

CHAPTER 3. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

Planning is the act of preparing for future decisions in an uncertain and time-constrained environment. It should incorporate flexibility and, when required, enable intuitive or recognitional decisionmaking. The commander must recognize benefits and potential pitfalls of planning. He is responsible to ensure that planning is conducted properly to avoid these pitfalls. The commander disciplines the planning process and teaches the staff the relevance of product content (MCDP 5).

The goal of fire support planning is coordinating and integrating fires from armed aircraft, land-based and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare systems that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operation forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives.

Fire support planning answers the question “How will fires support the scheme of maneuver?” To accomplish this, the staff determines—

- 1 What types of targets to attack.
- 1 How to acquire targets.
- 1 When to attack targets.
- 1 The supporting arms agencies to attack targets.
- 1 How to coordinate the attacks.
- 1 What defines success.

The collection plan must be integrated with and supported by the fire support plan. Fire support planning provides crucial input for developing the collection plan. It links acquisition assets to finding specific enemy formations to attack or required information to answer the commander’s CCIRs. NAIs and TAIs must support the requirements of the fire support plan.

The result of fire support planning must be an effective, integrated, executable, and flexible plan.

An effective fire support plan clearly defines and focuses on achieving the effects required to support the scheme of maneuver, which together, form the overall concept of operation.

An integrated fire support plan uses all available acquisition and attack assets and maximizes combat power to create a combined arms effect.

An executable fire support plan has the time, space, and resources to achieve the planned effects.

A flexible plan is simple, understandable, and has the agility to support the commander’s intent when the unforeseen arises through well-defined decision points.

Finally, maneuver commanders and all fire support agencies must understand the plan.

SECTION I. PRINCIPLES

Fire support planning is a continuous, concurrent cycle of analyzing the enemy and friendly situation; conducting targeting; tasking and allocating fire support assets; scheduling fires; and coordinating execution to integrate fire support with the scheme of maneuver and maximize combat power. Its tangible result is a fire support plan. Effective fire support planning requires a continuous interaction between higher and lower echelons. The following principles provide guidance regardless of the tactical situation.

PLAN EARLY AND CONTINUOUSLY

To effectively integrate fire support with the scheme of maneuver, planning must begin when the commander states his mission and provides his planning guidance.

The FSC should solicit that guidance from the commander whenever needed.

EXPLOIT ALL AVAILABLE TARGETING ASSETS

The FSC should ensure that target acquisition requirements are identified and incorporated as CCIRs in the collection plan and that target information from all available resources is rapidly evaluated. This includes information from all echelons.

CONSIDER THE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE FIRES

The FSC considers the use of available assets at both his echelon and higher. Available fires includes nonlethal means such as smoke, illumination, and EW resources. He also considers the commander's guidance for using supporting arms in current and future operations.

USE THE LOWEST ECHELON CAPABLE OF FURNISHING EFFECTIVE FIRE SUPPORT

The lowest echelon that has the means to accomplish the mission should furnish the fire support. The FSC decides what is needed and, if his own assets are inadequate, requests additional fire support from the echelon that controls the required asset.

USE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FIRE SUPPORT MEANS

Requests for fire support are sent to the supporting arm that can deliver the most effective fires within the required time. In making his decision, the FSC considers the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the availability of attack means, the results desired, and the number/type of assets required to achieve the desired effect.

FURNISH THE TYPE OF FIRE SUPPORT REQUESTED

The fire support requester is usually in the best position to determine his fire support requirements. However, the FSC is in a position to weigh the request against the commander's guidance and the current and future needs for fire support. If a request is disapproved, the FSC stops the request and notifies all concerned. When possible, he substitutes a new fire support means and alerts the agencies that are to provide the support and the requesting unit.

AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION

A key task for the FSC is to ensure that unnecessary duplication of fire support is resolved and that only the minimum force needed to achieve the desired effect is used. Eliminating unnecessary duplication conserves fire support assets, facilitates sustainment, and maintains tempo. This does not mean that only one asset is used. Taking advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of assets and integrating their effects provides the synergy of combined arms.

COORDINATE AIRSPACE

Inherent in fire support coordination is the deconfliction of airspace by supporting arms. FSCMs and coordination procedures protect aircraft while incorporating CAS and DAS with indirect fires in support of close operations and deep operations. The extent of airspace coordination depends on available time. At lower levels, such coordination is performed by FACs, forward observers, and aircrews.

PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT

The mission and the commander's guidance determine the effects that fire support must achieve for the plan to succeed. The FSC must clearly inform the maneuver commander when he lacks adequate resources to support his plan.

PROVIDE RAPID COORDINATION

Procedures for rapid coordination ensure speed and flexibility in delivery of fires. Established channels for coordination facilitate rapid coordination. The FSC must know the characteristics of available fire support weapons and their status. The FSC must maintain situational awareness as the battle develops to attack planned targets and targets of opportunity.

PROVIDE SAFEGUARDS AND SURVIVABILITY

Force protection includes considerations of both friendly and enemy threats. The FSC must be aware of situations that increase the risk of fratricide. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are close coordination at all levels and situational awareness. Use of FSCMs, coordination of position areas, and the locations of friendly forces during target analysis contribute to safeguarding friendly units. Safety measures must minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat. Fires that increase survivability include SEAD for

aviation assets and counter fire to ensure freedom of movement of maneuver forces.

ESTABLISH FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

FSCMs facilitate the rapid engagement of targets throughout the battlespace and at the same time provide safeguards for friendly forces. They ensure that fire support will not jeopardize troop safety, interfere with the delivery of other fire support means, or disrupt adjacent unit operations. FSCMs are discussed in appendix B.

ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

Timely and efficient exchange of information is a key requirement for all successful operations. Physical collocation of coordinating agencies provides the surest form of communication. If personal coordination is required but collocation is not possible or desired, liaison personnel are used and an electronic interface is established (voice and/or data).

SECTION II. THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

Fire support planning is a part of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) and is integrated with the other warfighting functions (command and control, intelligence, maneuver, logistics, and force protection). It applies the MCP tenets of topdown guidance, the single battle concept, and integrated planning. Steps of the MCP (fig. 3-1) support the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It helps organize the thought process of a commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. The MCP applies across the range of military operations and is designed for use at any level of command. It can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the tactical situation permit. The process described is a means to an end; the final output for fire support planning must be an effective, integrated, flexible, and executable fire support plan. The process outlined here is intended to help FSCs to better understand their role in the overall planning process and the procedures to develop a thoroughly integrated and effective fire support plan. See MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

DIVISION PLANNING

Higher echelons are generally organized with more planning capacity than lower echelons. Higher echelon planning should attempt to reduce the burden of lower echelon planning. The higher echelon's efforts are generally focused on influencing future operations while supporting current operations. Planning includes disseminating guidance and information on targeting, anticipating requirements, allocating assets, and coordinating with higher and adjacent agencies. Planning should not impede nor substitute the planning efforts of lower echelons. Fire support planning by higher echelons seeks to—

- 1 Support forces in contact by using fires to isolate the battlefield for current operations, and providing force protection; e.g., counterfire.
- 1 Support the commander's plan by establishing guidance on fire support and by using fires to shape the battlefield for future operations.




Figure 3-1. Steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

- 1 Combine the different supporting arms to shape the battlefield and set the stage or enable current operations.
- 1 Sustain fire support by allocation and distribution of assets and by anticipating requirements and providing logistical support.

- 1 Support the commander’s scheme of maneuver.
- 1 Integrate fire support with maneuver to create a combined arms effect.
- 1 Sustain fire support by judiciously employing limited assets where they will have the greatest effect.

REGIMENT AND BATTALION PLANNING

Lower echelons plan concurrently with higher echelons (see app. C). Close liaison facilitates concurrent planning. Lower echelons focus on providing close supporting fires and the coordination needed to integrate them with maneuver. Fire support planning at lower echelons seeks to—

- 1 Support forces in contact by providing close supporting fires.

COMPANY PLANNING

Planning at the company level may use the troop leading steps commonly referred to as BAMCIS. Figure 3-2 lists the fire support actions during each step of BAMCIS. Actions may be done in any sequence or simultaneously. The company fire support planner must organize the efforts of his assets to meet all these requirements in a time-constrained environment. See MCRP 3-11.1A for more information.

| TROOP LEADING STEP | FIRE SUPPORT ACTIONS |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. B egin Planning | Update friendly and enemy situations. Find out assets available, allocations, and FSCMs. Obtain battalion’s target list worksheet, FSEM, and attack guidance. Understand the battalion fire support plan and how it affects your company. Identify fire support tasks for your company. Brief your commander on above. Receive the commander’s mission. Receive the commander’s fire support guidance. Participate in warning order. Issue warning order to fire support personnel and mortar section on fire support issues. |
| 2. A rrange for Reconnaissance | Conduct map analysis. Plot obstacles and known enemy locations. Plot all battalion targets. List fire support tasks. Advise the commander if guidance can/cannot be met with available assets and allocations. Refine battalion targets if necessary. Determine if battalion targets support the commander’s guidance. Plot targets necessary to support commander’s guidance (within target allocation). Determine purpose, engagement criteria, trigger points, and primary and alternate executors. Develop target list worksheet. Develop FSEM. Brief commander on initial fire support plan. |
| 3. M ake Reconnaissance | Ensure battlefield observation is maintained. Accompany maneuver leaders on reconnaissance. Confirm or modify plan. Verify target locations, trigger points, and observation plan (primary and alternate). |
| 4. C omplete the Plan | Modify the plan as necessary after reconnaissance. Brief commander on the scheme of fires. Emphasize observer movement, OP requirements, and triggers. Receive approval for fire support plan. Transmit target list worksheet and coordination requirements to battalion FSCC and company mortars. Brief fire support personnel on fire support plan. |
| 5. I ssue the Order | Participate in company orders brief. Ensure fire support representatives and mortar section leader attend orders brief if possible. |
| 6. S upervise | Conduct rehearsals. Conduct inspections as required. Continue to refine targets and triggers for actual location, ground reconnaissance or new enemy information. Continuously update and coordinate the plan as necessary. |

Figure 3-2. BAMCIS.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Because fire support planning is a continuous process, the FSC must continually update his fire support estimate. Once a mission (or a probable mission) is identified, the efforts of the FSCC become focused. The mission statement received includes the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason. FSC's responsibilities during mission analysis are primarily focused on gathering information and participating in the staff's analysis of the mission. This allows the FSC and the supporting arms representatives in the FSCC to begin developing the situational awareness crucial to building a fire support plan. Understanding the enemy situation; the intent of higher HQ; commander's initial planning guidance; identifying the unit's specified, implied, and essential tasks; determining restraints or constraints; and identifying information shortfalls provides fire support planners information and direction to continue planning.

The resulting mission statement, commander's planning guidance, and commander's intent to subordinate commands will drive planning during course of action development. During mission analysis, the staff may identify issues that will require additional guidance from the commander.

Commander's Initial Planning Guidance

The commander develops this guidance using his commander's battlespace area evaluation (CBAE), experience, and information on the mission from higher headquarters. The commander's initial planning guidance provides the staff and subordinate commanders additional insight on how he views the mission. Depending on the time available, he may provide general guidance, as well as specific points; e.g., a particular enemy capability or a certain task organization. From this guidance, the FSC begins to frame fire support's role in the plan.

This guidance is more proscriptive than commander's intent. It should address what he wants fires to accomplish (task and purpose), the focus of fire support, what he initially sees as high-payoff targets (HPTs), any force protection issues (such as sensor zones), and any restrictions. An example of commander's guidance for fire support in a deliberate attack in an urban operation follows:

"1) I see our supporting arms assets accomplishing three tasks:

a) Starting with isolation, I want fires to limit the enemy's ability to reinforce and resupply forces in Obj A and Obj B through the use of complementary systems (artillery, UAV, FAC(A), and attack aviation). Position assets and integrate UAV and FAC(A) to limit the enemy's ability to move forces.

b) I see fires being used to destroy the enemy's ability to use strong-points and the upper stories of buildings through the use of field artillery and PGMs.

c) Finally, fires must deny the enemy's ability to mass a counterattack or reinforcing forces on the avenue of approach parallel to our axis of advance. I see this being accomplished through the use of UAV and FAC(A) and positioning artillery units to fire along the long axis of those likely enemy avenues of approach.

2) The focus of fires initially is to the isolating force to aid in the isolation effort, then to scouts and reconnaissance assets along our axis of advance. In the remaining phases, the focus will be on Obj A and B to ensure the assault force has freedom to maneuver.

3) My HPTs:

a) Initially C3, indirect fire assets, and armored vehicles operating in formation greater than a section.

b) Gaining a foothold - indirect fire assets, C3, and then strong-points.

c) Secure-counterattack/reinforcing forces, indirect fire assets, and C3.

4) My force protection priorities are on the lead forces of the assault force. Ensure that censor zones are in place to support their movement and assault on Objs A and B. Ensure artillery units providing fire support have adequate security. Place NFA's on buildings or specific locations that may house industrial chemicals to avoid the release of hazardous material. Ensure that boundaries and FSCMs are easily discernable to ground forces and aviation assets. Ensure that positions/buildings that have been occupied by our forces are marked. (Marking must be seen by ground and air assets.) Ensure that fire support nets are supported with retransmission sites to communicate with supporting arms assets and higher HQ. Position mortars with the assault force to ensure quick response."

