LESSON 1
GRAND STRATEGY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

> *"The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors, which explain why armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way they do."*
>
> —Michael Howard, noted author and editor of Clausewitz's *On War*

Lesson Introduction

Strategic Studies is a relatively new discipline; it only became a serious academic subject as a sub-field of International Relations scholarship in the 1950s. Beforehand, strategy was the province of primarily military officers, and only a handful of those officers explored the full political-military dimension of strategy as a concept. As such, the "idea" of strategy and strategic thinking confronts the student and strategist alike with many problems, not the least of which is the rapidly evolving nature of the concept itself and the influence of "real world" events on its development. Nevertheless, the subject is of extreme importance because it is concerned with issues of the utmost significance at the national and international level. In that regard, strategy has always been intimately connected with planning wars and fighting them, but strategy is much more. Fundamentally, strategy is about how states use power—in a military, economic, diplomatic, or other manner—to achieve political objectives. It therefore cannot be repeated too often that military power is but one means among many to achieve political ends. As a result, purely military definitions of strategy have virtually disappeared because they fail to encompass the scope of strategic thinking. Nevertheless, although strategy is as much about peace as it is about war, it is generally recognized that, if we fail to properly manage the former, we must be prepared to execute the latter.

This lesson is designed to help you understand the nature of strategic thinking and how that translates into the development and execution of strategy. Thus, you will gain a better understanding of how operational planning and execution is linked to strategy and policy at the highest levels in our government. Also, this lesson will promote your understanding of how, to a great extent, operational planning and its execution shapes the profession of arms to which each of you belong.

Student Requirements by Educational Objective

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Describe the various characteristics that make up the strategic environment. [JPME Area 3(d)]

Read:

- MCDP 1-1, *Strategy*, 12 November 1997, Chapter 1. "The Strategic Environment," pp. 9-33 (24 pages)

Objective 2. Explain International Relations (IR) theory and relate it to our understanding of important security issues that shape strategy. [JPME Areas 2(b), 3(b), 3(d)]

Joseph Nye argues that even though the world is shrinking, some things about international politics have remained the same over the ages. His analysis of the two antagonists in the Peloponnesian War reveals that very similar characteristics exist between that war and the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1947. Moreover, Nye professes that alliances, balances of power, and choices in policy between war and compromise have remained similar over the millennia. The peoples who live in the nearly 200 countries on this globe want their independence, separate cultures, and different languages. As his focus orients on international politics, Nye's thesis is that there are legal, political and social differences between domestic and international politics. The study of international conflict is an inexact science that combines history and theory. It is essential that students keep both in mind as they read Nye's article and, in particular, that they observe what has changed and what has remained constant.

Read:

- Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, Third ed., New York: Longman, 2000. Chapter 1, "Is There an Enduring Logic of Conflict in World Politics?" pp. 1-11 (12 pgs)

International relations is a compelling subject of rich complexity. Traditionally, the study of IR has focused on questions of war and peace, that is, the contest of political wills in the international arena, the crafting of alliances, and the clash of armies. In that regard, IR scholars want to know why international events occur, why nation states behave the way they do, why wars break out, and so forth. One kind of answer is descriptive: a war breaks out because of a crucial decision by a particular leader. Another kind of answer seeks to discern general explanations: for instance, war may break out as a consequence of a general pattern in which economic issues inexorably lead to conflict. This kind of answer is theoretical because it places the particular event in the context of a more general pattern that is applicable across multiple cases. The Strategy and Policy course, not unlike the study of IR itself, is concerned with both descriptive and theoretical knowledge, for, as Thucydides points out, it would do little good to merely describe

events without drawing useful lessons from them; nor, in addition, would it be useful to concentrate on purely abstract theory without regard for the real world. The study of IR is practical in that there is a close connection between IR scholarship and the policy-making community, and this relationship informs and shapes strategic decision-making.

