

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Introduction to Peace Operations**
  - **Describes the Related United Nations Charter Chapters**
  - **Defines Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations**
  - **Discusses Fundamentals and Key Considerations for Organizing, Planning, and Conducting Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Missions**
  - **Outlines Education and Training Considerations**
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### Introduction to Peace Operations

*Peace operations (PO) are a type of military operations other than war.*

US doctrine is consistent with the doctrine of many nations in recognizing the important but limited role of military forces in the creation of peace in today's turbulent world — that peace is a product of the will of the parties to a conflict. **Influencing that will requires the concurrent application of all the instruments of national and international power** — military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. These instruments are closely linked with the conduct of peace operations (PO). **There are no standard PO**, each having a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. All US military PO support **strategic and policy objectives** and their implementing **diplomatic activities**. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.

*The United Nations Charter provides several means for the international community to address threats to peace and security.*

Chapter VI of the **United Nations (UN) Charter** addresses **peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace** through conciliation, mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy. Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council with a wide range of enforcement actions, from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force. Although the terms **peacekeeping** and **peace**

**enforcement** are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken under Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively. The US Constitution, the UN Charter, and US law and policy provide the legal underpinnings for US participation in PO.

### Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Enforcement Operations

*PO encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.*

Although peace operations are guided by the **six principles of military operations other than war** (objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint), the **principles of war** should also be considered in those peace operations where combat actions are possible. **Peacekeeping operations** (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, and other related agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. **Peace enforcement operations** (PEO) are the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Although the United States will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the UN or other multinational organization, it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.

**Transitions** will occur in PO requiring planning for changes to rules of engagement (ROE), force structure, and other aspects of these missions. **Posthostilities activities** may also occur, requiring early consideration and interagency and multinational planning concerning responsibilities, activities to take place, and any need for agreements. Because of the dynamic nature of the PO mission, **changes** may occur and **gray areas** can develop requiring close political-military communication and coordination, assessments of the situation and threat, and prior contingency planning for practical requirements. PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances characterized by **three critical factors: consent, impartiality, and use of force**. Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. The United States may participate in PO under **various command and control (C2) arrangements**. These arrangements might include a unilateral US operation, a multinational operation with the United States as the lead nation, or a multinational operation

with the United States as a participant or in support. **Key documents** in PO include the mandate, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), terms of reference (TOR), and ROE.

## Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PKO

*PKO support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.*

**The peacekeepers' main function is to establish a presence** which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKO support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve **long-term political settlements** and **normalized peaceful relations**. The United States may participate in PKO as a **lead nation**, as a **contingent**, or by **providing military observers**. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. **Fundamentals of PKO** include firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration, and freedom of movement. Coordination between peacekeeping (PK) military forces and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is an important feature of PKO. **US military personnel may perform a wide variety of functions in support of PKO**. They may be detailed to serve on a **multinational staff** or in an observer group as **military observers**. The United States may also participate in PKO by **providing PK forces**. These may include ground, air, maritime, space, and special operations forces. The force size, contribution, and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate, and threat in the operational area. PK missions will usually involve observing, monitoring or supervising, and assisting parties to a dispute.

*Commanders have responsibility for the command and control (C2) of the forces assigned to them.*

The **organization of a PK force headquarters** will generally be structured around common military staff functions such as administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and civil affairs. The **commander** will also have a **personal staff** and **civilian staff**. In UN-sponsored operations, national contingents perform under operational control of the UN force commander. The **geographic combatant commander** exercises combatant command (command authority) over US forces assigned to PKO, and operational control over US forces attached for PKO in the combatant commander's area of responsibility. The **US contingent commander**, who is the senior US officer, provides the command link between US PK units and the geographic combatant commander.

The **force commander's directives** provide numerous details about C2, responsibilities, tasks, methods, force identification, media relations, and other details of PK force operations.

The **mandate, TOR, and SOFA** are important sources of information for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing **lessons learned** from previous PKO or training exercises. In PKO, just as in any other military operation, **logistics considerations** are as important as operational considerations. **Intelligence** is critically important to a PK force, not only for mission success but to protect the force. The methodology for collecting intelligence is generally the same as that for any other military operation. **Force protection** is a high priority for a deployed PK force. Coordination between the PK military organizations and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is essential to providing a secure PK environment within which these organizations can operate. **ROE** are also an essential element of force protection and will provide for appropriate action to protect the force. Although the UN utilizes multinational reserves, **the US contingent commander will also designate a US reserve**. The US contingent reserve should be sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located, and mobile. **Technologically advanced equipment** can improve the ability of the PK force to perform its mission. PKO will require **contingency planning** for disasters, evacuation and handling of displaced persons and refugees, and hostile action. **PK employment** includes separating parties to a dispute, observing and reporting, patrolling, and the operation of checkpoints.

### Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PEO

*The goal of PEO is to enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain peace and order.*

In PEO, **the enemy is the dispute**, not the belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Although PEO may require combat, **they are not wars and may have more restrictive ROE than wars**. Conflict, violence, disorder, a high level of mistrust, and possibly even chaos, rather than peace, describe the environment surrounding PEO. PEO may be conducted in interstate conflicts, but increasingly have involved intrastate conflicts. In PEO, **consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement**, although some parties may extend it. Although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting, peace enforcers generally have **full**

**combat capabilities**, depending on the mandate, ROE, and tactical situation. **Fundamentals** that help guide the conduct of successful PEO include impartiality, restraint in the use of force, a goal of settlement rather than victory, the use of methods of coercion, and the presence of civilians. **Accurate intelligence** and **comprehensive mission analysis** will be the basis for determining the **structure and composition of the force**. The US commander will have the authority to employ the force's **full range of combat capabilities** to achieve mission objectives and protect the force. Peace enforcement (PE) missions may include enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian assistance, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

*In most cases, PEO mirror conventional military operations and possess many of the same C2 characteristics.*

