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## LESSON 10

### U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS

#### Introduction

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**Purpose** This lesson introduces you to some of the problems associated with U.N. peace operations through a historical case study of U.S. Marine Corps involvement in Haiti during the 20th century.

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**Why Study U.N. Peace Operations?** You, as a Marine officer, must be aware of the problems arising during U.N. missions because the unstable post-Cold War environment with its changing ethnic, tribal, religious, and racial friction make U.S. troop deployments in U.N. peace operations probable.

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**Relationship to Other Instruction** This lesson

- wProvides a link between the Banana Wars and the current deployment to Haiti.
- wReinforces the counterinsurgency, special operations, civil affairs, and peacekeeping segments of the OOTW curriculum.

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**Study Time** This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 2.5 hours of study.

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## Educational Objectives

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**Heritage in Haiti** Explain the heritage of the U.S. military--particularly the Marine Corps--in Haiti.

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**Cultural Impact** Explain the impact of the Haitian culture on warfighting and nation building.

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**Operational and Tactical Problems** Evaluate operational and tactical problems faced by U.S. forces deployed on a multinational U.N. peacekeeping mission. [JPME Areas 1(b), 1(e), 3(a), and 3(d)]

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**Definitions** Define the differences between the terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement. [JPME Area 2(a)]

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**Training** Explain why contingency forces must be well-trained for participation in various operations other than war scenarios.

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**JPME Areas/  
Objectives/Hours  
(accounting data)** 1/b/0.2  
1/e/0.3  
2/a/0.3  
3/a/0.2  
3/d/0.5

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## Discussion

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### **U.N. Peacekeeping Operations**

Over the past few years the U.S. government tasked the military to serve in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Deployments to such undeveloped countries cause maneuver, logistics, and communications problems. In addition, complex ethnic or religious hatreds confuse any clear-cut end state.

A continuing debate within the U.S. military raises serious questions regarding fiscal constraints and training distractions detracting from the primary warfighting mission. The U.S. doctrinal emphasis on the offensive, maximum firepower, and decisive victory does not lend itself to peace operations requiring patience and minimal use of force.

Some argue that U.S. troops are not temperamentally suited for peacekeeping, while others, applying the Weinberger Doctrine, believe that the United States should deploy forces only when the national interest is threatened. There are also concerns about vague missions, ROEs, and the relationship of U.S. contingents to the U.N. command.

Others argue that the United States, as the world's greatest power, has a moral responsibility to prevent famine and genocide (as outlined in the NSS for Humanitarian Interests). Whatever the outcome of this debate, the post-Cold War environment makes U.S. troop deployments in U.N. peace operations probable. Consequently, you must be aware of the challenges these deployments may present.

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## Discussion, Continued

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### Haiti

From 1915 to 1934, U.S. Marines intermittently deployed to Haiti during the Banana Wars. Marine Corps legends like Smedly Butler ("Old Gimlet Eye") and Lewis ("Chesty") Puller commanded what today would be considered counterinsurgency and peace engagement operations.

Many Marines believed their only mission was to "civilize 'em with Krag" (the Krag-Jorgenson rifle) as they crushed two *Caco* rebellions. Haiti was governed from the deck of a battleship, while U.S. naval officers seized customs offices and controlled revenue collection. Back in Washington D.C., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, boasted that he had written Haiti's new constitution.

As in the case of the *Guardia Nacional* in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, the Marines trained and equipped a Haitian *Gendarmerie* to police the country. In the process, Marine officers and NCOs gained valuable tactical experience in jungle warfare which they later used against the Japanese in the Pacific. In addition, the Marines launched ambitious civil affairs operations including medical, sanitation and road construction projects. Marine supervisors also helped the *Gendarmerie* string telegraph lines, build schools, and clean prisons. One Marine stated, "Haiti is easy enough to pacify, the trouble is keeping it pacified after we leave."