Within the guidance, the commander should focus much more on what he wants done to the enemy and how he sees that helping the operation to succeed. For example, “Disrupt the ability of enemy ADA to engage the lift helicopters from PZ BLUE to LZ X-RAY to allow the helo force to arrive at the LZ with its forces intact.” Advantages of this guidance over “suppress ADA for the air assault” follow.

Suppress applies to artillery and mortars but does not apply to EW. By stating the affect in targeting terms, we also talk to the maneuver planner. He can support this task by planning air routes away from known or suspected ADA positions. He can choose to execute in visibility conditions that “disrupt” these systems.

The clear focus on a specific capability and when it is important helps focus the entire staff on *which* ADA is important and *when* it is important. ADA that is identified but can’t affect the air route may not be high payoff. This specificity can keep fires focused on the right target at the right time. The commander’s guidance for fire support developed at this point is refined through the planning process and is later included with the above detail in the operations order.

Higher Headquarters Order

The FSC must fully understand the mission (task and intent) of the commanders two echelons above his unit. He must understand the concept of operations (scheme of maneuver and fire support plan) of his higher headquarters. Understanding the higher headquarters plan and how his unit “fits” into the higher headquarters plan is essential to top down planning. The FSC must identify what his unit’s responsibilities are to the higher headquarters’ fire support plan as well as the fire support capabilities he has been allocated. These tasks may be found in the fires paragraph and the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) developed by higher headquarters. See appendix D.

Appendix 19 and the R&S plan are also sources for tasks that the FSC and the unit must accomplish. Information from analyzing the higher headquarters order may include—

- 1 The commander’s intent two echelons up.
- 1 Missions of higher and adjacent units.
- 1 The future mission of the unit.
- 1 If there are any contingency missions for the unit.
- 1 External fire support assets made available.

- 1 FSCMs.
- 1 Fire support coordination procedures. An example of this requirement may exist in joint/combined operations for such procedures as cross-boundary fire support coordination, airspace management for the deep supporting fires, and targeting.
- 1 Targeting tools (attack guidance matrix, HPT list, target list, etc.).
- 1 Planned fires.
- 1 Technical advice on fire support.
- 1 Rules of engagement (ROE). ROE must be fully understood by all personnel and incorporated into the fire support plan as appropriate.

See appendix E for Appendix 19 to Annex C.

Specified and Implied Tasks

Like other members of the staff, the FSC must identify specified and implied tasks. Input comes from the higher headquarter’s order (fires paragraph, appendix, FSEM, or R&S plan) and from the unit commander’s guidance. From these identified specified and implied tasks, the FSC will determine the EFSTs that must be accomplished to achieve the commander’s guidance. During this portion of the planning process, the FSC should determine the task and purpose of the proposed EFSTs. EFSTs are different than the tasks normally associated with the mission or tasks paragraph. Normal tasks are directed to units to attack, defend or support to achieve a certain purpose. However the task in an EFST is enemy oriented and uses a targeting objective to achieve a purpose that is friendly oriented. EFSTs are designed to ensure synchronization of all assets and that those involved understand their role in execution of the fire support plan and the desired effects.

Additional Constraints or Restraints

Additional constraints or restraints may be identified during mission analysis and should be reflected in the proposed fire support tasks. Topics are noted and carried forward for use in subsequent planning.

Effects of IPB on Fire Support

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the primary analytical methodology used to produce intelligence in support of decision-making. It is a systematic, continuous, mission-focused process of analyzing the threat and the environment in the area where the operation is to take place. The IPB process

is not exclusive to the S/G-2. It should include input from other special staff officers such as the engineer and NBCD officers. Avenues of approach (friendly and enemy), weather patterns and projections, time/space factors, and threat situation templates are reviewed and evaluated for their impact on operations. This analysis may identify additional information requirements. FSCs must understand and apply the affects that IPB has on fire support. See MCWP 2-3, *Intelligence Analysis and Production*. Information from IPB may include—

- 1 Organization, capabilities, limitations, and methods of employment of the enemy. Particular emphasis is on fire support assets, direct fire weapons, and vehicle mobility.
- 1 Likely enemy courses of action.
- 1 Known, suspected, or likely enemy locations.
- 1 Points that offer clear observation of the area of operation.
- 1 Cover and concealment in the area of operation.
- 1 Where obstacles are in the area of operation (man made or natural).
- 1 Location of key terrain.
- 1 The weather forecast and how will it affect—
 - NVGs or thermal sites effectiveness.
 - Artillery achieve range. Will aircraft have to fly in a high threat environment due to weather?
 - Aircraft identifying targets.
 - Lasers.
- 1 Terrain's affect on mobility (friendly and enemy). Howitzers may get stuck. Mortars may take longer to move and emplace.
- 1 Terrain's affect on communications equipment (life of batteries).
- 1 The kinds of munitions best-suited for the terrain and weather (effects on smoke and illumination, submunitions effectiveness, and precision guided missiles {PGMs}).
- 1 When the operation begins.
- 1 Time available to plan.
- 1 The expected duration of the operation.

Effects-Based Fire Support

Approaching commander's guidance for fire support from an effects-based standpoint incorporates targeting into both the MCPP and the fire support planning process. Fire support representatives should have a clear understanding of the mission and the

commander's planning guidance. Prior to the targeting effort, the FSC must thoroughly understand the commander's intent and how it applies to fire support. It is critical that fires objectives are thoroughly integrated with the objectives of maneuver, and that together they cause the measurable effect on the enemy desired by the commander. At this stage, intelligence and objectives for fires should be formulated. This process must not focus on specific percentages normally associated with damage criteria, but must concentrate on what fires can do to the enemy to shape the battlespace, set conditions for decisive action, and support maneuver forces. For example, not "destroy 40% of the enemy artillery", but "prevent the enemy from massing fires above the battery level to ensure freedom of maneuver".

Depending on the time available, the commander may provide general guidance and specific points he wants the FSC to consider (a particular enemy fire support capability or task organization,). Once the commander's guidance is understood, the FSC should analyze the enemy center(s) of gravity to determine the threat weaknesses that are critical vulnerabilities. (A critical vulnerability is something that a force needs to function effectively and is or can be made vulnerable to attack. Critical vulnerabilities provide an aiming point for applying friendly strengths against threat weaknesses.) The FSC identifies and plans fires against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities to hamper his ability to function, defend, attack, or sustain his forces or to command his forces.

Status of Supporting Arms

The FSC must translate data on supporting arms into meaningful capabilities. For example, artillery ammunition counts should be converted to a form that communicates capabilities to the commander; 300 M825 smoke rounds may translate to ten, 600 meter, 20 minute duration smoke screens; DPICM (600 rounds) can translate into ten, artillery battalion massed fire missions firing 3 volleys per mission; 200 rounds of 155mm illumination can be translated into approximately 75 minutes of illumination for an area with a 1 kilometer radius (firing four gun illumination). A similar analysis can be made of any ships made available by higher headquarters for NGF. CAS sorties allocated by higher headquarters may be translated, based on type of aircraft, time on station, and ordnance load, into number of strikes available. This information will be necessary for the FSC during the planning process.

Participating in the mission analysis phase allows the FSC to develop a shared situational awareness with the rest of the staff that will help integrate the fire support plan with other functional plans to support particular COAs. From the analysis of supporting assets, effects of IPB, specified and implied tasks, and commander's guidance, the FSC will have determined proposed EFSTs. These EFSTs should be briefed to the commander during the mission analysis brief along with the refined mission statement, commander's intent, etc. It is important that the commander and the FSC have a common understanding of "what" fires will do for the unit before determining the "how". From mission analysis the FSC should have approved EFSTs and commander's guidance for fires. The FSC should issue a warning order to subordinate FSCs, observers, or supporting arms representatives. Included would be the mission of the supported unit, commander's intent and his guidance for fires, and proposed EFSTs.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

The next step is developing COAs that accomplish the assigned mission. Normally, several COAs are developed for follow-on analysis, but time constraints may reduce that number. A COA must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable (when multiple COAs are developed), and complete. The FSC must conceptualize how to integrate fires into each developing COA. As a minimum, the fire support portion of a COA should allocate target acquisition assets, attack assets, planned target areas, and create the sequence the targets will be attacked. Including fire support planning is an integral portion of the concept of operations and, like other functional plans, shapes the battlespace and sets conditions that facilitate mission accomplishment. It cannot be a separate plan developed in a vacuum. Depending on time available, the FSC may have to prioritize the one or two key fire support tasks and targeting objectives in enough detail to facilitate COA wargaming and selection.

Begin Targeting

The targeting process begins during mission analysis and provides initial input for fire support and collection planning. Targeting requires an assessment of the terrain and enemy, without regard to unit boundaries, and identifies those enemy formations, equipment, facilities, and terrain that the enemy

commander requires to successfully complete his mission; i.e., high-value targets (HVTs). Attacking these targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions in the friendly commander's battlespace. After these HVTs are identified, the FSC begins to refine the list to identify those targets whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the proposed COA; i.e., HPTs. This refinement continues during COA wargaming and allows the FSC to develop specific tasks for fire support that affect these targets in the manner required by the COA. Initial plans may be made for acquiring, tracking, attacking, and assessing actions taken against HPTs.

At the highest level of command within the GCE, the targeting process begins with the IPB and target value analysis (TVA) for the entire area of operation. The commander, the G-2/ S-2, the G-3/S-3, and the supporting arms representatives focus targeting efforts to support the scheme of maneuver. This interaction is the foundation of building collection and fire support plans. Targets are developed and disseminated to lower echelons with any tasks for the attack of specific targets (top down).

Lower echelons conduct targeting concurrently with higher echelons. Lower echelons plan targets to meet their commander's requirements. Targets are compared with those provided by the higher echelon. Requests for targets to be added to the target list are submitted to the higher echelon for action (bottom up refinement).

When the tactical situation permits, targets are disseminated as soon as possible. If using overlays, the receiving unit fastens the overlay to its map and identifies gaps or duplications in coverage without the need to plot individual targets (fig. 3-3). Automated




Figure 3-3. Target Overlay Technique.

information systems (IFSAS and AFATDS) can rapidly share and update target lists. AFATDS can analyze targets (based on guidance) and determine target duplication without plotting any targets.

See appendix F for AFATDS information.

The target list is a tool for recording planned targets. It must be kept current and as short as possible. Targets are deleted when they are destroyed or no longer of value. New targets are added as required. Targets essential to one operation, or phase of an operation, may not be essential to the next. For example, an offensive operation may not require the same targets as that for the defense. When transitioning from one operation or phase of an operation to the next, previously planned targets that remain valid should be retained with the same target number. This reduces the number of changes to the target list and makes record keeping easier.

Targets that can be planned and approved without coordination with another unit and those that have been coordinated are submitted directly to the appropriate supporting arm or FSCC. While a target list may be maintained at any echelon, the infantry, tank, or LAR battalion FSCC is usually the lowest echelon maintaining a list since it is responsive to the companies and has fire support representatives to disseminate changes. The target list worksheet is a useful tool to identify targets to be engaged by supporting arms along with scheduling requirements when digital communications are not available.

Information contained in the target list worksheet can be disseminated via data or voice transmission from the lowest to highest echelons.

Quantify Desired Effects (Success)

As the FSC and the staff build the COA and determine how to accomplish each EFST, they must first try to quantify desired effects. The staff will better determine feasibility during wargaming. It is a clear means of telling subordinate elements what they have to do. Supporting assets also use this quantification of effects to determine the ammunition or attack parameters to accomplish the EFST. The FSC and staff must focus on what must be done, not on what can be done. If it is determined that the desired effects cannot be achieved with the allocated assets, then the method must be reworked or additional assets requested. However, broad categorizations of the enemy are almost never achievable when associating a percentage to damage criteria (30% = destruction, etc.) Effects should be expressed as a measurable action of combat effectiveness that enables maneuver to accomplish a mission or task; e.g., deny the enemy the ability to mass indirect fires above the platoon level for 48 hours to enable Y8 to cross the river.

Table 3-1 shows the differences between targeting objectives and attack guidance. Targeting objectives are tied directly to the maneuver commander's intent and what must be done to the enemy to meet that intent. Attack guidance is the specific attack criteria for target weaponing to accomplish specific target effects that meet the commander's targeting objectives.

Table 3-1. Difference Between Targeting Objectives and Attack Guidance.

| TARGETING OBJECTIVE | EFFECTS OF FIRE |
|---|---|
| DISRUPT: To not let the enemy perform a specific function. | HARASSING FIRE: Fire designed to disturb the rest of the enemy troops, curtail movement, and, by threat of losses, lower morale. |
| DELAY: To not let the enemy perform a specific function when he wants to. | SUPPRESSING FIRE: To create a temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives. Normally associated with duration. |
| LIMIT: To reduce options or COAs available to the enemy. | NEUTRALIZING FIRE: Fire that is delivered to render a target ineffective or unusable. The unit has degraded capability of accomplishing its mission. |
| DESTROY: To ruin the structure, organic existence or condition of an enemy target that is essential to an enemy capability. | DESTRUCTION FIRE: Fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying material objects to render a unit incapable of accomplishing its mission. |
| DIVERT: To force the enemy to tie up critical forces or resources from one area to another. | |

Plan The Method for Each Fire Support Task

The FSC determines fire support and acquisition asset requirements to accomplish the fire support tasks assigned to each supporting arms agency. Requirements are expressed in amounts and types of fire support and acquisition assets. Initial requirements are prepared and then refined during COA analysis and wargaming. Formats for recording of requirements are contained in MCWP 3-24, *Assault Support*, MCWP 5-1, and MCWP 3-31.1/NWP 3-09.11M, *Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations*. If requirements surface subsequent to allocating attack resources, requests for additional resources are forwarded to the next higher echelon. Requests for additional resources can take the form of radars, recon, JSTARs, or radio bn, reinforcing fires, or identifying specific targets to higher headquarters for attack by their resources.