In 1992, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and then Secretary of State James Baker III debated the merits of the first Bush Administration's willingness to embrace the reforms of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Baker argued that, should Gorbachev's reforms take hold, the competition between the U.S. and Russia would be reduced if not eliminated as Russia was transformed into a less autocratic and aggressive state. To Dr. Kissinger, Baker's view was in error in that it was rooted in the assumption that the only meaningful conflict in world politics was the one between democracy and communism and, by extension, the competition between the U.S. and the former USSR. According to Kissinger, this worldview is myopic, not taking into account the lessons of history and failing to consider Russian interests beyond the promotion of its former communist ideology. As he later explained, any democratic transformation of Russia would still upset the existing balance of power and Russia would seek to redress that imbalance. As Russian behavior during the debate preceding the most recent war with Iraq has amply demonstrated, Kissinger had a point. Russia, France, and Germany pursued their own national interests as they understood them, and these interests were clearly at odds with those of the United States.

As the exchange between Kissinger and Baker illustrates, worldview matters. It shapes policy and informs strategic thinking. As global change proceeds apace, we are confronted with the challenge of making the right policy choices. How do we avoid repeating mistakes of the past? What are our objectives and how do we employ the means at our disposal to achieve those ends? One way to probe these and other questions is to examine current events (and history) using the theories embodied in the time-tested classics of international relations (IR) scholarship. Despite its ambiguous reputation, IR is a practical discipline in that there has always been a close connection between IR theories and policy-making. For example, in July 2002 a reporter queried President Bush's National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, about the issues that informed her thinking on policy matters. She replied: "We had this talk, as you know [back in 1999] – the balance of power, realism versus ideals, power and values. And I said then, and I still believe, that they're inseparable. Clearly, the balance of power mattered when we defeated the Soviet Union…But you should never forget how powerful [our] ideals are. And every time, we tend to underestimate them…And you just forget how very powerful human dignity is as a principle of human behavior and how much it's supported by democracy." Thus, as Dr. Rice alludes, by examining the theoretical underpinnings of IR scholarship, we can place the current policy debate (whatever it might be at the moment) in a critical light and engage in a connected inquiry.

In light of the above, theorists agree that ideas shape decisions, and as Clausewitz posited, the decision to go to war is perhaps the supreme political choice. It is, of course, the military leader who must implement that decision to go to war. Therefore, the military professional must come to terms with the Clausewitzian "proof" of the necessity of choice. In so doing, the strategist must consider three questions:

1. What is our objective?

2. What obstacles or threats interfere with achieving our object?

3. What, then, should we do?

These questions address the matter of strategic choice in the present and in the future. These questions also help us examine past strategic decisions. What were the objectives of states in the past? How did political actors of the time interpret threats and shape their policies in that context? What choices did they make? What was the result? With the advantage of hindsight, we can analyze their actions. We can ask why they made the decisions they made. And, in determining whether the policies they pursued were successful, we can refine our own strategic choices.

The assigned chapter from Nye's book, *Understanding International Conflicts*, illustrates the basics of realist versus liberal IR theory. The realist worldview can be said to have originated with Thucydides and Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu advised rulers regarding how to use power to advance their interests. In the West, Thucydides focused on relative power between Greek city-states, noting: "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Penguin translation). Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of the exercise of power, and power politics is at the root of the realist perspective in what amounts to a **jungle**, characterized by a constant **state of war** between rivals. Rejecting the realist analogy of world politics as a jungle, liberals believe that international politics is a **garden** in which peaceful cooperation can be cultivated. This ideal is not new: the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) proposed a federal union among European states after the War of the Spanish Succession with the idea of preventing another world war. According to the liberal worldview, a state's interests are determined, not by its position relative to other states in the international system, but by the many interests, ideals, values, and activities of multiple actors that are internal as well as external to the state. Interestingly (and perhaps ironically), the liberal tradition includes the likes of Ronald Reagan, who, not unlike Woodrow Wilson, believed that the United States is the quintessential **city on a hill** and was not raised to greatness only to hide her lamp under a bushel. By making this observation, you can point out that liberalism in IR is not the same thing as a liberal political worldview, in terms of domestic politics (something that students often have difficulty with and why some prefer the term "idealism"). For liberals, promoting democracy and prosperity abroad is sound foreign policy in that democracies generally do not go to war with other democracies. In the end, for the liberal, the principles of IR flow from morality, as opposed to power.

