

Seemingly small events can have heavy repercussions in the politically charged atmosphere of the Middle East. This article reminds us of the hoped for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians, and how it ran afoul due to small acts that needn't have happened. The military efficiency, tactics and, most of all, sound judgment of our small unit leaders will spell out the victory or failure of our mission as manifested by our every act. Train your men well and image them through what they will face so at the point of decision, they make the right call.

The Tipping Point

How military occupations go sour

By Neil Swidey

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RICE AND FLOWERS. That's how the Shi'ite Muslims of southern Lebanon greeted Israel Defense Forces as they steamed into their villages in June of 1982. Throughout that summer, As'ad AbuKhalil, a 22-year-old graduate student in the village of Al-Qulaylah, saw his relatives and neighbors cheering Israeli troops. He saw them helping the Israelis uncover arms caches hidden by the fedayeen, the Palestinian militias. He even saw one village elder name his newborn niece Salaam, the Arabic word for peace, after the code-name of the Israeli invasion, Operation Peace for Galilee.

AbuKhalil understood why his neighbors were acting this way. For years, they had felt victimized by the Palestinian commandos who had set up shop in the villages of the South to wage guerrilla warfare against Israel. "They thought the Israelis would get rid of all the thugs and end the bombing, the misery, the mess," he says. But he refused to go along with them. "By the next season when you go to pick your oranges," he warned his neighbors, "your feelings about the Israelis will have changed." But nobody – not even AbuKhalil, the grad-student Cassandra – could have predicted the stunning turn the occupation would take. The flower-tossing Shi'ites were pleased to see Israel quickly accomplish its initial goals for the invasion, but that didn't stop them from eventually emerging as its most potent enemy. Over 18 years, the Shi'ites turned Lebanon into Israel's Vietnam.

As American soldiers in Iraq encounter occasional smiles and frequent denunciations, the question of how occupations succeed or fail looms large. The answers may have less to do with big, implacable forces than with the smallest incidents of everyday life. After all, if you want to know the moment when things changed for the Shi'ites of Lebanon – and, by extension, for the Israelis – don't look for the high-profile incidents that figure prominently in every timeline of Lebanon's war years. It was not the suicide bombing that killed 241 US Marines, or the assassination of the pro-Israeli Christian president-elect Bashir Gemayel, or the massacres of hundreds in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps. Instead, the tipping point was an incident that didn't claim many lives and never got much attention outside the Shi'ite community.

On Oct. 16, 1983, an Israeli convoy tried to make its way through the village of Al-Nabatiya while the local Shi'ites were commemorating Ashura, the most sacred day on their calendar. The emotionally charged holiday recalls the martyrdom of the prophet Muhammad's grandson Husain, and his courageous resistance against a far superior army. The Israeli troops clearly did not understand any of this, and started honking their horns for the locals to get out of their way. The locals threw rocks at them and tried to turn over some of their jeeps. The Israelis panicked and fired their guns. When the dust settled, two Shi'ites were dead and a lethal Shi'ite resistance had been born. "Nabatiya," says AbuKhalil, now a professor of political science at California State University, Stanislaus, "is the marking date of the beginning of the end."

In nearly every occupation, there is a tipping point – a defining incident that crystallizes the popular reception of the occupier. Right now, the views of many Iraqis toward the US occupation force are extremely fluid, changing depending on the circumstances of the day – or hour. They cheer US forces for bringing down a despised regime and delight in their newfound freedom to talk frankly or celebrate long-forbidden religious rituals. They curse the US forces for the darkness, for the lack of water, and for the looting. These are temporary reactions to temporary conditions. At some point – no one knows when – the views of the Iraqis toward Americans will become more fixed. As in Lebanon, the views of different communities may coalesce at different times. But those tipping points, says scholars, are what US leaders need to be most concerned about, even now, before the US transition civilian administration is fully in gear in Baghdad.

A tipping point is a concept drawn from epidemiology, where it describes the moment at which an infectious disease becomes a public health crisis. The idea is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then just one additional small change “tips” the system, producing dramatic consequences. The concept has been applied to human behavior to describe everything from breakout of bestsellers to the spread of buzzwords. Tipping points can favor the occupying forces.

Akira Iriye, who was a 10-year-old boy living in western Tokyo in 1945, recalls that when he and his friends spotted a GI walking into a jewelry store, they all pressed their faces against the store window to watch his every move. “I was very curious to see what an American looked like. This GI picked up a watch, and then he paid for it. I thought he was just going to take it.” For a Japanese population that had been fed only propaganda about how bad the Americans were, “these first impressions were very significant and people began to talk about them,” says Iriye, now chairman of the history department at Harvard University.

But tipping points are more likely to disfavor the occupier. Ian S. Lustick, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that as different and unpredictable as occupations can be, there are remarkably consistent patterns evident in most of them. And none of these patterns, he says, augurs particularly well for the United States in Iraq. Lustick, a specialist in occupations, says this is how they generally work: the occupying power has to rely on a band of locals to help navigate the foreign terrain. The choice of local agents can make or break an occupation, but it’s never an easy decision. It often comes down to choosing agents who will do what you want but don’t have much popular support or choosing those who will be less pliable but have a bigger base. “The ones who want to work with you the most are generally the ones you shouldn’t deal with,” he says.

From the start, the occupier is at a disadvantage. The locals know a lot more than the occupier about what’s likely to happen and who can pull the strings. So the local agents can manipulate the occupying powers, assuring them that they can deliver for them when they can’t, and using the occupier’s military strength to help settle old scores. This happened to the Israelis in Lebanon, when their Christian militia allies would direct them to shell an area where they said Palestinian fedayeen were, only to find out later that the place was in fact a stronghold of one of their rival sects. US forces occasionally fell into the same trap in Afghanistan when warlords fed false information to get the Americans to attack rival warlords rather than the Taliban.

AbuKhalil says that one of his distant cousins, who had been a nobody in their Lebanese village, became a Shi’ite agent for the Israelis and made the most of it. “I remember he would yell at people, ‘In the name of the IDF I will not allow this to happen!’” If people gave him trouble, he would make a call and two Israeli jeeps would show up.” But if resistance to the occupation grows, opposition groups start to go after the local agents. A year into the occupation, AbuKhalil’s detested relative was killed as he shopped in a grocery store.

If the risks of cooperating with their foreign power begin to outweigh the perks, the local agents hang back. And the occupier is then forced to walk more blindly through increasingly hostile territory. It becomes more prone to missteps, which then add fuel to the resistance’s fire.

In the early 1980s, Augustus Richard Norton was a US Army officer working with the Shi'ite community in southern Lebanon as a United Nations truce observer. He notes that most Shi'ite leaders, including those with the dominant political group Amal, initially took no position on the Israeli invasion. But things began to change when it became clear that the Israelis were not planning to leave any time soon and the daily humiliations associated with being occupied – security checkpoints, for instance – began to accumulate.

In his book, “Amal and Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon,” Norton writes that the Nabatiya incident “dripped with evocative symbolism, and the obvious connections between the commemoration of Husain's martyrdom, and the Israeli transgression were quickly noted by Shi'a religious leaders.” Nabatiya made fence-sitting impossible. The next day, a leading Shi'ite cleric issued a fatwa, warning that “those who trafficked with the Israelis would go to hell.” Amal leaders realized they were going to lose their popular following if they didn't take a tough stand against the Israelis. The Shi'ite community became increasingly radicalized, making way for the emergence of Hezbollah. Norton, now a professor of international relations at Boston University, says, “Nabatiya sealed the Israeli failure in Lebanon.” Hezbollah's leader even invoked Nabatiya last week, predicting the United States would meet a similar fate in Iraq.

So how can the United States avoid that? “A tipping point is a reflection of a set of structural conditions that allow any match that's lit to set off a grass fire,” says Lustick. A pigeon-hunting fracas between a few British soldiers and some peasants midwifed the Egyptian independence movement. A traffic accident between Israeli soldiers and a couple of Palestinians sparked the first Intifada. In both cases, the occupier was caught off-guard. Being alert to the underlying conditions requires solid, on-the-ground information about how people are feeling, and an awareness of the cultural codes and networks connecting various parts of society. That's hard to come by for an occupying power.

So far, US forces seem reasonably well attuned to the many religious and cultural sensitivities around them, and have wisely refrained from going into the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala during important religious observances by the Shi'ites last week. But as the “No to America” chants grew louder, and Shi'ite clerics vying for power grew more strident in their calls for an immediate American exit last week, some American officials began to wonder if a hands-off approach was the right one. Oddly, the absence of widespread applause from Iraqis for US forces may turn out to be a good thing. That kind of reception is always temporary in occupations, and it can lead the occupier to dangerously complacent assumptions on how strong his support is.

Yet the most consequential step may well be when US leaders decide which local agents it will join with, and how much of Saddam Hussein's old Ba'ath Party administration it allows to stay on. Right now there appears to be few good options.

And then, even under the best circumstances, an occupation's most significant consequences may not be known for years. “The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave us the Taliban,” AbuKhalil says. “The American occupation of Saudi Arabia gave us Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The Israeli occupation of Lebanon gave us Hezbollah. Let us see what the American occupation of Iraq is going to give us.”