Fire support capabilities must be allocated for each COA. Allocation establishes what capabilities all commanders have to employ. Allocation is essential for concurrent planning at lower echelons. The MAGTF apportions air and NSFS capabilities for a specific use; e.g., a certain percentage of air for CAS or a certain number of ships for support. These capabilities are then allocated to subordinate units; e.g., number of sorties for CAS or assignment of tactical missions to NSFS ships. Artillery is allocated by assigning tactical missions (see app B).

Task Target Acquisition Assets

Along with identifying the tasks to fire support assets to achieve the desired effects. Acquisition assets must be allocated and tasked to observe the attack of the assigned EFSTs and provide feedback on effectiveness. The S-2, S-3, and FSC must work together to build the R&S plan to identify which asset, based upon the COA's scheme of maneuver and priorities, can accomplish the task and a plan getting that asset into a position to execute the fire.

Priority of Fires

Fire support may be further allocated by the assigning priority of fires. Priority of fires provides guidance to organize and employ fire support means in accordance with the relative importance of a unit's mission and establishes the priority in which calls for fire will be answered. Priority of fires may be given for all fire support or a specific supporting arm. Units that have the priority of fire for artillery or mortars will usually be allocated priority targets or FPFs.

Positioning

Allocation of fire support will effect the positioning of fire support assets (artillery, mortars, and NSFS). For example, positioning an artillery battalion with a tactical mission of direct support in proximity to the area of operation of a supported regiment facilitates support to that unit. Positioning also includes the location of target acquisition assets (weapons locating radars, observers, etc.) to acquire targets and observe fires.

Ammunition

Ammunition is a major consideration for allocating fire support. Ammunition expenditures may be tightly controlled when ammunition supplies are restricted. If ammunition restrictions are such that one fire support means cannot provide adequate support, other fire support sources must be considered. It may be necessary for the ground commander to consider modifications to the scheme of maneuver to compensate for the ammunition shortage. Ammunition allocation can be made in terms of capability such as a number of battalion or battery volleys, minutes of illumination for a specific sized area, number of targets, number of specific sized mine fields of a specific density, or sorties of CAS availability.

To provide close fire support or set the conditions for maneuver to exploit, timing of fires is crucial. The FSC must understand the tentative timing flow of the scheme of maneuver to establish triggers. These triggers should be refined during COA analysis, through subordinate refinement, and rehearsals.

Test Feasibility

As the FSC and staff develop COAs, they must apply doctrinal or accepted planning factors to ensure the plan is feasible. Factors can come from the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES), T&R manuals, other "book" answers, or educated guesses based on previous experiences.

Assist S-2 in Collection Plan Refinement

The FSC must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure there are adequate, redundant collection assets integrated with the detect phase of the targeting process. Observers, terminal controllers, and counter-mortar/battery radars should be incorporated in the FS plan and the collection plan.

During COA development, the FSC has functioned within the staff process. As a result, the tentative fire support plans for each COA should be incorporated and integrated with the schemes of maneuver. Outputs from this phase should be a tentative plan for each COA. These fire support plans should include the—

- 1 Concept of fires, describing how fires will support the scheme of maneuver to accomplish the commander's intent. It is a sequencing of EFSTs.
- 1 Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM).
- 1 Draft target list worksheet and overlay.
- 1 Draft target synchronization matrix.
- 1 Collection/reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

This step examines friendly COAs against threat COAs. It allows the staff to adjust identified problems or weaknesses in the friendly COAs. Wargaming is a technique that aids COA analysis. It can be done formally or informally. Formal wargaming is a disciplined, interactive mechanism that examines the execution of friendly COAs in relation to threat reaction. Informal wargaming may be as simple as a “what if” conversation between the commander and selected staff officers. Whether formal or informal, wargaming relies heavily on tactical judgment and experience. It allows the staff to gain a common vision of the operations and to test the plan against the array of possible enemy and friendly actions. Wargaming provides the FSC with the opportunity to validate or refine the fire support plan.

Continue Targeting

Refinement of HPTs continues. Wargaming may identify additional HPTs or invalidate previously identified HPTs from COA development. Changes in HPTs must be coordinated for inclusion in the refined collection plan for acquisition, tracking, and assessment. Other targeting tools, such as the attack guidance matrix (AGM), may require refinement after wargaming.

War Game Fire Support Tasks

Fire support tasks are wargamed with the scheme of maneuver for each friendly COA against possible enemy COAs. This provides a means to test the fire

support plan's effectiveness and its integration with the scheme of maneuver. Wargaming can—

- 1 Validate existing fire support tasks.
- 1 Identify refinements to existing tasks (including assigning the task to another supporting arms agency).
- 1 Identify additional fire support tasks.

Refine Fire Support Requirements

Wargaming assists the FSC in validating or refining the previously identified requirements that accomplish the fire support tasks. Identifying additional or reassigning specific fire support tasks to other supporting arms agencies can require the FSC to revise his fire support requirements for each COA analyzed.

Adjust Fire Support Allocation

Allocating fire support capabilities may require adjustment based on refinements to COAs made during wargaming.

Prepare Estimates of Supportability

For deliberate planning, each supporting arm commander or representative in the FSCC may prepare an estimate of supportability. The estimate of supportability) analyzes the area of operations, enemy capabilities, and each COA proposed to the commander. It cites advantages and disadvantages of each COA from the viewpoint of a particular supporting arm. The estimate may be a written document and/or presented as a formal briefing. In detailed planning, a concept of operations and fire support tasks may be developed for each COA. If time is short, the estimate may be expedited and explained in as much detail as the tactical situation requires. This may take the form of the supporting arm commander, or his representative, providing a verbal estimate of that supporting arm's capability to support a contemplated COA. A formal estimate of supportability is normally only done during deliberate planning above the battalion level.

At the conclusion of wargaming, the FSC should have adjusted the fire support plans of each COA. As outputs to this step, the FSC should have final drafts of the fires paragraph and information required in appendix 19, such as FSEM, target overlay or TSM.

See appendix G for sample estimates of supportability.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

This step evaluates, compares, and decides the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The FSC must be prepared to brief his estimate of supportability of each COA to the commander. The level of detail for his brief will vary depending on the commander’s evaluation criteria and level of participation in the wargaming.

Course of Action Evaluation

Each COA is evaluated against the commander’s evaluation criteria. The FSC should normally brief the method to accomplish each fire support task along with the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from the perspective of each supporting arm. The FSC may decide to have his supporting arms representatives brief the latter information.

Advantages and disadvantages are then discussed and recorded. A comparison (fig. 3-4) can assist the staff in making recommendations for a particular COA.

Course of Action Comparison

The staff ranks each COA with respect to advantages and disadvantages in addition to evaluation criteria such as mission accomplishment, EFSTs, and warfighting functions. These ranks are totaled and compared. This comparison gives the commander the information he needs to make a sound decision. However, these rankings may be more subjective than objective numbers indicate. The commander and staff must examine the matrix for sensitivity. For example, one COA may be determined to be the “best” but it may not be supportable by one of the warfighting functions. The commander must consider this and determine if additional support is required or if the COA must be adjusted or thrown out. Figure 3-5 is an example of a comparison matrix.

| | COA 1 | COA 2 | COA 3 |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Advantages | RISK - Lowest risk. | COUNTER-FIRE - Simplicity. | MSN/TASKS - Best means of accomplishing EFST. |
| Disadvantages | FIRES - EFSTs difficult to accomplish. | C2 - Difficult to control due to mobile plan. | RISK - Accepts most risk. |

Figure 3-4. COA Comparison: Advantages and Disadvantages.

| CRITERIA | COA 1 | COA 2 | COA 3 |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Intelligence | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Force Protection | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Maneuver | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Decisive action | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Simplicity | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Movement - number and length | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Mission/fires - accomplish EFSTs | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Counterfire | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Command and control | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| CSS supportability | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Other | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 26 | 22 | 18 |

Figure 3-5. Comparison Matrix.

Commander's Decision

Based on COA comparison, the commander decides the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The commander may identify portions of the selected COA for further refinement by the staff. Once the commander selects a COA, warning orders may be issued to subordinate commanders and appropriate supporting arms agencies.

ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

Orders development articulates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions into a clear, useful form that will be understood by subordinates and supporting arms agencies that must execute them. Orders may be written or verbal, depending on time available.

Finalize Targeting Decisions

Final refinements to targeting decisions are made based on additional guidance or modifications specified by the commander during the COA comparison and decision brief. Plans must be finalized for acquiring, tracking, attacking, and assessing actions taken against HPTs. It is crucial that plans for assessing the effectiveness of attacks provide feedback to the FSC in a timely manner to determine requirements for reattack. Final targeting products should include, at a minimum, the HPT list, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrix.

Finalize Essential Fire Support Tasks

Final refinements to the fire support tasks identified by the commander during COA comparison should be incorporated into the concept of operations. Schedules of fire, FSCMs, and an FSEM are adjusted, as required, to reflect any modifications to the tasks.

Finalize Engagement Areas

An engagement area is an area where the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force with massed fires of all available weapons. The engagement area development process is vital to achieving the commander's intent. It compels the FSC to consider such factors as the number of indirect fire assets available, training proficiency of observer/firing unit, the enemy's direction/rate of march, trigger and intercept points, terrain analysis, anticipated enemy actions, and the amount of time the enemy can be expected to remain inside the area. The process requires forethought, analysis, and mathematical calculation. See table 3-2.

Finalize Triggers

Triggers are a physical point on the ground or an action or event. During offensive operations a trigger is often a maneuver action or event. In the defense a trigger is more often a physical spot on the ground. Trigger development sequence determines the—

- 1 Position on the ground that you want to engage the enemy or to silhouette the enemy with fires.
- 1 Enemy rate of movement. This may be done by estimation, on the basis of past experience, from doctrinal literature, or from scout reports of enemy speed.

Table 3-2. Engagement Area Development Process.

| | |
|--------|--|
| Step 1 | Visualize how the enemy will/might attack. |
| Step 2 | Select where and how to engage the enemy. |
| Step 3 | Position forces to engage the enemy with direct fires. |
| Step 4 | Position obstacles to support direct fires. |
| Step 5 | Plan indirect fires to support direct fires and obstacles. |
| Step 6 | Complete the plan, select/prepare final positions, site obstacles, and triggers. |
| Step 7 | Rehearse. |

- 1 Time of flight of the rounds from the weapon system firing the mission.
- 1 Processing time; i.e., the time required from the call for fire to rounds being fired from the weapon system.
- 1 Total mission time; i.e., the time of flight plus processing time.
- 1 Trigger point. Place the trigger point the required distance from a planned target location based on the total mission time x speed of enemy = distance.

Observation Plan

The observation plan as an integral portion of the fire support plan. It should provide the task and purpose for each phase of the operation. The observation plan should be synchronized with the scheme of maneuver during the MCPP. Construct an observation plan in concert with the S2 and S3. The FSC should plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's intent and each EFST. The observation plan should address where the observer needs to be, security, communications, how the observer gets into and out of position, what the observer is to accomplish, and disengagement criteria if necessary.

Effect Coordination

Coordination promotes the development, understanding, and subsequent execution of the fire support plan. Proper coordination is key to responsive coordination during execution of operations. FSCC representatives should, at a minimum, conduct the following tasks.

The fire support plan provides the detailed, logical sequence of fire support events executed by each supporting arm to accomplish their tasks. It includes the individual fire support plans of each supporting arm. These plans explain how each supporting arm will accomplish its fire support tasks and execute the supported commander's fire support plan. The supported unit provides the necessary planning information; e.g., timing of fires or special instructions, for supporting arms to conduct their fire planning. See section IV.

The FSC coordinates preparing the fire support plan with other supporting plans for the operation; e.g., obstacle/barrier plan, surveillance and reconnaissance plan, and C2 warfare plan.

The level of detail in the fire support plan varies with the tactical situation and time available. When time is abundant, the plan may be recorded in a formal format such as Appendix 19 to Annex C of the Operations Order. When time is short, certain aspects may occur without a need for documentation; e.g., orders to reposition fire support units may be issued verbally and accomplished while the plan is finalized. Documentation in these situations should include information to execute the fire support plan. This information should include, at a minimum, the—

- 1 Concept of operation.
- 1 Fire plan and tasks for each supporting arm.
- 1 Target priorities and attack guidance.
- 1 Priority of fires.
- 1 Target list update.
- 1 FSCMs.
- 1 Fire support coordination procedures not covered in SOPs.
- 1 Restrictions or changes in restrictions.
- 1 Schedules of fire.

TRANSITION

The transition provides a successful shift from planning to execution. Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a full understanding of the plan. Transitions may include briefs and rehearsals to increase situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and the staff, and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan.