The assumptions of realism and liberalism are easily contrasted. The realist regards human nature as essentially selfish, whereas the liberal finds humans to be altruistic and capable of cooperation in achieving mutually beneficial ends. Realists see the state as the most important political actor, whereas liberals believe that individuals, sub-state entities, and international organizations are equally important. Whereas the realist regards the *rational* pursuit of self-interest to be the principal motivator of state behavior, the liberal finds psychological motives of decisionmakers to be of crucial importance. Finally, realists interpret the international system in terms of **anarchy**, in which a state of war exists and the law of the jungle usurps the rule of law. Liberals, on the other hand, interpret the international system in terms of **community**, within which the potential exists to overcome conflict by an emphasis on relevant international structures, education, etc.

All the above indicates the complexity of the international security environment and the challenge of strategy therein. Sun Tzu's admonition to know the enemy and know yourself is key. Coercion holds the potential to achieve national aims more efficiently than brute force and conquest, but it is neither a cheap nor easy thing to do. As Bernard Brodie pointed out in his classic 1949 essay, "Strategy as a Science," policy-makers and strategists must appreciate that, in order to anticipate the utility of military force in changing an adversary's behavior, it is necessary first to understand how states function, interact, and react.

Requirement 2

Objective 3. Describe how national-level strategy and policy incorporates the instruments of national power as a means of exercising power and influence. [JPME Area 1(a), 3(b)(d)]

View:

- ACSC lecture, "Coordinating the Instruments of Power: The Use of Military Force," by Mr. Budd Jones (22 minutes)

Read:

- Dr. Joe Strange, "Capital "W" War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War (Because Wars Are Conflicts of Societies, Not Tactical Exercises Writ Large)," *Perspectives on Warfighting*, No. 6 (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 1998), pages 15 to 22. (7 pages)

As MCDP 1-1 points out, war is a phenomenon "fundamentally concerned with the distribution and redistribution of power." Power can be material or moral and can be defined as a state's *ability* to get another state to behave in a particular fashion, that is, to do what that state otherwise would not have done (or vice-versa). Such a definition treats power as *influence*. If a state exerts its will successfully, and often, then that state is said to be powerful. But power in the sense of influence is difficult to measure. For that reason, power is also considered in terms of *capability*, which is easier to measure than influence.

A state with a large military is said to be powerful. Power can also depend upon certain intangibles, such as the **power of ideas** (e.g., the appeal of democracy). In that regard, the ability to influence other states without resorting to more concrete measures, such as military force, is sometimes called **soft power**. Regardless, a state has power only in relation to other states. **Relative power** is the ratio of the power that two states can bring to bear against each other. In terms of power as capability, the ratio of nuclear or conventional military forces is often cited in terms of describing the balance of power between states. National power is a complex mix of many elements— military, economic, informational, moral, psychological, etc. The exercise of power is sometimes called *realpolitik*, or *power politics*. *Realpolitik* underlies Kissinger's criticism of James Baker. In short, irrespective of Russia's democratic transformation, Russia will continue to compete with the United States as it pursues its own regional and global interests.

The inventory provided by MCDP 1-1 is often referred to by the acronym DIME: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. These instruments first made their appearance in the national security strategies of the Reagan Administration and were carried forward to the first Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration dropped the explicit reference to information as an instrument, and, although all four are present in the George W. Bush Administration's national security strategy, they are more implied than explicit.

Strategists may be inclined to advance one instrument over another, but the wise strategist knows there is a dynamic relationship among the instruments themselves as well as between the instruments of national power and the constituent elements. Without adequate natural resources, a state may be economically disadvantaged, which, in turn, may reduce the military capability of the state. Nevertheless, an instrument may be dominant at one time or another, depending upon the circumstances and the grand strategy of the state.

Requirement 3

Objective 4. Determine how the full dimension of strategy as a concept and as a process relates to the policy, strategy, and military operations relationship. [JPME Areas 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 3(a)(d)]

Read:

- Richard Betts, "The Trouble With Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 2001-02 (8 pages)
- Drew, Dennis and Donald Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1998, pp. 13 to 44 (31 pages)
- MCDP 1-1, *Strategy*, 12 November 1997, Chapter 4. "The Making of Strategy," pp. 79-102 (23 pages)

Clausewitz's comments on friction in war can also be applied to strategy: "It is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." Formulating military strategy, however, is effectively anti-political. Strategy aims to nail things down and close options, while politics—especially in a democracy—strives to keep options open and avoid constraints. However, in the simplest terms, strategy is a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve objectives.