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Commanders – Remember my guidance, “First, do no harm.” If to destroy an enemy we kill or injure innocent Iraqis, we are failing. Discriminate use of firepower and calculated, disciplined response will characterize our performance on a mission where kindness and compassion are as important as killing only the enemy.

American Soldiers Kill Six Iraqi Civilians After a Bomb Explosion Near a U.S. Convoy

By Alex Barenson

Published October 29, 2003

FALLUJA, Iraq, Oct. 28 — American soldiers killed six civilians just west of this city on Monday after a roadside bomb exploded near their convoy, according to town officials and witnesses.

The soldiers, who were on the main road to Falluja when the bomb exploded, fired on a minivan heading in the opposite direction on a different road more than 100 yards away, witnesses said. Their accounts were corroborated by Taha Badewi, the mayor of Falluja, and Jalal Sabri Khamis, the chief of police.

A spokesman for the American military in Baghdad offered only a general response to questions about the incident, saying he had no details about what had happened but he believed the use of force was justified. The spokesman, who insisted on anonymity, said no one from the 82nd Airborne Division, which patrols Falluja, was available for comment.

The base in Falluja where the soldiers of the 82nd Airborne live was under mortar attack at dusk on Tuesday when a reporter and photographer approached seeking comment on the incident. Guards at the base's gate said no one was immediately available for comment.

In the past, commenting on incidents in which Iraqi police or civilians were killed, Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of allied forces in Iraq, has said the rules governing American troops here allow them to use overwhelming force on any entity considered hostile, even if it does not represent an immediate threat and is near civilians.

Falluja, in central Iraq, is a center of resistance to the American occupation and has been the scene of repeated violence over the past several months, including a car bomb Tuesday that killed four people.

The shooting on Monday in Falluja occurred about 7:30 a.m. near the intersection of two roads just west of a bridge over the Euphrates River, witnesses and the two town officials said.

An American convoy of about eight vehicles was traveling east toward Falluja, on a road where United States patrols are often attacked. Two bombs planted in the center median exploded, damaging one of the vehicles but not stopping the convoy's progress, witnesses said.

Still heading east, the convoy began to fire, shooting at several vehicles heading southwest, away from the patrol, on a nearby road, said Amir Ahmed Saleh, a passenger in a vehicle on that road.

The convoy's targets included a minivan carrying employees of Iraq's state oil company, Mr. Saleh said. He was a passenger in a second minivan being used by the oil company.

The minivan in which Mr Saleh was riding was ahead of the minivan that was shot, and Mr. Saleh was unhurt.

The American fire devastated the minivan, which crashed into a lamppost by the side of the road, Mr Saleh said.

Four people in the minivan died, and two were severely wounded, Mr. Saleh said. He showed what he said were photographs of the shattered van that he had taken immediately after the incident. The photographs show a gruesome scene. Pieces of bodies cover the van's seats, sharing space with a set of brown prayer beads. A headless, legless torso lies on the ground beside the van. There was no independent means of confirming that the van pictured was the one involved in the incident.

Hassan Hussein, who lives across the road from the spot where the minivan crashed into the lamppost, corroborated Mr. Saleh's account, as did Abbas Hussein, one of Mr. Hussein's neighbors. At least two other cars were also hit, killing two more people, the men said.

"There was an explosion," said Mr. Badewi, the mayor. Referring to the American troops, he added, "They accused some people in their cars of shooting at them, and they opened fire on them."

Colonel Khamis, the police chief, said of the American forces: "When they're subjected to attack, they start shooting indiscriminately. The minibus was heading to Ramadi — they didn't have any link with the issue."

Mr. Badewi said that he had pleaded with American commanders to restrain their troops, but that they had refused. "We've talked about this reaction, and so many people and clerics have talked to them," he said.

"They say, 'This is our way.' "

The political allegiance of the two Iraqi officials was not clear, but they seemed generally moderate in their view of the American occupation.

Three American soldiers from the 82nd Airborne have been killed around Falluja since mid-September, according to casualty reports from the United States military. The city is in the heart of the Sunni Triangle, an area west and north of Baghdad that is a stronghold of support for the ousted former Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein.

Guerrillas in the area regularly fire mortars at a base the 82nd maintains just east of Falluja and attack American patrols with roadside bombs and grenades.

Mr. Hussein said he blamed the United States for the violence that has plagued Falluja, including the car bomb on Tuesday that killed four people and wounded four more.

"First they said they want to protect the Iraqi people, but then they destroy us," he said. "The only one who is hurting us is the Americans themselves."

Since early September, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division have killed more than 20 civilians and Iraqi police officers in and around Falluja in incidents where the victims have put up little or no resistance, according to accounts from witnesses. American military officers have said the shootings were justified under American rules of engagement, but have provided scant details.

If proven, this shows a commander who has lost his moral balance or has watched too many Hollywood movies. By our every act and statement, Marine leaders must set a legal, moral and ethical model that maintains traditional Marine Corps levels of discipline.

Army Files Charge In Combat Tactic

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

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The Army has filed a criminal assault charge against an American officer who coerced an Iraqi into providing information that foiled a planned attack on U.S. soldiers.

Lt. Col. Allen B. West says he did not physically abuse the detainee, but used psychological pressure by twice firing his service weapon away from the Iraqi. After the shots were fired, the detainee, an Iraqi police officer, gave up the information on a planned attack around the northern Iraqi town of Saba al Boor.

But the Army is taking a dim view of the interrogation tactic. An Army official at the Pentagon confirmed to The Washington Times yesterday that Col. West has been charged with one count of aggravated assault. A military source said an Article 32 hearing has been scheduled in Iraq that could lead to the Army court-martialing Col. West and sending him to prison for a maximum term of eight years.

Some soldiers are privately questioning the Army's drive to punish the officer for an interrogation technique that likely is used regularly to get information from terrorists.

Col. West's unit in Iraq operates amid extreme danger. Fighters loyal to ousted Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein are poised at any moment to kill the soldiers in ambushes using explosive devices, guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

Col. West, 42, says he pressured the Iraqi after taking into account the dangerous environment and the risk to his soldiers' lives.

In response to an e-mail from The Times, Col. West, a 19-year veteran, gave his version of events.

Col. West is a member of the 4th Infantry, the Fort Hood, Texas, division occupying areas around Tikrit, Saddam's hometown and an area infested with loyalists of the former regime.

An informant reported that there was an assassination plot against Col. West, an artillery officer working with the local governing council in Saba al Boor. On Aug. 16, guerrillas attacked members of the colonel's unit who were on their way to Saba al Boor.

An informant told the soldiers that one person involved in the attack was a town policeman. Col. West sent two sergeants to detain the policeman, who was placed in a detention center near the Taji air base. The interrogators had no luck at first, so Col. West decided to take over the questioning.

"I asked for soldiers to accompany me and told them we had to gather information and that it could get ugly," Col. West said in his e-mail.

He said his soldiers "physically aggress[ed]" the prisoner. A subsequent investigation resulted in nonjudicial punishment for them in the form of fines.

After the physical "aggress" failed, Col. West says he brandished his pistol.

"I did use my 9 mm weapon to threaten him and fired it twice. Once I fired into the weapons clearing barrel outside the facility alone, and the next time I did it while having his head close to the barrel. I fired away from him. I stood in between the firing and his person.

"I admit that what I did was not right but it was done with the concern of the safety of my soldiers and myself."

Col. West said he informed his superior of his actions. The incident lay dormant until the Army conducted an overall command-climate investigation of the brigade. The investigation turned up the interrogation technique, and Col. West was charged with one count of aggravated assault.

Col. West said the gunshots spurred the Iraqi to provide the location of the planned sniper attack and the names of three guerrilla fighters.

Col. West says the 4th Infantry's staff judge advocate, the unit's prosecutor, is offering him two choices: resign short of gaining retirement benefits or face court-martial.

Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice describes assault in these terms: "Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

The Army relieved Col. West of his battalion command and has placed him in the 173rd Airborne Brigade, which is attached to the 4th Infantry in Kirkuk.

Said his wife, Angela, who lives in Fort Hood: "My husband is a top-of-the-line officer. My husband is an African-American. He has had to overcome a number of things to get where he is."

"I accept being retired at the grade of major and paying whatever fine required, but resignation and prison seems an attempt to destroy me," Col. West says. "All I wish is to go away, re-establish my family and retain some of my dignity."

Gents – read and ponder. We are going to rebuild trust while reducing frictions with the Iraqi people. We must engage the Iraqis on the street, the sheiks and clerics too, while isolating and destroying the enemy. We must do so without hurting the innocent so we prevent the Iraqis from having grievances that lead them to support our enemies.

'The Battlefield for All Iraq'

Intense Resistance Mounted in Fallujah

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Foreign Service

Published November 4, 2003

FALLUJAH, Iraq, Nov. 3 -- This city's pro-American mayor is on the run after his office was gutted by a bomb. The four-lane main street is lined with craters and patches of charred pavement from almost daily attacks on U.S. military convoys. A cornfield a few miles to the southwest is littered with the wreckage of an Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter that was brought down Sunday with a shoulder-fired missile.