Rehearse the Fire Support Plan

The rehearsal is an effective transition drill. A combined arms rehearsal is key to synchronize all warfighting functions before execution. Key fire support points that should be highlighted during the rehearsal include synchronization of the fire support plan with the scheme of maneuver, target execution responsibilities (primary and alternate observers), artillery and mortar positioning and movement plans, and verification of target acquisition. Plan FSCMs, CAS employment, and verification of windows to mass battalion fires.

Adjust the Fire Support Plan

Refinements are adjustments to the fire support plan by subordinate elements. Refinements are crucial in top down fire support planning. These refinements would include changes to the observation plan and target locations based on the subordinate unit's analysis of the terrain and selected scheme of maneuver. The higher FSCC receives the changes and approves or denies them. Choices the FSC has for target refinement include—

- 1 Numbering targets every five rather than sequentially; e.g., AD 1000, 1005, 1010. If this method is used, the FSC increases the regiment's target number by one (AD 1005 to AD 1006), determines the appropriate target location, and sends the refinement information to the regiment. Once the refined targets are plotted and approved, the regiment FSC then forwards the accepted refinements to other subordinate elements and fire support assets. By using this method, all involved will understand that the target has been refined but is executed in accordance with the original intent.
- 1 Maintaining the original target number but adjusting the location. This does not clutter the target list but FSC's must ensure that all elements receive and incorporate the adjusted location.
- 1 Using a battalion target number. Battalions can quickly target enemy locations but not all elements will have the refined location.

As the tactical situation dictates, the FSC recommends changes to the fire support plan to the commander. The FSC is responsible for effecting the changes the commander approves. The means for disseminating changes should be established in advance; e.g., messenger, wire, or radio (data or voice) transmission. If during fire planning, a supporting arm determines that certain support cannot be provided, they notify the appropriate FSC who then adjusts the fire support plan. The FSC may drop targets from the fire support plan or reassign them to another supporting arm. Figure 3-6 shows fire planning using the MCPP.

MISCELLANEOUS

Message Routing Protocol and Clearance Procedures

Message routing protocol determines routing of a request for fire; i.e., whether it goes initially to the

FSCC or supporting arm. Both decisions depend on communications net structure, type of transmission (data or voice), expected volume of traffic, and the training level of the FSCC. Routing requests for fire can be centralized and decentralized.

In the centralized option, all requests for fire are sent to the FSCC for approval and then relayed to the appropriate supporting arm. The advantage of this option is the ability of the FSCC to modify, coordinate, and clear every mission. The FSCC may be the only unit in direct communication with observers when operating on a dispersed battlefield. The primary disadvantage is the delay caused when mission coordination/ deconfliction occurs prior to forwarding the mission to the appropriate supporting arm. In amphibious operations, the higher echelon FSCC may be in the SACC.

In the decentralized option, requests for fire support are sent directly to the supporting arm (NSFS ship, artillery/mortar FDC, DASC). The supporting arm processes the mission while the FSCC concurrently coordinates and clears or denies the request for fire. Advantages to this option are the speed that concurrent processing and coordinating provides and the ability of the observer to communicate directly with the supporting arm for clarification or special missions (FPFs, Illumination, or Copperhead). Disadvantages to this option are the possibility of firing an uncoordinated mission when employing passive clearance and the requirement for the observer to maintain communications with the supporting arm.

The two options for clearing requests for fire are positive and passive approval. They specify the communication required between the FSCC and the supporting arm before firing or engaging a target.

Positive clearance requires a transmission from the FSCC to the supporting arm indicating clearance or denial. This includes NSFS requests. NSFS spotters and ships must wait for the FSCC to provide clearance before giving "Ready. Break. Fire." Voice transmissions indicating clearance or denial must be sufficiently different to avoid the chance of misunderstanding. For example, "Artillery on grid 123 456 cleared," for approval, and, "denied clearance on grid 123 456," are unmistakably different. Data transmissions use a plain text message stating the target number and cleared/denied. The supporting arms receipt of a call for fire from the FSCC can indicate mission clearance when utilizing centralized FSCC message routing.

Passive clearance (silence is consent) does not require a transmission from the FSCC to the supporting arm to clear the mission. The supporting arm assumes the mission is cleared unless the FSCC indicates the mission is denied. This requires the FSC to quickly determine conflicts that may necessitate cancellation of the mission and perform the required coordination. The FSC should acknowledge that the message/mission has been monitored to preclude conflicts resulting from loss of communications whether using voice or data transmission. Passive clearance can only be used in conjunction with decentralized FSCC message routing.

Acquire Clearance to Fire on Targets

Obtaining clearance to fire on targets is generally associated with fire support coordination during execution; however, during final planning, preliminary coordination can be effected. Preliminary coordination facilitates the execution of fire support plans and attack of targets outside the requesting unit's area of operation. The unit requesting fire support is responsible for obtaining approval for the attack from the unit in whose area of operations the target is located. The unit granting the approval for the fires notifies the requesting unit of changes which may negate the approval. Those requests for fire support which require special coordination through higher or adjacent headquarters, or where special restrictions apply, are passed to the next higher echelon FSCC as soon as possible.

Clearance of targets within a unit's zone can also be coordinated to expedite the execution of targets and provides a scenario in which passive clearance may be used.

Establish Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Fire support coordinating measures are tools that can facilitate the rapid attack of targets and provide safeguards to friendly forces. The type and number of fire support coordinating measures are dependent on the tactical situation. The early and prudent establishment of fire support coordinating measures can make planning and execution of fire support more efficient. Planning the establishment of fire support coordinating measures must be in conjunction with the establishing of maneuver control measures such as boundaries. FSCs should be careful not to use FSCMs as maneuver control measures and visa versa (i.e., the FSCL should not be used as a forward boundary).

Coordinate the Positioning of Fire Support Assets

The FSC must coordinate the positioning of fire support assets so they can respond to fire support requirements. Positioning of fire support assets and movement/displacement plans are coordinated to speed movement, ensure availability of support, and maintain tempo. Movement priorities and passage procedures must be coordinated to facilitate artillery units moving through the supported unit's area of operations. This may be the most critical function of fire support planning in terrain where movement is restricted to roads.

Coordinate Fire Support Delivery Procedures and Observation Coverage

Procedures for delivering fire to any unit in the supported units area of operations which do not have assigned observers must be coordinated. Plans to provide observation of the area of operations should be coordinated with the S-2, S-3, and company commanders. Examples include locating target acquisition assets to observe planned fires, determining how a reconnaissance team will fire a planned target, or disseminating PRF codes for observers and preset munitions.

Coordinate Fire Support Communications

The FSC must work closely with the operations and CIS officers to ensure that communications planned to coordinate fire support are adequate.

Establish Restrictions on Fires, As Required

A commander may wish to limit the use of certain types of ammunition in his area of operation or place restrictions on the attack of specific targets or target sets. These restrictions must be clearly articulated to both his subordinate commanders and the supporting arms agencies. Examples of these include restrictions on use of smoke, illumination, improved conventional munitions (ICM), and family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) or placing targets on a restricted target list or a no strike target list.

Coordinate the Delivery of Specialized Munitions

Certain munitions (improved conventional munitions, smoke, FASCAM, illumination, etc.) have the capability to produce unintended effects on operations of both the units employing them and those adjacent to the employing unit. Employment of these munitions

must be coordinated to ensure effectiveness to the supported unit without hindering operations of others nearby. For example, the uncoordinated delivery of illumination could reveal another units location, restrict the use of night vision devices, and injure friendly personnel with empty carrier projectiles.

Effect Other Required Coordination

Additional coordination may be required depending on the situation, mission, and the type of operation being planned. Examples may include identification of LF representatives in amphibious operations, fire support for rear area operations, integration with aviation operations (air defense conditions, airspace control and coordination procedures, SEAD

procedures, etc.), and integrating command and control warfare (electronic attack, electronic deception, etc.) with the fire support plan.

Disseminate the Fire Support Plan

The fire support plan is disseminated to those units that will use or provide fire support. It should be distributed as soon as it is prepared and should not be delayed to await preparing other documents. When the fire support plan is a complex document, it is often best to disseminate it in segments (such as tabs and enclosures) as soon as these are complete and approved by the commander.

SECTION III. THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

This tactical plan prepared by the FSC contains the information for employing fire support assets. It identifies specific maneuver units responsible for engaging targets with identified fire support assets at a specific time or event. It is the basis of how each supporting arms agency conducts its own fire planning. The fire support plan consists of essential information. Some information must be written and disseminated to subordinate and supporting units for execution. The extent of documentation depends on the quantity and type of data to be disseminated, time available, training of personnel, and the adequacy of SOPs. The FSC uses the format that best meets his needs.

AS PART OF THE BASIC ORDER

When the fire support plan is included in the basic order, the amount of detail depends on the echelon of command and the level of detail of the information to be included.

At company and battalion levels, the concept of fires normally is part of the concept of operations paragraph. This paragraph is written to include both direct and indirect fire support assets. Depending on the level of detail necessary, the fires paragraph created during the planning process may be included as the indirect fire portion of the fire support paragraph to show the integration of direct and indirect fires in support of the concept of maneuver.

Should the operation order not include any annexes, then the remaining portions of the fire support plan, such as the FSEM, schedules of fire and observer plan, would be included as attachments to the order.

Within the concept of operations the concept of fires paragraph (3.b. (2)) shows the overarching requirements that fire support will achieve to meet the commander's intent. The concept of fires is the sequencing of the task, purpose, and identified asset from each essential fire support task (EFST) in sequence with the concept of operations. See the following sample paragraphs.

3b. () Concept of Operations.

(1) () Concept of Maneuver.

(2) () Concept of Fires. 1/1 will initially use artillery and NSFS to disrupt the enemy regiments reconnaissance ability to identify and report our battle positions and obstacle locations to allow 2/1 to remain undetected within its battle positions, prepared to maximize fires within engagement area (EA) Mack. R/W CAS and artillery will be used by 2/1 to delay the advanced guard main body of the enemy regiment west of phase line Iowa to enable 1/1 to conduct rearward passage of lines with 2/1.

AS APPENDIX TO ANNEX C

The operations annex provides substantive guidance for the planning of the concept of operations. Within the annex, fire support is included as subparagraph (t) of paragraph 3, Conduct of Operations. This will normally refer to Appendix 19, Fire Support, but may be used as another location for the fire support plan, which includes the concept of operations for fires, should a separate appendix not be required. See MCWP 5-1.

The fire support plan may be written as an appendix (appendix 19) to the operations annex (annex C) of an OPOD or OPLAN. The appendix contains information to convey the commander's plan for fire support. It restates the current situation and the fires paragraph. The execution paragraph includes the commander's intent and each supporting arm's tasks.

The appendix contains tabs that complement the basic fire support plan; e.g., air fire plan, artillery fire plan or fire support coordination plan. If individual fire plans are not tabbed, then separate paragraphs stating fire plans and each arm's concept of operations should be included. Fire support coordination guidance, if not tabbed, is stated as a separate paragraph. Tabs provide detailed information or products typically included with the fire support plan, like--

- 1 Individual fire plans.
- 1 The fire support coordination plan.
- 1 Targeting.
- 1 The Marine Corps fire support system plan.
- 1 Enclosures.

The fire support appendix provides a complete and orderly arrangement of information. Administration

and logistics states specific command guidance for ammunition management, but primarily references the logistics annex (annex D) and combat service support (annex P). The command and signal paragraph identifies the necessary command relationships and the communications support for the plan. However, adequate time must be available to prepare a detailed document.

FRAGMENTARY ORDER FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

A frag order fire support plan is a fire support plan prepared using a shortened format. The frag order fire support plan may include, but is not limited to, the following.

See appendix H for an example frag order fire support plan with quick fire support planning.

Commander's Guidance

The commander spells out how fire support will support the scheme of maneuver. He establishes what, where, when, and why fire support must accomplish to support the overall plan. This may be graphically depicted as a fire support execution matrix (FSEM). The FSEM is a concise, simple tool that graphically

shows the fire support events associated with particular events in the scheme of maneuver. It can show when certain fires occur, who controls them, and priorities of fire. The FSEM shows activities of all supporting arms.

The commander provides instructions and critical information essential to executing the plan; e.g., ammunition allocation, changes to attack guidance, and new FSCMs.

Those targets closely tied to the scheme of maneuver and are critical to the success of the operation are disseminated with the frag order fire support plan.

See appendix I for targeting and execution tools.

AS PART OF THE BASIC FRAGMENTARY ORDER

Another option for disseminating the frag fire support plan is to place it in the basic fragmentary order (FRAGO). Fire support information normally consists of changes to an existing fire support document (appendix or frag fire support plan). The fire support plan may be a new FSEM, commander's guidance, or a list of specific fire support tasks, depending on the tactical situation.

SECTION IV. SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE PLANS

Each supporting arm and its representatives in the FSCC conduct fire planning. Their fire planning consists of those activities necessary for them to coordinate employment of their weapons to support the concept of operations. Scheduling fires, determining provisions for attacking targets of opportunity, positioning of firing units and observers, coordinating communications and CSS, and computation of firing data (as applicable) are examples of fire planning information. Fire planning information required by the supported unit to employ a specific supporting arm is contained in applicable tabs to the fire support plan. Detailed procedures, instructions, and information for use by the supporting arm is recorded in applicable annexes to the operation order.

