

LESSON 9

HOMELAND SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

“Many of you have served your country for years, in agencies with proud histories and honored traditions. Some of you are new to the federal service. All of us share a great responsibility. Our job is to secure the American homeland, to protect the American people.”

—President George W. Bush
October 1, 2003

Lesson Introduction

The President’s most important job is to protect and defend the American people. Since September 11th, all levels of government have cooperated like never before to strengthen aviation and border security, stockpile more medicines to defend against bioterrorism, improve information sharing among our intelligence agencies, and deploy more resources and personnel to protect our critical infrastructure.

The changing nature of the threats facing America requires a government structure to protect against invisible enemies who can strike with a wide variety of weapons. Before the President signed the Homeland Security Bill, no single government agency had homeland security as its primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security were dispersed among more than 100 different government organizations.

The President and Congress created a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century by realigning the current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary mission is to protect our homeland.

Additionally, the Department of Defense created U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) with an area of responsibility (AOR) that encompasses most of the North American continent, the surrounding water, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. USNORTHCOM’s mission is focused on the homeland defense aspect of the protection of the United States. The creation of both these governmental entities is a key step in the President’s national strategy for homeland security.

It seems appropriate to discuss interagency operations and coordination in this lesson since much of homeland security and homeland defense deal with the cooperation between the U.S. military and governmental agencies at local, state, and federal levels. This lesson will broaden its coverage of interagency operations beyond the homeland security/defense role. The interagency coordination process affects military planning for major theater war, small-scale contingency

operations, and military operations other than war. Processes exist, but they are generally defined and constantly evolving.

Student Requirements by Educational Objective

Requirement 1

Objective 1. Compare the differences between homeland security and homeland defense.
[JPME Areas 2(b)]

Objective 2. Describe the critical mission areas in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*.
[JPME Areas 1(a), 2(b), 3(e)]


Read:

- “The Futility of Homeland Defense,” by David Carr, *The Atlantic Monthly* (January 2002), (4 pages)
- *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002), Office of Homeland Security, Executive Summary, pp. vii to xii (stop at “Costs of Homeland Security”) (5 pages)

Homeland security is not homeland defense. Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, deterrence of, and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal organizations. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) homeland security roles include homeland defense and civil support.

Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. In understanding the difference between homeland security and homeland defense, it is important to understand that any U.S. military organization that conducts operations within the United States is governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement activities. This fact, along with countless other elements make the homeland security business very complicated.

As emphasized in the Carr article, homeland security is extremely difficult. As he states, “Don’t even try to close the holes in a country, and a society, designed to be porous.” The graphic below from ANSER Institute of Homeland Security shows another perspective on why homeland security is so difficult. A level of complexity exists between the many variables involved in the homeland security business and the numerous levels of response. To complicate matters even further, add the players to homeland security, the private, local, state, and federal participants. The challenging effect that results from adding these various players to the homeland security equation comes from the conflicting and oftentimes competing interests of those players because they are located at different levels of government, or they are private sector participants.



Source: Dr. David H. McIntyre, ANSER Institute of Homeland Security

The Strategic Dimensions of Homeland Security.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* attempts, as do most security strategies, to organize for the chaos of a complicated endeavor. In the next requirement, you will learn about two organizations, the DHS and USNORTHCOM, which were established to implement various aspects of this national strategy. Both of these organizations are rapidly evolving to meet the ever-increasing challenges of homeland security and homeland defense.

Requirement 2

Objective 3. Describe the mission and organization of the Department of Homeland Security. [JPME Areas 1(e), 2(b), 3(a)(e)]

Objective 4. Describe the mission and organization of the U.S. Northern Command. [JPME Areas 1(b)(e), 2(b), 3(a)(e)]

Objective 5. Compare and contrast how the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command contribute in different ways to the protection of the United States. [JPME Area 1(b)(e), 2(b), 3(a)(e)]

Read:

- *The Department of Homeland Security*, June 2002, pp. 8 to 16 (9 pages)

The Department of Homeland Security


The creation of the DHS is the most significant transformation of the U.S. government since 1947, when Harry S. Truman merged the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Department of Defense to better coordinate the nation's defense against military threats.