Six months after President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq, this deeply traditional Sunni Muslim city on the Euphrates River has become the most intense battleground between American troops and the myriad forces seeking to end the U.S. occupation.

There is little agreement between American commanders and local leaders about why Fallujah, where violence had been ebbing over the summer, has become such a flash point. Officers with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, which arrived here two months ago, contend their predecessors were not aggressive enough in rooting out resistance fighters, who had come to regard Fallujah as a haven. The city's tribal sheiks take the opposite view, maintaining that the 82nd Airborne's hard-nosed tactics have alienated residents and fueled more anger at the U.S. occupation.

"Fallujah has now become the battlefield for all Iraq," said Mustafa Naji, 19, a religious student. "Everyone is coming here to fight."

American and Iraqi officials say they believe resistance forces in Fallujah comprise Iraqis loyal to former president Saddam Hussein, Islamic extremists and foreign militants, many of whom were drawn here after clashes between residents and American soldiers transformed this otherwise unremarkable trading post about 30 miles west of Baghdad into a front line in the resistance fight.

Seeking to counter those resistance forces are about 1,000 paratroops from the 82nd Airborne. Instead of driving around the city in armored personnel carriers and entrusting security duties to ill-trained Iraqi police officers and militiamen -- as other military units occupying the city did -- they have swept through the bustling market and residential neighborhoods on foot patrols, conducting surprise searches and raids with a greater frequency.

Units that preceded the 82nd Airborne, including the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd Infantry Division, "rode around town in their armored vehicles, got shot at and didn't shoot back," one soldier with the 82nd said, echoing a sentiment expressed by his fellow paratroops. "We're here to show them that we're going to shoot back."

Unlike in almost every other part of Iraq, U.S. military commanders operating in and around Fallujah do not bother to talk of "winning Iraqi hearts and minds" -- a favorite phrase among Pentagon officials. Instead, their mission is focused almost exclusively on high-intensity combat operations.

"I expect to get attacked every day -- every single day," said Lt. Col. Brian Drinkwine, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 82nd Airborne's 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which is responsible for securing Fallujah and its surrounding area. "That may come in the form of a mortar attack, a drive-by shooting at the mayor's office, a vehicle ambush -- or a combination of all three."

But the 82nd Airborne's strategy, backed at the highest levels of the U.S. military, has rankled some of Fallujah's senior tribal sheiks -- the city's effective power brokers -- who maintain it is creating more enemies than it is eliminating.

"The Americans are wrong," said Khamis Hassnawi, the city's senior tribal leader. "Using more force will not solve the problems here."

Clash of Cultures

Hassnawi and other city leaders say they are incensed by what they call the excessive use of firepower by American soldiers, particularly after roadside bombings. City officials and witnesses said six civilians traveling to work in a minivan were killed on Oct. 27 when soldiers from the 82nd sprayed the street with bullets after a bomb exploded near their convoy. A week earlier, two civilians were killed by soldiers who opened fire after another bombing, local officials said.

"The Americans are creating enemies by the way they are treating people," said Feras Khalil, a psychology teacher. He said his house was hit with a 10-minute fusillade of American gunfire on Saturday evening after an attacker standing on the street fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the mayor's office, where a contingent of paratroops was stationed. The soldiers, who believed the grenade was fired from inside Khalil's house, responded with 40 Mark-19 grenades, a light antitank weapon and 1,000 rounds of small-arms fire.

"There is no justification for what they did," Khalil growled as he pointed at dozens of bullet pockmarks on the front of his two-story stucco house.

The morale of our men will be under constant scrutiny by the media and thus the enemy will monitor us closely. Low morale, a weakness in spirit, will embolden the enemy. Imaging our men through the frustrations and challenges, teaching them to take it all in stride, employing sound/effective tactics, sucking up things we don't like, and sharing our courage with the American people are all essential to maintaining the macho spirit of our men. We intend to confront the enemy with menacing dilemmas, share kindness with the innocent, and never to be intimidated, even if "morale" flights, etc., become problematic in this environment. We will keep our anger under control and faith in each other.

Erosion Of Morale Feared In Wake Of Foe's Success

By Stephen J. Hedges and Mike Dorning, Chicago Tribune correspondents. Tribune correspondent E.A. Torriero contributed to this report from Baghdad

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BAGHDAD -- Just 14 hours earlier, Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the military man in charge here, explained a week of unprecedented violence in Iraq as "a strategically and operationally insignificant surge of attacks."

By that, he meant no major military targets had been destroyed. But then came a cool, clear Sunday morning and the deaths of at least 16 Americans in the downing of a U.S. Army Chinook helicopter.

Sunday's attack may have been a lucky shot for the attackers; other anti-coalition fighters have tried and failed to bring down U.S. aircraft. But it could not be dismissed as, to use the general's words, strategically and operationally insignificant.

Experts say the attack could have a lasting impact on the conflict in Iraq, dimming the morale of U.S. troops and emboldening the anti-American opposition.

"It's a hugely important day," said Milt Bearden, a former CIA officer who led an insurgency against Soviet troops in Afghanistan and remembers how the downings of Soviet helicopters with Stinger missiles helped turn the tide there in the 1980s.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, appearing on ABC, said, "Clearly it is a tragic day for Americans," but added, "In a long hard war we are going to have tragic days."

A White House spokesman, Trent Duffy, refused to describe President Bush's reaction to the helicopter attack, but said those killed "served the highest cause to defend freedom and protect Americans from dangerous new threats before they reach our shores."

The period since May 1, when Bush declared major combat over, had been a kind of hunt-and-peck war--until now. The deaths of American soldiers had come in single digits, usually ones and twos.

The forces of the ex-regime--as Iraqis refer to the fighters--have hit political targets such as the Al Rashid Hotel, but until now had failed in their near-daily attempts to attack significant military targets.

The U.S. military in Iraq has established fortresses, slipping easily into the secluded compounds and bases that former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his security-state forces had used to insulate themselves from internal enemies.

U.S. forces are most vulnerable when they leave those bases, particularly in convoys.

Moving soldiers by air

To address that problem, the military moves as many troops as it can by air; seats on helicopters often are hard to come by. The bomb-cratered runways at two large airfields--one at Camp Ridgeway, near Sunday's attack, and another at Al Asad, farther west--have been repaired recently to make moving soldiers and supplies even less dependent on roads.

"You cannot ever create an effective defense," said Anthony Cordesman, a senior military analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There are too many points of vulnerability. And even if your offense is effective, it will not by itself solve the problem, unless the people as a whole come to support what you're doing."

So far, the Pentagon solution for an offensive has been more aggressive raids in Iraq and accelerated training for Iraqi police, security officers and the nation's new military. But that will take time.

The increasing pace of the guerrilla attacks--they have jumped from fewer than 20 a day to nearly 40 a day in just a month--has prompted calls for a more immediate response.

"They're in a surge period, the bad guys," said retired Brig. Gen. David Grange, a Special Forces veteran who is vice president of the McCormick Tribune Foundation in Chicago. "The coalition has got to do the same.

"They are going to get the psychological advantage if they [the insurgents] can show they can make these attacks at will. They've got to be crushed."

Each success against the U.S. raises the hopes among the ex-regime fighters.

Afghanistan lessons

Bearden, who spent several years directing a resistance that made good use of American-made Stinger shoulder-held missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan, remembers a day in 1986 when three choppers were struck.

"It was electric," he said. "It wasn't the Stinger missile that was so important. It just inspired what was a demoralized Afghanistan opposition to make every day an awful day for the Soviet occupation."

The attacks on U.S. and Iraqi targets during the past month suggest a tightly disciplined military campaign rather than disorganized remnants of the old regime. Gathering intelligence on the anti-American forces has so far been difficult.

Grange said U.S. abilities to gather effective intelligence on insurgents would be hampered so long as Iraqis harbor doubts about the motives and abilities of the U.S. occupation force.

"We have to convince them it's going to work," Grange said. "To do that, we've got to suppress this insurgency and show them through compassion and nation-building that it's worth it."

As if convincing Iraqis weren't tough enough, U.S. commanders face another potential enemy: sinking morale. A decision during the summer to extend the in-country tours of reservists to a full year landed like a lead balloon.

News of Sunday's crash hit hard among U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq, and it was especially tough because some of the victims were on their way out of the country on a leave program designed to improve the troops' morale.

"Today was pretty bad," said Army Pfc. Misty Scheirer, 23, of Knoxville, Tenn., an 82nd Airborne Division guard at a base near Fallujah. "You get kind of used to it, but of course it brings you down. It just makes it worse that they were almost just out of here."

During the weekend, an ABC-Washington Post poll found that, for the first time, a majority of Americans surveyed--51 percent--disapprove of Bush's handling of Iraq.

Concerns among soldiers in Iraq already were percolating before the Chinook went down.

"We were supposed to come over here, take names, kick butt and go home," said one soldier with the Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment recently. "Well, we're taking names and kicking butt. But we're still here."