The key to formulating grand strategy lies within understanding the constituent elements of national power and how they can best be utilized to achieve national objectives. Military capability is only one element of national power. Other tangible elements of power include geography, population and economic capability as well as the contributions of informational, political and diplomatic factors. Policy makers and strategists are naturally inclined to consider these elements as they formulate national level policy and strategy.

When strategy was regarded as the art of the general, the objective of strategy was military victory in the field. The general moved forces and directed operations as a means to achieve victory in battle. Though infantry, cavalry, and artillery officers were expected to grasp the particulars of their respective skills, the general had to integrate all three in order to defeat the opposing general. Even though victory in war was, for the most part, an end in and of itself, war has always been understood as being the means to a larger end. Sun Tzu was arguably the first ancient to explicitly state that war belongs to the realm of politics, that the latter directs the former; but it was Clausewitz, the father of modern strategy, who clarified war as a political act arising from a political condition that is the product of a political motive. As such, the political object was for Clausewitz the standard by which to measure military action. He understood, however, that the "political object is not…a despotic lawyer; it must adapt itself to the nature of the means at its disposal." In other words, a state had to evaluate its military capability in terms of whether its objectives could be obtained through military action. Adaptation is, therefore, a political act confirming his claim that policy always influences military action. Current deliberations regarding "transformation" are evidence enough of this claim.

In the end, strategy must be understood in terms of its military and political dimensions. As constructs, these dimensions can be distinguished from one another in an analytical sense, but strategic thought itself requires that the two be merged. Doing otherwise would be a recipe for failure. As Clausewitz wrote, "First…war should never be thought of as *something autonomous* but always as an *instrument of policy*. Second…wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them." Thus, strategy demands not only the art of the general, but also the art of the statesman.

A useful framework for examining the links between policy, strategy, and military action is Philip Crowl's Harmon Memorial lecture entitled, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers," presented to the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1978. At the time, Crowl was head of the Naval War College's Department of Strategy and the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History. Crowl asserted that we study history not so much to predict the future but to define the task before us and ask the right questions.

According to Crowl, the first and fundamental question is as follows: What specific national interests and policy objectives are to be served by military action? When answering this question, two others come to mind: What is the value of the object and what price are we willing to pay? Is it worth going to war? Any number of historical examples can be given and from any perspective. Why did Germany go to war in World War I, and why did the German leaders opt for war on two fronts? Why did the United States go to war in Vietnam? In the Gulf during 1990-1991 and again in 2003? In that regard, the "why" shapes the "how." Clausewitz noted that the supreme act of judgment is to know what kind of war we are entering. The Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* similarly noted, "The essence of a small war is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its inception and conduct." Thus, knowing our aims shapes how we intend to bring about the desired goal.

This realization brings us to the second question. Once the decision to go to war is made, what is the proper military strategy, once it starts? Is the national military strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives? Crowl used the example of Otto von Bismarck's war with Austria as an example of correctly linking decisive military victory on the battlefield with a political object, in this instance the unification of the many sovereign German states into a single empire. Once the Austrian army was soundly defeated at Koniggratz, Bismarck called off further military operations even though his generals proposed to march on Vienna. Bismarck vetoed their proposal because the object of the war had been achieved and he believed it was better to cultivate Austrian good will than humiliate them further and prolong the war. Conversely, President Roosevelt did not push his generals to drive on Berlin at the end of World War II when, in retrospect, he probably should have done so. In the absence of political direction to do otherwise, General Eisenhower halted American forces at the Elbe River, and he would not allow General Patton to advance to Prague. Eisenhower was fully justified in his decision on military grounds, yet, as Churchill understood, the post-war lines to be drawn on the European map would be largely determined by where American and British forces ended up vice the Red Army. In this instance, policy took a back seat to military strategy. General Marshall even went so far as to state that Prague was not worth it, that he was "loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes."

A third question posed by Crowl that strategists must ask themselves is the following: "What are the limits of military power?" The Dr. Strange reading, found in the previous requirement, also supports this notion. When the United States became embroiled in Southeast Asia, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery remarked: "The U.S. has broken the second rule of war. That is, don't go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia. Rule One is don't march on Moscow." The lesson is to calculate one's resources in relation to those of the enemy and the object desired. Napoleon and Hitler both attempted to march on Moscow and both failed. Subduing Russia was simply beyond their ability with the forces at their disposal. In small wars of the insurgent variety, it is common wisdom that military force is subordinate to the political strategy and as the *Small Wars Manual* notes, "The solution of such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and

should only be applied to such extent as permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures."

Question number four is as follows: "What are the alternatives?" As Crowl put it, "What are the alternatives to war? What are the alternative campaign strategies, especially if the preferred one fails? How is the war to be terminated gracefully if the odds against victory are too high?" The wise strategist considers alternatives and prepares contingency plans. During World War I, Germany had an opportunity to retain British neutrality by mobilizing solely on the Eastern front. But Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) claimed that the re-deployment of over a million soldiers from the west to the east simply could not be done. Ironically, the Kaiser responded that the elder Moltke could have accommodated such a change in plans and would have agreed that it was not only possible, but also preferable given the advantages it would accrue. Yet no change was made to the plan.

The fifth question regards the home front. Is there public support for the war and the military strategy therein? As Crowl put it, "If Vietnam has taught us anything, it is that, in the United States at least, no government can wage a protracted war successfully without strong domestic support. Dictatorships might be able to pull it off, but not democracies."

The sixth and final question in Crowl's strategic catechism is the following: "Does today's strategy overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of likeness between past and present?" As the *Small Wars Manual* pointed out, neither big wars nor small wars ever take the exact form of their predecessors. As a result, "One must ever be on guard to prevent his views becoming fixed as to procedure or methods." Aristotle similarly warned, "There is as much injustice in the equal treatment of unequal cases as there is in the unequal treatment of equal cases" (*Ethica Nicomachaea*). Yet policymakers and strategists routinely use historical analogies to help them define the nature of the task before them by comparing the new situation to previous situations with which the decision-maker is more familiar. During the run-up to American intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, the specter of Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan were repeatedly raised as warnings against what lay in store for the United States. But the analogies proved inappropriate, at least in the short term.

In the end, as Crowl points out, "The problem of strategy is essentially an intellectual problem. But before it can be addressed, it must be defined. To define the problem, one starts with questions: What is the object? What are the means to achieve it? Are they available? What are the costs? The benefits? What are the hazards? What are the limitations? How will the public react? Are the proposed actions morally justifiable? What are the lessons of experience? How does the present differ from the past?"

According to Drew and Snow, strategy is a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve objectives. It is a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends. Step 1 is to determine the national objectives. The authors use examples of well-defined and consistent objectives (WWII) and others less so. Step 2 is to formulate the grand strategy. The strategist must

decide how to develop, employ, and coordinate instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives. Step 3 is to develop a military strategy (likewise, an economic strategy, an informational strategy, etc; but, clearly, the emphasis here is on the military instrument). Step 4 is to design an operational strategy for the employment of the forces provided by the military strategy. Drew and Snow feel that the orchestration is central to operational strategy. The final step is to formulate a battlefield strategy, what the authors call the art and science of employing forces on the battlefield (tactics).

Requirement 4

Objective 5. Discuss how the current U. S. National Security Strategy integrates the various elements of national power to achieve its goals and objectives. [JPME Area 1(a)]

Read:

- *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C. The White House, September 2002 pp 1-20 (21 pages)
- Interview with John Lewis Gaddis on the 2002 NSS as a grand strategy, PBS Frontline, 16 January 2003 (18 pages)

Strategy begins with strategic thinking, which leads to strategic planning and strategic action. Grand strategy concerns the nature of opposition and conflict that defines the interrelationships of states and peoples, from striking bargains in the interest of stability and cooperation to war. Interests and objectives establish the strategic requirements, and policies establish the rules for satisfying those requirements. Available assets provide the means. In that regard, strategy is not linear, but dynamic, because it is always practiced in opposition to the strategy of at least one other party. The first rule of strategic thinking is to *look ahead and reason back*. In other words, the strategist anticipates where his or her initial decisions will lead and uses this information to calculate the best choice. In game theory, it is not always an advantage to seize the initiative and move first because this reveals your hand, and the other player(s) can use this knowledge to their advantage and your cost (think of Germany in the world wars). Nevertheless, value judgments are made (assigning values to possible outcomes), and in the case of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the Bush Administration has made what amounts to a "strategic move." Gaddis claims this NSS is the first true "grand strategy" that the U.S. has had since President Truman's Cold War containment strategy.

It seems clear that the object of the 2002 NSS is to promote freedom, democracy, and free enterprise as a means of creating a stable international environment. The strategy embodies realist as well as liberal ideas (constructivist?) in that it is rooted in certain presumed universal values (freedom) that are "true for every person" in "every society," yet the strategy claims to seek "to create a balance of power that favors human freedom," thus employing the rhetoric of the realist. The most important interest as stated is to defend the nation, and the government will use every tool at its disposal to achieve that end. Nominally, the emphasis of the strategy seems to be preemptive military action; but, upon closer examination, one can argue that it is fundamentally an economic strategy.

The overarching aim is to "make the world not just safer but better." The "goals on the path to progress" are political and economic liberty, peaceful relations among states, and respect for human rights. These goals reflect the fact that in a representative democracy such as the U.S. (being the premier example of the same), strategy is not merely *instrumental*, but it is, rather, a comprehensive worldview derived from certain fundamental principles regarding the nature of domestic and international behavior. At the heart of the strategy is the belief that a free and prosperous people are disinclined to be aggressive toward their neighbors; therefore, transforming states into free-market democracies serves the national security interests of the U.S.

Protracted sub-state war (transnational terrorism) is the immediate threat, and the first priority in that regard is to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations with global reach. In game theory there are "sequential" games (players make alternating moves) and "simultaneous" games (in which players act at the same time and make multiple moves at the same time). In broad terms, the Allied strategy in World War II was cumulative and sequential. The 2002 NSS explicitly declares that the global war on terrorism "need not be sequential." The effort will be broad-based and on many levels. Preemption (as opposed to deterrence) is the concept that has gained the most notoriety in the 2002 NSS, but the bulk of the strategy focuses on economic issues. The basic assumption, in the NSS, is that a "strong world economy enhances our national security." In that regard, the strategy proffers a carrot and stick approach. Assistance will be predicated on "right national policies," for example, "Where governments have implemented real policy changes, we will provide significant new levels of assistance." To those states that cooperate, the strategy proposes "results-based" grants, as opposed to loans. Interestingly, the word "diplomacy" appears late in the strategy, implying that diplomatic initiatives – like the military instrument – are largely subordinate to the economic instrument. In order of appearance, the instruments of national power emphasized in the strategy are (1) economic; (2) military; (3) diplomatic; and (4) informational.

Lesson Summary

Although the CSCDEP course is primarily oriented at the operational level of war and joint warfighting, the assigned readings in this lesson are intended to enhance your understanding of how strategy and policy at the national level impacts the operational level of war. Each of the readings focuses, to some degree, on the elements of national power. Of critical importance, however, are the strategy and policy decisions at the national level, which determine how those instruments are to be employed.

Insofar as the CSCDEP student is concerned, the distinction between diplomacy and strategy is a relative one. The two are linked and complementary in that the object of both is furthering the national interest, which, ultimately, is a political object, as Clausewitz well understood. Thus, the military instrument can be regarded as both method and means. But as G.F.R. Henderson wrote in 1898, "That the soldier is but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an instrument of diplomacy, no educated soldier will deny. Politics must always exercise an extreme influence on strategy." In that regard, no educated Marine, soldier, sailor, or airman will deny that strategic objectives

determine operational objectives. Thus, it goes without saying that the military professional must understand the relationship between policy, strategy, and the conduct of war – and this process necessarily begins with an understanding of the international security environment. To that end the Strategy and Policy course provides you with a framework to comprehend international politics and the interrelationship of objectives from the strategic level to operational activities at the tactical engagement level. This specific class lays the foundation, serving both to refine concepts discussed earlier in the Theory and Nature of War course as well as beginning to bridge the distance between theory and practice, as the latter is addressed in the Operational Level of War course and later in the 8800 courses.

JPME Summary

AREA 1					AREA 2				AREA 3					AREA 4					AREA 5			
A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D
X	X	X				X			X	X		X										