For both unilateral and multinational operations, **US forces will probably be structured as a joint task force (JTF)**. The composition of the JTF will depend on the mission, political objectives, and the threat. For multinational operations, PE forces may operate under either a **lead nation** or a **parallel C2 arrangement**. US PE forces are normally employed in accordance with a **detailed campaign or operation plan**, which includes the desired end state and a plan to transition responsibilities. A corresponding **political-military interagency plan** supports successful mission achievement and smooth transition. **Mission-termination objectives**, determined by political objectives and desired end state and found in a mandate in UN operations, ideally aim for conditions that will provide the basis for maintaining or restoring peace and order and a long-term settlement of the dispute or conditions that led to the operation in the first place. **Intelligence** is developed to support PEO using the same process used in war, but it will also seek information similar to that which is required in PKO. In PEO, **fire support** is constrained by more restrictive ROE, and a prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage. **Logistics planning and support** in PEO are the same as in war but include the considerations for PKO. The combination of **information operations** with other **advanced and nonlethal technologies** that are integrated into an overall campaign or operation plan can help to support PEO. Use of **special equipment** requires special consideration for the capabilities of allies and coalition members. Well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated **ROE** can make the difference between success and failure in PO. ROE in PEO are usually less restrictive than in

PKO, but more restrictive than in war. To ensure a mobile, survivable force, both **engineer and chemical protection forces** provide essential support during peace operations. **Employment planning** for PEO is the same as for combat operations, since these may occur. **Establishing phases** for PEO provides an execution framework for staff planning.

### Education and Training

*Readying forces to successfully conduct PO requires an approach based on both education and training.*

Readying forces for PO requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States — to fight and win the nation’s wars. In PO, military personnel adapt their **warfighting skills** to the situation. Credible warfighting skills are the foundation for successful performance in PO. **Professional military education** and the **training of individuals, units, and staff** before, during, and after operations are essential considerations in planning PO. Members of a deploying force require **knowledge and proficiency in a wide variety of basic military skills** as well as specific aspects of the mission and operational area. **Negotiation, mediation, and other nonstandard skills will also be required. Situational training exercises** to enhance the use of ROE have proven especially helpful.

### CONCLUSION

This Executive Summary provided an introduction to peace operations, along with key considerations for the planning and conduct of these operations. The subsequent chapters elaborate on this basis by providing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

# CHAPTER I

## PRIMER FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

*"We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous threats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace. Americans must understand . . . that a number of small challenges, year after year, can add up to a more serious challenge to our interests. The time to act, to help our friends by adding our strength to the equation, is not when the threat is at our doorstep, when the stakes are highest and the needed resources enormous. We must be prepared to commit our political, economic, and if necessary, military power when the threat is still manageable and when its prudent use can prevent the threat from growing."*

**George Shultz**  
Secretary of State, 1986

### 1. US and Multinational Doctrine Development and Terminology

During the Cold War, the military doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies focused on deterrence and preparation to fight and win wars. Given changes in the political-military and strategic environment of the post-Cold War era, the US military and others began to develop new doctrine. This doctrine addressed a broad range of missions to include those short of war, called **military operations other than war (MOOTW)**. Some MOOTW came to be called **peace operations (PO)** in the US and other militaries, and **peace-support operations** in other quarters, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The difference is not significant. Early drafts of a US approach to these operations used the term "peace support operations" as a way to highlight the important but limited role of military forces in the creation of peace in today's turbulent world. This publication maintains that approach, but does not use the term "support," in order to preserve its usage for other purposes.

Common to most military doctrine is the recognition that **peace is a product of the will of parties to a conflict and the**

**concurrent application of all the instruments of national and international power**—military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. NATO doctrine for peace support operations, in fact, includes humanitarian efforts as part of the doctrine, while US doctrine does not. Again, the difference is not significant since US doctrine addresses such efforts separately, but in a manner that closely links those humanitarian efforts with the conduct of PO. (See Joint Pub 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," and Part III of the glossary of this publication, "UN and NATO Terminology.") **For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO)**. Since World War II, the United States has participated in and supported several types of these operations, ranging from the more **traditional peacekeeping missions**, like the multinational force and observers (MFO) in the Sinai, to more **complex and multidimensional operations**, like the United Nations (UN) transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) or the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). These included missions under the legal authority of mandates promulgated by the UN and other multinational organizations. Also included



*While there is no standard peacekeeping operation, monitoring and observing events in the area is a common task for joint forces.*

were tasks that ranged from monitoring and observing cease-fires and separation of former belligerents to more complex tasks of supporting civilian efforts to assist in elections, rehabilitation of civic institutions, establishment and support of civilian police, and the reintegration of former combatants to normal life. There is no standard peace operation. As in other types of military operations, **PO will have a unique setting with their own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.**

## 2. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and US Policy

US military participation in PO **supports the national security strategy (NSS), national military strategy (NMS), and US policy.** The US approach is to apply **effective policies and strategies which combine the four instruments of national power** (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military). With the careful orchestration of these instruments, in conjunction with other international resources, the peace process may be effective. **The nature of each situation,**

coupled with the desired end state, as related to US national strategies and interests, **guides the National Command Authorities (NCA) in the selection and balance of the instruments of national power.** The resulting US policy is then implemented preferably through diplomatic activities, supported by military, economic, and informational efforts designed to achieve US objectives.

*“The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice. It is also true that if we move early in dealing with these conflicts, and if we have an effective method for carrying out international peace enforcement, especially in a preventative way, we have a new tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations that could well offset our national interest and our future.”*

**Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering  
Remarks to an NDU Conference**

### 3. Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities

All US military PO support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success in the peace process by **lending credibility** to diplomatic actions and **demonstrating resolve** to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO (PKO and PEO), the military may conduct

**operations in support of diplomatic efforts** to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These are listed in Figure I-1 and described below.

- **Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive diplomacy consists of **diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence**. An example of military support to preventive diplomacy is the preventive deployment Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US forces deployed in 1993 in



Figure I-1. Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

support of the UN effort to limit the spread of fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. If preventive diplomacy is successful and conflict is averted, the military may conduct PKO to help ensure agreements are followed by the parties to the dispute.

- **Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is the process of **diplomacy, mediation, negotiation**, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an **end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to conflict**. Military support to the peacemaking process may include provision of military expertise to the peacemaking process, military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities to influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

*“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe.”*

**General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.**  
**US Army, Retired**

- **Peace Building.** Peace building consists of **postconflict actions**, predominately diplomatic, economic, and security-related, that **strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions** in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Peace building in the geographic confines of failed states may require a much longer and more robust presence. Initially, intervening forces may have to assume governing functions and rebuild absent government institutions prior to transitioning to traditional peace building actions. Military support to peace building may include PKO, nation assistance, or other

activities which establish an environment conducive to continuing the postconflict political process. The PO force may facilitate demobilization, arms limitation, referenda, national reconciliation, elections, or creation of new governments.