Trust is difficult to build, easy to lose in this environment. We must warn our young men that the enemy will try to manipulate us into thinking Iraqis are the enemy so we then create enemies by our response. We will not be manipulated. Our faith in victory and in each other, as well as use of sound tactics that single out and destroy the enemy will be tested. Additionally we will not build up this enemy or show disillusion in our progress because the enemy fights us. We shouldn't say, "It seems like we've taken a step backwards" unless the intent is to raise the enemy's morale. Again, we'll take it all in stride, gain trust and intelligence from the people, and isolate/destroy the enemy.

Goodwill Is Fragile In New Iraq

By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Published November 5, 2003

ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ – As the cinderblock rubble of what was to be Abu Ghraib's new marketplace is carted off by scavengers, a piece of the goodwill that had slowly been built between Iraqis and Americans stationed here is also disappearing.

Just this month the new market had opened, a symbol of reconstruction progress in this poor agricultural town just west of Baghdad - and on the fringes of the violent Sunni Triangle. But by Sunday, what was intended as a community-improvement project, planned and executed by the US military in cooperation with the local town council, lay in ruins. It was crushed by American tanks and a combination of fear, misunderstandings, and outside insurgent interference.

The two days of riots and destruction of Abu Ghraib's market - which left at least seven Iraqis dead - symbolize the fragile state of relations between Iraqis and the American authorities, and the susceptibility of those relations to cultural differences and faltering security. Six months after the American military began planning and helping with everything from water projects to school refurbishments here, Abu Ghraib suggests how cooperation and sympathies so painstakingly nurtured, can be lost in a flash.

"We loved the Americans when they came, I believed when they said they came to help us," says Hossein Ibrahim, an intense former film student who lost the dishware and cutlery he sold in the market after the war. "But now I hate them, they are worse than Saddam."

The Americans, many of whom have been here since the war, are perplexed by the abrupt turn against a project meant to improve lives. But at the same time, as US soldiers have faced increasing roadside attacks and random fire, they have shifted to a more defensive and protective stance - a position that raises walls higher between them and the Iraqis.

"We'd made a lot of progress, so to have this problem at the market, where people come in and occupy it, and force us to destroy it, is really... It's disturbing," says Maj. Eric Wick, executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment, responsible for Abu Ghraib.

"It seems like we've taken a step backwards, but we're working hard with the local council to get things back on track," adds the Wisconsinite, who has watched Abu Ghraib evolve for eight months. "We want to make things better."

There are about as many versions of what happened at the Abu Ghraib market, beginning Friday, as there are plump crimson pomegranates on the average fruit cart here. But what started as a small protest over

Iraqi police efforts to move traffic- blocking vendors flared to a bloody confrontation between locals and outsiders on one side- some armed with rockets - and US troops and tanks.

The new market was designed to get vendors - whose numbers had mushroomed after the war as nearby factories closed - off the streets and into new stalls. The market was also envisioned as a traffic-control project. The many vendors often blocked the entrance to a hospital, as well as the highway running through town to nearby Fallujah.

As attacks against US forces have increased in Fallujah - where a helicopter was downed Sunday, killing 15 American soldiers - keeping the highway clear has become a higher priority.

Offering more than 400 stalls, the new market looked like it would be a success. But when the town council decided to impose a small daily fee for stall space, some vendors balked, and returned to laying out their goods beside the highway.

With congestion building again, the new Iraqi police on Friday decided to return order and clear the street. Rocks were thrown, and the police, feeling threatened, called in the Americans. As tanks and infantry soldiers arrived, what had been small-arms fire escalated to grenades and 25- millimeter shells being fired at the US troops.

According to Major Wick, the Americans followed established rules of engagement, carefully targeting only rioters with weapons or seen lobbing grenades. But buildings where assailants had taken up positions - in at least one case with a missile launcher - were fired on. And as at least a dozen individuals retreated with arms into the new market, the Americans turned to blasting the very walls that so recently they had helped build.

On Sunday, violence peaked again when Estonian soldiers on patrol were attacked, obliging the Americans to step in once more. By the time it was all over, at least seven Iraqis were dead - although Wick acknowledges that some of the injured had been removed from the scene by locals, and that 14 funerals were held in Abu Ghraib on Monday.

"The Americans arrest people just for selling in the streets, and now they kill them, so how is this better than Saddam?" says Ali Ahmed Saleh, standing by the flattened hulk that was once the rusty pickup from which he operated a moving business.

Furious that a tank crushed his only source of income, he says it's actions like this that are turning Abu Ghraib away from the US. "The Americans used to walk through the market and buy things, it was nice, but about a month ago they changed. They showed less respect, and now this. I'm afraid that with so many people out of work in the market," he adds, "if someone comes and offers them \$200 to kill an American, they won't hesitate to do it."

WHAT happened about a month ago is that attacks on Americans here picked up. Security forces also began getting information about infiltration by outside parties - perhaps Hussein loyalists or radical Islamists - and some local people say they noticed more visits by strangers as well.

American soldiers on search missions following the riots found weapons in one mosque. And on Monday, a new banner, "Long live the Jihadis," fluttered at the town's entrance, though no one claimed to have put it up.

And the Iraqi outsiders weren't the only newcomers. Feeling a need for reinforced security, the nearby American base called in Ace Company, an armored group whose moniker is "Aces of Death." While the 70th Armored Regiment had ridden around Abu Ghraib for months with a smiling turtle as their emblem, now Ace Company flies through town with their symbol, a skull and crossbones.

"They are the dirty unit, they are killers and thieves," says Saad Jemeel, who lost the lamb meat stall he rented in the new market. "What are we supposed to think when we see their flag, that they are coming to help us?"

The local council, which was so proud to be the first elected municipal council of the new Iraq, has also been stunned by riots that targeted Iraqi authorities - the police and the council - as much as the US military.

"So much needed to be done here and we have accomplished so much, there's more electricity, clean water, better schools, it's difficult to understand why this happened," says Dhari Khamis al-Dhari, a local sheikh who was the council's chairman for its first six months. "There isn't much to smile about these days."

Now the council sits behind large sand-filled berms and a locked gate, watched over by two American tanks. Mr. Dhari, still a council member here, has moved up to a seat on the Baghdad city council in recognition of his ability to navigate local and American demands. But he and other council members have received threats in Abu Ghraib, so they don't mingle with the public as they once did.

"I'm sure it's people from outside the area," says Dhari, who admits to feeling deep sadness over the recent events.

The council on Sunday voted to build a new market outside the town center and away from the Fallujah highway - a decision that could inflame public opinion again when moving time comes.

But Major Wick remains hopeful. He says the riots have resulted in an abrupt uptick in local cooperation, as more people decide they want the attacks to stop. And he thinks the bitterness over the ill-fated market can be addressed. On the council, he says, "They're looking at making the destroyed site into a park instead."

Men – remember: brilliance in the basics and the fundamental role of NCO expectations/supervision of our troops basic soldiering.

This is in reference to the book review "I am a Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story" in the Press-Enterprise on November 16, 2003.

I honestly feel sorry for Jessica Lynch, not only for what went through and is currently going through, but for the lack of leadership she had in Iraq, which led to this whole fiasco. Why haven't we heard anything about her commanding officer or NCOs being brought up on charges for endangering their soldiers because of THEIR lack of leadership? I still can't believe that all the M16s jammed during the firefight Jessica Lynch was in. I was in several firefights in Iraq and my weapon never jammed once. I don't remember seeing one rifle jamming in a firefight. Why did her weapon jam and mine did not? The answer is simple: I was a United States Marine, not a soldier. I had the self-discipline to clean my rifle several times a day. The excuse of not having time should not even be brought up, as I was a Marine Infantryman on the front lines, and I had the time to clean my rifle. Everywhere I went I saw Marines cleaning their M16s, machine-guns, mortars, trucks, tanks, etc. The NCOs (young corporals and sergeants) were making sure their Marines were keeping up the maintenance on weapons and equipment. They did not have to be told to do this, they knew it had to be done.

I want to know why we don't hear about an investigation into why there was a lack of supervision in Lynch's unit. Where is all the media hype about her unit being lost? Where is all the hype about the weapons failing in combat due to a lack of self-discipline on the individual's part and the lack of leadership in her unit?

The author of the book has not spent time with the Marines as he states, "All they had with them was the metal and plastic M16, a weapon infamous over four decades for jamming in the hands of its users." Maybe Bragg (the author) should interview Marines and ask their opinions on the M16A2/M16A4. Marines love the M16 family of rifles. They are the most accurate battle rifles in the world, easy to clean, and are reliable. There are reports of Marines hitting enemy soldiers out to 800 meters with the new M16A4's and not having problems with the rifle jamming.

Maybe the top brass in the U.S. Army should go to recruit training in San Diego or Parris Island and see how the Marine recruits are trained with the M16. I think fewer classes on how to be politically correct and more classes on being a warrior may be the solution to their problems.