DHS represents a similar consolidation, both in style and substance. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against America on September 11th, 2001, President George W. Bush decided twenty-two previously disparate domestic agencies needed to be coordinated into one department to protect the nation against threats to the homeland.

The department's first priority is to protect the nation against further terrorist attacks. Component agencies will analyze threats and intelligence, guard our borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for future emergencies.

Besides providing a better-coordinated defense of the homeland, DHS is also dedicated to protecting the rights of American citizens and enhancing public services, such as natural disaster assistance and citizenship services, by dedicating offices to these important missions.

The chart that follows shows the organization of the DHS as of March 1, 2003. It is anticipated that this organization will significantly evolve over the next several years. DHS's organizational makeup may change even faster and more significantly if the U.S. is struck by another substantial terrorist attack.



Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Northern Command

USNORTHCOM's mission is homeland defense and civil support, specifically: Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and it is directed by the President or Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations.

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President. Approximately 500 civil service employees and uniformed personnel representing all Services provide this essential unity of command from USNORTHCOM headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

USNORTHCOM's AOR is America's home front. The AOR includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and our territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command.

USNORTHCOM Civil Support

In addition to defending the nation, USNORTHCOM provides military assistance to civil authorities in accordance with U.S. laws and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Military assistance is always in support of a lead federal agency, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Military civil support includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and consequence management assistance, such as would occur after a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction.

Generally, an emergency must exceed the management capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. In providing civil support, the command operates through subordinate joint task forces.

USNORTHCOM is the "heavy lifter of last resort." If and when local communities and federal agencies need additional support—in the form of equipment, expertise, manpower, plans, organization, communications, and training—the men and women in uniform are prepared and ready to lend a helping hand.

There is a process for obtaining military assistance to civil authorities. The graphic below depicts that process that starts with the lead agency requiring assistance.

PCA generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's role in domestic affairs.

However, Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the United States. The PCA applies to the uniformed services within DOD (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force) but not to the U.S. Coast Guard.

Many organizations at local, state, and federal levels have important roles in collecting intelligence, investigating, and then conducting the operations to preempt terrorism. Once again, the PCA prevents the military from direct law enforcement involvement. Instead, USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission is directed against military threats emanating from outside the United States. As previously stated, USNORTHCOM will provide support to lead federal agencies but only when directed by DOD.

Terrorism targeted against the U.S. is fundamentally a homeland security (HLS) matter that is usually addressed by law enforcement agencies. USNORTHCOM will, however, have a cooperative relationship with federal agencies working to prevent terrorism. These organizations share information and work together to coordinate plans and actions. This level of cooperation and information sharing improves the effectiveness of homeland security efforts overall and may result in the prevention of threats, attacks, and other acts of aggression against the U.S.

The list below is a synopsis of USNORTHCOM's overall roles and responsibilities.

- Deter attacks against the U.S. population or territory in the USNORTHCOM AOR; employ appropriate force should deterrence fail.
- Provide support to civil authorities as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
- Provide technical advice and assistance to supported unified commanders for WMD consequence management outside CONUS.
- Plan bi-national Canada-U.S. land and maritime defense of CONUS region.
- Plan for **appropriate** interagency coordination.
- Plan for use of U.S. forces to protect sea, air, or information lines of communication to allies and combatant commands.
- Plan for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance operations, combating terrorism, consequence management, and counter-drug operations in the AOR.
- Work with civil authorities to protect critical U.S. infrastructure required to project and support forces overseas and other infrastructure as directed.
- Provide support for defense of the U.S. against CBRNE weapon attacks and for post-attack consequence management.
- Coordinate with other combatant commanders, the intelligence community, and the federal interagency community on collaborative intelligence for common threat assessment.
- Develop campaign plan for contribution to ongoing war on terrorism.
- Enhance security cooperation with countries within the AOR.

U.S. Neighbors

USNORTHCOM is responsible for safeguarding the land, air, and sea-lanes of the continental United States and Alaska. Defending our nation cannot stop immediately at our borders and shoreline. Therefore, it is important to cooperate with our neighbors to the north and south.