*See JP 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),” and JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”*

## 4. Legal Basis of Peace Operations

The **UN Charter** (see extracts in Appendix C, “United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations,” Figure C-3) provides several means for the international community to address threats to peace and security. Although the terms “peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement” are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken under the Charter’s Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively. **Chapter VI addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace** through conciliation, mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy. **Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council with a wide range of enforcement actions** — from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force by the air, sea, and land forces of member nations. The range of potential actions in Chapter VII is so broad that operations such as the UN operations in Korea (1950-1953) and in Kuwait and Iraq (1990-1991) are often referred to as PEO. However, these operations were considered wars, with an aggressor being defined and military victory sought. They are not operations within the scope of this publication.

- a. The domestic legal authority for US forces to participate in peace operations (either UN authorized or UN directed) is founded in

the US Constitution, the UN Charter, and US statutes.

*“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.”*

**Constitution of the United Nations  
Educational, Scientific and  
Cultural Organization**

- **The US Constitution.** The Constitution affords the President independent legal authority to order the deployment of US forces to support peace operations. Under Article II, the President is exclusively responsible for the “conduct of diplomatic affairs.” (Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 [1950]). Further, as Commander in Chief, the President has the “power to dispose of troops and equipment in such a manner and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the country.” (Training of British Flying Students in the United States, Op. Att’y Gen 58, 62 [1941]). A recognized limitation on this constitutional authority is that such a deployment must be to protect US national security interests or to protect US nationals abroad.
- **The UN Charter.** In addition to providing international legal authority for the conduct of peace operations, the UN Charter is a treaty ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate under the treaty clause of the US Constitution. As such, it constitutes Federal law and provides domestic legal authority for US support to peace operations authorized or directed by the UN. Specifically, Art. 2, Section 5, of the UN Charter calls upon all members to give the UN “every assistance” in any action it takes under the Charter. In addition, Art. 25 calls upon all member

States to agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the UN Security Council.

- **Statutory Authorization.** The President also has statutory authorization to support peace operations. The UN Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) are the two primary statutory enactments which provide legal authority for US support to peace operations. For example, Section 7 of the UNPA (22 US Code (USC) Section 287d-1) authorizes the President to provide support, including the formal detail of up to 1,000 US military personnel worldwide, to UN directed peace operations dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes (e.g., Chapter VI peacekeeping operations). For Chapter VII, peace enforcement operations, Sections 628 and 630 of the FAA have in the past served as legal authority for the formal detail of US forces to such UN directed operations (e.g., UNOSOM II).

b. Although the UN has been the most frequent sponsor of international PO, **regional organizations** such as NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West Africa States, and the Arab League **have also acted to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions**. Regional arrangements to maintain peace and security are the focus of **Chapter VIII of the UN Charter**.

c. Similarly, some nations have negotiated **multilateral agreements to create PKO independent of any permanent international forum**. An example is the MFO mission established in 1982 on the basis of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords to Protocol to 1979 Egyptian Israeli Treaty. There have also been instances of other types of operations such as the **loose coalition of**

**national units** known as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. However, such operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN.

d. Although the United States will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the UN or other multinational organization, **it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.**

### 5. Peace Operations

**PO encompass PKO and PEO** conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (see Figure I-2). PO are **tailored to each situation** and may be conducted in support of diplomatic peace activities **before, during, or after** conflict. PO are guided by the **six principles of MOOTW**

which are listed in Figure I-3. **The principles of war should also be considered in those PO where combat actions are possible.** These principles are discussed fully in Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.” The latter includes a discussion of the application of the principles of MOOTW to a PO.

a. **Peacekeeping Operations.** PKO are **military operations** undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to **monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement** (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and **support diplomatic efforts** to reach a long-term political settlement. PKO are conducted by peacekeeping (PK) forces that are impartial. Chapter II, “Peacekeeping Operations,” provides a detailed discussion of PKO.



Figure I-2. US Peace Operations



Figure I-3. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

b. **Peace Enforcement Operations.** PEO are the application of **military force or the threat of its use**, normally pursuant to international authorization, **to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions** designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Chapter III, “Peace Enforcement Operations,” provides a detailed discussion of PEO.

c. **Transitions.** Optimally PK forces should not transition to PEO or vice versa unless there is the **requisite mandate** or **political decision** and appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and other important aspects of the mission. Nevertheless, just as in war, it is crucial that commanders and their staffs continually analyze the mission. In PO, this translates into **planning for a possibly unavoidable transition from PKO to PEO or for other transitions, such as from PEO to PKO**. In the former cases especially, rapid and unpredictable events may occur. By contrast, the shift from PEO to PKO might be more deliberate and predictable as the operation unfolds successfully. **Examples of types of transitions include the following.**

- **From a US unilateral operation or a multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition.** The transition in Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an example of this type of transition. The US unilateral effort expanded to a US-led coalition. This coalition then came under UN leadership.
- **From combat to noncombat operations.** In this type of transition, a peace enforcement (PE) force, for example, might be prepared by virtue of its force structure to engage in active combat operations but, due to its size and capabilities, serves as a deterrent to opposition. Initial stages of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, conducted under the auspices of a UN Chapter VII Peace Enforcement Security Council Resolution, is an example. Versatile US forces were able to transition swiftly to a preplanned noncombat course of action (COA). Again, continuous mission analysis is key.
- **From military to civilian control.** Transitions may involve the transfer of certain or most responsibilities to local government and civil agencies as the requirement for some form of military presence diminishes. This may occur during termination of the peace operation. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), for example, may be responsible for a major contribution to the overall success of the peace operation. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the desired end state involved such a transition.

d. **Posthostilities Activities.** Related to transitions, **these activities require interagency and multinational planning.** Joint forces involved in PK or PE may conduct posthostilities operations concurrent with or

following the primary peace operation activity. These activities may include military support to relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development, negotiation and mediation, management of arms, or human rights investigations conducted by other agencies. In some cases, joint forces will provide direct support to a recovering host nation (HN) or population. Specific types of support may include but are not limited to demobilization of belligerent parties, training for demining, temporary support to or repatriation of refugees or return of displaced persons to their original homes, electoral assistance, maintenance of public order and security, or maintaining a deterrent presence. (Note: Authority for US forces to conduct what is called “humanitarian demining” is found in Title 10, USC, Section 401. As a matter of policy, US forces shall not engage in physically detecting, lifting, or destroying land mines. The Department of Defense (DOD) has the expertise to establish training programs to assist foreign countries with a land mine problem.) An example which involves the continuing presence of some US forces is the US Support Group Haiti, formed following Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY by US Southern Command. The mission of this force is to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) and exercise command and control (C2) of deployed-for-training units conducting humanitarian and civic assistance operations approved by the government of Haiti. Some **guidelines for planning posthostilities activities**, which should commence prior to the introduction of forces, may include the following.