Mike Chermie
Retired Marine

Ours will largely be a battle for intelligence: once we know where the enemy is, we will move swiftly to crush him without hurting the innocent, who will then provide us more intelligence. When highly reliant on human intelligence (HUMINT), two points need to be made: that “dry holes” are to be expected and should be no cause for frustration on the lance corporal level; and that gaining the affections of the people while reducing adversarial relations between us and the people is critical to mission success. Young Marines on patrol need to know they are more valuable than million dollar satellites. To be “gentle as a dove, shrewd as a serpent” is necessary.

Insurgents Gain A Deadly Edge In Intelligence

By John Diamond, Steven Komarow and Kevin Johnson, USA Today

Published November 5, 2003

U.S. forces are losing the intelligence battle in Iraq to an increasingly organized guerrilla force that uses stealth, spies and surprise to inflict punishing casualties.

U.S. military, intelligence and law enforcement officials say that after six months of intensifying guerrilla warfare, Iraqi insurgents know more about the U.S. and allied forces — their style of operations, convoy routes and vulnerable targets — than the coalition forces know about them. Indeed, U.S. intelligence has had trouble simply identifying the enemy and figuring out how many are Iraqis and how many are foreign fighters.

With local knowledge and the element of surprise on their side, the guerrillas are exploiting their intelligence edge to overcome the coalition's overwhelming military superiority. Insurgents routinely use inexpensive explosives to destroy multimillion-dollar assets, including tanks and helicopters. Using surveillance and inside information, the guerrillas have assassinated many Iraqis helping the coalition, gunned down a member of the U.S.-appointed Governing Council, killed the top United Nations official in Iraq and blasted the heavily guarded hotel in Baghdad where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying.

Sophisticated U.S. intelligence tools such as spy satellites and electronic eavesdropping intercepts have been of little practical use, according to intelligence officials in Washington and military officers in Iraq. And despite an intense search and exhaustive intelligence efforts, deposed leader Saddam Hussein remains at large.

The key problem is that Iraqi guerrillas simply have more and better sources than the coalition. U.S. military officers worry that the Iraqis who work for them, such as translators, cooks and drivers, include moles who routinely pass inside information back to insurgents. In at least two cases, Iraqis have been fired on the suspicion that they were spies.

A former senior director in the Iraqi intelligence service says the Americans are right to be anxious.

"The intelligence on the Americans is comprehensive and detailed," says the Iraqi, who insisted on not being identified and spoke to a reporter in a private home rather than at a restaurant or hotel to avoid being observed. He says Iraqi guerrilla forces get detailed reports on what is going on inside the palace grounds occupied by Paul Bremer, the chief U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq, Bremer's staff and the Governing Council. Again on Tuesday, guerrillas fired mortar rounds into the "Green Zone," the heavily secured area of central Baghdad that includes Bremer's headquarters.

Attacks on troops, Iraqis

Guerrilla forces have mounted repeated attacks on U.S. convoys despite frequent changes of route and routine. One frustrated U.S. commander points out that there are only so many ways to drive between downtown Baghdad and Baghdad International Airport, a trip U.S. forces must make and during which they have frequently been ambushed.

Insurgents have also mounted devastating attacks after conducting patient surveillance of major targets such as the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, the elaborately secured Al Rasheed Hotel and a military supply train.

And they have identified and in several cases killed Iraqis helping the coalition. An Iraqi scientist who had provided confidential assistance to U.S. teams hunting for banned weapons last summer was gunned down outside his Baghdad apartment, chief U.S. weapons searcher David Kay told members of Congress last month. A week ago, an Iraqi security guard working with the Army on the secure transport of surplus Iraqi munitions answered a knock on his door and was asked whether he was still helping the Americans. He answered yes and was fatally shot three times in the chest, according to Dan Coberly, spokesman for the Army Corps of Engineers.

U.S. intelligence cable traffic between Baghdad and Washington is rife with warnings about Iraqi employees of the coalition secretly supplying information to guerrillas, according to a U.S. intelligence official and a high-ranking defense official. Coalition authorities suspect that some insider information may have aided guerrillas in the Aug. 19 bombing of the U.N. headquarters that killed Sergio Viera de Mello, the top U.N. official in Iraq. The former Iraqi intelligence official says guerrillas knew that Wolfowitz was at the Al Rasheed Hotel last week, a closely guarded secret.

"Absolutely they did. In fact, the sixth and 12th floors were targeted," the Iraqi says. Pentagon officials say they have no evidence the guerrillas knew Wolfowitz was in the hotel when they launched their rocket barrage Oct. 26.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says the coalition will rapidly increase the number of Iraqis serving as police and joining U.S. forces on military patrols. But he acknowledges that hurrying Iraqis into security roles increases the risk that some will be moles working for the other side.

The guerrillas are as skillful at keeping their secrets out of U.S. hands as they are at collecting sensitive information about coalition operations. By using rudimentary security precautions such as avoiding the careless use of cell phones, guerrillas have kept their attack plans a secret. A series of bombings last week in Baghdad caught U.S. commanders completely by surprise, according to two U.S. military sources in Iraq.

A defense intelligence official says Iraqi guerrillas are sophisticated in covert tradecraft. They "compartmentalize" information, so no one operative knows enough to compromise an operation if caught. They use "cut-outs," intermediaries who protect the identity of operatives and pass messages. And they plant false information in coalition hands.

Just such a false lead may have led to the ambush death of a National Guard military policeman, Spc. Richard Orengo, in Najaf in June. Called to investigate a car theft, Orengo instead walked into a firefight and was killed.

Coalition struggles

Army Lt. Col. Jim Danna, a unit commander in Baghdad, says soldiers in Iraq know they can't rely on complex intelligence devices to fight the Iraqi insurgency.

"The U.S. intelligence community in general is a technology-based force, designed to fight against a peer foe," such as the Soviet Union, Danna says. But what is going on in Iraq today "is a human-based war." For troops trying to protect themselves and the new Iraqi government, the useful information is "98% human intelligence" from local sources.

Military intelligence field units have had some success developing reliable sources, arresting former regime officials and increasing the volume of viable tips, commanders say. But they face an Iraqi populace reluctant to help them, whether because the Iraqis oppose the occupation or fear they'll be killed by guerrillas if they cooperate.

Intelligence officials say they have had little success in getting information that would allow them to thwart attacks. Some tips have turned out to be traps meant to lure soldiers into ambushes.

"No, we're not satisfied with the quality or quantity of our intelligence," Wolfowitz told National Public Radio last week. Field commanders now get so many reports from Iraqi sources that "sifting out the good from the bad is a real challenge," Wolfowitz said.

At the field headquarters of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in downtown Baghdad, intelligence gathering resembles old-fashioned detective work.

Told that an informant says a Saddam loyalist wanted for questioning has turned up at a local hotel, Army Col. Ralph Baker replies, "Let's pick him up."

Baker says traditional Army methods are light on human intelligence. The focus is the battlefield, not the community. But now, Baker and others say, the only way to win is to get tips from the same people the Army is working with on sewage projects, school renovations and the like.

"We call them the silent majority," Baker says. "We were slow getting started," he concedes, but today "we have a tremendous information network."

'Mission impossible'

While the military wants information about the location of guerrilla hideouts and coming attacks, the FBI has a large team in Baghdad trying to find the culprits in recent rocket and car-bomb attacks.

One official with knowledge of the investigations says the difficulty of getting reliable intelligence has made tracking down attackers "almost mission impossible." For example, Iraq's unreliable telephone system has confounded U.S. efforts to consistently gain information from the sort of electronic surveillance that works in U.S. investigations, the official says.

An example of the frustration experienced by U.S. authorities has been the ongoing FBI investigation into the U.N. bombing.

Within hours of the blast, investigators had recovered the vehicle identification number, manufacturer number and Iraqi license plate attached to the Russian-made truck used in the bombing. In most countries, the recovery of just one of those items would have been a coup, tantamount to a quick and sure resolution.

In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the rear axle of the truck that held the bomb led agents to the Kansas rental agency where bomber Timothy McVeigh had leased the vehicle. Parts of the truck used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing also linked terror suspects to a rental agency. In Iraq, the gold mine of vehicle evidence yielded little immediate payoff because Iraqi vehicle records are in disarray.

Furthermore, continuing combat in Baghdad means that even on routine forays through the city, FBI agents must travel with the bureau's hostage rescue team just to ensure the agents' safety. The heavily armed and visually conspicuous teams get in the way of conducting clandestine meetings with Iraqi sources.

"It's pretty difficult to get people to feel comfortable with you when you pull up with a SWAT team," the official says.

Diamond and Johnson reported from Washington, Komarow from Baghdad. Contributing: Dave Moniz in Washington; wire reports.



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5000

PAO

19 Nov 03

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
To: Commanders And Senior Staff Noncommissioned Officers

Subj: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

1. Gentlemen: For obvious reasons we need to keep keen situational awareness of the dynamics associated with Iraq stabilization operations. Attached are articles chosen for their relevance. While learning from experience is good, learning from others' experiences is even better.

2. The cost of any discipline breaches is potentially tragic in the environment we will face. These periodic updates are required reading for all company/battery, battalion and regimental commanders. Commanders are encouraged to inculcate lessons learned throughout their ranks as they deem appropriate, thus ensuring my intent is understood and implemented throughout the command.

