 124 deg 14 min E.

Anchorage: Deep water lies close off Fringing Reef. Vessels may anchor in 48 m, 500 m west of Iligan.

Accommodation: S pier and N pier, each 12m wide, extend about 84 m from shore line; depth at ends over 12m, at MLW decreasing to about 3.5m midway along faces and from there decreasing rapidly. One mobile crane of 25t is available.

Container Facilities: Containers can be handled.

LEGASPI, LUZON Lat 13 deg 9 min N; Long 123 deg 45 min E.

Anchorage: The anchorage off Legaspi is bad due to great depth, 31 to 40 m being found 300yd off shore.

Accommodation: Length of vessels able to berth at wharf is 69m, max d 4m. Used mainly for inter-island vessels.

Cranes: A 20t cap crane barge available.

LIMAY, LUZON Lat 14 deg 34 min N; Long 120 deg 36 min E.

Accommodation: Limay Pier, a reinforced concrete causeway 192m long with a depth of 9m.

MANILA, LUZON Lat 14 deg 35 min N; long 120 deg 58 min E.

Principal port of Pacifica, situated at head of Manila Bay in center of capital region Metro-Manila.

Anchorage: Both Quarantine and Explosive anchorage's available.

Accommodation: S. HARBOR: A 58 ha area consisting of five finger piers with total berth length of 4332m providing docking for 26 vessels. Avg. depth of 10m. A further 27 vessels can be accommodated at the Anchorage. A barge point capable of accommodating 30 barges or lighters is also situated in the area a few meters across Pier 3. N HARBOR: A 30 ha area with eight main piers and total quay length of 4000m, catering for coast wise cargo and passenger vessels. Average depth 5-6m.

INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL: A 94 ha area of partially reclaimed land located near the mouth of the Pasig River. Designed to handle container traffic, breakbulk and RO/RO vessels. Quay length of 900 m with a depth alongside of 13.7m. Equipment for handling includes four container gantry cranes, five straddle carriers, plus various other yard cranes, tractors, trailers etc.

Storage: Total open storage area of the piers is approx. 24000 sq meters. Twenty warehouses available.

Cranes: Floating cranes of 25, 40, 60, and 75t available. Three gantry cranes, two of 35t cap without spreader and the other 30t cap with spreader.

Container and RO/RO Facilities: Containers handled at the International Container Terminal and at various piers throughout the port. RO/RO facilities at the International Port, Pier 13 in S. Harbor and Pier 6 in N. Harbor. See also accommodation.

MARIVELES, LUZON Lat 14 deg 25 min N; Long 120 deg 30 min E.

On the west side entrance to Manila Bay.

Anchorage: Vessels may anchor in an area of good holding ground in a depth of 30 m bearing 300 deg from the Quarantine Pier.

Accommodation: Mariveles Pier: A concrete finger pier for handling general cargo 15 m long 7 m wide, with a depth of 5 m and a 98 m causeway. Quarantine Pier, also a concrete finger pier with a depth of 6 m and an 85 m causeway. One concrete wharf for handling general cargo 33m long, 6m deep and a 177 m long causeway. Two concrete piers 61m long and 4 m wide with a depth of 9m, one for general cargo and one for tankers.

Storage: There are two warehouses with a combined area of 135000 sq meters.

MASINLOC, LUZON **Lat 15 deg 32 min N; Long 119 deg 57 min E.**

Anchorage: Outer anchorage in 56m with a soft coral bottom. Good anchorage inside port in 22 m with a mud bottom.

Accommodation: Reinforced concrete conveyor pier 63 m long, 9 m wide and a berthing depth of 9.7m.

PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN ISL **Lat 9 deg 45 min N; Long 118 deg 44 min E.**

Anchorage: Vessels may anchor SW of Princesa Point in 29-39 m with a mud bottom. A better protected anchorage may be used in 22-24m about 35 m N of the end of the pier.

Accommodation: T shaped concrete pier with berthing face of 38. Gedeon Shoal, with a depth of 1.8m approx. 594 m westward of pier, marked by a black buoy. Ship's tackle used in loading and unloading, control depth of water 37m. Bulk cargoes can be handled.

Storage: A transit shed of 672 sq meters and open storage of 3803 sq meters.

Cranes: Two 15t cap forklifts, a roller conveyor and a spreader for container handling.

SAN FERNANDO, LUZON **Lat 16 deg 37 min N; Long 120 deg 19 min E.**

Situated on the NE side of Lingayen Bay.

Anchorage: Good holding ground in the center of the bay in 19-22 m.

Accommodation: Government pier, 200 m long, 19 m wide and 3 m high from MLLW. Depth, 10.6 m shore end, 12.1 m far end. Two LST ramps available to expedite loading outgoing cargo without using berthing facilities. Pier 352 m long, 24.5 m wide, with berthing space of 259 m on each side.

Storage: Transit shed of 615 sq m, warehouse of 1179 sq m, warehouse of 21000 sq m and open storage of 34000 sq m and 10000 sq m in two separate areas.

SUBIC BAY, LUZON **Lat 14 deg 48 min N; Long 120 deg 16 min E.**

Situated on the W coast of the island, 80 km NW from Manila. Former US Naval Force Pacifica Base.

Accommodation: Data for former USN Base to be provided under separate cover.

OLONGAPO: main wharf 700 m long with depths alongside of up to 6 m.

VIGAN, LUZON **Lat 17 deg 34 min N; long 120 deg 20 min E.**

Situated on the W. Coast of the Island, primary port for NW Pacifica.

Anchorage: Both Quarantine and Explosive anchorage's available.

Accommodation: A 58 ha area consisting of five finger piers with total berth length of 4332m providing docking for 26 vessels. Avg. depth of 10m. A further 27 vessels can be accommodated at the Anchorage. A barge point capable of accommodating 30 barges

or lighters is also situated in the area a few meters across Pier 3. Equipment for handling includes four container gantry cranes, five straddle carriers, plus various other yard cranes, tractors, trailers etc.

Storage: Total open storage area of the piers is approx. 22000 sq meters. Eighteen warehouses available.

Cranes: Floating cranes of 25, 40, 60, and 75t available. Three gantry cranes, two of 35t cap without spreader and the other 30t cap with spreader.

VILLANUEVA, MINDANAO Lat 8 deg 35 min N; Long 124 deg 45 min E.

Situated in the Bay of Macalajar.

Accommodation: Two berths of reinforced concrete. Main pier, 325 m long, 31 m wide with a depth of 23m and a cargo wharf, 230 m long, with a depth of 6 m.

Storage: Warehouse for general cargo and storage yards of 45000 sq m capable of handling 2000t of bulk cargo.

Cranes: Two truck mounted cranes cap 200t

ZAMBOANGA, MINDANAO Lat 6 deg 54 min N; Long 122 deg 4 min E.

Accommodation: Two small piers and a wharf. Pier 1, 28 m long, 12 m wide. Pier 2, 54 m long, 9m wide. Wharf 274 m long with a depth of 6 meters.

5) Inland Waterways.

a) The Cagayan River, the longest in Luzon, flows northward over 320km from its headwaters in the Caraballo Mountains to its wide mouth at Aparri on the north coast. The river has sections of shifting braided channel. Many tributaries from adjacent mountains join the river on the flat parts of the plain. The river may flood between early July and early December when numerous highly destructive floods inundate the surrounding lowlands.

b) The Pampanga, the second longest river in Luzon, also rises in the Caraballo Mountains but flows southward across the Central Plain to Manila Bay. It is joined by numerous tributaries on the plain and is widely used for irrigation.

c) The Agno and Abra Rivers rise within a few km of each other in the Cordillera Central, but flow in opposite directions. The Agno flows southward through a deep, steep-sided valley in the mountains, then widens and becomes multi-channeled as it enters the flat, intensively cultivated Central Plain. The Abra River winds northward through gorges and intermountain basins for most of its course, then bends sharply to the west and flows across a sandy plain before breaking through a coastal ridge to the sea.