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### Haitian Mission Deteriorates

Inevitably, the Haitian mission began to deteriorate. Marines, originally dispatched by President Wilson to act as imperial proconsuls, found themselves facing brutality charges before a Senatorial investigation committee. Herman Hanneken, who received a Presidential decoration for single-handedly killing the *Caco* rebel Charlemagne Peralte, was savagely attacked in the liberal media.

Moreover, the attempt to administer Haiti "according to Marine Corps methods" ran into serious problems. The *Gendarmerie* system led to abuses by Haitian soldiers against their own people. Corruption flourished, and the newly constructed transportation infrastructure soon began to decay. The use of conscription to draft laborers under the old French *corvee* system revived Haitian fears of a resurgence of slavery. In addition, unfamiliarity with the Creole language and the Afro-French, voodoo culture hampered well-intentioned civil affairs efforts to remodel the economic system.

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## Discussion, Continued

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**Haitian Mission Deteriorates** Even worse, after the U.S. withdrawal, the Marine-trained *Gendarmerie* formed the nucleus of the Haitian Army which supported the dreaded *Tan-Tan Macoute* of "Papa Doc" Duvalier, and more recently, the *Attachees* of General Raul Cedras.

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**Dayton Agreements** Time turned full circle when the Marines, along with the Army's Special Forces and the 10th Mountain Division, returned to Haiti. Ironically, these troops, as a part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, displaced a Haitian Army which was once armed and trained by U.S. Marines.

The intervention was noble in intent; no one can deny the corruption and brutality of the FAD'H. But most of Haiti's problems remained political, social, and economic in nature. Moreover, cultural beliefs and institutions have tremendous survivability in Third World environments. Haiti, with the lowest living standard and highest illiteracy rate in the hemisphere, has little experience with democratic government.

Nevertheless, the objective of the U.S. mission was to restore the democratically elected President Aristide until he could be replaced after elections in December 1995. In keeping with the original objective, 6,000 U.N. peacekeepers; including 2,500 U.S. troops then turned over power to a newly trained, 5,000-member Haitian police force in February 1996, with the aim of fostering a lasting democratic government. However, it remains to be seen whether or not democracy survives in Haiti without extensive U.S. military support.

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## Required Readings

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*Operations Other  
Than War  
(OOTW)  
Readings*

wShacochis, Bob. "The Immaculate Invasion." *Harper's*, Feb. 1995. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex I, pp. I- to I-. Following the arrival of the American troops, the author joins a group of print and television reporters in Haiti. The group tours the squalor, chaos, neglect, political corruption, and continuing violence countrywide. In spite of the best efforts of commanders and troops, little is likely to change.

wStolley, Richard B. "Our Man in Haiti." *Life*, Nov. 1994. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex I, pp. I- to I-. Stolley discusses the invasion plan for Haiti and the overall actions of then Lt. Gen. Shelton.

wWilentz, Amy. "Letter from Haiti: Lives in the Balance." *The New Yorker*, Dec. 1994. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex I, pp. I- to I-. Wilentz talks about the country, its people, and its government.

wParker, T. W. (LtCol) USMC. "Operation Sharp Edge." *Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex I, pp. I- to I-. LtCol Parker gives insight into Operation Sharp Eagle. He states that its importance and successful execution were not as well known to most (due to events in the Middle East at the time) as they should have been.

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## For Further Study

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### Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

wHQMC, *Small Wars Manual*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

wLangley, Lester D. *The Banana Wars: The United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1924*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986.

wPirnie, Bruce R., and Simons, William E. *Soldiers for Peace*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996.

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## Issues for Consideration

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**U.S. Mission in Haiti**      What does Shacochis say about the Marines, Special Forces, and the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti? After reading his article, what do you think about the U.S. mission in Haiti?

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**U.S. Intervention**      Give specific justification for the U.S. intervention in Haiti based upon the reading "Letter from Haiti: Lives in the Balance." Do you agree with its assessment of the crisis?

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**Operational and Tactical Problems**      According to the reading "Our Man in Haiti," what are some of the operational and tactical problems faced by U.S. forces in Haiti?

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