The desired effect is a major consideration in fire planning. It influences selecting the weapon, type and amount of munitions, and the required time of delivery. Availability and characteristics of the weapons and munitions, troop dispositions (unit locations and proximity to targets), and the scheme of maneuver are also considered. The goal is to use the best available weapon munition combination to achieve the desired effect on approved targets.

AIR FIRE PLAN

Aviation assets are made available through an apportionment process. Apportionment (air) is the determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time (JP 1-02).

The MAGTF commander works closely with and may receive taskings from higher commanders in the apportionment process. The MAGTF commander, based on recommendations by the ACE commander, determines the allocation of aviation effort within the MAGTF. The ACE commander also makes recommendations to the MAGTF commander for distributing its allocated CAS sorties. Air control measures are established to allow aircraft maneuverability while minimizing interference with indirect fires. AirOs in the GCE identify/anticipate aviation requirements and pass tactical air requests up the chain of command. These requests are reviewed

for approval or disapproval, prioritized, modified as required, coordination initiated, and (if approved) forwarded to the next higher echelon. Once all requirements have been identified, prioritized, and approved, they are passed to the TACC, where the MAGTF direct support portion of the ATO is prepared.

The AirO prepares the air fire plan to provide air support information to the supported unit. It is made in coordination with the supporting ACE and the development of the air operations annex, which addresses aviation specific procedures and information. The air fire plan provides information on immediate and preplanned CAS (scheduled or on-call). With pre-planned CAS, Marines from the GCE may track their JTAR request numbers on the ATO in any of the following ways:

- 1 Review the given air day air support list (ASL) in AFATDS. Confirm mission status for each request submitted, and open the request to review mission data. If further information is needed, review the ATO in AFATDS.
- 1 Submit a request to the DASC to review a given request status through the ATO/ACO tool (AAT Browser) in TBMCS using the "Re" field as the basis of query.
- 1 Use the "find" feature of the Execution Management Control (EMC) of TBMCS to search for mission line comments containing GCE request numbers. Before operations start, MAGTFs should develop a numbering system for preplanned requests. Specific blocks of numbers are assigned to subordinate units. Predetermined numbers allow requesting units to follow their requests from initiation to execution. The request number stays with the request as it is processed through the FSCCs to the Marine TACC. The published ATO includes the request number. Examples of other information in the air fire plan include—
 - Aircraft alert status.
 - Coordination measures and procedures incident to air safety.
 - An air target list annotated with necessary attack instructions.
 - Applicable air delivery procedures; e.g., target marking or SEAD.
 - Laser PRF codes.
 - Air request procedures.
 - Graphic illustration of all preplanned air strikes.

When possible, reference is made to other publications and parts of the OPORD; e.g., SOPs or the air operations annex. For more discussion on air fire planning, see MCWP 3-23, *Offensive Air Support*.

Planning not only directs and coordinates actions, but also generates shared situational awareness. The more liaison between the supported unit and the ACE, the quicker the plan can be developed and effectively executed.

ARTILLERY FIRE PLAN

The fire plan of the artillery battalion in direct support of an infantry regiment or separate battalion is done by the artillery battalion S-3. He plans the fires of any reinforcing artillery. The S-3 receives target information, fire support requirements, and guidance/input from artillery LNOs, the artillery regimental S-3, and the artillery regimental S-2. Fire support tasks assigned to the artillery are the basis for his fire plan. The artillery battalion S-3 prepares the artillery battalion's fire plan and forwards applicable portions of it (schedules of fires, firing positions, movement plans, etc.) as early as possible to the supported unit for approval. A copy is also sent to the artillery regiment along with requests for additional fires. The completed fire plan is distributed to the firing batteries and reinforcing artillery.

Artillery LNOs also receive the plan and ensure that all FOs are notified and, if necessary, can observe fires planned in their sectors. The artillery unit continues its planning to ensure that the required support can be rendered (positioning of firing elements, ammunition availability, firing restrictions, etc.).

The artillery regiment S-3, in coordination with the AFSC and G-3, prepares the artillery fire plan for the division's fire support plan. The artillery fire plan incorporates the requirements of subordinate artillery units and fire support requirements of the division. The plans of the battalions assigned the direct support mission are reviewed, duplications eliminated and necessary additions/changes made, and integrated into the division artillery fire plan. The fires of artillery battalions in general support reinforcing (GS/GS-R) are planned by the artillery regiment. These fires are employed on targets requested by the artillery battalions in DS, targets identified by the artillery

regiment, and targets designated by the division commander.

The artillery regiment may also plan counter-fire. Based on the complexity of the counter-fire plan, a separate tab may be required. The counterfire plan addresses how counterfire will be prosecuted and assigns unit counter-fire responsibilities.

The artillery fire plan is normally done in FDCs. However, some planning tasks may occur in the supported unit's FSCC (division or regiment) when multiple supporting arms are being integrated into the fire support plan (counterfire procedures, scheduling of fires, etc.). Remaining artillery fire planning tasks are then performed at the appropriate FDC (fire direction, resupply, and positioning to meet the fire support requirements, etc.).

81MM MORTAR FIRE PLAN

Fire planning for the infantry battalion mortar platoon is normally done by the platoon commander or platoon sergeant. They receive target information, fire support requirements, and guidance/input from the FSC. Fire support tasks assigned to mortars are the basis for the mortar fire plan.

Fire planning for the company mortar section is normally done by the company commander or his designated representative. As with the 81mm mortars, fire support tasks assigned to company mortars are the basis for the company mortar fire plan.

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

The MAGTF's NSFS requirements are submitted to the appropriate naval component commander. He examines overall Navy and MAGTF requirements and subsequently allocates NSFS assets to support the MAGTF. An NSFS plan is prepared by the LF NGLO who coordinates closely with the ATF NGF officer in planning NSFS. The LF NGLO provides information on the LF concept of operations; e.g., scheme of maneuver, that allows the ATF NGLO to plan NSFS employment to meet LF requirements; e.g., positioning of fire support areas and stations. The use of NSFS depends to a large degree on hydrography,

number, and type of ships available, and on the commander's priorities and guidance.

The LF NSFS plan contains pertinent information and instructions taken from the ATF NSFS plan. Subordinate echelons may simply refer to higher echelon plans and not issue a separate plan. NSFS plans normally include specific instructions on the tactical use of NSFS. The NSFS plan contains a NSFS operations overlay, a schedule of fires, and instructions on communications, radar beacon employment, and reports. Upon deployment, much of the planning between the supported unit and the supporting ship may occur via radio or teletype. For more information on NSFS fire planning, see MCWP 3-31.1/NWP 3-09.11M, *Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations*.

COUNTERFIRE PLAN

Enemy FS systems can potentially inflict serious damage on friendly maneuver forces, fire support systems, and supporting infrastructure. Therefore, the enemy's fire support system, which includes the cannons, rockets, mortars, target acquisition, C2, and logistics elements, must be eliminated as a viable threat. Counterfire is a vital consideration for both maneuver and fire support planning. Counterfire should be integrated into the MAGTF and GCE commanders' battle plans and not fought as a separate battle. The fire support coordinator is responsible for establishing a counterfire plan based on the commander's priorities and guidance for counterfire. Location of target sets, capabilities of sensor platforms, and ranges of available weapon systems dictate counterfire responsibilities. Usually, the MEF is responsible for proactive, deep counterfire, establishing overall priorities, and allocating resources. The presence of an FAHQ, when augmented with USA Q-37 radar and rockets, provides a deep, reactive counterfire capability as well. The artillery regiment, in support of the division, provides organic radar assets to the GCE for reactive counterfire, and can serve as a counterfire headquarters.

Counter-fire is either proactive or reactive. Mid- to high-intensity conflicts demand an aggressive, proactive counter-fire effort to limit or damage hostile

fire support systems. This requires allocating proportionate target acquisition and delivery assets at the MEF and division level. In reactive counterfire, designated fire support assets respond to enemy mortar and artillery fires during or immediately following enemy engagement of friendly forces.

In the offense, friendly counterfire should initially focus on enemy long-range weapon systems used to conduct hostile counterfire missions. It is a critical element for friendly forces to generate the necessary momentum and to counteract enemy artillery.

In the defense, counterfire should focus on artillery formations supporting ground attacks and on the enemy's counterfire systems. Attack systems must be positioned to meet the enemy's main effort with counterfire target acquisition elements focused on the most likely avenues of approach where the enemy is expected to concentrate his indirect fire weapons. Available assets should be emplaced for maximum lateral and in-depth coverage.

Two primary concerns of the FSC when creating a counterfire plan are radar zone management and establishing quick fire channels.

In radar zone management, the maneuver commander's guidance should include top-down planning and bottom-up refinement guidelines, priorities within the unit's sector for radar zones and most importantly, assigned responsibility to facilitate the plan's execution. Timely information quickly shared with the artillery battalion S2 will ensure accurate critical friendly zones (CFZs) are emplaced to provide responsive counterfire and force protection when the maneuver elements are most vulnerable to enemy indirect fires.

To clarify radar zone management and incorporate the maneuver commander's guidance, a proper planning sequence must be followed. Radar zone planning must be structured around a simple sequential process.

See appendix J for radar zone management.

In quick fire channels, the headquarters responsible for counter-fire planning can establish a direct link to the supporting arm that will attack the target (quick fire channel). This is particularly effective for reactive counterfire.

| | | | | | |
|--|------------|-------------|----------|-----|---------|
| FIRE PLAN: <u>APPLE</u> SUPPORTING: <u>2/4</u> ORIGINATOR: _____ MODIFICATIONS BY: _____ | | | | | |
| DATE: <u>12/01</u> H-HOUR: _____ SHEET: _____ OF: _____ DATE/TIME GROUP: _____ | | | | | |
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| LINE | TARGET NO. | DESCRIPTION | LOCATION | ALT | REMARKS |
| 1 | AD 3011 | BUNKER | 420267 | 160 | |
| 2 | AD 3001 | AT GUN | 416269 | 220 | |
| 3 | AD 0421 | AT ROCKET | 412260 | 210 | |
| 4 | AD 3092 | OP | 409271 | 170 | |
| 5 | AD 3093 | OP | 421261 | 180 | |
| 6 | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | |
| 9 | | | | | |
| 10 | | | | | |

| LINE | ORG | FIRE UNITS | SCHEDULE | | | | | REMARKS |
|------|------|------------|-------------------|---|----|-------------------|-----|---------------------|
| | | | TIMINGS | | | | | |
| | | | -5 | 0 | +5 | +10 | +15 | |
| 1 | 1/12 | A | AD 3092 36 (a) | | | AD 3011 36 (b) | | |
| 2 | | B | AD 3093 36 (a) | | | AD 3001 42 (b) | | |
| 3 | | C | | | | AD 3093 42 (b) | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | | a. 7-54 SP b. VT |
| 5 | | | | | | | | b. VT |
| 6 | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | |

Figure 3-7. Quick Fire Support Plan Form.

SECTION VI. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The FSC should focus on tasks, command and control (C2), and planning.

means of fire or by follow-up forces. Provide fires to slow enemy retreat.

TASKS

The following examples of fire support tasks may be required during offensive operations based on the tactical situation and the mission.

Provide Fire Support in the Preparation Phase

Attack targets as part of a deception effort. Use smoke to screen the movement of friendly forces preparing for the attack. Disrupt enemy defenses before the attack by engaging enemy indirect fire weapons and OPs, reserves or second echelon forces, C2 centers, logistic and assembly areas, and front-line defenses.

Support the Movement to Contact and Potential Meeting Engagements

Provide immediately responsive fires to leading elements. Attack deep targets with massed indirect fires and air support. Implement an aggressive counterfire plan to prevent enemy indirect fires from unnecessarily delaying the advance. (This requires rapid artillery radar cueing.) Make maximum use of preliminary coordination.

Provide Support During the Attack

Use all available fire support means to destroy, neutralize or suppress targets that could impede or react to the attack.

Plan Fires During Consolidation

Protect friendly units during reorganization. Break up enemy counterattack. Prevent enemy reinforcement, disengagement or resupply.

Provide Support for Exploitation

Provide mobile, flexible fire support for maneuvering units. Place fires on bypassed enemy pockets of resistance to fix them for attack by a more suitable

COMMAND AND CONTROL

In the offense, the attacker has the initiative and can concentrate maneuver forces and firepower at the time and place of his choosing. A balance between centralized and decentralized control of fire support assets should be maintained to allow responsive fires, massing of fires, and shifting of fires as the main effort shifts.

PLANNING

Make plans as detailed as time allows before the attack. Make maximum use of the FSEM and the attack guidance matrix. SOPs should be well understood.

Make fire support planning and coordination flexible for execution at lower echelons. Allocating fire support to subordinates and simple coordination procedures will facilitate this.

Make speed in execution easier by planning priority targets, on-call targets, and schedules of fires; e.g., groups or series.

Anticipate CAS requirements. Coordinating the assignment of alert status; i.e., ground or airborne can increase responsiveness. Attack helicopters may be positioned forward in designated holding areas. Plan for airspace coordination.

Plan only essential targets. Cancel targets no longer needed and update targets; e.g., descriptions and locations, as the supported unit moves forward.

Use permissive FSCMs well-forward to accommodate speed of advance and preclude endangering friendly forces. Use on call FSCMs and to the maximum extent possible, key their activation to existing maneuver control measures; e.g., phase lines.