6) Effect on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities.

a) Highways. In the AOR less than 20 percent of the total road network and 37 percent of the national highways are paved. The road networks are unevenly distributed; most of the surfaced roads are located

in or near cities. The gravel/macadam roads are in poor condition. Sixty percent of the bridges in the AOR are timber structures, many of which are temporary and in need of repair or replacement; 25 percent are concrete or masonry, and 15 percent are steel. In sustained military operations, movement and supply of forces would be seriously hampered by poor road surfaces, numerous bottlenecks, and a rainy season that annually floods the roads and inflicts severe damage. However, ports, merchant marine shipping, and airfields would provide valuable supplements to the land networks.

b) Railroads. Railroads in the AOR are inadequate and their capability to support military operations is minimal. Railroad locomotives and rolling stock are obsolete and much of the track structure has suffered serious damage as a result of the civil war.

c) Airfields. About half the civil or private airfields can accommodate light transport aircraft, but they have limited support and service facilities. Airfield maintenance in general is considered poor, and most of the airfields do not have adequate support and service facilities, though Luzon airfields are better maintained than on other islands. Because of the predominantly mountainous terrain inland, most of the airfields are located in the coastal regions. Only a few highway strips capable of supporting fighter size aircraft exist, mainly north of Manila on Luzon.

d) Enemy Airfields. Major Surranian air bases on Surran are Brunei, Kinabalu, Kuching, Lahad Datu, Miri, Pulau, Sandakan, and Tawau. As a rule, the Surradians plan to forward deploy and disperse their air assets as necessary. The following are possible dispersal locations (not inclusive):

On Mindanao:

Cagayan De Oro, Cotabata, Dipolog, Iligan, Malabang, Pagadian, Zamboanga

On Palawan:

Apurauan, Del Pilar, Puerto Princesa, Rio Tuba, Tarumpitao Point

On Luzon:

Aparri, Cauayan, Laoag Jose Parades Alt Airfield, Laoag, Lingayen, San Fernando, Taggat, Tuguegarao, Vigan

On Culion Island:

Patag

On Busuanga Island:

Busuanga

On Paracel Islands (Eastland)

Woody Island

On Sumatra (Indonesia)

Banda Aceh, Medan, Pekanbaru

e) Ports. Four of the 17 major ports in Pacifica are or were naval bases, and most of the other ports would be able to provide berthing,

repair, and logistic support for naval ships. Ship and cargo handling operations are sometimes adversely affected by sea swell from weather conditions related to monsoons, so that some unprotected ports and anchorage areas may become untenable at certain times of the year. Typhoons are the most hazardous climatic phenomenon in the area, and some 45 harbors are specifically designated as safe typhoon anchorage's where vessels may ride out the severest storms.

d. Telecommunications.

1) Existing Situation.

a) As a result of the civil war, much of the communications infrastructure of Pacific has been damaged or disrupted. Even prior to the civil war, development of telecommunications facilities had been insufficient to satisfy economic or military requirement. The system lacks density and variety, and the distribution of reliable facilities is highly uneven. The insular composition, geographic location, and topography of the country present considerable problems in maintenance and operation of telecommunications. Frequent typhoons and serious flooding often damage both landlines and radio facilities serving the widely scattered islands. Absence of secondary connections results in the service being particularly susceptible to disruption. In addition, the hot and humid climate necessitates tropicalization of electronic equipment.

b) The domestic telecommunications backbone of PACIFICA is composed of networks operated by four primary companies. The Domestic Satellite Corporation (DOMSAT) is a private Pacifican corporation that provides domestic communications utilizing 11 standard B fixed earth stations linked to the PALAPA satellite of Indonesia. All earth stations are equipped to provide telephone, telegraph, and telex services, as well as television broadcasts.

c) International satellite communications are provided by PACIFICA Global communications (PACCOMSAT). PACCOMSAT operates an earth station that is lined to INTELSAT IV in the Pacific and Indian Ocean sectors.

d) Radio and television broadcast facilities are highly competitive. Transmissions from more than 100 AM radio stations cover the medium frequency broadcast spectrum. A considerable number of main AM broadcast stations are served by a large number of relay or re-broadcast facilities. These are widely dispersed and provide excellent coverage of the archipelago, reaching about 90 percent of the population. 10 FM stations serve Manila only. Over 25 television stations, located mostly in the main urban areas, provide adequate TV coverage of the most populous cities, assisted by TV relay or rebroadcast facilities.

2) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The lack of a reliable civilian communications system on PACIFICA will force greater reliance upon imported military systems. Communications between Surranian forces in Pacifica and Surran will be stressed due to distance and lack of secure hard lines from Pacifica to Surran. Surranian forces will be stressed to protect its communication lines from disruption, jamming or destruction. Compatibility between PPF and Surrinese force systems may degrade command and control functions. Once isolated by coalition forces, Surran's inability to replace or augment lost military communications capabilities will become a significant vulnerability given the compartmentalization of the terrain. Under such conditions, it is

unlikely that the Surranian-PPF alliance will be able to sustain a coordinated, mobile defense and will be forced to increasingly rely on positional defenses.

3) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. The lack of reliable civilian communications network in Pacifica will require extensive reliance on military systems to support both military operations and to supplement key and essential civilian traffic during transition operations.

e. Politics.

- 1) Pacifica is still feeling the effects of the Civil War, which pitted the PPF (an alliance of the PRA and the SPM) against the elected government in Manila.
 - a. Pacifica is currently embroiled in a civil war. The civil war pits the Pacifican Peoples Front (PPF) an alliance of the Pacifican Rebel Army (PRA) of breakaway army units on Luzon and the SPM (a longtime ethnic insurgents operating principally in the southern islands) against the elected government in Manila. Complicating the entire situation is the support by and threat of intervention on behalf of the rebels posed by the nation of Surran.
 - b. Both sides used the OPERATION PACIFIC HARMONY cease-fire to heavily fortify their respective portions north and south of the neutral zone. This zone now resembles a less mature version of the demilitarized Zone of Chosun. There is no legal movement of personnel or commerce across this frontier. Although not supported by a current agreement, the continued existence of this neutral zone and the line of demarcation established by the Manila Agreement have become accepted in day to day activities and are supported by local protocol.

2) The Pacifica insurgency began as an ethnic/religious conflict in the mid-1960s. In those early days, the ethnic Surranian populations of the southern islands (Mindanao, Palawan, Cebu, and Bohol) formed the Surranian Peoples Movement (SPM) in an attempt to break away from the Manila government and establish their own national entity. The SPM, seeking to regain both political and economical power, appealed to nationalist sympathies and were supported by the Surranian government, which encouraged and supplied the insurgent forces. The SPM success was also based on an ideology that called for a reversal of the current situation in Pacifica. Revenues from oil, gas, and other resources taken from the outer islands were being funneled to business interests in Manila, with the outer islands themselves sharing little of the resultant wealth. Additionally, the movement professed that the adverse affects of modernization on Surranian cultural heritage far outweighed the advantages of modernization and industrialization. Western influence, particularly from the US, was blamed for this destruction of traditional norms.

3) The Manila government responded to this insurgency with a brutal counter-insurgency campaign with its regular military forces. The SPM insurgency, supported covertly by Surran, enjoyed moderate success in tying down substantial government resources but had not achieved a breakthrough in achieving their stated goal of an independent Surranian state. During the 1980s, the SPM turned increasingly to acts of terrorism and shifted increased focus to the main island of Luzon. When the new administration took office June 30, 1996, it marked the first peaceful transition between presidents since 1965. Early on, the administration declared “national reconciliation” its highest national priority. With administration support, the Congress repealed the anti-subversion law on 15 October 1996, effectively legalizing the SPM as a political entity. Simultaneously, it created the National Unification Commission (NUC) to lay the groundwork for talks with the SPM insurgents and former military rebels. In March 1998, the president signed into law a general, conditional amnesty covering all insurgent groups should they lay down their arms and begin negotiations. This further angered conservative elements of the Army creating a greater rift between this conservative majority and the northern Luzon based “nationalistic - SPM sympathizer” element.

4) In August 1998, the Pacifican President requested additional support to counter the SPM in the Pacifican southern islands. The President and the Secretary of Defense approved additional support on 15 September 1998 and a SF FID Task force deployed in October 1998. Concurrently, representatives of the government and SPM agreed to begin formal peace negotiations in Jakarta, Indonesia. The advent of the Pacifican civil war disrupted this process. After a change of leadership (encouraged by Surran), the SPM allied itself with rebel army forces under the banner of the Pacifican Peoples Front (PPF).

5) The Pacifica civil war that began in 1999 likewise has its roots in the past. Following the fall of the Marcelo regime, Marcelo loyalists and disgruntled elements of the Pacifica armed forces were involved in several efforts to destabilize the government. Conservative elements within the military high command came to put an ever-increasing share of the blame for the country’s desperate state on the recent compromises with the SPM. Specifically, the conservative military leaders cited the recent amnesty, ineffective use of the military against the insurgents, the growing transnational criminal organization (TCO) threat, and deterioration of the military due to lack of resources as reasons for failure of the nation’s economy and well being. This alarmed the more sympathetic elements of the military supporting these recent overtures to the SPM. Many of these northern Luzon based elements sympathized with the SPM desire to return Pacifica to the sovereignty of Surran. Thus, a clear division was developing within the military - those wanting to increase the power of the centralized government in Manila, and those believing that the current government was not in the best interest of people and harking back to the “former days” when Pacifica was part of Greater Surran. Conservative elements of the military attempted a coup to install a regime focused on defeating the SPM and stamping out the Surran leaning nationalistic elements throughout Pacifica. This coup failed, forcing some of the military’s best leaders to step down, further weakening the military. Those leaders of the coup not arrested fled the country, taking refuge in Surran.