- Achievement of the end state, as determined by the mandate or other instructions.
- Determination of correct players such as local government agencies, US agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional powers,

representatives of parties to the conflict, and other military forces.

- Types of activities required, such as security assistance, demobilization, and electoral assistance.
- Funding and other responsibilities.
- The acceptable size, location, types of units, and equipment that may be required in a remaining military element from the PO force or its national or multinational sponsor.
- Any need for bilateral agreements for follow-on US presence and activity.
- Establishing appropriate ROE and rules concerning treatment of inhabitants and property to include procurement, claims, souvenirs, trophies, and adoptions. Ill conceived actions or rules can become a source of new disputes, cause parties to renege on agreements, or result in renewed resolve to further repudiated objectives on the part of some of the parties to the conflict. Rules and procedures should also balance the necessities of the military situation against infrastructure degradation and civilian casualties. For example, neutralizing a city’s electrical power supply may appear militarily advantageous in some PEO, but may also disrupt water and sewage treatment facilities, which could lead to cholera and dysentery epidemics, thus complicating posthostilities activities and requirements.
- **Security Requirements for the US Force and Others.** The transition from hostilities to posthostilities is a volatile and uncertain process. The effectiveness of military operations will often be

determined by the force's ability to provide for its security and ensure the safety of the civilian population.

- **Intelligence Requirements.** Timely and accurate intelligence will aid the force and other agencies in identifying and marginalizing potential threats and will provide information on the needs of the population, the condition of the infrastructure, and other areas critical to aiding recovery from hostilities. Intelligence support can also assess the effects politics, history, and culture may have on COAs.
- **Information Activities.** The media may have a significant influence on the eventual outcome of the conflict. A supportive portrayal of military operations during posthostilities activities can further the desired end state by enhancing local public support. Effective psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) can also positively impact posthostilities efforts by influencing attitudes and behaviors of a variety of important audiences. Information operations (IO) may contribute to thwarting activities counterproductive to the goals of posthostilities operations.

*See JP 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)," especially Chapter IV, for a host of matters related to posthostilities activities. See also JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," and DA Training Circular 31-34, "Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook," for related material. See also the section on Civil Aspects of the Dayton Accords in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."*

e. **Mission Creep.** This occurs when the mission assigned to a PO force changes in

response to new events or circumstances. In most cases, mission creep is undesirable.

- **Mission creep may develop from inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, or unrealistic development of implied tasks in planning.** It can also derive from well-meaning but erroneous interpretation of law or regulation. One example would be direction to execute civil action projects that fall outside the authority of the force commander. Mission creep can be avoided by paying special attention to specified and implied tasks in planning, and to the desired end state during both planning and execution. Implied tasks especially are subject to interpretation and require thorough examination to conform to higher level intent and the mission or mandate provided by higher authorities.
- Mission creep does **not** include activities that: are consistent with the mandate; are within the legal authority of the commander; contribute to the legitimacy of the force; or enhance force protection, even if not specified tasks.
- **Circumstances may arise from rapid and unpredictable changes in the operational environment unrelated to the activities of the PO force that threaten US or indigenous lives or property.** In such cases, commanders should apply sufficient force to address the threat. **ROE should be tailored accordingly.** Similarly, natural disasters may require the PO force to support underdeveloped or degraded indigenous capabilities. Continuous **political-military assessments** of the situation and threat and **prior contingency planning** for practical requirements for mission changes will confront commanders. Proposed mission changes raise questions about the commander's legal

authority to act, reimbursement, and on the impact on readiness due to the increased tempo of operations. **Legal support** will be important in answering many of these questions.

### 6. Distinction Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

a. A clear distinction between PKO and PEO is important. Although both are PO, they are not part of a continuum. **A distinct demarcation separates these operations.** PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances, characterized by three critical factors — **consent, impartiality, and the use of force.** Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. **Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation.** These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation. **Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim.** This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties. During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties — employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. The French Army has called this notion **active impartiality.** Parties may believe they are being treated unfairly and will accuse the PO force of favoring the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. But impartiality does not imply that a PO will

affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict. This standard does not preclude the **use of force** in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for **self-defense.** In the latter, force is used to **compel or coerce compliance with established rules.** Moreover the central “goal” of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission.

b. **The Gray Areas.** PKO and PEO are **distinct operations,** the dividing line being determined by the variables of **consent, impartiality, the use of force, and decisions by the NCA.** The existence of a cease-fire to the conflict among the parties and a demonstrated willingness to negotiate on their part are indicators of the presence of consent. Other variables are more clearly within the control of outside actors. However, **because of the dynamic environment in which these operations take place, gray areas can develop.** Such operations foist on commanders and policymakers the potential for uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity, which requires extremely close political-military communication.

- For example, during PKO conducted under the general provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, **cease-fires may break down, factions may withdraw their consent, some elements may operate outside the authority of existing leadership structures, or new political entities may emerge** that had no part in the original granting of consent to the PKO. Therefore, the assigned force will be capable of defending itself as appropriate to the threat level in its operational area. **Force augmentation may be necessary,** and the commander

of the PKO force will monitor the situation to ensure the force is capable of self-protection. **Commanders also should be prepared for transition to a PEO**, if a change of mission is directed, or for withdrawal if a higher authority decides the mission is not achievable. At the same time, **geographic differences in the nature of the operation may develop** or the conflict may spread to different geographic areas. Certain sectors of the operational area may assume different characteristics in terms of threat, consent, perceptions of impartiality, and other factors. In this case, **commanders may need to be flexible** and prepared to adjust the activity of the force in terms of composition, threat posture, and use of force to account for these differences and new or emerging guidance from higher authorities. In these cases, **close political-military coordination and communication are essential**. Many of these circumstances arose during the conduct of operations by the UN Protection Force in the Balkans in 1995.