Provide continuous adequate fire support coverage within the zone of action.

Position indirect fire weapons well-forward.

Consider assigning route precedence to indirect fire units.

Consider replenishment of units.

Plan for continuous communications. Make use of radio relays, brevity codes, and signals. Use wire and messengers during preparation and shift to radio when the attack has begun.

Maintain close and continuous coordination with the FSC of the designated reserve unit to facilitate fire support if the reserve is committed.

Plan observation, including target acquisition, adjustment of fires, surveillance of prearranged fires, and battlefield surveillance. Observers must be positioned where they can see the battlefield. Remember reconnaissance teams, aircrews, and artillery weapons locating radars.

The rest of this section identifies other considerations appropriate to specific offensive operations. They should be used as a guide. They are not all-inclusive nor do they always apply.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

Assign priority of fires to the main effort.

Plan fires on critical points along the route of march.

Plan priority targets.

Plan fires to support the momentum of the supported unit; e.g., screens, suppressive fires on bypassed enemy defenses or obstacle clearing.

Consider laser designators positioning. Some may be positioned with the lead units. (See appendix K for employing lasers.)

Ensure communications for calling for fire.

Ensure FSCs in trailing and adjacent units coordinate and pass information continually.

Consider positioning FOs, FACs or spot teams in overwatch positions.

Plan for hasty attack contingencies, SEAD, and counterfire.

HASTY ATTACK

Give priority of fires to the main effort.

Plan fires on known and suspected enemy direct fire positions.

Plan electronic attack of critical targets when assets are available.

Plan priority targets.

Plan fires on likely assembly areas.

Plan fires on the objective, on gaps, and beyond the objective to exploit success.

Use smoke to obscure line of sight of enemy observers and to screen friendly movement.

DELIBERATE ATTACK

Plan fires to--

- 1 Support the maneuver's attack on the objective.
- 1 Prevent the enemy's withdrawal from the objective.
- 1 Create a gap in the enemy's defenses or to cause him to react where he becomes vulnerable; e.g., fires to disrupt his direct fire weapons to facilitate maneuver of the supported unit.
- 1 Attack enemy indirect fire assets to keep them from firing on friendly forces as they advance.

Consider using preparation fires on the objective coordinated with maneuver.

Attack targets beyond the objective to prevent reinforcements and resupply.

Plan smoke on the flanks and on crossings of exposed areas.

SECTION II. THE TARGETING PROCESS

Targeting is a continual, decisionmaking process. Commanders and key personnel (fire support, intelligence, operations and planning) must understand the functions associated with the process, be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of acquisition, target intelligence development, and attack systems, and be able to integrate them. The entire targeting process must be fully integrated into the tactical decisionmaking process.

Targeting is an integral part of the planning process that begins with receipt of the mission and continues through the development and execution of the plan. It is based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and/or tactical plan. It includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and the enemy situation. This assessment then identifies those enemy units, equipment, facilities, and terrain which must be attacked or influenced to support the concept of operation. Targeting and intelligence support to targeting include determining/deciding which targets are to be acquired and attacked, when and how they are to be acquired and attacked, and what is required to achieve the desired effects on target. Selected HVTs and HPTs are also identified for deliberate follow up action and analysis (combat assessment [CA]).

The targeting methodology for the GCE is *decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A)*. Targeting must be completely integrated into the fire support planning process. For example, the priorities established by the commander in the *decide* phase are not for targeting alone, but include his guidance for intelligence operations, fire support planning, and execution of fires. The four phases of D3A are inherently intertwined and overlapping. Simply put, the D3A methodology should determine—

- 1 What enemy capabilities, functions, formations should be targeted whose loss to the enemy will set conditions that contribute to the success of the friendly course of action?
- 1 What must we do to these targets to deny them to the enemy?
- 1 Have these targets been located with enough accuracy to successfully attack them? If not, where should we look for them? With what collection asset? What level of production effort is required to develop the needed target intelligence?
- 1 When will we attack these targets? As detected? At a specific time in the operation? Or, in a particular sequence?
- 1 What fire support asset will we task to attack these targets?
- 1 Once attacked, how will we assess the success of the attack to determine if we have deprived the enemy the use of the target?
- 1 If we do not achieve the desired effect, what is the impact on the friendly COA? If necessary, how will we reattack the target and evaluate effectiveness of the reattack?

DECIDE

Intent

This phase translates commander's intent into priorities and attack guidance. As the first step in the targeting process, it provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection, production and dissemination, and attack planning. Targeting priorities must be established for each stage or critical event of an operation. For targeting to succeed, all must understand the unit mission, commander's intent, and the commander's planning guidance. The commander bases his initial guidance on the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB is the foundation for the rest of the targeting process. It is a continuous and systematic method for analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a geographical area.

Target Value Analysis

The target information officer or G-2/S-2 performs TVA, a detailed analysis of the enemy in selected COAs. TVA provides a relative ranking of target sets (or categories) based on enemy characteristics: doctrine, tactics, equipment, organizations, and expected behavior. It begins when the target analyst in the G-2/S-2 places himself in the position of the enemy commander. The target analyst, in coordination with other staff members, war-games friendly COAs and analyzes their impact on enemy operations and likely responses. War-gaming finalizes individual staff estimates. It identifies high-value targets (HVTs) in priority of assets that the enemy commander needs to successfully complete a specific COA. It also

identifies high-payoff targets (HPTs) (a subset of HVTs), whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA. See MCRP 3-16A/FM 6-20-10, chapter 2.

Products

Products from the decide function are incorporated into the fire support annex of the OPORD.

Target Acquisition Taskings

Target acquisition (TA) assets that belong to fire support agencies; e.g., radar or FOs are incorporated into the collection plan to contribute to target information.

High-Payoff Target List

A high-payoff target list (HPTL) is the prioritized list of HPTs established and used by targeting personnel and FSCCs to develop the attack guidance matrix (AGM).

Attack Guidance Matrix

The AGM is a document that tells how, when, and to what effect an HPT will be engaged. The AGM is incorporated into the maneuver and fire support plans. It is the commander's attack guidance and is designed to support his plan. An AGM that supports the division commander's plan may not support a regiment or battalion commander's plan. One AGM rarely supports the needs of an entire force and may differ between the various levels of command.

Targeting Selection Standards

TSS establishes criteria to distinguish between known targets and suspected targets based on the attack system's target location error (TLE) requirements, size and status of enemy activity, and timeliness of information. TSSs and TLEs are used by FSCCs and attack assets to help plan and direct supporting intelligence requirements/operations and to quickly identify targets for attack and confirmation.

Requirements for Battle Damage Assessment

The commander may specify targets of a critical nature that require immediate BDA to determine effects and support rapid CA. Requirements will be incorporated into the collection plan and may be classified as commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR). When possible, fire support

organizations provide initial BDA to the FSC and the supporting intelligence officer on targets attacked.

DETECT

This phase is designed to validate known and suspected HPTs based on guidance from the decide phase, as well as locate and identify new targets that meet HPT criteria. Detecting is accomplished by executing the intelligence operation plan. Target acquisition assets are tasked to collect information for target analysis and production. Intelligence collectors focus on the relevant characteristics of the intelligence operation plan and FSC-provided targeting information requirements (IRs) and TSS. Target priorities from the decide phase expedite processing of information and the rapid production of tailored, pertinent intelligence products to support targeting. Products are actual targets and suspected targets.

The G-2/S-2 is the primary staff officer who executes the intelligence operation plan and validates the overall effectiveness of intelligence support to targeting. The commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) drive intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plans and should incorporate fire support targeting requirements. The G-2/S-2 must work closely with the FSC to determine target location error (TLE) and dwell time requirements for collection systems to produce valid targets. This should result in clear, concise taskings to target acquisition assets. As information is collected and intelligence produced, it is disseminated by intelligence personnel to the TIS in accordance with current intelligence reporting criteria. Targets acquired or developed that are specified for attack are passed to the FSCC to engage under the attack guidance matrix. Suspected targets are forwarded to the FSCC for tracking and correlation with other information for target development.

A MAGTF has a wide variety of assets available to detect and identify targets; e.g., national intelligence collection assets like satellite photography or a squad leader's shelling report (SHELREP).

The FSC works closely with the G-2/S-2. The G-2/S-2 requests support from collection resources at higher levels of command. Following the guidance in the decide phase, the G-2/S-2 will exercise staff cognizance from MAGTF and supporting units with

intelligence collection and production capabilities that normally employ in general support. C2 management is executed via the intelligence battalion commander in his role as the G-2/S-2's intelligence support coordinator (ISC). Sources of information include—

- 1 Communications collection and direction finding (radio battalion and the VMAQ squadrons).
- 1 Visual reconnaissance (ground recon and LAR elements).
- 1 Videotape and handheld imagery (primarily UAV squadrons, but also the HML/A squadrons, ground reconnaissance units, and LAR bn).
- 1 Multi-sensor imagery (UAV and F/A-18D squadrons).
- 1 Electronic reconnaissance (EA-6B squadrons).
- 1 Ground remote sensors (intel bn's ground sensor platoon).
- 1 Visual ground reconnaissance (division and force reconnaissance units).
- 1 Prisoner of war interrogation (interrogation platoon, intel bn).
- 1 Pilot debriefs (conducted by the ACE G-2).

Other MAGTF target acquisition assets are found at battalion level and below (LAR bn, artillery FOs, NGF spot teams, and the scout/sniper platoon). The primary mission of these assets is to support their parent units. The bulk of their effort is with planned targets or targets of opportunity. Essential target information for reporting acquired targets consists of the reporting unit; time of acquisition; target location, size, and activity; TLE; dwell time; and stationary or moving status. The FSCC can develop targets in zone by monitoring calls for fire, CAS requests, and counter battery radar reports.

DELIVER

The objective of this phase is executing attack guidance on targets in support of the commander's plan. The key to the deliver phase is well-established procedures for execution, prior coordination, and rehearsals.

The deliver phase is comprised of a set of tactical and technical engagement solutions. The MAGTF relies on a decisionmaker, i.e., the staff/watch officer at the detecting fire support agency, to exercise his authority in attacking targets. His tactical decision is based on

the AGM and the current situation. If he decides not to attack but to *track* a target, it is passed back to the TIS.

After targets are identified by the FSCC, determining when and how to attack a target is made considering attack resources available, their capabilities, the desired effects, and rules of engagement (ROE). This refined analysis produces the following tactical decisions: time of attack, desired effect, and the attack system to use. Another important decision is employing combined arms to attack certain targets, including lethal and nonlethal fires. Any remaining coordination with higher, lower, adjacent units, or other Services is done at this time.

Once tactical decisions are made, the target is passed to the selected supporting arm for technical attack decisions; e.g., the unit to conduct the attack, number and type of munitions, and response time. The supporting arm's ability to respond based on range, time on station, available munitions, and reaction time cannot be assumed but are functions of the prior coordination and the current tactical situation.

The extent of the deliver phase depends on time available, the type of target, and attack guidance. Targets attacked immediately are prioritized in accordance with attack guidance. A time sensitive target (moving or short dwell time) may need tracking if it is not attacked within the appropriate response time. Planned targets may be attacked individually or incorporated into the appropriate asset fire plan; e.g., ATO or schedule of fires. When time is available, a thorough analysis is conducted for detailed consideration of targets. In targeting for amphibious operations, particularly pre D-day, the final decision on the attack of targets may be made at the ATF or MAGTF level; e.g., the ATF N-3 or the MAGTF G-3. At lower levels, the authority to decide to attack is normally decentralized because of the need for responsiveness. When time is limited, the process may be greatly abbreviated.

ASSESS

Combat assessment (CA) reveals if the commander's guidance is met and determines the overall effectiveness of force employment. In the decide phase, the commander designated critical targets that required immediate BDA and the type of surveillance desired. G-2/S-2 and fire support planners identified

how damage assessment was collected, considering limited assets and continued requirements for the detect phase. The degree of reliability and credibility of BDA depends largely on enemy targets and their operations, MAGTF collection resources, and the scope of intelligence analysis and production needed to produce the required intelligence. BDA, when analyzed with an assessment of the effectiveness of the attack tactics, weapon systems, munitions, fusing and delivery systems-munitions effects assessment (MEA)-leads to recommendations for reattack, further target selection or modifying commander's guidance. Collectively, BDA, MEA, and reattack recommendations (RR) comprise CA (see fig. 4-2). Also see MCWP 2-12, *MAGTF Intelligence Analysis and Production*, for more information on BDA capabilities and operations.



Figure 4-2. Combat Assessment Process.

Employment of fire support assets for reattack is coordinated the same way as employment of TA assets for detection. This is most easily done when assessment is planned, coordinated, and, when possible, executed concurrently with the attack. At lower levels, specific targets may be designated for assessment. When the attack of a target is controlled and observed by an FO, FAC, NGF spotter, or any other observer, separate tasking for assessment is usually not necessary. When active assessment is not possible, other measures can be used to assess effects on a target. For example, if an artillery battery were to be attacked, the appropriate measure of a successful attack might be terminating firing by the target. If a target is so important that destroying or neutralizing it must be confirmed before a planned course of action

can be initiated or continued, then positive assessment must be made regardless of risk.