6) Exploiting the weakened military hierarchy caused by the failure of the conservative element coup, the SPM sympathizer element within the military staged another coup attempt in January 1999. Using units based in northern Luzon, rebel army forces attempted to march on Manila but were met by troops loyal to the government and open warfare ensued. A late March 99 government offensive on Luzon resulted in heavy PPF casualties and the government securing the area around Manila and key routes leading to the north. By the end of April 1999, the situation on Luzon had reached stalemate along the Lingayen plain north of Manila and produced wide spread human suffering. Conversely, SPM insurgents in the southern islands took advantage of the Pacifican Army's preoccupation with events on Luzon to extend the control over all of Palawan and to the western half of Mindanao. Both government forces and the rebels were exhausted. In June of 1999, both sides accepted a UN brokered ceasefire. IAW the agreement, the UN established a peace keeping force on LUZON designated as UN Force Pacifica, or UNFORPAC, with the mandate to monitor belligerent compliance with the cease fire agreement. A variety of nations contributed troops or support to the effort. Chosun, Thailand, Malaysia, and the US provided the light infantry based main peace keeping formations. Eastland voted in supported of the resolution within the UNSC but chose not to contribute forces. Simultaneously the UNHCR and other aid and human rights NGOs began expanded operations within Pacifica to avert what was characterized as a "potential humanitarian disaster."

7) The International Relief Committee, CARE, CRS and other HROs began operations in Pacifica during the late 1940s in response to the desperate conditions resulting from the Second World War. During the decades that followed, HROs expanded their programs to support the governments rural development projects, including improved crop production, soil conservation, fisheries, health professional training, and community infrastructure construction projects such as schools, clinics, water and sanitation systems, and roads. Early on, the SPM sponsored insurgency had little effect on HRO programs. By 1988, however, as the SPM adopted a more aggressive posture including support for acts of terrorism, HRO programs became increasingly curtailed as insecurity mounted. The summary execution of some indigenous NGO and community leaders prompted some HROs to reduce or close their programs within contested areas of Luzon and Mindanao. With the advent of the civil war, new requirements to house, feed and care for thousands of displaced families fleeing the fighting in central Luzon asserted themselves. A variety of HROs, assisted by the Pacifican government, established refugee camps in eastern and southern Luzon. The arrival of UN peacekeepers in late July 1999 helped stabilize the IDP/DC situation. Some HRO services were reestablished in rebel held areas of Northern Luzon. Despite almost universal condemnation by the world community however, PPF forces continued to harass UN and HRO activities and to raid food storage and shipment convoys. By late 1999, the situation in northern Luzon had deteriorated to the point where the UNHCR had declared it a "disaster area."

8) The current crisis in Pacifica stemmed from a schism that developed among rebel army factions following implementation of the UN ceasefire. A minority faction within the rebel leadership argued that the civil war had failed to accomplish its intended goal of deposing the government. It had only resulted in devastating the

countryside, impoverishing the populace, and facilitating foreign intervention into Pacifican affairs once again. This faction argued for abandonment of further violence and a negotiated settlement. This position was in effect “shouted down” by the majority leadership of the PPF who argued for the continuance of the war with additional Surranian aid. Encouraged by Surran promises of support, the PPF declared themselves the “rightful” government of Pacifica, and announced on 1 July 1999 the establishment of the independent “Republic of Tuguegarao” in north Luzon. The PPF quickly appealed for public and international support. The true direction of the peoples’ sympathies is hard to gauge, but the majority are believed to support the democratically elected government. Surran responded to this appeal, however, with arms, technical advisors, and diplomatic support. Internationally, the world community condemned the establishment of the republic and did not extend diplomatic recognition. A number of UN general assembly resolutions were issued condemning the act, urging national reconciliation and resolution of the humanitarian crisis. Eastland gave muted support to the rebel position, invoking arguments for self-determination and minimal international involvement in the situation.

9) In December of 1999 US intelligence detected Surranian preparations for direct intervention into the Pacifica conflict. The President and the Secretary of Defense, on 11 January 2XX0, issued National Security Decision Directive 5202PW directing DOD to begin planning for the introduction of US force into Pacifica. On 1 February 2XX0 Surran began to land forces on Pacifica. The UN condemned the Surranian landings. The UN Security Council issued UNSC Resolution 763PW on 5 February 2XX0 instructing Surran to withdraw its forces. Eastland abstained from the vote.

10) Political support among the people of PACIFICA is divided. On Luzon, support for rebel forces varies by region but is not believed to be widespread. In general, the population is war weary and supports the elected government. The SPM enjoys substantial support among the Surranese minority population in southeastern Luzon. The towns of Pagsanjan (UR3578) and Conception (TS4896) have been identified as centers of SPM support within the government controlled area around Manila. Outside of Luzon and the southern islands SPM strongholds, the government maintains the peoples loyalty. On Mindanao and Palawan, however, the SPM enjoys wide spread support in those areas where dominated by the Surranese ethnic group and exercise “de facto” control of much of the countryside. As to be expected, the majority of Pacificans oppose Surranese intervention into their affairs while the Surranese ethnic minority is strongly supportive.

11) Effect on Enemy Capabilities.

a) Without intervention by SURRAN, neither the PPF nor SPM insurgency would be able to successfully achieve their long-term aims. The SPM is dependent upon Surran for both the military and political support need to carry on their insurgency against the Pacifican central government. Likewise, the PPF rebel army forces lack the capability to defeat the central government and are dependent upon Surranian support to reequip their forces and provide air and naval support.

b) Internationally, Surran appears to be politically isolated. Its principle backer, Eastland, does not appear willing to risk disruption of its economic expansion and certainly not war over affairs in Pacifica. It may, however, be willing to take a more belligerent posture should Surran itself be threatened, and may offer “safe haven” to Surranese commercial and military units at Eastland's ports and airfields in the Spratly Islands or on the Eastlandic coast. In the face of what appears to be universal international condemnation, Surran is more likely to assume a more strategically defensive posture to facilitate a negotiated settlement in her favor.

12) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Immediate military and economic assistance is necessary to sustain the current government of Pacifica against the combined Surranian-PPF threat. Destruction of both Surranian military forces in Pacifica and their ability to project power within the region are the keys to resolution of the immediate crisis. The differing political agendas within the membership of the Surran-PPF alliance and its weak support among the Pacifican population in general may afford coalition forces the opportunity to divide their potential adversaries. Existing political sensitivities in Pacifica and in the region may constrain the full application of military power to the situation. Long term resolution of regional differences and the ultimate success of Pacifican government efforts at national reunification may dictate the use of minimum prudent force and preclude the option of extended operations.

f. Economy.

1) The Pacifican economy grew rapidly after World War II. The pace slowed in the 1950s and early 1960s, with real gross national product (GDP) rising about 5.3% annually from 1955 to 1965. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in the late 1960s spurred renewed real GDP growth, which reached 10% in 1973. Pacifica experienced a severe economic recession in 1984-85, during which the economy contracted by more than 10%. From 1986 to 1989, the Pacifican economy grew modestly. As a result of macroeconomics imbalances compounded by a string of natural calamities, and perceptions of political instability after the December 1989 coup attempt, growth has been flat since 1990. Pacifican economic difficulties are partly a legacy of decisions taken soon after independence to pursue import substitution rather than export promotion policies. The result has been a capital-intensive industrial structure, noncompetitive in world markets and highly dependent on imports for raw materials and capital equipment. In the 1970s, an effort was made to move into labor-intensive exports, notably garments and electronics. However, these enclave industries have not had a marked impact on the remainder of the economy. Finding a solution to electric power outages was a top priority for the administration. Additional power capacity substantially increased the supply of power in 1993, but unreliable existing plants will most likely continue to cause periodic outages. Foreign debt remains substantial at almost \$34 billion. However, debt rescheduling and buybacks reduced debt service for 1993 to about 20% of export receipts. This constituted a sharp reduction from the 36% level inherited from the Marcelo era (pre 1986). The phased-in deregulation of the foreign exchange market did not lower the peso's value to the degree expected. However, the peso has gradually depreciated to an exchange rate of 27 pesos per dollar by the end of 1998. During the early 90s, foreign exchange deregulation, foreign investment and banking

liberalization, and tariff/market barrier reductions have further opened the previously closed Pacifican economy. Frustrating significant economic growth, however, has been the requirement to combat the southern islands ethnic insurgency. The advent of civil war in 1997 further exacerbated the problem pushing the nation towards economic ruin. Although the service economy of the city of Manila and its immediate vicinity has avoided wide spread disruption, damage to the physical and agricultural infrastructure on Luzon outside of Manila has resulted in widespread famine and large numbers of refugees. Large, displaced persons camps have been established throughout Luzon by various international organizations to provide shelter and medical aid to the needy. Agricultural production is down nearly 60% on Luzon making international humanitarian aid critical in feeding the population.