- During PEO conducted with the authority granted for the use of force

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, **the deployment of a robust force**, with flexibility in its authority to use force, **may serve as a deterrent to unacceptable behavior by parties to the conflict and others**. Such a force may encounter a degree of cooperation and consent. It may build on and foster this cooperation. In this case, such a force **may conduct itself in most circumstances as if performing PKO, and be prepared to use force** to implement the mandate by virtue of its size, composition, and authority. Again, close political-military communication is essential to ensure that all military actions support the overall political objectives. Many of these circumstances apply to the conduct of operations by the peace implementation force in the Balkans during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

## 7. The Peace Operations Environment

PKO are dramatically different than PEO and military operations in support of the diplomatic activities of peace building, peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy. However, **the environments of these**



*The presence of a robust force may serve as an effective deterrent in peace operations.*

**operations and activities share some common characteristics** which are listed in Figure I-4 and described below.

a. **Primacy of Political Objectives.** In PO and in war, **political objectives** derived from the NSS, NMS, and US policy **drive military decisions at every level, from the strategic to the tactical.** As in war, commanders should adopt COAs and **plans** that support political objectives. While applicable throughout the range of military operations, two important factors are particularly sensitive in PO.

- **First, military personnel at all levels should understand the objectives of the operation and the potential impact of inappropriate military actions.** Having such an understanding helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects on the force or the mission at the tactical or operational level, and catastrophic effects on US policy at the strategic level. Junior personnel could

make decisions which may have significant strategic implications.

- **Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes in objectives, the situation, or the players which demand an adjustment of the military operations.** These changes may be subtle, yet failure to recognize them and adjust may lead to operations that do not support the attainment of objectives and may cause needless casualties.

b. **Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty.** PO often take place in **political, military, and cultural situations which are highly fluid and dynamic.** Ambiguity may be caused by unresolved political issues, an unclear understanding or description of a desired end state, or difficulty in gaining international consensus. Additionally, the deploying PO forces may have little or no familiarity with the operational area or the complex ethnic and cultural issues which, in



Figure I-4. Common Characteristics of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

some cases, led to the dispute. Complexity in PO may derive from:

- Difficulty in identifying the disputing parties;
- Absence of basic law and order;
- Widespread destruction of physical and social infrastructure and institutions;
- Tenuous cease fire arrangements;
- Environmental damage;
- Threats of disease or epidemics; and
- Emigration (flight) of indigenous population.

Consequently, **commanders strive to provide clear guidelines** for military support of political objectives even when the situation is constantly changing.

**c. Parties to the Dispute or Belligerents.** The parties to the dispute or the belligerents **may or may not have professional armies or organized groups responding reliably to a chain of command.** Operations may take place within a functioning state or within a failing or failed state. Rogue, undisciplined elements or paramilitary units may be present. **Decisions by the leaders may not bind the subordinate elements.** Loosely organized groups of irregulars, criminal syndicates, or other hostile elements of the population may be present. **Multiple parties, each having a different agenda or view of participant's motives, may have to be considered.** Disputing or belligerent forces may range from insurgent forces to large military forces with ground, air, and maritime capabilities. **Weapons may range from** conventional munitions and mines to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) devices. Modern weapons systems may include surface-to-air and

surface-to-surface missiles as well as long-range mortars.

**d. The Planning Process. The planning process for PO is the same as for any other military operation.** Planners need to ensure they have a complete understanding of the implied and specified tasks and the desired end state before planning begins. However, the wide-spread availability of data and its broad dissemination in time-urgent fashion, to civilian and military alike, requires **simultaneous planning for each level of a political-military operation.** This process will address as early as possible factors related to the location and duration of operations and force structure.

- **Location of Operations.** Frequently, PO take place in **austere or highly populated urban environments.** Logistics may become a major challenge when PO are conducted in **remote areas** with poor air and sea ports, over rugged and broad spans of terrain with poor transportation networks, or in cities with underdeveloped infrastructure. Therefore, deploying forces require **careful time-phasing with the appropriate resources** to accomplish the mission and compensate for unanticipated shortfalls. **Carefully planned and executed reconnaissance surveys** of anticipated operating areas carried out by key members and specialists of the force are essential to the later efficient and effective deployment of the force and associated resources. Logistics and health service references and lessons learned found in Appendix E, "References," will contribute to the skills, knowledge, and training required for successfully meeting these challenges.
- **Duration of Operations.** PO are often conducted on short notice, yet **may require long-term commitments** to

resolve the issues that led to the escalation of tension or conflict. Years of problems may have preceded the situation, and the disputing parties may have determined that violence is justified and inevitable. Therefore, **long-term solutions that are primarily political in nature should not be assumed to be achievable by short-term military actions.** The process of reconciliation may take years. However, PO can help establish stable and secure conditions for progress towards long-term political settlements. **Time constraints for the duration of the operation are high-level political-military decisions.** On the one hand, the **declaration of an operational timescale** can cede the initiative to the parties to the conflict. They can then wait out the departure of the PO force. On the other hand, **establishing a fixed date for the participation of the PO force** serves notice that parties must also work diligently to resolve their differences, unless they are willing to forgo the support of the PO. In either case **establishing criteria and conditions which define a successful end state in as timely a fashion as possible and directing efforts to that end state are important.**

e. **Force Structure and Composition.** Force selection for PO must consider the role of units in Major Theater War plans. Plan to mitigate risk and maintain flexibility to execute other aspects of the National Security Strategy. Close political-military communication is essential to assure that the composition of the force is based on the mission, the threat, and possible no-notice operational permutations. Force composition should be robust enough to respond to threats to force security. Use of **air, space, ground, maritime, and special operation forces** is discussed in more detail in later chapters. **Each capability has advantages and**

**disadvantages to employment.** Use of Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities,” will provide commanders with a resource to review and align their mission needs with available capabilities. See also “Wings for Peace” excerpt in Annex G (“Historical Examples”) to Appendix A, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