Battle Damage Assessment

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, lethal or nonlethal, against a target. It is primarily an intelligence responsibility, however, at the tactical level, BDA provides commanders a snapshot of targeting effectiveness and enemy status. In the targeting process, BDA helps to determine the effects of our attacks and other force employment on the enemy and if reattack of a target is necessary. It may take many forms, including number of casualties, damage to equipment, target reaction to the attack (moving orb hardening) or deception efforts. BDA consists of three elements: physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment.

Phase I

Phase I is the quantitative extent of physical damage through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects to a target. This assessment is based on the most immediately available data. Typically, data originates from operational forces that cannot conduct detailed observation of weapons effects because they are engaged with enemy forces. Thus, initial phase I analysis may consist of nothing more than a "hit" or "no-hit" call provided by the shooter.

Phase II

A functional damage assessment (FDA) is built on phase I reports as well as all-source intelligence collected and developed from assets at all levels. FDA at a minimum will describe the estimated effect of attacks and other force employment on the target's ability to perform its intended mission. It may also include an estimate of the time required for the enemy to reconstitute or replace the target functions destroyed or degraded. Tactical units provide input to their intelligence sections to support phase II analysis, which is usually conducted at the MAGTF, component or theater level.

Phase III

Target system assessment is a broad assessment of the impact and effectiveness of all types of attacks and other employment of forces against an entire target system's capability; e.g., an enemy's integrated air defense system (IADS). Target system assessment is

conducted by theater and national level intelligence agencies.

Munitions Effects Assessment

Conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA, this is an assessment of the weapon system and munitions employed to determine and recommend any required changes to the methods, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing or delivery parameters to increase effectiveness. At the tactical level, fire support planners make this assessment by comparing

expected results from tactical and technical decisions made during the deliver phase with BDA.

Reattack Recommendations

Based on BDA and MEA, the FSC and G-2/S-2 advise the commander on reattack of targets and further target selection to achieve his objectives. Reattack recommendations consider objective achievement, target and aim point selection, attack timing, tactics, and weapon system and munitions selection.

CHAPTER 5. EXECUTING THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

Execution implements the fire support plan and manages fire support available to combat units. It also applies fires to shape the battlefield, coordinate attacks, protect the force, and reduce duplication of effort.

SECTION I. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION TASKS

Basic tasks are—

- 1 Advise the commander of changes in the status of fire support.
- 1 Recommend changes in fire support employment based on the current tactical situation.
- 1 Deliver fires on targets detected in the targeting process by executing attack guidance.
- 1 Select the best supporting arm to attack a target considering availability, weaponeering, and coordination requirements.
- 1 Clear requests for fire using an established approval mode.
- 1 Integrate fires to support the scheme of maneuver.
- 1 Coordinate fires between lower, adjacent, and higher units.
- 1 Coordinate fires between the observer and supporting arm and/or multiple firing units.
- 1 Request additional fire support when needed.
- 1 Establish and maintain FSCMs to aid the rapid engagement of targets and provide safeguards for friendly forces/installations.
- 1 Resolve fire support conflicts at the lowest possible level.
- 1 Disseminate information within the FSCC, to other COC staff sections, and to adjacent battalions, supporting artillery units, and higher headquarters; e.g., unit locations, FSCMs, target information, and fire support status reports.

COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

When no adjacent units are affected, the coordination required for fire support is best accomplished by the company commanders and the supporting arms representatives assigned to their units. Battalion FSCCs have no need to intervene unless a requested fire support asset has to be diverted to a higher priority mission. Artillery batteries and NSFS ships can

normally handle simultaneous missions. FSCs should not intervene to cancel requests for higher priority missions unless the artillery fire direction center (FDC) or ships report that they cannot handle any more missions. Simultaneous missions should not be approved if fire support effectiveness will be degraded. Coordination between companies is essential for effective battalion fire support coordination. Coordination between the supporting arms representatives within a company can be facilitated by assigning an individual the task of coordinating the company's supporting fires. Such coordination reduces the frequency with which FSCC personnel must intervene to cancel or modify requests for supporting arms and frees battalion FSCC personnel for tasks that companies cannot accomplish (coordination with higher headquarters, requesting additional fire support assets, etc.). Battalion SOPs should establish procedures for coordination between companies; e.g., cross boundary fires, target hand-offs or requests for observation support.

BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

A large portion of the coordination tasks required to execute the fire support plan are accomplished at the battalion level. Battalion FSCCs monitor/receive calls for fire and air requests from the companies. This is normally performed by the appropriate supporting arms representatives (artillery LNO, AirO, NGLO, or mortar representative). Supporting arms representatives assist the FSC in performing the tasks required to coordinate and clear the missions (see section III for detailed procedures). Fires, such as a counter mechanized program, may also be initiated by the battalion FSCC. Established message routing (centralized or decentralized) and clearance procedures (positive or passive) will specify mission flow for clearance of fires.

REGIMENT FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

Regiment FSCCs play a key role in planning and using fire support. Regiment FSCCs assist battalion FSCCs in fire support coordination by granting clearance for fires delivered in the regiment's area of operation beyond the battalion's area of operation and coordinating the routing of aircraft with adjacent forces. The attack of targets in the regiment's area of operations detected during the targeting process is coordinated at the regiment FSCC.

Artillery

The artillery LNO at the infantry regiment FSCC provides information and expertise on all artillery matters. He represents the direct support artillery battalion commander. The artillery LNO does not normally monitor artillery COF nets. The artillery LNO in each battalion FSCC and the DS artillery battalion FDC monitor those nets and forward significant information to the regiment LNO. He monitors the artillery battalion fire direction (FD) net to keep abreast of significant artillery missions. He assists the artillery LNO in battalion FSCCs in obtaining additional artillery support, if required. In the automated FSCC, he is able to automatically retrieve data from the battalion FSCCs and FDC, process artillery target information, clear artillery fires, and quickly disseminate critical fire support information to subordinate units.

Coordination of artillery fire by adjacent maneuver battalions is normally effected by direct coordination between the units involved. However, if direct coordination cannot be effected or conflicts arise which cannot be resolved, the artillery LNO or FSC at the regiment will assist by effecting the required coordination or resolving the conflict.

The artillery LNO may request fires on targets within the regiment's area of operation. These fires may be provided by the DS battalion or the fires from other artillery (GS, GS-R) units. These fires are coordinated with higher, lower, or adjacent units, as required.

Air

The AirO at the regiment FSCC provides information and expertise on all aviation matters. He monitors

immediate air requests and may approve, cancel, amend or recommend that another fire support agency provide the fire support requested. He consolidates preplanned air requests forwarded from the battalions. The AirO makes recommendations to the FSC who determines, based on the commander's guidance, the best way to satisfy competing demands for air support. The regiment AirO coordinates air support missions with the regiment FSC and makes recommendations for incorporating SEAD. Approved requests for air support are forwarded to the division.

Naval Surface Fire Support

The NGLO at the infantry regiment has information and expertise on all NSFS matters. If the regiment is allocated a ship in GS, the regiment NGLO coordinates the fires of the GS ship based on the guidance from the regiment commander. These fires may also be used to reinforce the fires provided to subordinate battalions.

DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

The division FSCC has the key role in conducting targeting, as well as attacking targets to support the division commander's concept of operation. It plans and coordinates fires on targets of interest to the division. The division FSCC assists the regimental FSCCs in fire support coordination. If the division generates a target to be fired, the FSC may use any of the means available to the division. Coordination with adjacent or higher fire support coordination agencies is required prior to firing on targets outside the division boundary.

Artillery

The AFSC in the division FSCC is also the artillery LNO. He employs the division's GS artillery in counterfire, planned fires, and the attack of detected targets in the division area of operation. He assists the artillery LNO at the infantry regiments in obtaining additional artillery support. The AFSC resolves conflicts that arise concerning artillery support that cannot be resolved at a lower level. He assists regimental artillery LNOs in effecting coordination when direct coordination cannot be accomplished.

Air

The AirO functions generally in the same manner as the regimental AirOs. He monitors immediate air requests and compiles preplanned air requests forwarded from the regiments to the division FSCC. The division AirO provides close liaison with the DASC agency to assist in coordination of requirements and routing of air support.

Naval Surface Fire Support

The division NGFO performs functions generally in the same manner as the regimental NGLOs. If a request for additional NSFS is received from any regiment, the FSC directs the NGFO to coordinate the mission with a GS ship and the regimental NGLOs. He then ensures that the requesting agency is properly linked with the appropriate ship. The NGFO plans targets to be fired by the division's GS ships.

MEF FORCE FIRES COORDINATION

The MEF FFCC plans, coordinates, and executes lethal and nonlethal fires in support of the MEF commander's concept of operations. The FFCC is the senior fire support coordination agency. The force fires coordinator (FFC) is responsible to the MEF commander for planning, coordination, and conduct of force-level fire support operations in the MEF deep operation and for coordinating MSC fire support operations in the close and rear operations. The FFCC works closely and in concert with the MEF air center and the G-2 target intelligence section. The FFCC is organized into three functional sections.

Plans/Target Information Section

This section conducts all planned fire support coordination functions including support for OPLAN/CONPLAN/FragO development and deliberate targeting. In coordination with future operations and future plans, the plans section develops the MEF commander's concept of fire support. This section works closely with MEF representatives at JFACC/HHQ fire support agencies; e.g., the deep operations coordination center (DOCC). The target information officer (TIO) organizes and conducts the MEF targeting board. It recommends targeting guidance, priorities, and asset allocation, to the MEF commander for approval or modification. Fire support planning

and targeting products are handed off to current fires in the COC for execution.

Current Fires Section

Current fires executes the deep operation and coordinates fires for the close and rear operations as required. This section receives the fire support plan from target information and ATO/ITO from the air center, monitors execution of the fire support plan, revises and adjusts the plan in keeping with the developing situation, and engages reactive targets per the MEF commander's guidance. Although current fires is primarily focused on the deep operations area, it is also responsible for coordinating rear area fires, conducting/coordinating deep fires, and when required, assisting the MSCs with their close fires. Within the COC, current fires coordinates closely with current operations, intelligence, the C3 analysis cell, and liaison officers (LNOs). Current fires maintains close contact with the ACE TACC and force artillery (FA). Current fires conducts reactive targeting with current operations and intel, and directs the attack of targets with the appropriate assets.

Force Fires Liaison Section

Force fires includes those LNOs sent from the FFCC to external (higher and adjacent) commands and those fire support LNOs sent to the MEF. It provides a coordinated MEF view of the battlespace to all external MEF fire support LNOs, and receives and consolidates LNO reports and requests. Force fires also provides a central location for external fires LNOs provided to the MEF. For more information on MEF force fires, refer to MCWP 3-42.1, *Fire Support in MAGTF Operations*.

REAR OPERATIONS

Fire support coordination in the rear area is accomplished in the RAOC. The FSC in the RAOC, augmented by fire support representatives, coordinates and clears fire missions in the rear area. He coordinates with the senior GCE FSCC and the MAGTF FFCC for fulfilling fire support requests. The MAGTF FFCC resolves conflicts that arise in fire support coordination involving the rear area.

FSCMs may be established within the rear area for coordination of fires; e.g., restrictive fire areas

(RFAs), no-fire areas (NFAs), free-fire areas (FFAs). Establishing FSCMs should be coordinated closely with the MAGTF and GCE FSCCs.

The RAOC uses the MAGTF fire support coordination net and the MAGTF tactical net for external fire

support coordination traffic. The RAOC AirO must be able to communicate on the TAR net. Internal fire support coordination traffic will be primarily on the combat service support security net. For more information on fire support coordination in the rear area, see MCWP 3-41.1, *Rear Area Operations*.




Figure 5-8. Altitude Restriction Computations.




Figure 5-9. Artillery-Aircraft Altitude Separation.




Figure 5-10. Artillery-Aircraft Timed Separation.

APPENDIX D. ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS METHODOLOGY

Based on lessons learned from previous fire support coordination exercises, the Marine Corps now uses a methodology called essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). The purpose of EFST is to translate the maneuver commander's intent into usable information for the fire support coordinator (FSC). The FSC uses EFSTs to focus supporting arms agencies on critical or essential tasks that must be accomplished to meet the maneuver commander's intent.

CONCEPT OF FIRES PARAGRAPH

As a subparagraph to the concept of operations, the concept of fires paragraph contains EFSTs and describes the commander's guidance for fires and the concept of fires to support the scheme of maneuver. The concept of fires must clearly describe the logical sequence of EFSTs and how they contribute to the concept of operations. The FSC uses the specified and implied tasks identified during mission analysis and from the commander's guidance for fire support to identify specific fire support tasks. The FSC must then determine the methodology to accomplish each task.

The methods frame the role of supporting arms agencies in the overall plan and serve to focus their efforts in supporting the scheme of maneuver. The concept of fires along with the concept of maneuver communicates how the force as a whole will achieve the commander's intent. For the FSC to meet the commander's intent, EFSTs must be closely integrated with maneuver.

EFSTs can also help focus the targeting effort by concentrating on enemy critical vulnerabilities and necessary targets that will facilitate maneuver. The primary audience for the concept of fires is the subordinate maneuver commanders and their fire support personnel. At each level of command (division, regiment, battalion) there are different levels of experience working with various fire support products and tools. This technique applies to all levels of FSCCs and staffs.

FORMAT

Overall paragraph organization should mirror that of the scheme of maneuver paragraph. If the maneuver paragraph is phased or otherwise organized, the concept of fires paragraph will take on the same organization. Just as maneuver tasks use task and purpose, fire support tasks are defined by the task, purpose, method, and effects (TPME) thought process. TPME may be used by the FSC to develop the concept of fires that is concise but specific enough to clearly state what fires are to accomplish in the operation. Within each phase of an operation, each EFST will be described in sequence of planned execution. This can be done using TPME in step action form or as subparagraphs. The information required in each subcategory is outlined below.

Task

Describes the targeting objective fires must achieve against a specific enemy formation's function or capability. Formations are HPT's or contain one or more HPT's.

Memory Aid: Task = Objective, Formation, and Function.

Objective

MCRP 3-16A/FM 6-20-10, *Targeting*, outlines several terms to describe targeting objectives that can be used, however disrupt, delay or limit are most commonly used. Targeting objectives should not be mistaken for effects of fire such as: *harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy* used to determine the degree of damage or duration of effects on a specific target. Targeting objectives entail the analysis of enemy situations relative to the objectives, mission, and the capabilities at the commander's disposal, in order to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's intent through disrupting, delaying, limiting, or diverting enemy forces or critical resources. See chapter 3 for information on targeting objectives and effects of fire.

Disrupt. Means to preclude efficient interaction of enemy combat or combat support systems. Simplified, it means to not let an enemy formation perform a specific function: not to do what it is supposed to do.

Example: Disrupt the AT battery long range fires against the TF flank companies...

Delay. Means to alter the time of arrival of a specific enemy formation or capability. It focuses on not letting the enemy do some function when it wants/needs to.

Example: Delay the ability of the advance unit to support the security element with direct fires until...

Limit. Applies to reducing the options or courses of action available to the enemy commander. For example, the commander may direct the use of air interdiction and fire support to limit the use of one or more avenues of approach available to the enemy. Also, he may direct the use of interdiction to limit enemy use of fire support capability. To limit capabilities implies we also disrupt enemy plans by precluding effective interaction or the cohesion of enemy combat and combat support systems.

Example: Limit the ability of the enemy air assault company to establish an LZ in the high ground west of the firebase....

Divert. Addresses the commander's desire to tie up critical enemy resources. Attack of certain interdiction targets may result in the enemy commander's diverting capabilities or assets from one area or activity to another. Divert indirectly reduces the capability of the enemy commander to continue his plans.

Formation

A specific element or subelement of the enemy. Can specify a specific vehicle type or target category as long as the element or subelement is clear.

Function

An ability of the formation to achieve its primary task and purpose. What is the formation doing that is unacceptable? What do we want the formation to do/not do? Helping words: "the ability to..."

A task example follows.

| Objective | Formation | Function |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Disrupt the ability of | the enemy platoon at the point of penetration | to effectively direct fire against the breach force. |

Purpose

Describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the task.

Memory Aid: Purpose = maneuver purpose. Identify as specifically as possible the maneuver formation that will leverage the targeting objective; describe in space and time what the objective will accomplish.

Example: To allow Bravo Mech to occupy the support by fire position without becoming decisively engaged by the center enemy platoon.

Method

Describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the detect function or "lookers" (executor/observer/TA sensor) with the deliver function or "shooters" (lethal and nonlethal assets) in time and space and describes how to achieve the task.

Memory Aid: Method = Priority, Allocation, Restriction.

- 1 PRIORITY OF FIRES (POFs)
- 1 FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES (FPFs)
- 1 OBSERVERS (Pri/Alt)
- 1 RESTRICTIONS
- 1 TRIGGERS
- 1 SPECIAL MUNITIONS
- 1 TGT ALLOCATION
- 1 TARGET
- 1 PRIORITY TARGETS
- 1 IEW
- 1 CAS /ATTACK AVIATION
- 1 ANY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

Priority

Describes the "how" of the EFST. For the looker, it can assign POF to execute the task outlined. It assigns observers in maneuver units or other acquisition means. Assignment of the looker requires the consideration of Target Selection Standards. When a specific asset; e.g., CAS, is to focus exclusively on a task, that information can be communicated here.

Example: Priority of CAS is to destroy the tanks in the enemy Combined Arms Reserve. This part of the method can also provide focus by using NAIs, TAIs, targets, or EAs to describe where attacks will occur.

Allocation

For the shooter, it describes allocating fire support assets to accomplish the EFSTs. Assets may include projected or mechanical smoke, indirect fires (suppress, neutralize, destroy, obscure, screen), FASCAM, CPHD, F/W and R/W CAS, and EW. In method, fire support assets identify their part of accomplishing the EFST. It is from the method of an EFST that the artillery and other FS/TA assets get their essential tasks.

Restriction

The method can also outline any limitations or restrictions on accomplishing the tasks. Ammunition (no ICM on the OBJ), FSCM (ACA Blue) or other restrictions that may effect accomplishing the EFST.

Example - Method (Bullet Format)

- 1 PRIORITY: Arty POF to Alpha Co, Mortar POF to Charlie Co. Team Mech. Arty and Mortar POF when committed.
- 1 ALLOCATION: Alpha fires Arty Pri Tgt AB1000, Bn 3 DPICM when security element goes to ground. Charlie fires mortar Pri Tgt AB 2001 Plt 10 HE at AT-5 platoon when they set their firing line. Back up observer for both targets is Recon Tm 2 vic. OP1. Send suppression missions to Bn FSCC, expect mortar Plt 3 HE. CAS maintained at Bn level.
- 1 RESTRICTIONS: RFA 200m radius over Recon Tm 2. No DPICM within 500m NP123456. ACA Joe in effect when CAS at IP, no fires south of 58 North / South gridline.

Example - Method (Paragraph Format)

Arty POF to Alpha Co, Mortar POF to Team Charlie. Team Mech gets Arty and Mortar POF when committed. Recon Tm 2 occupies OP 1 prior to LD. Upon contact, Alpha (P), Recon Tm 2 (A) fires Arty Pri Tgt AB 1000 Bn 3 DPICM at security element when it goes to ground. Charlie (P), Recon Tm 2 (A) fires mortar Pri Tgt AB2001 Plt 10 HE at AT-5 firing line when they set. Adjust and repeat as necessary. Send all suppression missions to Bn FSCC, expect Plt 3 HE. Push CAS, if available, maintained by Bn. All RFAs 200m radius, Recon Tm 2. No DPICM within 500m NP 123456. ACA Joe i/e when CAS at IP, no fires south of 58 N/S gridline.

Effects

Attempts to quantify successful accomplishment of the task. It provides the looker with a measure of effectiveness (MOE) for the task. If multiple shooters are involved it helps delineate what each must accomplish. Effects provide a measure of when we are done with the task. It also provides the basis for the assess function in D3A and the decision to reattack or not. See also appendix X, table X-8, damage criteria matrix (DCM) example. TARGETING/&X TOOLS.

Example: AGMB delayed for 20 minutes. 1 T80/4 BMPs destroyed by FASCAM. CAS destroys 4 T80s and 2 BMPs behind FASCAM. Enemy ADA jammed by EW during CAS attack.

Example of Relationship of Concept of Fires and EFSTs:

3b. () Concept of Operations

(1) () Concept of Maneuver.

(2) () Concept of Fires. Task and purpose for each EFST from the base order.

ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS

PHASE ONE. RECCE MOVEMENT FORWARD

TASK

Destroy the 2 x Forward Security Combat Outposts of the 127 th battalion's main defensive positions in order to prevent identification of FO and Scout forward movement and initial movement of 1/6 from AAHOTBED.

PURPOSE

To allow FO's and scouts to occupy forward OP locations and safeguard initial movement of 1/6 from AA HOTBED to LD (PL JIMMY).

METHOD

Priority: Artillery POF to FO TM 1, mortar POF to Scouts.

Allocation: AB 1001 CPHD PRI TGT Identified CSOP (1 x BMP + Inf section) FO tm 1 (P), Scouts(A) at H-180 BU Bn 3 DPICM. AB1002 CPHD PRI TGT Identified CSOP (1x T80 + Inf section) FO tm 2 (P),

FO tm 1 (A) at H-120 BU Bn 3 DPICM. AB1005 templated OP Scouts (P), FO tm 2 (A) when TM B Crosses PL BILL. AB1003 MTR SMK Deception 10 Min 300 x 60 Scouts (P) FO tm 2 (A) at H- 10.

Restrictions: Clear Illum thru regiment, No DPICM on MSR MARS, regiment release Authority for SD FASCAM. CFL PL TOM o/o PL DICK. RFAs 300m radius on all FO tm and Scout locations. FFA 67599977-67009710-65009675.

EFFECTS

2 x CSOPS destroyed (1 x Bmp, 1x T80, 2 x sections) 1 x OP destroyed FO tm's and Scouts in forward OP positions able to observe BPs and TF1-69 crosses LD unhindered from direct or indirect fires.

PHASE TWO, SUPPORT BY FIRE & BREACH OPERATION

TASK

Disrupt the ability of the 127 th regiments 2 X Plt BP from effectively engaging Breach Force with Direct and Indirect Fires.

PURPOSE

To allow TM B to occupy SBF Posn and TM C to establish 2 x Breach lanes prior to assault on to OBJ GOLD South.

METHOD

Priority: Artillery POF TM A, mortar POF TM C.

ALLOCATION

A1B (AB1003 & AB1004 2 x MIP BPs)1x Bty per TGT Continuous Fire 20 Min TM B (P), FO tm 1 (A) as TM B crosses 34 Northing. AB1009 20 Min FA SMK 300 x 60 TM B (P) TM C (A) as TM B crosses 34 Northing.

RESTRICTIONS

Clear Illum thru regiment, No DPICM on MSR MARS, regiment release Authority for SD FASCAM. CFL PL DICK o/o PL HARRY. RFAs 300m radius on all FO tm and Scout locations. FFA 67599977-67009710-65009675.

EFFECTS

TM B occupies SBF position, TM C establishes 2 breach lanes and retains 85% combat power. 2 x Plt BPs unable to effectively engage 1/6.

PHASE THREE, SIEZE OBJECTIVE GOLD

TASK

Disrupt the ability of the 127th regiments 2xPlt BPs and enemy regiment from effectively engaging TM C & TM Mech with Direct and Indirect fires.

PURPOSE

To allow 1/6 to seize objective GOLD.

METHOD

Priority: Artillery POF TM C o/o TM Mech, mortar POF TM C o/o TM Mech.

ALLOCATION

AB1100 FA PRI TGT continuous fire 15 min East Plt Pos TM C (P) Scouts (A) as TM C exits breach lane. AB1200 mortar Smk 60 x 300 15 Min TM C (P), FO tm1 (P) as TM C clears exits breach lane. If the enemy is observed moving vicinity ELGIN FO tm 1(P), Scout (A) initiates 2xCAS when CAS is 5 minutes off IP AB1010 1 x bty 6rds templated SA13 SEAD FO tm 1 (P)TM C (A) when CAS 3 minutes off IP AB1201 (1 Tube) mortar red phosphorus (RP) CAS marker. Once TMC seizes Objective GOLD East, Artillery & mortar POF to TM Mech. AB1101 Artillery PRI TGT Continuous fire 10 Min West TM Mech (P) Scouts (A) when TM Mech moves through TM C. If the enemy is observed moving vicinity ELGIN FO tm 1(P), Scout (A) initiates 2xCAS when CAS is 5 minutes off IP AB1010 1 x bty 6rds templated SA13 SEAD FO tm 1 (P)TM C (A) when CAS 3 minutes off IP AB1201 (1 Tube) mortar RP CAS marker.

RESTRICTIONS

Clear Illum thru regiment, no DPICM on MSR, regiment release Authority for SD FASCAM. CFL PL DICK o/o PL HARRY. O/O ACA ORANGE. RFAs 300m radius on all FO tm and Scout locations. FFA Grids 67599977-67009710-65009675.

EFFECTS

1/6 seizes OBJ GOLD, SA13 unable to engage CAS. CAS destroys enemy formation (3 x AT5s 12 x T80s).

PHASE 4, CONSOLIDATION

TASK

Limit the ability of the 127th regiment's remaining forces from penetrating PL KEN.

PURPOSE

To allow 1/6 to establish a Hasty defensive position along PL HARRY before the FPOL with 2/6.

METHOD

Priority: Artillery POF TM Mech, mortar POF TM A.

ALLOCATION

AB8000 FASCAM SD, MD, 400 X 200 TM C (P) TM B (A) when Plt > size of BMPs or T80s seen passing South PL KING along Peters Pass. TMB (P) TM Mech (A). TM Mech to plan 1 x FA FPF. AB1020 mortar FPF TM C (P) as required.

RESTRICTIONS

Clear Illum thru regiment, No DPICM on MSR, regiment release Authority for SD FASCAM. CFL PL HARRY. RFAs 300m radius on all FO tm and Scout locations. FFA Grids 67599977-67009710-65009675

EFFECTS

No remaining 127 MIRB forces able to penetrate PL KEN.

1/1 will initially use artillery and NSFS to disrupt the reconnaissance element's, from 132nd MRR, ability to identify and report our battle positions and obstacle locations in order to allow 2/1 to remain undetected within its BPs, prepared to maximize fires within EA Mack. Then R/W CAS and artillery will be used by 2/1 to delay the Advanced Guard, Main Body, of 132nd MRR west of PL Iowa to enable 1/1 to conduct rearward passage of lines with 2/1.