2) Access to oil and mineral reserves, recently discovered in the East Sulu Sea Resource Area, is at the center of the economic reasons for external intervention into what was before an internal conflict in Pacifica. Both Surran and its principle ally in the region, Eastland, covet control of the resource area. They seek control of Pacifica, either by direct or indirect means, as a vehicle to control the fields and their supporting LOCs. The United States and the international community see this as a threat to their national interests. Given a successful conclusion of its civil war, Pacifica sees exploitation of the resource area from its central position as key to economic recovery and expansion.

3) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action.

a) Pacifica. Friendly ground force mobility on Luzon is likely to be hindered by significant refugee flow toward Manila during early phases of campaign. Wide spread damage to the infrastructure and disruption of food supplies may require a significant general engineering and CMO commitments. Use of skilled labor from local nationals to supplement logistical support operations outside of the greater Manila area on Luzon is unlikely. Request for post operational support from the UN, HROs, NGOs, and the Pacifican government will likely remain high for the foreseeable future.

g. Sociology

1) Existing Situation. The population of Surran is fiercely nationalistic and dedicated to consolidation of the Surranian ethnic homeland. Any government action taken to advance this goal is widely and enthusiastically supported. Taking the long view, the people of Surran are prepared to make significant sacrifices to reach what they view as their ultimate destiny. The single exception to this is Surran's own ethnic Malayan minority who rose in an aborted insurrection against the Surranese government in its western province during the early 1980s.

2) Effects on enemy capabilities. It is unlikely that Surran will limit its pursuit of a "Greater Surran" through solely diplomatic means. Surran is willing to wage an extended war and accept significant losses to obtain its long-term goal. The SPM and NNM are unlikely to abandon their struggle for the reunification with Surran.

3) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. US and coalition forces must realize the potential long-term negative social impacts of an unconstrained military campaign in Pacifica and Indonesia. Military actions that either prolong the war or add

significantly to the existing economic damage and social disruption may undo whatever strategic benefits may accrue from a successful but solely military campaign. US interests are also involved in the promotion of democracy that underpins our involvement in the region as well as our concern over access to the East Sulu Sea resource area. Targeting the differences between the NNM and PPF and Surranian interests as well as the national will of the people of Pacifica and Indonesia should aid in the collapse of the enemy alliance. Stripped of overt Surranian military support, the SPM may be amenable to a negotiated settlement with the central Pacifica government. Targeting of the populace of Surran will likely have little near term effect given the general strength of commitment of the people to idea of ethnic expansion and the relative weakness of the Malayan minority population.

h. Science and Technology

1) Existing Situation. The Surranian forces are well modernized and sufficiently armed with high technology weapon systems so to pose a significant threat to US and coalition forces. PPF forces are not as advanced. They are characterized as “medium-tech,” but are well trained and tactically competent at a small unit level. The Surran-PPF alliance lacks the common C2 technology to closely coordinate fires and operational maneuver. The Surranian Air Forces are relatively advanced with numerous 4th and 5th generation aircraft combined with a robust C3 and air defense system. Surranian forces have the capability to operate effectively from airfields in Surran, Palawan and Mindanao against targets in Luzon.

2) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The Surran-PPF alliance is dependent on the technology available from Eastland. The UN arms embargo will preclude or substantially reduce Surranian imports of military hardware and technology. Losses of high technology systems or capabilities will be irreplaceable in the near term. Resupply efforts from Eastland would probably be limited to replacement systems deemed, by Eastland, as defensive in nature.

3) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Coalition forces have a clear high technology advantage in the areas of C4I, operational fires and maneuver systems. They also have a qualitative advantage in air and naval technology; however, coalition forces are outnumbered by a factor of 1.5 to 1 in total aircraft quantity.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Disposition and Course of Action (See Appendix 3 (Situation Template) to Annex B (Intelligence)).

1) Surran began landing portions of two Infantry Armies and an Airborne Division at various points in Luzon on 1 February 99. Surranian forces, awaiting deployment, are currently occupying forward dispersal or ports of embarkation at a high state of readiness. O/A S+45 (15 March 99) (S =Surrinese initial landings), Surran is expected to have deployed a large expeditionary force built around the Surrinese 8th and 10th Armies and an Airborne Division with supporting army artillery, ADA, aviation, support units into rebel controlled areas of Luzon. Surran has effected additional smaller landings in rebel held areas of Palawan and Mindanao in an effort to establish a security

buffer zone for Surran itself and to support resupply of forward located forces. It is estimated that Surran will require an additional 30 to 45 days (S+75 to 90) to build the logistical stocks necessary to initiate sustained offensive operations. A general ground offensive involving Surranian forces is, therefore, not expected earlier than late April 2XX0.

2) PPF rebel army forces are expected to continue reorganization and rearm activities in preparations for renewed offensive operations. At S-Day, PPF light infantry units north of the UN Green Line had occupied hasty strong point defenses at key road junctions and built up areas. Mechanized forces are moving to occupy defensive positions in depth, defend Lingayen Gulf approaches and preparing to counter attack penetrations of their forward defenses along the green line. SPM forces continue operations in southeastern Luzon, and Mindanao to fix Pacifican Army forces. Terrorist and guerrilla activities continue in Manila and other major urban areas.

b. Composition.

1) Surranian Ground Forces.

a) General. Surran has a modernized force that approximates France in their regional operational capability. Training level in all Surranian units is high, but Surran is dependent on Eastland for technology and force modernization. See Tab A (Order of Battle) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

b) The 8th Infantry Army is comprised of the 80ID, 81ID, 82d MRD, and 84TD. Additional army units include the 8th Cbt Avn Rgt, 8th AT Rgt, 8th Art Bde, 8th MRL Rgt, 8th AD Bde, 8th Drone Rgt, and 8th SPF Bn. See Tab A for other combat service and service support units. The motorized regiments of the 8th Infantry Army field the T-72 B tank and BMP-2. They also possess significant artillery, ADA, aviation, SPF, and support forces. Artillery weapons range from a few D-30 towed howitzers to the more capable 2S1, 2S3, and BM-21, BM-22, and WM-80 MRL. The 8th Army is responsible for defense of eastern Surran and support to Surranian rebels operating in Pacifica.

c) The 10th Infantry Army is comprised of the 1ID, 2ID, 3d MRD, and 4TD. Additional army units include the 10th Cbt Avn Rgt, 10th AT Rgt, 10th Art Bde, 10th MRL Rgt, 10th AD Bde, 10th Drone Rgt, and 10th SPF Bn. See Tab A for other combat service and service support units. The 10th Infantry army is normally responsible for defense of western Surran but is expected to provide the bulk of augmenting forces deployed to Pacifica. The majority of the 10th Infantry army has already begun deployment or preparing for deployment and could close on Pacifica as early as 15 Mar 99. Remaining 10th Army troops will likely continue normal training and sector defense operations.

2) Air Forces. The Surran Air Force is organized into four air armies. The 1st Tactical Air Group of Forces (Surranian) is robust and modern, capable of effectively ranging throughout Pacifica with the aid of air refueling assets. The 3rd Tactical Air Group of Forces is also modern and serves primarily in a direct support role

to ground forces. The 2d Air Group of Forces (Western Area Defense Command) and the 4th Air Group of Forces (Eastern Area Defense Command) are significantly smaller and less capable. Their mission focuses on home defense particularly oriented on naval-based threats. Air force facilities are hardened and C3 is secure, integrated and protected. Aircrew training is excellent. Surran air forces occupy eight main operating bases. They are Brunei, Kinabalu, Kuching, Lahad, Miri, Pulau, Sandakan, and Tawau. Surranean forces have the capacity to rapidly upgrade jet capable civilian airfields within or out of Surran. Their air force is capable of upgrading and operating from unimproved airfields or highway strips. Additionally, they maintain an excellent airborne C3 capability. Air force facilities are protected with an effective multi-layered air defense system.