- **Force Caps.** These **establish limits** on the number of military personnel, number and type of weapons, or the type of units (such as light infantry) **to be deployed in support of PO.** To be avoided are force caps that may result in a force structure that is not appropriate to the mission or the threat and may cause an otherwise avoidable increase in risk. Within the limits of the cap, commanders should posture to protect the force.
- **Unit Integrity.** Another important issue in planning force structure is **maintaining unit integrity whenever possible.** Units that have trained together and operate within normal chains of command and under established procedures are more likely to be successful in any mission to include PO. **Unit integrity may be especially important for US units assigned to a multinational formation.** Flexibility, modularity, and tailorability, however, are also important considerations, along with a reduced footprint for US forces. Many units train to be flexible and tailorable. A commander seeking the capacity of a bulldozer, for example, may need to weigh its usefulness without the complete complement of its structure, leadership, and sustainment.

f. **Interagency Coordination.** In PO, other agencies including the Department of State (DOS) will be involved. Therefore, **commanders should ensure military activities are closely integrated at all levels** — strategic, operational, and tactical — **with**

**the activities of other agencies** to optimize the effectiveness of the total effort and prevent military actions which may be counterproductive to achieving the end state. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” is designed to improve interagency planning of future complex contingency operations. The PDD’s intent is to establish management practices to achieve unity of effort among US Government (USG) agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. A detailed discussion of other USG agencies is in Appendix B, “US Government Involvement in Peace Operations.” Emphasis should be placed on **early establishment of liaison** among the various agencies. The establishment of **interagency coordinating centers**, such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), is one means of fostering unity of effort in achieving objectives of the operation. If available, a **Country Team** may facilitate coordination at the HN level.

*For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”*

**g. Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations.** In many cases, adverse humanitarian conditions arising from natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, violations of human rights, civil wars, or privation that presents a serious threat to life or loss of property will characterize the PO environment. **Commanders, therefore, coordinate their efforts** not only with the sponsoring organization, other militaries, and HN, but also **with a myriad of NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies** involved in relieving adverse humanitarian conditions. Structures like the CMOC are specifically designed to facilitate this process. Only through concerted cooperation and coordinated efforts can the human tragedy that led to or resulted from

the conflict be adequately addressed. Therefore, **it is desirable for all participants to understand the intent, methods, and in-country disposition of the NGOs and PVOs** and to foster a spirit of cooperation and mutuality of interest. It is in the military’s interest to allow NGOs/PVOs to take over the humanitarian assistance (HA) role. By cooperating, both organizations help facilitate a transition to a desired end state. **These organizations can be an important source of information.** They may help PO force commanders and staffs to better accomplish the mission because of their familiarity with the **culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace.** **However, caution is necessary to prevent any perception by the populace or the parties to the dispute that these organizations are part of an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Their purpose is to address humanitarian requirements, and their primary source of security is their neutrality.** Commanders will also find that the cultures of some of these organizations differ markedly from military culture, and there may be a strong desire on their part to maintain a wide distance from military activities.

*For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”*

**h. Multinational Cooperation.** Several factors are essential for success when operations are conducted in cooperation with other nations.

- **Respect and Professionalism.** Mutual respect for multinational partners’ ideas, culture, religion and customs, and a demeanor of military professionalism helps establish a basis for cooperation and unity of effort.
- **Mission Assignment.** Missions assigned by the force commander will be appropriate to each multinational

partner's capabilities and national direction. Multinational partners should be integrated into the planning process, thus assuring both the perception and the reality of unity of effort. Language requirements and linguistic support will be an important consideration. Special operations forces (SOF) capabilities, such as liaison elements, may assist commanders in the employment of multinational forces.

- **Management of Resources.** Multinational partners may seek assistance with logistic support. Agreements need to be established for exchangeable or transferable commodities before operations begin and are further developed and refined throughout the operation. Legal support will be important in formulating and interpreting these agreements.
- **Harmony.** Personal relationships and an effective rapport established among members of a multinational force at all command levels can contribute significantly to the success of the operation.

i. **Information Intensity. All military operations are information intensive.** In PO, this is further complicated by the multiplicity of parties and other actors involved. The scope and scale of required coordination and communication is another major information challenge. The cascading effects of events and their magnification globally through the media further exacerbate the complexity of this characteristic of the PO environment. **The PO force can master this environment by gaining and maintaining information superiority** through effective employment of IO and/or warfare. Activities such as public affairs (PA), CA, and interagency and multinational cooperation and coordination can assist in this effort. In the PO environment, the centerpiece of IO is the **ability to use information to focus**

**engagements to control the situation.** The commander knows that information superiority has been gained when the staff senses and acts more quickly, using information to forestall potential hostile acts and convince parties to the conflict to act in a manner supportive of the peace process. The payoff from information superiority is that it increases survivability and potential lethality of the force and its ability to control the tempo of operations. See "Information Dominance for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."

- **Liaison.** Liaison officers (LNOs) are **critical to the successful conduct of all PO, but particularly in multinational operations.** In some situations, LNOs may be the only means for the commander to communicate with some members of the force. **LNOs help coordinate a myriad of details** within a joint task force (JTF) or PO headquarters and among the multinational contingents, the sponsoring organization, USG agencies, international agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies. LNOs are well-qualified and speak with the authority of the commander they represent. **Many intelligence linguists and SOF personnel are well-suited to serve as LNOs** because of their language abilities, training, and experience. The importance of LNOs in PO cannot be overemphasized.

*"From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. The American and world publics, families of Service members, the news media, and the government have an insatiable demand for information that must be made readily and immediately available."*

**Joint Universal Lessons Learned  
No. 70344-88264 (06186)**

- **Public Affairs.** In PO, news media coverage generally plays a major role in quickly framing public debate and shaping public opinion. Consequently, the media serve as a forum for the analysis and critique of PO. **US and international public opinion affect political, strategic, and operational decisions, and ultimately the perceived success or failure of a mission.** The key issue is that the legitimacy and support for a PO can be lost if PA does not receive the proper level of attention. Commanders will also be aware that the parties to a dispute may find it advantageous to release information which is slanted to support their position. These activities may grow into a fully orchestrated media operation, making it difficult, if not impossible, for US PA personnel to set the record straight. Consequently, **a close working relationship between the PO force and the media can be mutually beneficial.** Providing journalists and other members of the media with releasable information on a timely basis can help reduce the level of speculation in the news.