Historically, the United States has viewed threats and aggression against the country as being located outside North America. Decades ago, the DOD established unified commands with areas of responsibility outside of North America, reflecting that view. The attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, made it clear that enemy forces outside of North America can mount large-scale attacks from within North America—a geographic area (including Canada and Mexico) that had not been the responsibility of any single military command to defend.

The Commander of USNORTHCOM must develop plans for the defense of all approaches to the North American continent—air, land and sea. USNORTHCOM is responsible for security cooperation and coordination with our sovereign, adjacent neighbors, Canada and Mexico. This, however, does not necessarily mean increased military-to-military contacts, joint exercises or U.S. operations on Canadian or Mexican territory.

The United States' relationship with Canada includes sixty-plus years of defense cooperation. Shared strategic concerns of threats common to both nations, as well as geographic proximity and an appreciation for the benefits of closer collaboration on defense matters, led first to the Ogdensburg declaration between Canada and the U.S. in 1940 and later to the establishment of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command in 1957. Canada and the United States have a well-established history of security coordination and cooperation that respects the national interests and sovereignty of each country.

USNORTHCOM is prepared to address security coordination and cooperation matters with the country of Mexico, as determined jointly by the two countries. Mexico continues to have direct access to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Fifth Army, JTF-6, and other existing relationships.

Requirement 3

“...wars in the 21st Century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and covert military operations.”

—Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
19 August 2002

Objective 6. Examine the interagency environment both in the U.S. and in foreign countries. [JPME Areas 2(a)(b), 4(b)]

Objective 7. Describe the interagency process, which is nested within the National Security Council System. [JPME Areas 1(c)(e), 2(a)(b), 3(c)(e)]


Read:

- Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination in Joint Operations, Vol I*, 9 Oct 1996, pp. I-5 (start at para 6. Interagency Environment) to I-14 (stop at para 8. Media’s Impact on Interagency Coordination) and pp. II-15 (start at para 8. Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries) to II-17 (stop at para 9. Command Relationships “Supported,” “Supporting,” “Associate”), (12 pages)
- NSPD 1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, 13 Feb 2001, (5 pages)

The interagency environment is foreign to many military officers. Most duty assignments at the more junior grades never include interactions with members of other federal agencies. It is very useful for you as a potential commander or future staff officer to understand that the motives and goals of other federal agencies and its members are quite different from your organizational and professional motives and goals. One must understand that each federal agency, just as there are separate Services within DOD, have different cultures, attitudes, abilities, and knowledge. One should never underestimate the intellectual prowess and political savvy of various members of the interagency environment. It is extremely critical for military commanders and planners to truly understand their limitations within this environment and adapt accordingly. This can be a “battlespace” unique to any previously experienced.

For the sake of simplicity and in a practical sense there are two major processes that deal with interagency coordination and operations—the Washington interagency process and the process used by combatant commanders within their AOR. Both will be discussed.

NSPD 1 clearly outlines the organization of the National Security Council (NSC) system and describes the interagency process used by the U.S. government. The graphic that follows shows the interagency process in a simplified format.



Interagency Process.

It must be understood that the “interagency” is not an organization but a collection of agencies participating in pre-established groups that are created at different decisionmaking levels and are comprised of varying participants, depending upon the conflict, challenge, problem, or situation encountered. In the case of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), membership is more closely defined by NSPD 1; whereas the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) membership is determined, in large part, by the designated Chairman of the individual NSC/PCC in consultation with the Executive Secretary (an NSC staff member appointed by the National Security Advisor). It is the NSC/PCCs and their subordinate working groups that do a majority of the work coordinating, deconflicting, analyzing, and reporting.