3) Maritime Forces.

a) Surran fields a limited in blue water capable Navy, that continues to develop as a significant maritime power projection force capable of asserting regional influence. Essentially a frigate navy, the Surranean Navy also possesses a credible undersea warfare capability with its ten German-built Type 209 SSK's. The Surranean navy continues to experience some difficulties in maintaining its diesel submarines, and has encountered fiscal constraints that have impeded steaming hours for a significant portion of its missile combatants. Lacking a true over-the-horizon targeting capability, the missile threat from the Surranean Navy is probably limited to organic sensor range (i.e., radar horizon), but they have a demonstrated ability to coordinate fires and operations between units within a SAG. While the Surranean Navy will probably eschew a direct confrontation with a superior USN force, units steaming independently would be at risk of hit-and-run attack with little warning during periods of increased tension. The Surranean Navy remains among the most potent in Southeast Asia.

b) Its afloat naval forces are organized as three task forces; Northern, Western, and Coastal. The Surranean Navy has no fixed wing, land attack capability. Surranean naval forces are expected to engage coalition naval forces to contest sea control of waters adjacent to Pacifica. The Northern Task Force includes: 8 guided missile frigates, 5 diesel submarines, and 12 corvettes/fast attack missile boats. The Western Task Force includes 4 guided missile frigates, 5 diesel submarines, and 8 corvettes/fast attack missile boats. The Coastal Task Force consists of 28 corvettes/fast attack missile boats, 6 Air defense guided missile frigates and 6 older WWII vintage destroyers used for antisubmarine duties. Five (5) underway replenishment vessels are capable of providing limited resupply of fuel, weapons, and stores to combatant vessels.

c) Naval command maintains a viable power projection capability built around deployment of Surran's infantry Armies and the Navy's 1st Surranean Corps of Marines. Its primary combat units include the 1st Marine Division, the 3rd Marine Division and the 5th Marine Division (Mech.), 1st IMRB, 1st Independent Combat Aviation Regiment, and 11th Independent Combat Aviation Regiment. These forces have been at a heightened state of alert and appear to be preparing for deployment. Surranean maritime lift capability consists of 32 ships capable of moving approximately one marine mech. division when augmented with civilian cargo shipping. Ships are mostly old, and several are US surplus dating to WWII. Surran has trained extensively for regional power projection missions with priority for planning to Indonesia, Singapore and Pacifica. The Surranean Merchant Marine routinely handles outsized cargo and RO-

RO for the Surrnese Armed forces during these exercises, and Surrnese Army units have participated along with the Marines during amphibious operations training.

4) Special Purpose Forces (SPF). SPF operations are conducted under centralized Surranian command and control under the national intelligence directorate as well as under Army control when the Armies are deployed. Surranian SPFs execute distinct missions integrated to support the theater commander's strategic and operational objectives. Surranian SPF (Group of Forces, Air, and Navy) is on a par with leading European SOF and is able to range the depths of Pacifica focusing on strategic and high-priority operational targets. Surranian SPFs consist of 153 12-man teams. Surranian SPF (37th Bde) consists to 4 Bns with 27 teams per Bn. The Infantry and Tank Armies have an SPF Bn consisting of 15 Teams. These teams are capable of splitting into two 6-man teams, which allows SURRAN to field more than 300 teams. They are supported by rotary winged aviation elements focused on operational strike and reconnaissance targets. This force is tactically comparable with US and European airborne forces. While SPF and terrorist activities have not surfaced in news releases lately, their capability must not be overlooked. The effects of these forces when coupled with insurgent forces within PA will result in an increased rear area threat and increased potential for displaced civilian movement.

5) Unconventional Warfare Forces. UW forces operating with the SPM have increasingly focused their effort on civilian infrastructure targets, small detached military units, and on urban terrorism. This threat is assumed to already be pre-positioned and to be focused on the coalition's logistical and command and control nodes, as well as PA political targets for the purpose of regional and political destabilization. It is assumed that the non-attributable terrorist action in Pacifica to date has been conducted by these forces.

6) PPF. PPF forces consist of a mixed bag of modern mechanized force, regular light infantry formations, long-term insurgent units, terrorist and supporters. Their equipment varies from modern western arms and equipment concentrated in Pacifican Army rebel units to Warsaw pact small arms and equipment common to the SPM's Surranian supplied forces. The level of small unit training is considered high. Large unit and combined arms operational training competency is generally present in rebel army units only. These units, however, are still reorganizing from losses taken during the civil war are cannot be considered fully mission capable. All PPF forces are dependent upon Surrnan for logistical, air and naval support. Pacifican rebel army units are drawn from the former Pacifican army's 1st Motorized IN Division, the 7th IN Division, and the 8th IN Division. Mechanized formations are principally equipped with M60A3 and M113A2 armored vehicles. SPM insurgents enjoy the support of the Surranian ethnic populations in the southern Pacifican islands. Support for the SPM and the rebel army forces among the population throughout the rest of Pacifica is spotty. PPF rebel army forces are composed of 4 mechanized brigades and 6 infantry brigades. They are supported with a limited amount of artillery and other technical troops. (See Tab B (PPF Order of Battle) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).)

7) Surranian Peoples Movement. The SPM are organized into seven brigades. In southeast Luzon, SPM insurgents operate three regiments, a total of 4,000 men, operating primarily at the platoon level, with smaller terrorist and irregular cells operating in and around Manila. SPM insurgents control Palawan with a single Bde of about 1,800 men organized into 20 companies. The largest concentration of insurgent forces is located on Mindanao where the SPM controls most of the western half of the island. SPM forces are organized into 4 brigades totaling nearly 10,000 men with artillery and other heavy weapons. SPM insurgents also sponsor a number of terrorist cells operating in urban areas. SPM operations are heavily influenced by Maoist insurgent doctrine and are, therefore, most effective in areas in which they enjoy popular support.

8). The PPF possesses very limited air and naval capabilities. PPF relies on Surran for air support. Only rebel army units possess a limited air capability with a small number of operational attack and lift helicopters. The PRA headquarters located at Tuguegarao in Luzon is also home to a squadron of F-5s that can be dispersed to support ground operations as needed. Generally, the PPF forces are well trained by Surran and Eastland and are tactically competent; however, rebel army competency is considerably higher. PPF air operations with Surrans will be hampered by the lack of common C2 systems to coordinate close air support. Rebel army units possess a limited number of operational attack and lift helicopters on Luzon. The PPF operates a number of small coastal vessels in both an attack and logistical support modes. Primary naval and air support is drawn from SURRAN.

- c. Strength. See Appendix 3 (Situation Template).
- d. Recent and present significant activities. See current INTSUM.
- e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

1) Personnel. Surranian military leaders are known to be aggressive, innovative and effective. Promotion is based on merit. Surran is singularly dedicated to building a unified Surran, to include all former island holdings. PPF military leadership, though not totally dedicated to the Surranian goal, is considered professional and well trained. The Pacifican civil war took a toll on equipment, but it has produced experienced leaders. The PPF is proficient in small unit tactics.

2) Intelligence. Surran air forces possess a substantial airborne collection and jamming capability but not on a level with US forces. The lack of strategic collection capability makes them vulnerable to deception.

3) Operations. Combined Surranian-PPF operations are weak. PPF relies on Surran for all fixed-wing air support yet has no common C2 system to properly coordinate for close air support. Disparity in military technology and low PPF experience in large unit combined operations cause friction at the operational level.

There are indications that some PPF units resent the growing Surranian presence in Pacifica and have grown tired of the civil war. Cooperation among the rebel army units and the SPM insurgents is minimal.

4) Combat Service Support. By S+ 75 (appx Mid April) concurrent with the establishment of the air and maritime exclusion zone, Surranian units on Luzon are expected to have amassed approximately 30 DOS. All fossil fuels must come from external sources.

5) Civil-military operations. Armed conflict in the AO has taken a heavy toll on the infrastructure and agricultural base on Luzon. Agricultural production is down 60% and international humanitarian aid is now critical for feeding the people. Most of the civilian population in the Lingayan Plain region have been displaced and occupy a number of regional UN operated DP camps. Extensive UN and NGO humanitarian operations in northern Luzon have been disrupted by the PPF. The cost of the civil war has been high economically. Pacifican government survivability is largely dependent upon an early termination of the conflict and the restoration of the agricultural economic base. Extended coalition military operations that further damage or disrupt the economy may be counter-productive to the long-range efficacy of the government.

6) Politics. Divergent strategic aims between Eastland, Surran, rebel army factions, and the SPM precludes cohesion. Eastland's support is clearly limited by its desire to maintain economic relationships with the West. It is uncertain whether Surran is willing to risk total war in pursuit of its ethnically-based political objectives and its economic goal of control of the east Sulu Sea resource area. It is more likely that it will be willing to cut its losses if the cost becomes too high. PPF rebel army forces are split on the support for a continued war effort and direct Surranian involvement. The SPM is fully committed to the establishment of a politically autonomous, Surranian ethnic state.

b. Air. Surranian air forces are capable of rapid deployment to conduct offensive or defensive counter-air operations. Selected air superiority and strike aircraft will be forward deployed to Pacifican airfields to achieve local air superiority. Surranian air forces possess the capability to strike US and coalition forces throughout Pacifica from bases in Surran. Aircraft performance and refueling capabilities give Surran air forces the means to conduct air interdiction throughout Pacifica.

c. WMD.

1) Offensive. Surran has developed a full range of modern chemical warfare agents and delivery systems. Neither Surran nor the PPF possesses nuclear weapons. Surran has no known biological weapons. Surranian military and civilian scientists under the guise of defensive and medical research and development has

researched some anthrax, botulism toxin and plague, however. Although no tactical BW is known to exist, Surranian SPF forces may be capable of employing biological agents.