*For additional information about PA, refer to JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations." See also the "Public Affairs Update" excerpt in Annex G ("Historical Examples") to Appendix A, "Key Documents in Peace Operations."*

*"The media gives you a chance to tell your story. You never get a second chance to create a first impression."*

**Colonel G. Anderson, USMC  
Marine Warfighting Center**

j. **Force Protection.** Force protection considerations are central to all aspects of PO planning and execution, particularly when the mission is a PEO or a PKO that involves interposition between former belligerent forces. Even in relatively benign

environments, **force protection measures will be employed commensurate with the security risks to the force.** These risks may include conventional military threats and a wide range of nonconventional threats such as terrorism, exotic diseases, criminal enterprises, environmental hazards, computer hackers, and so forth. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace will prepare the PO force for adequate force protection. The impartiality of the force may also serve as a measure of force protection. **ROE and weapons control policies are also an aspect of force protection.** In developing these policies planners take into account the capabilities of the PO force. This will avoid a situation where policies and capabilities do not match. Measures taken to identify and plan for possible hostile acts against a PO force can only be successful if the force is given the commensurate ROE to protect itself. If a weapons-control policy is in effect, as is in most POs, capability and ROE have to match the tasking. See Appendix E, "References," for details and reference material related to logistics, IO, engineering, risk management, safety, security, health service support, morale, and welfare aspects of force protection.

*"My initial concern for the task force deploying to Operation ABLE SENTRY was force protection. Some UN military commanders don't understand our preoccupation with this issue because they are not faced with the same threat as US forces. They don't understand that because we are the American Army, we are an isolated target of opportunity."*

**MG W.H. Yates, USA  
CDR, Berlin Brigade**

k. **Measures of Success.** A common understanding of the **desired end state** and the **conditions that will constitute success** is important to commanders at all levels.

Ultimately, **settlement, not victory, is the key measure of success in PO**. Settlement is not achieved through military operations alone, but through a combination of actions that may include all the elements of national power and various international factors. **A resolution reached by conciliation among the disputing parties is preferable to termination by force**. PO are conducted to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military operations will complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and perhaps humanitarian efforts in the pursuit of the overarching political objective. **The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is not an appropriate measure of success in PO**. It is also important to recognize when the mission is not achievable. This may stem from such factors as a breakdown in political resolve by the parties to the dispute or the international community. In these cases, close political-military communications again remains important.

1. **Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)**. Measures of success may be difficult to determine at the operational and tactical level of action, because they require higher level, strategic political-military assessments. Nevertheless, at the military operational and tactical levels, **MOE may assist commanders and political decision makers in gauging progress in the accomplishment of the mission**. The key question is whether the military effort is doing what it is expected to do in terms of the mission or mandate. MOE focus on whether military efforts are having the desired result in achieving the mandate or mission specifically assigned to the force. These measures will provide commanders and higher authorities with a means to **evaluate the contribution of military efforts** to the more encompassing and overarching desired end state. More importantly, these measures will provide a **baseline of indicators** of how well the

military effort is achieving its specific, possibly limited goals in accordance with the mission statement provided by higher authorities. Such measures will be situationally dependent, often requiring readjustment as the situation changes and higher level political-military guidance develops. MOE are normally discrete, quantifiable, and helpful in understanding and measuring progress.

- **Constructs**. A variety of **constructs may prove suitable to the development of MOE**, depending on the mission or mandate provided to military forces. These may include the constructs listed in Figure I-5 or combinations thereof.
- **Caveats**. MOE are only limited by the imagination of commanders and their staffs. However, **they should exercise a certain degree of caution and judgment when using statistical indicators alone**. These may vary widely in interpretation, may be valid only for a specific time, place, or group of people, and may not have a direct correlation to effectiveness. Such indicators as enemy unit-effectiveness status, weapons seized or confiscated, and the like may have limited applicability in MOE for PO.

m. **Civil Disturbances**. PKO and PEO inherently include the likelihood of encountering civil disturbances. Success in handling these disturbances will have an effect on operations. A poorly handled civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potentially long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation can lead to both an enhanced view of the professionalism and strength of the PO force, instill confidence in democratic and law enforcement institutions involved, and result in fewer disturbances in future operations. **Controlling civil disturbances includes the following actions**.

## CONSTRUCTS SUITABLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- Variables of consent, impartiality, use of force
- Principles of war and military operations other than war
- Centers of gravity, decisive points, and culminating points. See Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
- Universal Joint Task List, component interoperability tasks, or Service tasks
- Phases or patterns of operations
  - Force projection and entry operations
  - Shaping the environment
  - Decisive operations
  - Information operations
  - Protecting the force
  - Preparation and planning for posthostilities activities
  - Sustainment
  - Transitions, termination, or redeployment
- Consent or compliance with specific provisions of the mandate
  - Violations of buffer zones, cease fire lines, demilitarized zones, areas of limitation, safe areas, checkpoints
  - Rules of Engagement viability and enforcement
  - Violations of cease-fires
  - Freedom of movement compliance
  - Interference with humanitarian assistance efforts
  - Curfew compliance
  - Demobilization, disarmament, demilitarization, mine clearance, fortification removal

**Figure I-5. Constructs Suitable to the Development of Measures of Effectiveness**

- Isolate in time and space the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Use a system of checkpoints to limit and control access together with the use of helicopters and other monitoring technologies to screen the flanks. Attack helicopters may also overwatch nearby sites that may pose a threat and as a deterrent to outside intervention.
- Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. An overwhelming show of force at checkpoints, coupled with

helicopter overflights, may dissuade entry into the area by potentially destabilizing elements. Unmanned aerial vehicle platforms and helicopters may provide real-time situation reports, ensuring that units know the “ground truth” at all times. This situational awareness gives commanders a decisive advantage in both negotiations with potentially hostile elements and during tactical operations.

- Maintaining common situational awareness by requiring timely, accurate, complete, multi-source reporting and effective information dissemination. A broad spectrum of sources will assist this effort.
- Multi-dimensional, multi-echeloned actions. One element may provide local security while another focuses its efforts on the larger strategic or political spectrum. Use all available resources to influence the outcome, including convincing local media to avoid inflammatory broadcasts or to make broadcasts designed to quell and disperse the crowds. Multi-dimensional responses include the use of civil and military nonlethal assets. Nonlethal assets will be considered and applied to avoid overwhelming military responses that could escalate tensions or cause unnecessary injury or death.

n. **Other Factors.** Other factors which characterize the PO environment and demand careful analysis include, but are not limited to the following:

- Geopolitical situation;
- Prevailing social conditions and indigenous cultures;
- Level of conflict or the effectiveness of the cease fire;

- The number, discipline, and accountability of disputing parties;
- Effectiveness of the governments involved; and
- The degree of law and order that exists.