3. Commanders are further encouraged to submit articles, excerpts, etc. for inclusion in the upcoming distributions. Together we will disseminate critical information that will ensure shared situational awareness up and down the chain of command and arm ourselves for the challenges we must take in stride. I consider full situational awareness, to include our youngest Sailors and Marines, critical to mission accomplishment and an essential building block for the discipline standards essential for force protection.

J. N. MATTIS

Copy to:

General Staff
CG, I MEF
CO, CSSG

Shutting down arms markets and controlling ammo dumps until the explosive materiel is destroyed is essential. We will commit troops to these tasks to reduce our enemy's access to what they require to continue attacking us. Alert troops, active HETs, integrated ops with Iraqi police and winning the trust of locals will be necessary to winning this part of the fight.

Iraqis Sell Weapons At Open-Air Locations

By Paul Martin, The Washington Times

Published November 4, 2003

BAGHDAD — Groups of Iraqis can be seen any day sitting on iron chairs around the graves at a large cemetery on the outskirts of the Iraqi capital, but not all of them are visiting their ancestors.

During three two-hour shifts each day, the cemetery serves as an open-air arms bazaar where, virtually under the noses of coalition officials, Iraqis trade in the sorts of deadly weapons that are being used to attack U.S. forces.

One U.S. soldier was killed and another wounded in the latest such attack yesterday, when a homemade bomb exploded near the northern Iraqi town of Tikrit, the U.S. military said.

U.S. forces meanwhile searched through barns and haystacks near Fallujah, about 30 miles west of Baghdad, seeking shoulder-fired missiles like the one that brought down a Chinook helicopter Sunday, killing 16 soldiers.

A former Iraqi military officer last week illustrated the ease with which such weapons are bought and sold in Iraq by negotiating the purchase of two rocket-propelled grenade launchers at the Baghdad cemetery.

The launchers were subsequently handed over to an American officer at the Al-Saliyha police station in downtown Baghdad, who acknowledged that the country is awash with weaponry left over from Saddam Hussein's vast arsenal.

"What you've done is help reduce the death threats we face daily," the appreciative officer said before writing out a receipt for the weapons. "You've taken some rocket launchers off the street, but we know there are so many more."

The former army officer who negotiated the purchase agreed to be identified only as Gen. Alameen.

He said he ordered the weapons in the late afternoon from Brahim Khalil, a former sergeant in the disbanded Iraqi army, who was a mine-laying specialist. But, he said, most of the arms-sellers at the graveyard are ages 15 to 20 and work for more-senior dealers.

The next day, the general waited at the cemetery for 15 minutes before a young boy arrived and led him to another part of the graveyard where senior Ba'athist officials are buried.

There the boy offered five RPG launchers and seven rockets for sale. The general chose two launchers, both Russian-made, costing a total of \$220. "If you need more, just let me know," he quoted the seller as saying.

Also on offer were hand grenades with timing devices.

Rockets to go with the RPG launcher can be bought for \$20 to \$30, the general said, though in Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, there is a market where huge numbers of rockets are available at just \$10 to \$15 each. Even lower prices are available for purchases of 50 rockets or more.

One of the RPG launchers purchased by Gen. Alameen had a white stamp with the head of Saddam indicating it had belonged to the hard-line Saddam Fedayeen guerrilla forces, who used RPGs extensively against U.S. and British troops during the spring war.

An RPG is thought to have been used a week ago to shoot down an American Black Hawk helicopter, which caught fire after an emergency landing near Tikrit. A more sophisticated SA-7 Grail shoulder-fired missile was blamed for the weekend crash of a Chinook helicopter near Fallujah.

"An ordinary man can buy weapons in around 10 days, just by getting sent to the right dealer by word of mouth," said Gen. Alameen. "But for former army people it's easy. I could buy 100 RPG launchers and their rockets if I had the ready cash."

The general made a separate weapons purchase for his own use of a Kalashnikov automatic rifle for \$150 dollars, a 9mm Iraqi-made pistol for \$300 and several magazines.

"I need these to defend myself from 'Ali Baba' robbers and to protect my kids when I take them to school. Kidnappings and robberies are common," he said.

Tucking the weapons into special compartments inside his car, the officer said authorities "will never find them even if they use long-handled mirrors to search under the car. A U.S. checkpoint stopped me when I came back from buying the RPG launchers, and they found nothing."

While seeking authorities to whom he could surrender the launchers, the general parked opposite the Al Rasheed Hotel, which housed numerous top coalition and Iraqi officials until it was hit by a rocket attack last month.

"From this distance, around 80 yards, you can easily hit any window," Gen. Alameen noted.

He also parked in front of Assassin's Gate, the arched entrance to the grounds of the 'Four-Headed Saddam' Palace where coalition chief L. Paul Bremer's staff is based. Guards at the gate directed the car to a conference center opposite the Al Rasheed.

In the end, a U.S. intelligence officer suggested that launchers be handed in at the nearby Al-Saliyha police station.

In terms of why we are fighting in Iraq, this article provides some focused analysis. I expect our commanders will be able to articulate our purpose in Iraq sufficiently to keep their men focused on the mission despite certain frustrations.

It's No Vietnam

By Thomas L. Friedman

Published October 30, 2003

Since 9/11, we've seen so much depraved violence we don't notice anymore when we hit a new low. Monday's attacks in Baghdad were a new low. Just stop for one second and contemplate what happened: A suicide bomber, driving an ambulance loaded with explosives, crashed into the Red Cross office and blew himself up on the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. This suicide bomber was not restrained by either the sanctity of the Muslim holy day or the sanctity of the Red Cross. All civilizational norms were tossed aside. This is very unnerving. Because the message from these terrorists is: "There are no limits. We have created our own moral universe, where anything we do against Americans or Iraqis who cooperate with them is O.K."

What to do? The first thing is to understand who these people are. There is this notion being peddled by Europeans, the Arab press and the antiwar left that "Iraq" is just Arabic for Vietnam, and we should expect these kinds of attacks from Iraqis wanting to "liberate" their country from "U.S. occupation." These attackers are the Iraqi Vietcong.

Hogwash. The people who mounted the attacks on the Red Cross are not the Iraqi Vietcong. They are the Iraqi Khmer Rouge — a murderous band of Saddam loyalists and Al Qaeda nihilists, who are not killing us so Iraqis can rule themselves. They are killing us so they can rule Iraqis.

Have you noticed that these bombers never say what their political agenda is or whom they represent? They don't want Iraqis to know who they really are. A vast majority of Iraqis would reject them, because these bombers either want to restore Baathism or install bin Ladenism.

Let's get real. What the people who blew up the Red Cross and the Iraqi police fear is not that we're going to permanently occupy Iraq. They fear that we're going to permanently change Iraq. The great irony is that the Baathists and Arab dictators are opposing the U.S. in Iraq because — unlike many leftists — they understand exactly what this war is about. They understand that U.S. power is not being used in Iraq for oil, or imperialism, or to shore up a corrupt status quo, as it was in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Arab world during the cold war. They understand that this is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched — a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.

Most of the troubles we have encountered in Iraq (and will in the future) are not because of "occupation" but because of "empowerment." The U.S. invasion has overturned a whole set of vested interests, particularly those of Iraq's Sunni Baathist establishment, and begun to empower instead a whole new set of actors: Shiites, Kurds, non-Baathist Sunnis, women and locally elected officials and police. The Qaeda nihilists, the Saddamists, and all the Europeans and the Arab autocrats who had a vested interest in the old status quo are threatened by this.

Many liberals oppose this war because they can't believe that someone as radically conservative as George W. Bush could be mounting such a radically liberal war. Some, though, just don't believe the Bush team will do it right.

The latter has been my concern. Can this administration, whose national security team is so divided, effectively stay the course in Iraq? Has the president's audacity in waging such a revolutionary war outrun his ability to articulate what it's about and to summon Americans for the sacrifices victory will require? Can the president really be a successful radical liberal on Iraq, while being such a radical conservative everywhere else — refusing to dismiss one of his own generals who insults Islam, turning a deaf ear to hints of corruption infecting the new Baghdad government as it's showered with aid dollars, calling on reservists and their families to bear all the burdens of war while slashing taxes for the rich, and undertaking the world's biggest nation-building project with few real allies?

I don't know. But here's what I do know: If Mr. Bush doesn't treat the next year as his second term, when he must do all the right things in Iraq without regard to politics, it is the only second term he's going to see.

On Oct. 23, when I cited 900 wounded in action in Iraq, I was referring to the period since Mr. Bush declared major fighting over on May 1. I was still wrong. Pentagon data shows 1,059 U.S. soldiers wounded in action from May 1 to Oct. 22.

Read the Tipping Point... then read this article.

Killing Shatters Goodwill

A U.S. soldier kills the head of the municipal council in Sadr city in a misunderstanding

By *ORLY HALPERN, Cox News Service*

Published November 11, 2003

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- The slum of Sadr City, a teeming Shiite Muslim quarter of the capital, has posed relatively few problems for the U.S.-led occupation. Shiites were persecuted by Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated regime and lived in poverty and fear.