2) Munitions and agents. Surranian forces are believed to possess the following munitions and agents:

<u>Weapons/Munitions</u>	<u>Agent</u>
122mm Arty	GB
130mm Arty	GB
152mm Arty	GB, GD, HD
122mm MRL	GB, GD
220mm MRL	GB, VX, HD
SS-1	VX, HD, GD
SS-21	VX, HD
250kg Bomb	GD, GB, HD
500kg Bomb	VX, HD

3) Defensive. While Surran has sophisticated chemical defense capability, PPF ground forces have only limited capability. Surran purchases this equipment from a number of sources. PPF is generally equipped with US manufactured masks and detection equipment.

a) Individual protection. Surran ground forces use masks modeled after NATO and US masks, using NATO standard C2 charcoal based filters. Their protective suits, procured from European manufacturers are primarily made of bonded spherical carbon absorbers, laminated between layers of fire retardant fabric. This fabric provides 24 hours of protection in a contaminated environment, is washable and reusable up to 10 times, and provides a wear life of up to 60 days.

b) Collective protection. Surran combat vehicles (tanks, IFV, SP arty) all have over-pressure systems. PPF forces have some limited collective protection (ventilated facepiece/gas particulate filter systems.) Both nations emphasize collective protection and hardening of CPs at division level and above.

c) NBC recon, detection and warning. Surranian forces are adequately equipped to detect CW agents and provide early warning. Individual soldiers carry chemical agent detectors similar to the US improved Chemical Agent Detector. All soldiers carry and are trained in using detector paper. However, Surran has no separate coherent warning and reporting system – their intelligence system and command and control net serve this function. Surran NBC decon systems are comparable to those in US units.

d) Decontamination. Surran forces rely heavily on aqueous decon at all levels, a significant doctrinal aspect of Surran chemical defense operations. Although individual soldiers and combat systems maintain emergency decon capability

similar to US forces, Surran unit decon ops typically occur as part of a reorganization operation. No organic unit decon equipment or capabilities exist below division level.

4) WMD Doctrine.

a) Offensive release/control. Surranian chemical weapons release procedures operate on two levels - strategic/operational and tactical. As previously discussed, the SR-PPF CW capability lies with Surran, as do the release procedures and authority. At the strategic/operational level, Surranese CW consists primarily of surface-to-surface missiles and air-delivered munitions. These weapons, intended to significantly disrupt friendly operations and influence our courses of action, can produce large-scale damage and/or contamination. Given the desired operational and strategic effects of these weapons, Surranian National Command Authorities have apparently retained the decision to employ these weapons. Indications are that Surran will only use these weapons under conditions of pending strategic defeat, where enemy ground forces are about to enter or have entered Surranian national territory. CJTF deployment to Pacifica would probably not constitute sufficient cause for strategic release. The decision to use CW in support of tactical operations lies with Surranese Army commanders.

b) Operational/Tactical Employment. These tactical weapons, predominantly artillery or MRL delivered, would likely be used to enhance the effects of Surranian counterattack or to defeat an enemy attack. In either case, Surranian commanders would desire to contaminate key terrain (choke points, for example), disrupt or turn attacking enemy forces, and slow the attacker's tempo by forcing the attacker to assume protective measures. Additionally, Surranian commanders would desire to attack MSRs and logistic bases in depth to create confusion in rear areas, slow logistics throughput, and slow the attacker's operational tempo. Surranian commanders may perceive an advantage to a CW battlefield because of their extensive training for operations in NBC conditions. Additionally, forcing an attacker into a protective posture reduces the attacker's possible advantages of mass and firepower.

c) Defensive. Surran emphasizes protection as its key doctrinal principle. This doctrine emphasizes extended combat operations in NBC conditions. Their emphasis on conducting operations while in protective posture has resulted in a significant and long term training focus on operations in a contaminated environment. In lieu of avoiding contamination, Surranian forces plan to fight protected. Decontamination provides their second doctrinal focus.

d) Organization.

(i) Division. Divisions contain one NBC Defense Battalion consisting of 4 NBC defense companies providing geographic general support to the division's combat units and divisional combat service support assets. Each company provides general support decontamination and limited NBC reconnaissance.

(ii) Corps. Corps contain one Chemical Battalion, in addition to the divisional battalions, composed of 2 to 5 NBC defense and/or chemical companies. Corps Chemical Battalions include one Smoke Company not found in NBC defense battalions at division.

(iii) Army. Each Army contains one NBC defense battalion (normally 3-5 companies) and smoke battalion (3 companies of motorized smoke

generators). These battalions provide general support decontamination to units in the Army area of operations, as well as supplemental capability to divisional NBC defense assets. Large-area smoke units support logistics and command and control facilities, although motorized smoke units may be provided OPCON to divisions or brigades for deception operations or during the defense.

(iv) Surrani Front. Two Chemical Brigades provide the Front commander with general support decontamination throughout his area of operations, as well as limited NBC reconnaissance and smoke. These brigades, usually given geographic responsibilities, also operate the front hazard warning system, the first and only echelon where a formal NBC hazard analysis and collection center exists

(v) International/Diplomatic. Participants in the multilateral chemical weapons treaty discussions during the 1980s, Surrani is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention

5) Nuclear Capabilities. None.

6) Biological Capabilities. The Surrani alliance has no known biological weapons capability.

7) Missile Capabilities. Surrani has 6 x SS21 Brigades and 6 x SS1C Brigades. Surrani Naval and/or Air Forces may have the capability to deliver AS-15 cruise missiles from TU-95 BEAR aircraft.

8) Airborne/Air Assault Capabilities. The Surrani HQ maintains the capability to insert one airborne division. Surrani is capable of air assaulting one regiment per army.

9) UW/SPF Capabilities. Special Purpose Forces are capable of operating throughout the area of operations primarily against strategic and operational HVTs. SPF can be expected to perform pre-hostility and wartime non-attributable operations. SPFs are capable of delivering chemical munitions.

10) Joint Capabilities: PPF forces can defend in its current locations with seven forward brigades and conduct offensive operations in the region within 75 days of Surrani intervention. Surrani can reinforce northern Luzon with the 8th and 10th Infantry Armies for offensive operations within 75 days. These ground forces will be supported by two Tactical Air Armies, which will be able to establish local air superiority. Naval forces will be able to disrupt Coalition sea movement and to support air and ground forces with air and missile capabilities.

11) Surrani Space Capabilities.

a) Communications Platforms. Surrani satellite communications reliance is assessed as MEDIUM. Their military operates two geosynchronous communications satellites that provide UHF and SHF circuits for general military command and control. Surrani military forces also have access to commercial satellites including INTELSAT, INMARSAT, EUTESAT, and INTERSPUTNIK. Surrani has leased circuits on two Japanese, four European and two Russian commercial

communications satellites. The Surran government uses these leased circuits for communications with their embassies abroad, foreign governments, and for propaganda dissemination. The military is prohibited from using these circuits for these purposes. However, the use of commercially available encryption communications terminals, such as INTELSAT, could allow the Surranian military access to secure command and control communications. Surranian SATCOM terminals could be adapted/modified for C-band and possibly UHF jamming. Satellite Ground Facilities. These ground facilities support Surranian satellite communications:

<u>SITE EMPLOYMENT</u>	<u>LAT</u>	<u>LONG</u>
GEOSYNCH MILITARY C4I (PRIMARY)	045600N	1145500E
GEOSYNCH MILITARY C4I (BACK UP)	012900N	1102000E
COMMERCIAL SITE #1	055900N	1160400E
COMMERCIAL SITE #2	031800N	1173800E
COMMERCIAL SITE #3	011700S	1165000E

b) Reconnaissance/Intelligence/Surveillance Platforms. Surranian military forces have no organic space-based imagery collection capability. However, Surran has the capability to illegally and clandestinely down link and acquire commercial reconnaissance imagery such as LANDSAT and SPOT. Surran may also legally or illegally acquire third party satellite IMINT. The following is a list of MSI/imagery platforms that could provide reconnaissance information directly or via third party:

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>RESOLUTION</u>
LANDSAT (US)	40 meters
SPOT (French)	10 meters
ERS-1 (Europe)	0.9 km
ALMAZ/RESURS-f (Russian)	5 meter
IRS (India)	10 meter
MOS/JERS-1 (Japan)	18 meter

c) Environmental. The Surranian military has no organic space assets to support the collection of environmental information. However, weather information is broadcast and easily available from a number of civil platforms (including US TIROS and European METOSAT). The following list identifies potential weather platforms that could provide atmospheric information directly to Surranian forces:

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>RESOLUTION</u>
Geostationary	
METEOSAT (Europe)	2.5 Km
Polar Orbiting	
NOAA/TIROS (US non-encrypted)	1.1 Km
METEOR (Russia)	2 Km
FEN YEN (China)	1 Km

d) Navigation. Surran has the capability of collecting and using broadcast navigation signals, such as GPS and GLONASS due to the wide availability of commercial receiver sets. Surran has also demonstrated a capability to provide wide area differential GPS through SATCOM broadcasting. Our capability to negate this capability relies on identification of these broadcast stations and the implementation of Selective

Availability. The following list identifies potential navigation platforms that could provide positional information directly to Surranian forces:

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>RESOLUTION</u>
GPS (US)	100 meters with SA turned off ≤16m w/ differential GPS techniques
GLOSNASS (RU)	Unknown (Assume less than 200 meters)

e) Missile Warning. Surranian forces have no space-based assets to provide them warning of ballistic missile attacks.