## 8. Command and Control

The United States may participate in PO under various C2 arrangements. These arrangements might include a:

- Unilateral US operation;
- Multinational operation with the United States as the lead nation; and/or
- Multinational operation with the United States as a participant or in support.

*See JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” Chapter VI, “Multinational Operations.”*

In any of these arrangements, **US forces will report to the US NCA.** However, **in multinational PO, US forces may also report to the sponsoring organization** such as the UN, NATO, OAU, and/or OAS. In PKO, the United States will normally be a contingent; in PEO, the United States should ordinarily be the lead nation, in accordance with the policy of PDD-25, “Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.”

Although US forces may be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of non-US commanders in certain circumstances, **the command line from the NCA will remain inviolate, running from the NCA to the combatant commander (and other supported combatant commanders, as appropriate) to subordinate US commanders.**

*For additional information, refer to JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”*

and PDD-25, “Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.”

## 9. Key Documents in Peace Operations

The political objectives of a particular operation guide the development of **key documents that provide legal authority and define the parameters for a PO**. Key documents include the mandate, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) (often called status of mission agreement [SOMA] in UN operations), terms of reference (TOR), and ROE (see Figure I-6).

a. **Mandate.** In PO, the force generally conducts operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations. UN PO conduct operations in accordance with mandates established by the UN Security Council. Operations sponsored by organizations other than the UN may also be based on mandates. These mandates will usually result from treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements of international or regional organizations. A sample UN mandate is in Annex A (“Mandates”) to Appendix A, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

- For PKO, the mandate issued by the UN Security Council is based on negotiations with the parties to the dispute, the HN, and potential contributors of PK forces or personnel.

- For PEO, the UN Security Council will normally seek broad ranging support for enforcement actions from the international community before issuing a mandate.

b. **Status-of-Forces Agreement or Status of Mission Agreement.** These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, **establish the detailed legal status of PO forces**. These agreements are negotiated between UN, HN, and sponsoring organizations on behalf of participating countries and involve close coordination between combatant commanders, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements (such as a SOFA) is held at the national level. Some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff and combatant commanders. Neither the commander nor his staff has such authority without specific approval or delegation from higher authority. Before entering into any negotiations or agreement with another nation, consult the staff judge advocate. A sample SOFA is at Annex B (“Status-of-Forces Agreement”) of Appendix A, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

- The SOFA or SOMA (hereafter SOMA is included wherever the term SOFA is used) proceeds from the mandate. However, PEO do not normally include a SOFA, except with the HN or other countries from which operations are staged.

- Members of PO contingents remain subject to applicable national laws,



Figure I-6. Key Documents in Peace Operations

policies, and regulations of their own nations, including military criminal codes. Ordinarily, military discipline and punitive actions are taken by the appropriate national chain of command, not by the sponsoring organization. All US personnel remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which will be administered by the appropriate US commander.

c. **Terms of Reference.** The TOR are developed to **govern implementation of the PO** based on the mandate and the situation and may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute in PKO. **The TOR describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force.** The TOR are written by the UN or other sponsoring organization. When the United States is a participant in a PO, the TOR are coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, and DOS before final approval by the NCA. A sample TOR is in Annex C (“Terms of Reference”) of Appendix A, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

d. **Rules of Engagement.** In PO, well conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between mission success and failure. **ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate or continue engagement with other forces or elements.** ROE define when and how force may be used. All commanders will assess threat capabilities and make recommendations for specific ROE through the chain of command. The ROE are written with consideration of legal, political, and military factors and may include elements of the law of armed conflict. A sample ROE is at Annex D (“Rules of

Engagement”) of Appendix A, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

- CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, **“Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces,”** provides the starting point for all ROE development. These ROE may be tailored to each PO, but are approved by the combatant commander.
- **Restraint**, a principle of MOOTW, **should guide ROE development.** The development process balances mission accomplishment with political considerations that ensure protection of the force and its mission. However, nothing in the ROE can negate a commander’s responsibility and authority to take all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense.
- **Commanders ensure dissemination of the ROE to all personnel.** Additionally, because ROE seldom anticipate every situation, commanders ensure personnel understand the intent of the ROE. ROE should be included in all plans and be reviewed by the force commander’s legal advisor.
- **When ROE change, the changes should be rapidly disseminated to all personnel.** Changes may be driven by tactical emergencies, attacks by hostile forces, incidents involving loss of life, or other events. Commanders may request changes to the ROE through the chain of command. A strong, reliable command and control system must be in place, especially for PEO where ROE inputs to fielded troops under rapidly changing conditions is of utmost concern for force protection.
- US commanders will be aware that **PO forces from other nations may interpret ROE differently than US**

**forces or may wish to use different ROE.** This creates a challenge for unity of effort of the PO force as a whole. A common interpretation of the ROE between the contingents will facilitate unity of effort.

- **For PKO, ROE are normally highly restrictive** and written to limit the use of force to self-defense of the force and protection of its mission.
- **In PEO, the ROE are less restrictive on the use of force than in PKO,** but are tailored to the situation. Restraint will still be a primary consideration since the transition to peace may be easier when the PE force has only used proportional and appropriate force.

e. **The Campaign Plan.** The theater or multinational campaign plan is the **tool for linking operational- and tactical-level actions to strategic aims.** Because PO tend to unfold incrementally, **the joint or multinational staff writes a campaign plan that lays out a clear, definable path to the desired end state.** This plan should relate to and support a strategic-level interagency, political-military plan. Such a plan will help

commanders to assist political leaders in visualizing operational requirements and defining a desired end state. Essential considerations for developing a PO campaign plan include understanding **the mandate and TOR, analyzing the mission, and developing the ROE.** A concept for transition and termination is essential. Joint Pub 5-00.1, “JTTP for Campaign Planning,” includes a sample outline of a PO campaign plan.

## 10. Conclusion

PO are complex operations conducted in a dynamic environment that involves initial objectives that may change in pursuit of the end state. Consequently, commanders seek an understanding of the political-military objectives, the tasks and political-military plans designed to attain them, forces required, and the operational environment. Then commanders ensure that military actions support political objectives. Commanders and their staffs conduct detailed mission analysis and clearly articulate the situation, mission, and ROE. Finally, commanders will continue to analyze the situation to prevent divergence between military actions and the overall objectives of the operation.