Requirement 4

Objective 8. Explain how combatant commands conduct interagency coordination and operations. [JPME Areas 1(a)(e), 2(b), 3(c)(e), 4(e)]

Read:

- “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” by Charles Cardinal, Timber Pangonas, and Edward Marks, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 2002, pp. 49 to 53, (5 pages)

Joint Interagency Coordination Group

The second interagency coordination process, which is used by combatant commanders at the operational level of war, is similar to the process used in Washington in that it is new and evolving. The process used by these combatant commanders requires the establishment of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

JIACGs, which were formally approved by the NSC Deputies Committee in Feb 2002, were designed to provide combatant commands the counsel and expertise of civilian agencies on a broad range of issues that require civil-military cooperation.

These new coordination mechanisms can strengthen multi-agency operational plans; deconflict agency efforts and eliminate waste; keep all agencies informed of agency efforts and prevent misconceptions; and provide real time feedback between civilian and military agency efforts. The JIACGs do not make policy, task interagency elements, or replace existing interagency policy-making processes but rather serve as advisory bodies that can greatly improve interagency coordination between the Washington-based policy community and the combatant commands to the benefit of all involved. Each of the combatant commanders tailors the JIACG to meet the opportunities and challenges faced in his AOR.

The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information-sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. JIACG functions include:

- Participating in combatant command staff crisis planning and assessment.
- Advising the combatant command staff on civilian agency campaign planning.
- Working civilian-military campaign planning issues.
- Providing civilian agency perspectives during military operational planning activities and exercises.
- Presenting unique civilian agency approaches, capabilities & limitations to the military campaign planners.
- Providing vital links to Washington civilian agency campaign planners.
- Arranging interfaces for a number of useful agency crisis planning activities.
- Conducting outreach to key civilian international and regional contacts.

In day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, the group supports planners by advising them on civilian agency operations and plans, and providing perspective on civilian agency approaches, capabilities and limitations to develop a coordinated use of national power.

When a joint task force forms and deploys, the JIACG extends this support to the commander's staff through the JFHQ political-military planning staff. This staff becomes the mechanism to plan the best mix of capabilities that will achieve the desired effects to include the full range of diplomatic, information, and economic interagency activities.

Even though the JIACG is in its relative infancy as of the publication date of this course, all combatant commands are actively engaged in some stage of JIACG implementation. USCENTCOM's JIACG was actively at work in Iraq, as evidenced by the ABC online news report quoted below:

“This is the operations room of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, JIACG for short. This is part of a team of 80 now deployed across the region and drawn from agencies with expertise in counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and sanctions busting. Twenty-five are drawn from the US Department of Defense, military intelligence and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons experts. But 55 out of the 80 are non-military, undercover customs investigators and the CIA. “News Night” understands that British intelligence officers from MI6 are part of the team. We agreed to disguise the identity of some operatives while filming this report. The JIACG intelligence team has never been filmed before. U.S. Central Command gave “News Night” access partly to prove to the Iraqi people that the coalition is intent on finding evidence against the dictator and those countries which [sic] broke sanctions imposed after the last Gulf War.”

Lesson Summary

Defending the homeland has been an inherent mission of the armed forces since the founding of the republic. With the attacks on September 11th, that role has taken on new meaning. The material in this lesson has continued the discussion of the military's role in support of national security.

This lesson has defined the distinction between homeland security and homeland defense. It is important to understand this distinction since military commands can only be used for our nation's defense while law enforcement is linked more to the security-type missions and tasks. We learned in this lesson how the DHS and USNORTHCOM fit into homeland security/defense roles. Over the next several years and pending any further terrorist event of cataclysmic proportions, DHS and USNORTHCOM will continue to evolve in terms of missions, tasks, and structure.

This lesson has also described the two interagency processes that affect military planners today, the process dealing directly with the NSC at the strategic level, and the process that uses the JIACG located at the operational level. Both processes seem to be maturing, but, as with any process that deals with political entities, the existing interagency process or processes may change. The military planner needs to understand that the political environment of the interagency is highly unpredictable.

You can see how knowledge of the operational and strategic levels of war applies to the study of homeland security, defense, and the interagency processes. More discussion on interagency cooperation is discussed in the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) course.

JPME Summary

AREA 1					AREA 2				AREA 3					AREA 4					AREA 5			
A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D
X	X	X		X	X	X			X		X		X		X			X				