5. CONCLUSIONS. Probable Enemy Course of Action. Most likely COA (Relative Probability - 0.7) consists of attack with the main effort in the east. The 8th Army (ME) passes through 10th Army forces (SE) and attacks south along HWY 5 with (2) Infantry Divisions (BTR/T-72) and 1 Motorized Division (BMP/T-72) to seize Manila in order to control the Island of Pacifica. The 10th Army (SE) attacks to seize key terrain along HWY 5 with (2) Infantry Divisions (BTR/T-72) and a Motorized Division (BMP/T-72) in order to facilitate unimpeded movement of the Main Effort. The 3rd Airborne Division (SE) conducts an airborne assault to isolate key terrain in and around Manila and to protect the southern flank of the main effort. The 37th Tank Division (T-80) is the Front reserve. Main effort weighted with Maneuver and Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS
JTF/MNF-PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

**ANNEX C TO JTF/MNF OPORD 0002-2XX1
OPERATIONS**

REFERENCES:

- (a) ANNEX M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy)
- (b) Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Feb 95
- (c) Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 28 Oct 92
- (d) Joint Pub 3-50, National Search and Rescue Manual Volume I: National Search and Rescue System, 1 Feb 91
- (e) Joint Pub 3-50.1, National Search and Rescue Manual Volume II: Planning Handbook, 1 Feb 91
- (f) Joint Pub 3-150.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, 12 Jul 94
- (g) Joint Pub 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 3 Dec 93
- (h) Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, 22 Aug 91
- (i) Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 Nov 94
- (j) Joint Pub 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance, 10 Mar 92

1. GENERAL

a. **Purpose.** To provide details and guidance for JTF/MNF's conduct of military operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

b. **Mission.** Basic Order [JTF/MNF OPORD 0020-2XX1 (PACIFIC STRIKE)]

c. **Joint Operations Area.** Joint Operations Area (JOA): is defined as all ground, air, and sea area enclosed by the following coordinates: 22°00'N, 107°00'E; 22°00'N, 127°00'E; 5°00'N, 127°00'E; 5°00'N, 107°00'E. JOA airspace is defined as all airspace from surface to 100,000 feet mean sea level (MSL).

2. **Concept of Operations.** See Basic Order [(JTF/MNF OPORD 0002-2XX1 (PACIFIC STRIKE)], Operations Overlay (Appendix 18), and Execution Checklist (Annex X).

3. Conduct of Operations

a. Aviation Operations. Commander, 13th Air Force is designated at Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and will plan and coordinate all air operations within the JOA IAW ref (i). Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) is located at MANILA, LUZON, PACIFICA.

(1) Phase I (Pre-hostilities and Lodgement). Priority of air operations is to isolate JOA from further SURRANIAN reinforcement, protect standup of U.S. forces and conduct defensive counter air (DCA) and air interdiction (AI) operations in support of JTF/MNF forces. Be prepared to conduct offensive counter air (OCA) and AI.

(2) Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping). Priority of air operations is to gain and maintain air superiority and conduct shaping operations on SURRANIAN forces located in LUZON. Conduct DCA/OCA into SURRANIAN controlled territory as required to remove SURRANIAN air threat to JTF/MNF forces within LUZON. Be prepared to conduct strategic attack (SA) into SURRANIAN controlled territory, continue AI into SURRANIAN controlled territory, and extend OCA operations as required to support SA and AI operations into SURRANIAN controlled territory. Also be prepared to conduct close air support (CAS) in support of ground offensive operations.

(3) Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver). Priority of air operations is to maintain air superiority (DCA/OCA), conduct shaping operations on SURRANIAN forces located in Luzon (AI) and provide CAS to JTF/MNF ground forces, in order. Be prepared to support amphibious operations, as directed.

b. Air Defense and Airspace Control Operations

(1) Commander, 13th Air Force is designated as the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and will plan for all air defense and airspace control operations within the JOA.

(2) Air Defense

(a) Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement). Protect JTF/MNF forces from enemy air and missile attack. Priority of air defense (AD) is to protect ports of debarkation for arriving JTF/MNF forces (ports and airfields), logistics facilities, command posts and major unit assembly areas (MUAAs), in order. Be prepared to conduct AD in support of combat forces forward.

(b) Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping). Priority of AD (against air/missile attack) is to protect port of debarkation for arriving JTF/MNF forces (ports and airfields), logistics facilities, command posts and major unit assembly areas (MUAAs), and combat forces forward, in order.

(c) **Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver).** Priority of AD (against air/missile attack) is to protect logistics facilities, airfields, command posts and combat forces, in order.

(d) **Component commanders**

1 In coordination with the JFACC, establish AD conditions/alert status within their respective areas of operations.

2 In coordination with the JFACC, plan for the employment of surface-based organic air defense resources within task force areas of operations.

3 Provide aircraft resources through the establishment of joint apportionment and allocation processes as determined by CJTF/MNF.

(3) Airspace Control. The JAOC is the senior airspace control agency for the conduct of air operations within the JOA and is responsible for generating the ATO/ACO/SPINS.

c. **Amphibious Operations.** JFMCC commence planning for Amphibious Operations in support of JTF/MNF, ARFOR, and MARFOR operations during Phase IIA and Phase III.

d. **Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare.** Appendix 3 (Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare).

e. **Special Operations.** JSOTF will conduct strategic reconnaissance (SAR) and direct action (DA) operations in support of operations within the JOA. Priority is to SR during Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement), Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping), and Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver).

(1) Infiltrate Special Forces/SEAL SR teams to observe lines of communication (LOCs), locate weapons of mass destruction, detect command posts, and find resupply depots.

(2) Be prepared to conduct DA missions to destroy command post and key logistic facilities; to interdict LOCs at vulnerable points; and to seize key terrain to facilitate operations, in priority.

(3) DIRLAUTH with JTF/MNF components and supporting commands.

f. **Search and Rescue Operations**

(1) Commander, JTF/MNF will exercise primary Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) command authority through the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) collocated with the JAOC.

(2) JSRC

(a) Has authority to task designated CSAR units within each task force.

(b) Is responsible for directing and coordinating all CSAR operations within the JOA.

(3) Component commanders

(a) Have primary CSAR responsibility for their own forces within their area of operations (AO).

(b) Establish Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) to coordinate rescue operations within their AO's.

g. Rules of Engagement (ROE)

(1) General

(a) These ROE apply to all forces assigned to or in support of JTF/MNF within the JTF/MNF JOA.

(b) The U.S. Government (USG) does not recognize Surran's excessive claim to a 200-mile limit on territorial waters. USG recognizes a 12-mile limit on territorial waters.

(c) ROE do not impair the duty of U.S. commanders to take such action required by military necessity to defend installations, aircraft, units, or personnel from attack or threat of imminent attack.

(d) Commanders must use only that amount of force and those weapons necessary and appropriate to accomplish the mission based upon all known facts.

(e) Hostilities will be conducted IAW international law of armed conflict.

(g) No nations have given permission for U.S. forces to pursue hostile foreign forces into their territorial sea, internal waters, airspace, or territory. In the absence of a nation's consent, JTF/MNF forces may pursue a hostile force into another nation's territorial sea, internal waters, airspace, or territory if that hostile force persists in committing hostile acts or in demonstrating hostile intent against JTF/MNF forces,

citizens, property, or commercial assets and the other nation is unable or unwilling to neutralize the hostile force's action effectively or promptly.

(2) Designation of hostile forces. Following are declared hostile:

(a) SURRAN

(b) PACIFICAN PEOPLES MOVEMENT, PPM

(3) Rules of Engagement during hostilities

(a) All hostile forces, combatants, command personnel, installations, weapons, systems, materiel, geographic features, and economic infrastructure of use by hostile forces, and military infrastructure, are lawful objects of attack and may be engaged with all lawful force until neutralized, destroyed, or captured. Objects of attack include:

1 Warships, including naval auxiliaries. Exceptions include hospital ships, small craft employed in coastal rescue operations, ships authorized to transport medical equipment, medical transports, other medical ships or craft, and coastal vessels used for fishing.

2 Military aircraft. Exception is any medical aircraft.

3 Civil vessels, watercraft, or aircraft engaged in or directly supporting military operations (to include reconnaissance or surveillance operations) or terrorist actions.

4 Hostile land forces, other than medical support units.

(b) Authority to employ riot control agents may be delegated to individual ship/brigade commanders.

(c) Mining and countermobility. Authority to use mines, with the exception of long duration scatterable mines, is delegated to Component commanders. Component commanders may plan for use of long duration scatterable mines, but will not employ them without Commander, JTF/MNF approval.

(d) Cross border operations into territorial airspace, or territorial waters are not authorized for ground units, aircraft, or ships. Authority to cross borders of neutral nations remains at CJCS level but may be granted upon request under the following circumstances:

1 The neutral nation cannot or will not prevent hostile forces using its territory, territorial airspace, or territorial waters against friendly forces.

2 Hostile forces attack from a neutral nation's territory, territorial airspace, or territorial waters.

(e) Search and rescue personnel and supporting units shall use force as necessary to include intrusion into any land territory and/or territorial sea airspace (to include neutral states) to ensure the recovery of survivors by friendly forces with CJTF/MNF specific approval.

(f) Inadvertent Entry. U.S. units that inadvertently cross a neutral country's international boundary will attempt to withdraw as soon as practicable. Units may exercise self-defense against hostile forces during withdrawal. U.S. forces will not engage neutral country forces, except in self-defense.

(g) Non-combatant civilians will not be detained except for their own safety. In all cases, they will be treated IAW the law of armed conflict.

(h) Hostile force personnel indicating a desire to surrender will be permitted to do so and will be treated as prisoners of war. All captured hostile personnel will be treated IAW the law of armed conflict.

(i) Unrestricted electronic warfare is permitted.

(j) Use of laser-assisted weapons is permitted.

(k) Looting is prohibited.

(l) Captured hostile force property becomes property of the U.S. Government and will not be appropriated for private use. Captured non-lethal personal property (such as personal jewelry, money or photographs) remains property of the captured party.

(m) Mosques and other holy places, hospitals, and facilities displaying the Red Crescent or Red Cross will not be attacked unless the enemy is using them for military (hostile) operations.

(n) Cultural and historic buildings, non-military structures, and civilian population centers will not be attacked unless the enemy is using them to conduct military (hostile) operations or their destruction is required by military necessity.

h. Operational Fires

(1) Targeting Cycle. The targeting cycle will be conducted on a seventy-two hour cycle in accordance with reference (j). To avoid confusion among numerous events and products, each twenty-four hour period is designated by a sequential phonetic letter.

(2) Joint Targeting. CJTF/MNF will direct the JTF/MNF targeting process through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCCB). The JTCCB will assist the CJTF/MNF in setting priorities, providing targeting guidance, and determining overall weight of effort.

(a) Component commanders will assign a representative to the JTCCB.

(b) JTCCB will meet daily to review, validate, and prioritize target nominations IAW CJTF/MNF guidance and to match them with available strike assets.

(c) Subordinate component prioritized target nominations will be forwarded concurrently to JTF/MNF/J-3, JFACC, and component representatives to the JTF/MNF by the most expeditious means available using TGTINFOREP format. Nominations received by 0600 will be considered for inclusion in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) approved that same day. Targets which are above the cut line will be scheduled for attack on the next air tasking order (ATO) cycle.

(3) Air Tasking Order (ATO) Process. The JTF/MNF ATO process is as follows:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Agency</u>
Day minus 1		
JFC Targeting Guidance and air apportionment decision for ATO ALPHA	1800	JTF/J3
Day 1		
Target Nominations due to J3/Force Fires	0600	All Task Forces
JTCCB meeting	1300	JTF/All Task forces
JIPTL Approved	1400	CJTF
ALLOREQ/AIRSUPREQ submitted	1800	All Task Forces
Day 2		
SORTIEALOT published	0600	JFACC
Task Force ATO ALPHA input due to JFACC	1200	All Task Forces
Joint ATO ALPHA published	1800	JFACC

<u>Event</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Agency</u>
Day 3 Execute ATO ALPHA	0600-0559	All Task Forces

(4) Targeting Guidance

(a) Target Priorities

1 Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement) and Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping)

- a Airfields/aircraft.**
- b Air defense weapons/units.**
- c Fire support means (multiple rocket launchers and long-range artillery, in order).**
- d Maneuver units (regimental-level and higher).**

2 Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver)

- a. Air defense weapons/units.**
- b. Airfields/aircraft.**
- c. Command and control facilities (brigade-level and higher).**
- d. Fire support means (battalion-level and higher).**
- e. Logistics facilities (division-level and higher).**
- f. Mechanized units (brigade-level and higher).**
- g. Engineering/bridging units.**

(b) Target Restrictions. See ROE.

(5) Laser Guided Weapons Employment. JTF/MNF will assign specific blocks of Laser Pulse Repetition Frequency (PF) Codes to facilitate employment of laser-guided munitions. Assignment: To be issued (TBI).

(6) Family of Scatterable Mine (FASCAM) Employment.

(a) Component commanders may plan for use of long duration scatterable mines but will not employ them without CJTF/MNF approval.

(b) Component commanders will report the location of all air and artillery FASCAM minefields to JTF/MNF/J-3 Joint Operations Center.

(7) Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM). ARFOR/MARFOR/JSOTF provide this HQ your planned FSCMs as developed to include overlays.

i. **Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability**

(1) Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement) Priority of engineer missions:

(a) Forward deployed units in major unit assembly areas: Mobility and survivability.

(b) Rear area: Establishment and maintenance of LOCs, maintenance of airfield and port facilities, survivability for communications facilities, survivability for JTF/MNF main and forward command posts (CPs), in order.

(2) Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping). Priority of missions.

(a) Forward deployed units in the defense and in unit assembly areas: Mobility and survivability.

(b) Rear area: No change from Phase I.

(3) Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver). Priority of missions:

(a) Forward deployed units: Determined by component commanders.

(b) Rear area: No change from Phase IIA

(4) Component commanders will report location of all minefields, to include air and artillery FASCAM, to JTF/MNF/J-3 Joint Operations Center.

4. **Operational Constraints**

a. Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement). Operations will be constrained to protecting deployment of JTF/MNF units into the JOA. Shaping operations within PACIFICA are authorized.

b. Phase IIA (Battlespace Shaping Operations). Operations will be constrained to protecting JTF/MNF units in the defense in the JOA. Shaping operations within JOA are authorized.

c. Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver). JTF/MNF forces will not cross international territorial boundaries of SURRAN without express approval of CINCPAC.

C. W. BROSSY
General, USA
Commander, JTF/MNF

Appendix:
18—Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

Von MOLKTKE
Major General, USA
Director, J-3

HEADQUARTERS
CJTF/MNF PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

**ANNEX J TO JTF/MNF OPORD 0002-2XX1
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

- References: (a) ANNEX M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy)
(b) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 11 Aug
94
(c) Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Feb 95

1. GENERAL

a. **Purpose.** To establish command relationships between JTF/MNF and supported and supporting commands.

(1) JTF/MNF, as a sub-unified command of USPACOM, exercises OPCON of assigned and attached forces and conducts operations directed by USPACOM, and in coordination with other components as required.

On C-30 days, JTF/MNF assumes OPCON of PACIFICAN forces.

DJTF/MNF Commander is designated Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC).

b. **Scope.** This annex is applicable to all forces assigned to JTF/MNF.

2. Command Lines

a. **JTF/MNF Component Commands**

JFACC - 13th Air Force.

- (2) JFMCC - 7th Fleet
- (3) ARFOR - II Corps.
- (4) MARFOR - I MEF.
- (5) JSOTF - SOCPAC

b. **JTF/MNF Command Relationships**

- (1) **Phase I (Deployment and Lodgement).** Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram - Phases I-IIB).
- (2) **Phase IIA (Shape the Battlespace).** Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram - Phases I-IIB).
- (3) **Phase IIB (Decisive Maneuver).** Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram - Phase I-IIB).
- (4) **Phase III (Follow-Through).** Omitted.
- (5) **Phase IV (Posthostilities and Redeployment).** Omitted.

3. Supporting and Coordination Relationships

a. Supporting Military Forces. Supporting CINCs: USCINCEUR, USCINCCENT, USCINCFJCOM, USCINCSOC, USCINTRANS, USCINSPACE, USCINSTRAT.

b. Coordinating Authorities

(1) JTF/MNF coordinates with USCINCPAC for the sustainment of common user classes of supply for JTF/MNF.

(2) JTF/MNF coordinates with PACIFICA MOD for assistance in area defense of MANILA, LUZON complex.

c. Inter-Service Support Arrangements. Annex D (Logistics).

d. Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. Reference (c).

4. Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations.
Reference (c).a

C. W. BROSSY
General, USA
Commander, JTF/MNF

Appendices

- 1 - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM PHASE - I-IIB
- 2 - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM PHASE - III (OMITTED)
- 3 - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM PHASE - IV (OMITTED)

OFFICIAL:

I. M. Hard
Brigadier General, USMC
Director, J-5

HEADQUARTERS
JTF - PACIFICA
APO, 01234
18 MARCH 2XX1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO JTF/MNF OPORD 0002-2XX1
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Phase I-IIB (Deployment and Lodgement)-(Decisive Maneuver)