But in an instant, a measure of goodwill toward the Americans was shaken.

The head of the U.S.-appointed municipal council was shot dead Sunday by a U.S. soldier during an altercation outside the municipal offices. Muhanad al-Kaadi, 27, who essentially served as mayor of the 2 million residents of Sadr City, died after being rushed to a hospital with at least one gunshot wound.

"It's a sad event," said U.S. Army Col. William Bishop, a liaison with the council. "A good man died, and I'm concerned not only for the family of the individual but how the good people of Iraq will view this."

The municipal council, created by the U.S.-led coalition to bring democracy to grass-roots Iraqis, announced a three-day strike to protest the killing and mourn al-Kaadi. A demonstration expected to draw thousands was scheduled for today.

"This is unthinkable," Jassen Kathem al-Abudi, a council member, said Monday. "Instead of being protected by the people who are supposed to protect us, we are killed by them."

On Monday, men carried al-Kaadi's coffin through the streets of Sadr City as women covered in black sobbed. Others carried banners declaring he had been "killed by American bullets."

At his home, his sisters demanded to know what the punishment would be for the soldier who killed their eldest brother.

"You Americans are no different from Saddam, just killing the Iraqis," said Dala al-Kaadi, 18.

Sunday just before noon, a U.S. soldier barred al-Kaadi from passing through the front gate of the municipal offices to head a meeting of the council.

Eyewitnesses said U.S. soldiers did not recognize al-Kaadi and turned him away. Council members said al-Kaadi left and used his cellphone to call and secure permission to enter. He then returned to the gate but was again refused entry.

Al-Kaadi "got out of the car and yelled at the soldier, and the soldier pushed him," said Ahmad Jabbar, an Iraqi policeman who witnessed the killing. "Then he grabbed the soldier, and then another soldier shot one bullet into the air. They both backed off from each other, and then the other soldier shot Muhanad."

U.S. military officials on Monday said the incident is under investigation.

Gentlemen – Remember the Small Wars Manual that highlights such attributes as compassion and the provision of jobs as being important to mission success in this environment. When the locals articulate this sort of fondness for us even months after our departure (in the case of 3/5), we've broken the enemy's support base and opened human intelligence flow to our fighting teams. We must fight to gain Iraqi goodwill first by doing no harm to any innocent person regardless how the enemy tries to agitate distrust between us and the Iraqi people.

Locals Miss Americans In Southern Iraqi City

By Luke Baker, Reuters

Published November 5, 2003

DIWANIYA, Iraq – U.S. forces have been criticized for heavy-handedness in many parts of Iraq, but in the bustling riverside city of Diwaniya, residents long to have them back.

Spanish soldiers took over responsibility for the city from United States troops back in July, and while the Europeans are seen to be fair and firm overseers, many in the city say they miss the Americans' warmth and openness.

"The Americans have a good culture, they got along with us and integrated with us – they brought down the barriers," said Ala Saleh, 41, a high school teacher in the city, which lies about 110 miles south of Baghdad.

"The Spanish are good and they keep things under control, but the Americans are better," he said Wednesday.

Others backed that view, emphasizing the gap between what the Americans and the Europeans have achieved during their time in command, without necessarily criticizing the Spanish.

"The Americans did a lot of work, they fixed up buildings and offices, got schools going, gave us jobs," said Hussein Fadel, who was hired as a security guard by U.S. forces.

"They were flexible and communicative, whereas, unfortunately, it's not easy to communicate with the Spanish."

That is largely the result of the language barrier, with many Iraqis able to speak a few words of English – and keen to repeat any American slang they've heard – but very few capable of understanding any Spanish.

But it may also reflect the fact U.S. troops arrived in the euphoria following Saddam Hussein's fall and launched quick-start projects, often with cash from the old regime's bank accounts.

In cities like Diwaniya, which largely escaped fighting during the war that overthrew Saddam, U.S. forces were able to repair buildings, fix schools and provide jobs, quickly winning "hearts and minds" in the process.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Now, as the United States passes security and peacekeeping responsibilities on to other members of its coalition such as Spain, Poland and Hungary, locals are comparing the efforts of the new arrivals to the impact the Americans achieved.

In Diwaniya, security guards hired by the United States were originally being paid \$160 a month. But the Spanish cut that to \$75, one guard said. And while the Americans paid \$20 for any weapons handed in, the Spanish don't pay anything.

With cash running out from the old government accounts and local people now looking for more than quick fixes, the problems the Spanish face could also arise for other troops around the country, regardless of their nationality.

Spanish forces patrolling the streets of Diwaniya say they're happy with the work they're doing and feel they get a good response from the locals.

As the Spanish Legion went on patrol, young boys gave the soldiers a thumbs up and smiled. But older residents were less happy.

"The Spanish don't give us anything, they don't give us jobs," said Kareem Hassan, 26, who used to work as a translator for the Americans but is now unemployed.

"They're good at keeping things calm, but now we need something more."

The health, hydration and prevention of disease is a line officer responsibility. Leaders are accountable for the well being of their men. In the 1st Marine Division, a situation like the one outlined below would lead to relief of the responsible commanders. The hygiene, monitored hydration, and disease prevention measures must receive all commanders' attention, and symptom surveillance reporting is mandatory within the Division.

Disease prevention measures include such seemingly minor details as Permethrin treatment of every uniform we take in theater, ensuring repellent is used, sleeves are worn all the way down at all times (also a safeguard against flash burns), and maintaining absolute certainty that 100% of the troops are taking their anti-malarial medicine.

Marines' Complacency Cited In Malaria Case

By C. Mark Brinkley, Marine Corps Times staff writer

Published October 29, 2003

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.- Doctors studying an outbreak of malaria among peacekeepers in Liberia say the Marines had plenty of medicine but grew complacent about taking the pills and employing other precautions- a charge their commander denied at the time of the infections and questions even now.

Doctors studying the malaria outbreak among members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and other U.S. troops in September can prove that only seven of 133 Marines adhered to the required dosing schedule, despite access to strong, adequate antimalarial drugs, Marine officials said.

The results are based on a variety of medical tests conducted on troops who went ashore and one Marine official familiar with the findings called the conclusions "undeniable."

The doctors also report that 95 percent of the infected troops claimed to have missed no dose of drugs, the official said.

The investigation was conducted with assistance from a variety of agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization. The findings were briefed to members of the House and Senate armed services committees in October.

The Marine Corps did not release the findings, and the service's medical spokesman was not available for comment by press time.

Malaria is an infectious disease transmitted through the bite of a mosquito, characterized by a cycle of chills, fever and sweating similar to the flu.

If the infection goes untreated or the parasites are resistant to medication, the illness quickly can become life threatening, destroying red blood cells and clogging the capillaries that carry blood to the brain and other vital organs, according to the World Health Organization.

Typically, Marines who deploy to regions where malaria is prevalent protect themselves through a combination of preventative medicines and insect repellent. In the case of the Marines ashore in Liberia, a similar regimen was prescribed.

All told, 80 U.S. peacekeepers became infected with malaria during their brief stay in the West African nation, including 69 Marines from the 26th MEU, two Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Marines, seven sailors, one soldier and one U.S. civilian.

At the time of the outbreak, 26th MEU commander Col. Andrew Frick was “adamant” that his troops could not be blamed for the problems.

“Was it out of negligence or not taking medicine? I’d say no,” Frick said in September, when Marines were in intensive care after contracting the disease “I’d be adamant. We feel we took the appropriate steps to mitigate this.”

Those steps included taking the prescribed antimalarial medicine, as well as spraying staging areas for bugs and using insect repellent, he said.

On Oct. 21, as the members of the 26th MEU returned to Camp Lejeune after a nearly eight-month deployment, Frick said the malaria issue still was under investigation. Although he had heard reports of complacency among his Marines, he said that’s not an answer he’s prepared to accept without serious proof.

“I’ve heard that report, but I’m not sure it’s true,” Frick said, during interviews at the homecoming. “If it’s true, it’s. But I think we need to look at it some more. I might be surprised, but I don’t think that was the cause.”

At least 300 million acute cases of malaria occur globally each year, resulting in more than a million deaths, according to WHO statistics. About 90 percent of those deaths occur in Africa, where malaria kills a child every 30 seconds, on average.

“The important thing is that everyone is OK and we can look at it,” Frick said. “We need to see what happened.”

Humiliation of Iraqis must not be part of our interaction with the people in our AO. Engaging former officers in PME's, dealing reasonably and in a friendly manner, and showing courtesy to all does not increase risk to our troops: in fact, it reduces risk. An alert Guardian Angel, curious and perceptive, permits us to deal with Iraqis as partners in destroying the remnants of the Ba'ath, whether with jobs or bullets. Treat them well and never allow our enemy to manipulate us into treating the Iraqi people in a humiliating manner – we stay friendly one week longer, one day longer, one hour longer, one minute longer than our enemy can withstand.

Muslims And The Humiliation Factor

By Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times

Published November 11, 2003

If President Bush wants to get a better handle on the problems he's facing in Iraq and the West Bank, I suggest he study the speech made Oct. 16 by Malaysia's departing prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, to a conclave of Muslim leaders. Most of that speech was a brutally frank look into the causes of the Muslim world's decline. Though it was also laced with shameful anti-Jewish slurs, it was still revealing. Five times he referred to Muslims as humiliated. If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.

“I will not enumerate the instances of our humiliation,” Mahathir said. “We are all Muslims. We are all oppressed. We are all being humiliated. . . . Today we, the whole Muslim community, are treated with contempt and dishonor. . . . There is a feeling of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their people. They feel that they can do nothing right.” He added: “Our only reaction is to become more and more angry. Angry people cannot think properly.”

One reason Yasser Arafat rejected the Clinton plan for a Palestinian state was that he and many followers didn't want a state handed to them by the U.S. or Israel. That would be “humiliating.” They wanted to win it in blood and fire. Hezbollah TV had bombarded Palestinians with stories of how the Lebanese drove the Israelis out. Palestinian militants wanted the “dignity” of doing the same.

Always remember, the Arab-Israeli conflict is about both borders and Nobel Prizes. It's about where the dividing line should be and it's about the humiliation that comes from one side succeeding at modernity and the other not. As Mahathir said in his speech, “We sacrifice lives unnecessarily, achieving nothing other than to attract more massive retaliation and humiliation. [But] we are up against a people who think. [The Jews] survived 2,000 years of pogroms not by hitting back, but by thinking. . . . We cannot fight them through brawn alone. We must use our brains also.”

Which is why the Palestinians need both their own state and a new leadership able to build their dignity on achievements, not resistance.

Ditto Iraq. Why have the U.S. forces never gotten the ovation they expected for liberating Iraq from Saddam's tyranny? In part, it is because many Iraqis feel humiliated that they didn't liberate themselves, and America's presence, even its aid, reminds them of that. Add the daily slights and miscommunications that

come with any occupation, and even the best-intended liberators will wear out their welcome over time. I was with my Iraqi translator one day in Baghdad, trying to enter the office of the Governing Council. The American private security guard at the door ordered me to shut my mouth until I was told to speak. Then he told my translator to sit in the 130-degree heat while he escorted me -- the American -- inside to see if the Iraqi leader we were seeing was available. Both of us felt like punching that guard in the face.

``Iraq is full of angry men," Mustafa Alrawi, managing editor of Iraq Today, wrote in Beirut's Daily Star. ``For example, in the area unfairly labeled as the `Sunni triangle,' the population was badly hurt by the decision to disband the army and the policy of de-Baathification. ... Thousands of men, many of whom took pride in their rank and status, were left bewildered and confused. It must be remembered that the army ... did not fight the U.S. invasion, effectively giving their stamp of approval to the plan to topple Saddam Hussein. They have wounded pride to restore. Entire tribes feel embarrassed that they supported the invasion, only to be left out in the cold by the coalition's myopic vision of how Iraq should be run."

Never, ever underestimate a people's pride, no matter how broken they might be. It is very easy for Iraqis to hate Saddam and resent America for overstaying. Tap into people's dignity and they will do anything for you. Ignore it, and they won't lift a finger. Which is why a Pakistani friend tells me that what the U.S. needs most in Iraq is a strategy of ``dehumiliation and re-dignification."

The only way we'll foster a decent government in Iraq is if every day we turn a little more power over to Iraqis and create the economic conditions where Iraqis can be successful. The more we empower Iraqis, the less humiliated they will feel, the more time we will have to help them and the less they will need our help.

Men – Marines carry out such other duties as the President may assign. We have our Small Wars doctrine, we have the training, and we have the disciplined, unregimented thinking that allows us to carry on the legacy of Chesty Puller's operations in the Caribbean. If asked, we will make it clear, Marines do windows – always have, always will.

New role in Iraq for local Marines

Troops to assume long-term duties typically left to Army

By Rick Rogers and James W. Crawley

Published November 17, 2003

Twenty thousand San Diego-based Marines will return to Iraq early next year, raising questions about whether the role of occupying force really suits the Marines and what degree of danger they will face.

"The Marines had a slogan that they win battles and the Army wins wars, but these protracted stability operations are what we have," defense analyst Michael Vickers said.

Since World War II, the Corps has been legendary for strikes from sea and air, while long-term land operations are generally left to the Army. The Marines at times have taken on nontraditional tasks over their 228-year history.

Vickers said Marines waded ashore at Da Nang in March 1965 and that during the Vietnam War two divisions, including the 1st Marine Division from Camp Pendleton, helped secure the northernmost part of that country until 1971. At the height of the war, about 85,700 Marines were deployed to Vietnam.

"The Marines were also a major small-war force from 1915 to the 1930s" in Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, said Vickers, director of strategic studies for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. "So there has been swings in what the Marine Corps does, and we might be seeing a new era for the Marines."

Whether the Marine Corps wants the job of caretaker and terrorist-hunter might be another story.

"I don't think there is any doubt that if the Marines were given a vote, they'd vote that the Army should continue doing this role," said retired Marine Gen. Joe Hoar, former head of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for military activities in the Persian Gulf region.

"This is a nontraditional role for the Marines," said Hoar, who retired in 1994 and lives in Del Mar. "But the Army is deeply overcommitted around the world and is not capable of meeting all its responsibilities."

Since most of Camp Pendleton's 1st Marine Division returned from Iraq last summer, the unit commander, Maj. Gen. James Mattis, has pushed to get the troops retrained and their equipment repaired.

Mattis wanted the division ready by November. That marching order has been largely met, said several Camp Pendleton military sources, speaking on condition of anonymity.

When the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Michael Hagee, was asked this week whether his Marines were prepared to spend years rotating through Iraq, he replied, "We are prepared to do anything."

Regardless of whether that is their traditional role, defense experts say – and Hoar agrees – that the Marines are the best choice to do the tough job of patrolling a section of Iraq that includes part of the "Sunni Triangle." There, U.S. forces have come under frequent deadly attack.

"Thank God for the Marines, because the Army needs them," said defense analyst Patrick Garrett with GlobalSecurity.org, an independent think tank in Alexandria, Va.

In earlier interviews, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force commander, Lt. Gen. James Conway, said the Corps' emphasis on infantry was an advantage during post-combat operations during the summer in southern Iraq because ground troops were less frightening to civilians than lumbering tanks. The 1st Marine Division is the infantry portion of the expeditionary force.

Before turning over the region to the multinational forces led by Poland, Marine battalion commanders were given extraordinary powers to oversee Iraqi regions, called governates. The lieutenant colonels controlled police, utilities, education and other government services, negotiating with local Iraqi officials.

But that was then.

"The problem is the environment of Iraq today is very different than the environment they left a few months ago," Garrett said. "It will be interesting to see if they adapt."

Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst with the Washington-based Brookings Institution, said the Marines have experience in counter-insurgency warfare – valuable experience in an Iraq besieged by guerrilla actions against coalition troops.

O'Hanlon cautioned that the Marines have too few civil affairs personnel who are experts in government services, policing and cultural relations. Compared to the Army, the Marines also are light on military police units.

He and Garrett said the Marines probably should emphasize urban warfare and cultural training in the months before the local troops ship out in spring. Both will be important in the continuing search for insurgents, Saddam Hussein and lasting peace.

Peace has been an elusive commodity. In the past five weeks, at least 62 U.S. troops have been killed in Iraq, many of them within the Sunni Triangle.

But security in the region the Marines will be taking over is improving and it could be a much safer place when the Marines get there, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer for the Lexington Institute, a public policy think tank.

"There is good news in what is going on there," Thompson said. "The situation is improving fairly rapidly, and is not as bad as many environments that the Marines have entered."

But it is not all good news, he said. For example, intelligence on the ground has been poor.

"No one can really tell you who is attacking us," Thompson said. "We don't have a good grasp on who the enemy is and their strategy for attacking us. We know that in the end we have to kill them, but finding them is the problem."

"My guess is that the Marines will see violence that isn't as bad as people fear," Thompson said.

COMPANY GRADE

1. Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Comp at Tactics in Afghanistan by Lester W. Grau.
2. The Arab Mind by Raphael Pataki
3. The Village by Bing West
4. The Battle of the Kasbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 by Paul Aussaresses
5. Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps Nineteen-Forty by Ronald Schaffer

FIELD GRADE

1. The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein by Sandra Mackey
2. A History of Iraq by Charles Tripp (From booklist Margaret Flanagan)
3. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare by Bard E. Oneill (Marine Corps Gazette)
4. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750 (Warfare and History) by I. F. W. Beckett
5. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power by Max Boot
6. Street Without Joy by Bernard B. Fall
7. Low-Intensity Conflict in American History by Claude C. Sturgill
8. Cap Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969 by Barry L. Goodson
9. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 by Alistair Horne
10. British Counterinsurgency; From Palestine to Northern Ireland by John Newsinger

11. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan by Gerard Chaliand
12. Modern Warfare a French view of Counter Insurgency by Roger Trinquier
13. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid