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MCCP PE

6th Marines Operation Order

1. You are the S-3 of **2d Battalion (Rein), 6th Marines**. At 111000R Sep 20XX, you and the Commanding Officer are called to the Regimental Command Post (CP) to receive the following operation order.

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6TH MAR (REIN)
SCHNEIDER CROSSROADS, VIRGINIA
111000R Sep 20XX
YSP-5

OPERATION ORDER 5-XX (OPERATION OLD DOMINION)

REFERENCES:

(a) Maps: V734, MIDDLEBURG, Sheet 5461 I, FAIRFAX 5561 IV 1 DMA, 1:50,000 (color composite); MARYLAND/VIRGINIA, 1:250,000 (color composite).

TIME ZONE: ROMEO

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

1. Situation

- a. General. (Not Applicable)
- b. Battlespace. (Not Applicable)
- c. Enemy Forces. See Appendix 11, INTEL ESTIMATE to Annex B, INTELLIGENCE and current INTSUMs.
- d. Friendly Forces

(1) Higher

(a) 2d MarDiv

1 Mission. At H-hour on D-day, 2d MarDiv attacks in zone to seize MEF Obj A (Strasburg TU290182) in order to control the north-south LOCs in the lower Shenandoah Valley. Upon

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consolidation, as the stationary force, conducts a forward passage of lines with the 26th Maryland National Guard in the vicinity of MEF Obj A (Strasburg). Becomes MEF Reserve upon completion of forward passage of lines.

2 Commander's Intent. (CG 2d MarDiv)

(1) Purpose. Control the north-south LOCs in the lower Shenandoah Valley.

(2) Method. I want to penetrate the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde defenses, then continue the attack with the Division reserve against the elements of the 34th Mtzd Inf Div units in zone before it can complete its resupply.

(3) Endstate. Penetration of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's defenses along the Bull Run Mountains, enemy units in zone destroyed, MEF Obj A (Strasburg TU290182) free of enemy and obstacles along the north-south LOCs, the MEF reserve (26th MdNG Div) passed through our zone, and 2d Division poised to continue the attack to the south.

(2) Adjacent

(a) At H-hour on D-day, 44th Virginia National Guard (VaNG) Division attacks in zone to seize MEF Obj B (Harrisonburg PN866580) in order to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.

(b) 2d LAR Bn conducted a zone recon and determined enemy composition, disposition, and orientation east of the Bull Run Mountains; currently screens along the LD/LC forward of the regiment until 6th Marines assumes the offensive; O/O, serves as stationary unit for the forward passage of attacking forces; O/O, conducts area reconnaissance oriented on MEF Obj A (Strasburg TU290182).

(c) At H-Hour on D-Day, 2d Marines (Rein) attacks to secure Div Obj 1 (Leesburg) in order to open an alternate route for the forward passage of follow on forces.

(d) At H-Hour on D-Day, 8th Marines (Rein), the Division reserve, follows 6th Marines and prepares to

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assume the main effort and conduct a forward passage of lines/battle handover as the moving unit with 6th Marines vic Rectortown. Upon completion of forward passage, attacks in zone to seize MEF Obj A (Strasburg) in order to open LOC's for exploitation by the MEF Reserve.

(3) Supporting

(a) Artillery. 2d Battalion, 10th Marines (-) (Rein) is in direct support of the regiment.

(b) Air. 2d MAW is in general support of the MEF; conducts air operations in II MEF's zone in order to shape the battlespace for II MEF's attack; O/O provides CAS and assault support to 2d MarDiv.

(c) CSS. 2d FSSG is in general support of the MEF. Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD)26 in direct support of the regiment.

2. Mission. At H-hour on D-day, 6th Marines (Rein) attacks in zone to secure Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap TU703175), seize Regt Obj B (Hopewell Gap TU655050), and destroy enemy armor in the vicinity of Regt Obj C (Rectortown TU520108) in order to create a gap for the forward passage of 8th Marines, the division reserve.

3. Execution

- a. Commander's Intent. OVERVIEW: The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde will continue to guard along the Bull Run Mountains until the 34th Mtzd Inf Div has completed rearming/refitting. When the weather breaks, the 342d will require at least 24 hours to resume offensive operations. The weather is forecasted to break by the morning of 16 September. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's center of gravity is its tank battalion in reserve in the vicinity of Rectortown (off your composite map sheet about 10 km to the west, vic TU 520108). CV: In our zone, the enemy's critical vulnerability is that he can't move his reserve to react to a penetration except along limited avenues of approach. This leaves the reserve vulnerable to flanking attack whenever it moves. I intend to exploit this vulnerability by conducting two simultaneous, supporting attacks to create a gap in two places of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's position along the Bull Run Mountains. This will force the enemy to choose where he will commit his reserve to restore his FEBA. We will then use Aldie gap as a route into the flank of his

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reserve. We'll attack to destroy the reserve with our main effort, ending the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's combat effectiveness and creating a gap for exploitation by the division reserve. ENDSTATE: Regt Objs A (Aldie Gap) secured and B (Hopewell Gap) seized, the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's Tank Battalion (Rectortown) destroyed, and the regiment prepared to pass the division reserve forward to continue the attack toward MEF Obj A (Strasburg).

- b. Concept of Operations. At H-hour on D-day, 6th Mar (Rein) conducts a frontal attack with one reinforced infantry battalion and one mechanized battalion task force forward, one armor heavy task force back and one reinforced mechanized infantry battalion in reserve. Supporting Effort #1: At H-hour on D-Day, one mechanized battalion task force attacks to secure Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap) in order to create a gap for exploitation by the regimental main effort. Supporting Effort #2: At H-hour on D-Day, one reinforced infantry battalion attacks to seize Regt Obj B (Hopewell Gap) in order to prevent the enemy from using Hopewell Gap as an avenue of approach to interfere with the Regiment's operation. Main Effort: One armor heavy task force follows in trace of Supporting Effort #1, conducts a forward passage of lines vic Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap) and attacks to destroy the enemy reserve in the vicinity of Regt Obj C (Rectortown). Reserve: One reinforced mechanized infantry battalion follows in trace of the Main Effort, prepared to support the main effort's attack toward Regt Obj C (Rectortown). Priority of Fires: Initially, to Supporting Effort #1; on order, to the main effort. See Appendix 19 to Annex C.

c. Tasks

(1) 1ST BN (-) (REIN)

- (a) At H-hour on D-day, attack in zone to secure Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap TU703175) in order to create a gap for exploitation by the regimental main effort (8th Tank Battalion).
- (b) On order, you are stationary unit for forward passage of the regimental main effort and regimental reserve vicinity of Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap).
- (c) Upon completion of forward passage, assume the regimental reserve.

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- (d) You are supporting effort #1 and will initially have priority of fires.

(2) 2D BN (REIN)

- (a) At H-hour on D-day, attack in zone to seize Regt Obj B (Hopewell Gap TU655050) in order to prevent the enemy from using Hopewell Gap as an avenue of approach to interfere with the Regiment's operation.
- (b) Upon consolidation, establish defensive positions oriented North and East to block enemy access to Hopewell Gap.
- (c) Be prepared to continue the attack toward Regt Obj C.
- (d) You are supporting effort #2.

(3) 8TH TANK BN (-) (REIN)

- (a) Initially in trace of 1st Bn (Rein).
- (b) On order, conduct forward passage of lines vicinity Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap TU703175) and continue the attack to destroy the 342d's tank battalion in the vicinity of Regt Obj C (Rectortown TU520108) in order to create a gap for follow on forces.
- (c) You are the main effort and will have priority of fires once committed.
- (d) On order, detach from 6th Mar Regt; attach to 8th Mar Regt vicinity Regt Obj C (Rectortown). Be prepared to continue the attack in support of 8th Marines. Coordinate with 8th Marines before crossing the LD.

d. Regimental Reserve

(1) 3D BN (REIN)

- (a) Initially in trace of 8th Tank Bn.

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- (b) Be prepared to conduct forward passage of lines as the moving unit vic Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap) and Regt Obj C (Rectortown).
- (c) Be prepared to follow and support 8th Tank Bn's assault on Regt Obj C (Rectortown).
- (d) Be prepared to establish battle position vicinity TU640180 oriented north to block in order to protect 8th Tank's northern flank.

(2) 1ST BN (-) (REIN)

- (a) Effective upon completion of forward passage with 8th Tanks and 3d battalion.
- (b) Be prepared to continue the attack toward Regt Obj C.

e. Commander's Critical Information Requirements

- (1) Indications that the enemy is employing his counter attack force.
- (2) Indications the enemy is withdrawing west (towards Rectortown and/or Strasburg).
- (3) Location of the enemy brigade artillery group.
- (4) Indications of 342d initiating offensive operations prior to 2d Division's interdiction.

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-day/H-hour is 140200R Sep XX.
- (2) LD (PL MOON) is Highway 15 in 2/6's zone and Highway 624 to Highway 600 in 1/6's zone. LD is current Line of Contact (LC).
- (3) Forward passage of lines (FPOL)/Battle handover (BHO) with Co B, 2d LAR.

<u>ROUTE</u>	<u>START PT</u>	<u>RELEASE PT</u>
BLUE (Rte 234)	SP1 TU797020	RP1 TU714055
RED (Rte 234 to 701)	SP2 TU768036	RP2 TU721088

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<u>LANE</u>	<u>PASSAGE PT</u>
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OAK	PP1 TU705052
HICKORY	PP2 TU711089

(Details of FPOL with Co A, 2d LAR omitted for brevity)

- (4) Battalions in trace coordinate passage routes with forward units.
- (5) Cross LD in MOPP 0.
- (6) 6th Mar Regt Obj A - (3/342-Mtzd Inf Bn)
Aldie Gap (TU705173)
6th Mar Regt Obj B - (3/342-Mtzd Inf Bn)
Hopewell Gap (TU655050)
6th Mar Regt Obj C - (3/37-Tank Bn)
Rectortown (TU520108)
- (7) 2d MarDiv Obj 1 - (2/342-Mtzd Inf Bn)
Leesburg (TU784326)
- (8) 6th Mar Regt Contact Points as follows:
4 - TU783030 (Vicinity Mt Calvery Church)
6 - TU754120 (Vicinity Road intersection 1400 meters SE of Little River Church)
- (9) 6th Mar Regt Checkpoints as follows:
Chkpt 9 - TU717135 (Road Intersection)
Chkpt 12 - TU728165 (Gilbert's Corner)
Chkpt 15 - TU683174 (Intersection Rte 629 & Rte 50)
Chkpt 20 - TU718088 (Intersection Rte 701 & Rte 15)
Chkpt 22 - TT705995 (Road Intersection Rte 55 & 15)
Chkpt 24 - TU669044 (Intersection Rte 681 & 601)
Chkpt 27 - TU640059 (Hopewell)
Chkpt 28 - TU713056 (Intersection Rte 15 & 234)

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- (10) Phase Line STAR, per PE 1 (Starter Graphics)
 - (11) Regt Boundaries are as follows: Between Co B, 2d LAR Bn and 2d Bn, 6th Mar, from the intersection of the powerline & Hwy 29 (TT768983) north along the powerline to the intersection of another powerline (TU774079). Between Co A, 2d LAR Bn and 1st Bn, 6th Mar, continue north along the powerline to the intersection with Rte 621 (TU791160). Between 1st Bn, 6th Mar and 2nd Bn, 6th Mar, per PE 1 (Starter Graphics).
 - (12) Coordinate evacuation and transportation of civilian personnel discovered in 6th Mar zone of action through this headquarters.
 - (13) Minimize damage to civilian property. Occupy civilian property without consent of owner or local authorities only if military necessity dictates.
 - (14) Do not utilize civilian materials, to include POL, without consent of owner or local authorities unless military necessity dictates. Notify this headquarters of the monetary value of any materials used due to military necessity.
 - (15) Bypass criteria. Battalions designated as M.E. are authorized to bypass enemy forces that are incapable of blocking supporting battalions. Battalions assigned as S.E. are authorized to bypass enemy forces that are squad size and smaller.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, LOGISTICS (issued separately)
 5. Command and Signal
 - a. Command Relationships. Forward units DIRLAUTH with 2d LAR Bn.
 - b. Command Posts and Headquarters
 - (1) 2d MarDiv - Chantilly (TU893078).
 - (2) 6th Mar - Vicinity Schneider Crossroads (TU823063).
 - (3) 1/6 - TU794096.
 - (4) 2/6 - TU791025.

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- (5) 3/6 - TU830019.
- (6) 8th Tk Bn - TU854068.
- (7) Report CP locations when established.

c. Succession to Command

- (1) XO, 6th Marine Regiment
- (2) CO, 2d Battalion
- (3) CO, 8th Tank Battalion

d. Signal. Annex K, COMBAT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

- (1) Maintain wire communications until time of attack.
- (2) Report by exception

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

R. SALASKO
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operations (TBI)
- D - Logistics (TBI)
- E - Personnel (Omitted)
- F - Public Affairs (Omitted)
- G - Civil Affairs (Omitted)
- H - Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations (Omitted)
- J - Command Relationships (Omitted)
- K - Combat Information Systems (TBI)
- L - Environmental Considerations (Omitted)
- M - Geospatial Information and Services (Omitted)
- N - Space Operations (Omitted)

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- P - Host Nation Support (Omitted)
- Q - Medical Services (Omitted)
- S - Special Technical Operations (Omitted)
- U - Information Management (Omitted)
- W - Aviation Operations (TBI)
- X - Execution Checklist (Omitted)
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution)

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111000R Sep 20XX
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ANNEX A to OPERATION ORDER 5-XX (OPERATION OLD DOMINION)

REFERENCES: None

TIME ZONE: ROMEO

(All attachments effective upon receipt of this order)

6th Mar (Rein)

Col SALASKO

Hq Co (-), 6th Mar
Det, HqBn, 2d MarDiv
Det, Comm Co
2d Plat (-), Trk Co
Arty Ln Tm, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 10th Mar
2d Aslt Amphibious Bn (-) (2 AAVC-7, 3 AAVP-7, 1 AAVR-7)
Co B (-)(Rein), 2d Cbt Engr Bn, 2d Mar Div
Det, HUMINT Co, Intel Bn, II MHG
Det, Co A, 2d Rad Bn (1 Mobile EW Support System) (DS)
Det, MACG-28, 2d MAW (DS)
1st Plat (-), Btry A, 2d LAAD Bn
Det, MASS-1 (Air Support Element)

1st Bn (-) (Rein) (Mech Heavy Task Force)

LtCol TAYLOR

1st Bn (-)
H&S Co
Co B
Co C
Wpns Co
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 6th Mar
Arty Ln Tm, Btry E, 2d Bn, 10th Mar
Co B (-), 2d Aslt Amphib Bn, 2d MarDiv
(2 AAVC-7, 31 AAVP-7, 1 AAVR-7)
1st Plat (Rein), Co B, 2d Cbt Engr Bn, 2d MarDiv
Det, H&S Co, 2d Cbt Engr Bn
Det, Engr Spt Co, 2d Cbt Engr Bn (2 ACE, 1 SEE)
Det, Mob/Cmob Plat, H&S Co, 2d Aslt Amphib Bn
(4 AAVP-7, 2 MK 154)
Co B, 8th Tk Bn
Det, 2d plat, Trk Co, HqBn, 2d MarDiv
(5 trk, 3 M-105 trlr)

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2d Bn (Rein) LtCol TALIAFERRO
2d Bn
H&S Co
Co E
Co F
Co G
Wpns Co
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 6th Mar
Arty Ln Tm, Btry F, 2d Bn, 10th Mar
2d Plat, Co B, 2d Cbt Engr Bn, 2d MarDiv
1st Sect, 2d Plat, Trk Co, Hq Bn, 2d MarDiv
(18 trucks, 6 M-105 trlr, 1 M-149 water bull)

2d Bn (Rein), 10th Mar (DS) LtCol CUTSHAW
2d Bn
Hq Btry
Btry E
Btry F
Btry G
Det, Hq Btry, 10th Mar

8th Tk Bn (-) (Rein) (Armor Heavy Task Force) LtCol ASHBY
8th Tk Bn (-)
H&S Co
Co A
Co C
Co D
Co A, 1st Bn, 6th Mar (Rein)
Co A
1st Plat, Co B, 2d Aslt Amphib Bn, 2d MarDiv
(12 AAVP-7)
Det, C2 Sect, GS Plat, H&S Co, 2d Aslt Amphib Bn
(2 AAVC-7, 2 AAVP-7)

Regimental Reserve:

3d Bn (Rein) LtCol GARNETT
3d Bn
H&S Co
Co I
Co K
Co L
Wpns Co
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 6th Mar
Arty Ln Tm, Btry G, 2d Bn, 10th Mar
Co C, 2d Aslt Amphib Bn, 2d MarDiv
(2 AAVC-7, 43 AAVP-7, 1 AAVR-7)
3d Plat(Rein), Co B, 2d Cbt Engr Bn, 2d MarDiv
Det, Engr Spt Co, 2d Cbt Engr Bn

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(2 ACE, 1 TRAM, 2 trucks)
Det, Mob/Cmob Plat, H&S Co, 2d Aslt Amphib Bn,
(4 AAVP-7, 2 MK154)
Det, 2d Plat, Trk Co, HqBn, 2d MarDiv
(5 trucks, 2 M-105 trlr)

1st Bn (-) (Rein) (Eff upon relief)

LtCol TAYLOR

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

R. SALASKO
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (Omitted)
- 2 - Shortfall Identification (Omitted)
- 3 - Force Module Identification (Omitted)
- 4 - Deterrent Options (Omitted)
- 5 - Reserve Component Requirements Summary (Omitted)

OFFICIAL:

C. Cates
Major, USMC
S-3

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APPENDIX 11 to ANNEX B to OPERATION ORDER 5-XX (OPERATION OLD DOMINION)

REFERENCES: (a) Maps: (1) V734, Middleburg, VA, Sheet 5461 I, Fairfax, VA, Sheet 5561 IV, I-DMA, 1:50,000

1. Mission. At H-hour on D-day, 6th Marines (Rein) attacks in zone to secure Regt Obj A (Aldie Gap TU703175), seize Regt Obj B (Hopewell Gap TU655050), and destroy enemy armor in the vicinity of Regt Obj C (Rectortown TU520108) in order to create a gap for the forward passage of 8th Marines, the division reserve.

2. Area of Operations

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography. (A narrative of the military aspects of terrain specific to this Area of Operations will be provided as "*Summary Reference Points*" when you complete the *Practical Exercise for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*).

(a) Topography

1 The Bull Run Mountain's highest elevation is 417 meters at Signal Mountain (TU6506). The Bull Run Mountain range averages above 350 meters. Elevation differences impact on line of sight communications and electronic emissions.

2 Vegetation in the area includes uncut forest on the Bull Run Mountains. The forests consist of a variety of evergreen and deciduous trees about 70 feet tall, 10 to 40 inches in diameter, and three to four feet apart. Secondary growth makes much of the forested area difficult for foot movement in the summer. The remainder of the terrain is mostly cultivated fields and meadows, demarcated by tree lines. Vegetation

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generally follows the streambeds, roads and fence lines.

3 Soil is loam and clay, with large rocks and boulders at some points in the mountains. During dry weather, valley soil will not present a problem to foot mobile or vehicle traffic. Tracked vehicle mobility can be expected to be fair to poor in wet weather due to the rock/clay underlayer in this region. Swampy areas along streams may restrict traffic, and heavy rain will preclude wheeled vehicle traffic from crossing most water courses. Wheeled vehicle mobility will be poor off road during periods of prolonged wet weather.

(b) Hydrography. (Omitted)

(c) Climate and Weather

1 Climate and weather normally favor movement during late August-early September. The current weather resulting from the hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico is an exception to the norm.

2 Temperatures are expected to be in the mid-70s during the day and average in the mid-60s at night. As the weather clears in the wake of the approaching high pressure system, fog and rain will give way to mild conditions with clear skies, cooler temperatures and winds rising to 15-20 knots from the NE.

3 Heavy rainfall expected in next 24-36 hours. Flooding will occur, but will be limited to water courses and low-lying areas.

4 Humidity will hover around 70% to 80%.

(2) Transportation

(a) Most LOCs in 6th Marines' area of interest generally run east-west and will facilitate movement of the reserve and logistic elements. Highways 50, 620, 601, 234, 29/211, and 66/55 are east-west running, all-weather roads capable of bearing mechanized and wheeled vehicles. Highways

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17, 710, 713, 626, 628, 629, 600, 15, 701/676, 705, 659, and 621 are all-weather north-south connectors to the east-west LOCs. There are numerous secondary roads throughout the area. The power lines that intersect in the 6th Mar zone vic TU7707 make good avenues of approach.

(b) Railroads. The Southern Railroad has an interchange in Manassas (TT842916) and the railroad passes through Gainesville (TT735973) and Broad Run (TU646004). All rail right of ways should be assumed to be excellent all-weather movement routes for mech units, to include trestles.

(c) Airfields. The largest commercial airfield in the Middleburg area is Dulles (TU8713). The airfield at Frederick, Maryland, has been destroyed. Other operating airfields are located at Andrews AFB in Washington, DC, and at Quantico, VA. There are three small airfields suitable for use as FOBs in the area of operations: Glascock Landing Field (TU7913), Smith Field (TU7711), and Hickory Field (TU6215).

(3) Telecommunications. (Omitted)

(4) Politics. (Omitted)

(5) Economics. (Omitted)

(6) Sociology. (Omitted)

(7) Science and Technology. (Omitted)

b. Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Services)

(1) Strengths. Committed Forces:

(a) Ground. The 6th Marines are opposed by the 3d Bn of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde. See Figure B (page 2-B-13) and C (2-B-14) for general dispositions.

(b) Naval. None.

(c) Air. No enemy attack aircraft or helicopter-borne forces are currently operating forward of the regimental zone.

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- (2) Composition. Truck associated Motorized Infantry Brigade with a T-62 tank battalion. See Figure D (page 2-B-15) for the Brigade composition.
- (3) Location and Disposition. Forward trace of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde is from Snickers Gap (TU740340), Aldie (TU710170), Hopewell Gap (TU655050), Thoroughfare Gap (TU643005), to New Baltimore Gap (TU632943).
- (4) Movements and Activities. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde has been improving its defensive positions and has added foot patrols to local security measures. Vehicular movements have been limited, probably to conserve fuel and equipment.
- (5) Availability of Reinforcements. Indications are that there are no ground combat forces east of the Shenandoah Valley that could be used to reinforce the committed 342d Mtzd Inf Bde.
- (6) Logistics. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde is experiencing supply shortages; diesel fuel, ATGM rounds, artillery ammunition and repair parts for major end items appear to be running out. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde has been receiving supplies directly from the Mtzd Inf Div's forward combat service support area in the vicinity of Front Royal (QD432119). Though their LOCs are extremely vulnerable to aerial and partisan interdiction, the current weather has probably given them time to improve their situation.
- (7) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. The 34th Mtzd Inf Div has been reinforced with a Rocket Launcher Battalion attached from Division. It is composed of three firing batteries of BM-21s, with 2 launchers per battery. These units have not been identified with the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde, but two attrited BM-21 batteries have been identified with the 343d Mtzd Inf Bde in the vicinity of Strasburg (QD2819).
- (8) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft.
(Omitted)
- (9) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels.
(Omitted)
- (10) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. (Omitted)

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- (11) Electronic Intelligence. (Omitted)
- (12) Weapons of Mass Destruction. No information has been reported on the number and types of NBC munitions available.
- (13) Air Defense. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde has employed Air Defense Artillery systems located in the vicinity of the artillery units, the tank reserve and the HQ elements. SA-14 MANPADS are available down to the company level.
- (14) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses
- (a) Strengths. The enemy's most significant strengths are his armor (T-62) and indirect fire assets. His prepared defensive positions on key mobility corridors are backed up with forward deployed indirect fire support that can range well into his security area.
- (b) Weaknesses
- 1 Enemy forces in the area of operations are dispersed because of the frontage they are trying to cover. His combat power has been significantly reduced by the loss of effective air support.
- 2 Gaps in his defenses will have to be covered by fire support, making him vulnerable to infiltration with the current reduced visibility conditions. This weakness is compounded by the state of his fire support systems, which are short on ammunition and attrited to some 40% of their normal strength.
- 3 The 342d's supply routes are extremely vulnerable to air interdiction because they lack local air superiority.
- 4 A marked reduction in motorized patrolling is an indication that fuel conservation efforts may have been instituted.
- (15) Recent and Present Significant Activities. Analysis of imagery and patrol/recon reporting indicates:

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- (a) Antitank obstacles have been emplaced along major avenues of approach into strongpoints, specifically at TU719169, TU667045, TU658003, and TT641943.
- (b) Aldie (TU710170). Defended by a Mtzd Inf Bn (-) tentatively identified as 3d Bn, 342d, indicating they believe Highway 50 is the primary avenue of approach into their sector. Squad-sized foot patrols are being conducted, probably as a local security measure for the flanks of their positions. 2d LAR Bn has identified a company size position located at Gilberts Corner (TU725165). Another company position appears to be located in depth at TU715170. Elements of a 122mm battery are arrayed in depth to the west of the gap, vic of Dover, probably positioned for a direct fire role on Hwy 50. Some form of air defense system, most likely ZU-23, will be associated with this position.
- (c) An observation post (OP) has been established at the lookout tower at TU686103. Current poor visibility has rendered this OP ineffective, however, in clear weather, it will give them a substantial advantage.
- (d) Hopewell Gap (TU655050) appears to be defended by one Mtzd Inf Co, probably elements of 3d Bn, 342d. The company's main defenses are dispersed in the vicinity of the intersection of Highways 681, 600 and 601 (TU668044). Squad-sized foot patrols have been observed, probably as local security for the flanks of their positions. No obstacles are currently emplaced on any but the main roads in this vicinity. An MTU-55 bridge is in place over the washed-out road culvert at TU623062. Analysis of recon reports and electronic emissions indicate this Mtzd Inf Co's parent Mtzd Inf Bn is defending from Hopewell Gap (TU655050) to Aldie Gap (TT710170).
- (e) Thoroughfare Gap (TU643005). Imagery depicts a company size element in the vicinity of the gap, but the extent of this unit's activities is undetermined at this time. In addition, six 2B11 120mm mortars were sighted moving into position north and west of the gap vic TU628013.

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- (f) New Baltimore (TT632943) appears to be defended by one Mtzd Inf Co. Engineering obstacles have been located at TT641943. Elements of a D-20 152mm battery have been sighted in the vicinity west of the gap, probably positioned for a direct fire role along the MSR. It is anticipated that some form of air defense system will be associated with this position.
- (g) Tactical Reserve: The 342d's tank battalion has been located near Rectortown (TU520108), which matches templated predictions of its location. From there it can relocate to counter a penetration in the vicinity of Middleburg (TU6316) with three companies in approximately 2 hours. It can counterattack a penetration at Aldie Gap (TU710170) along three routes within two hours. Any movement to the N/NE will require it to move on three hard surface roads, with an average lateral separation between companies of 2-5 kilometers. Creeks and woodlands will preclude reinforcement or massing of more than one company until well north of Highway 50. It can counterattack a penetration at Hopewell Gap (TU655050) within two hours, but narrow roads and restrictive terrain will limit tactical dispersion to one company. It can counterattack a penetration at Thoroughfare Gap (TU643005) in approximately 1.5 hours with two companies in tactical formation.

c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Operations Situation

- (1) Guerrilla. Unconventional warfare (UCW) forces have been active in the division's rear area, where they seek to target logistics and command and control nodes. Threat UCW forces occasionally dress as civilians. Normally, UCW forces do not directly support front-line units. UCW forces may be used in the recon and surveillance role against high payoff targets.
- (2) Psychological. Ineffective to date.
- (3) Subversion. (Omitted)
- (4) Sabotage. (Omitted)

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- d. Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities.
(Omitted)

3. Enemy Capabilities

- a. Defend. The enemy can defend in 6th Marines' zone with a Mtzd Inf Bn and a tank battalion, supported by two battalions of artillery.
- b. Reinforce. The enemy can reinforce the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde with other elements of the 34th Mtzd Inf Div. Such elements will come from the Shenandoah Valley via the passes. For example, a Mtzd Inf Bde in approach march formation would require in excess of four uninterrupted hours to deploy out of Manassas Gap (TU535104), in order to be capable of offensive operations along the Bull Run Mountains within six hours.
- c. Attack. (Ground) Once the enemy completes resupply of his frontline forces, he can attack eastward along Highway 50 with one Mtzd Inf Bn and one tank battalion, supported by two battalions of artillery, two hours from his decision to do so. He can also attack with one Mtzd Inf Bn, reinforced with one artillery battalion, from New Baltimore (TT632943) in 3.5 hours. He can mass two battalions for an attack in the vicinity of Aldie (TU710170)--Glenwood Racetrack (TU6219)--in 6 hours, but must strip his FEBA to do so.
- d. Withdrawal. The enemy can withdraw to the west at any time prior to our attack.
- e. Delay. The enemy can delay in present and successive positions at any time after our attack with a Mtzd Inf Bn and a tank battalion, supported by elements of three artillery battalions.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

- a. Defend
 - (1) In the 6th Mar zone the enemy can defend against U.S. forces attacking westward with elements of a reinforced Mtzd Inf Bn and one tank battalion. This action will delay our ability to interdict his offensive preparations, and facilitate enemy control of the avenues of approach into his eastern flank.

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Indications that show the enemy intends to defend are:

- (a) Strongpoint defenses being prepared throughout the Bull Run Mountains at Snickers (TU740340), Aldie Gap (TU710170), Hopewell Gap (TU655050), Thoroughfare Gap (TU643005), and New Baltimore Gap (TT632943).
- (b) Absence of significant rearward movement in the area.
- (2) Terrain will favor defense by enemy forces because of concealment, superior observation, and constricting avenues of approach. However, enemy armor/mech movement is also extremely channelized. Until clearing occurs, weather will be marginal for both sides for observation of fires and air support.
- (3) The major disadvantage to the enemy maintaining the defense is that time is working against him. Also, should he remain on the defensive, he will:
 - (a) Remain vulnerable to air attack once the weather clears.
 - (b) Expose his supply lines to interdiction.
 - (c) Suffer attrition of his forces.
 - (d) Remain vulnerable to U.S. partisan action.
 - (e) Lose operational momentum.
- (4) His adoption of this course of action could significantly delay, but not prevent our mission accomplishment. This is the most likely enemy course of action.

b. Reinforce

- (1) The 342d can reinforce its Mtzd Inf Bns with all or part of its tank Bn in 2 hours or more. Doing so reduces or eliminates his tactical reserve. Other reinforcements are available from the Shenandoah Valley, but will require a significant amount of time (6 hours) to influence the action along the Bull Run Mountains.

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- (a) Reinforcement is required in order for the enemy to gain a relatively favorable balance of combat power at any point on the battlefield.
- (b) A U.S. penetration of the Bull Run Mountains will endanger the entire 34th Mtzd Inf Div, as the 34th Mtzd Inf Div has insufficient combat power to counter more than one penetration of any size.

- (2) The major disadvantages to an enemy reinforcement in our zone are that he will expose his forces to our air power and his avenues of approach are extremely limited. If he commits the tank battalion to the north, it will significantly degrade his ability to defend the avenues of approach into his sector at Thoroughfare (TU643005), New Baltimore (TT632943), and Hopewell Gap (TU655050).

c. Attack (Ground)

- (1) The enemy does not currently possess sufficient ground forces in our zone for an immediate large-scale attack. However, enemy dispositions provide potential for spoiling attacks by units up to battalion size, supported by up to two battalions of artillery.
- (2) Weather and terrain do not favor an enemy attack. Limited avenues of approach favor the defender until the trafficability improves to where the enemy can mass combat power. East of the Bull Run mountains, enemy supply lines would become exposed to air attacks that could not be defended against by systems to the west of the Bull Run Mountains. His current logistics status limits his ability to mass sufficient men and supplies for a successful attack.
- (3) Enemy adoption of this course of action would facilitate the attrition of his forces and the accomplishment of our mission.
- (4) An unsuccessful enemy attack would support U.S. forces gaining the initiative and the rapid seizure of passage sites through the Bull Run Mountains. This would endanger the 34th Mtzd Inf Div.

- d. Withdrawal. Current known disposition of units of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde facilitate withdrawal to the west and to the southwest.

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- e. Delay. The enemy can delay with present forces. The gaps in the Bull Run Mountains offer good places to trade space for time in order to allow time for reinforcement. Terrain does favor a delay along successive stream beds. He may choose this course of action if he gains early warning of our offensive. Delay will be best achieved by blocking the LOCs through the Bull Run Mountain passes from his current defensive positions.

5. Conclusions

a. Relative Probability of Adoption

- (1) Defend. The enemy will defend with two battalions covering the passes in the Bull Run Mountains. The passes at Aldie (TU710170) and Hopewell Gap (TU655050) are currently defended by one Mtzd Inf Bn. A Mtzd Inf Bn-size force, defends the passes at Snickers (TU740340) and New Baltimore (TT632943), while another Mtzd Inf Bn-size force defends the pass at Thoroughfare Gap (TU629194). At least one AT Company will screen the enemy's north flank in the vicinity of Glenwood Racetrack (TU629194). Subsequent to our attack, the Mtzd Inf Bde commander will attempt to determine our main effort and then counterattack it with his reserve tank battalion in order to restore his defense.
 - (2) Delay. If forced to quit the defense, the 342d will delay from successive positions as long as possible.
 - (3) Withdraw. The 342d is unlikely to withdraw because it must retain maneuver space east of the Shenandoah Valley for a resumption of the offensive by the 34th Mtzd Inf Div, and the 3d CAA.
 - (4) Attack. If his defend/delay operation is successful, the enemy will resume the offensive by first fixing us, then conducting a limited objective counterattack in order to halt our attack. This will happen if the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde is successful in stopping the 6th Marines' main effort.
- b. Enemy Vulnerabilities. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde has several notable weaknesses. Currently, the enemy strength is depleted, forces dispersed, and momentum lost. Shortages in supply of diesel, artillery ammo, ATGM's, and repair parts are critical. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde must consolidate and resupply before it can regain any

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offensive striking power. A significant vulnerability is the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's reliance on limited north-south routes for employment of its reserve tank battalion. The enemy is vulnerable to infiltration because of the current weather conditions and his relative shortage of dismounted infantry. The 342d Mtzd Inf Bde's subordinate Mtzd Inf Bns cannot effectively employ most of their weapon systems to the flanks because of the terrain. Enemy artillery strength is only 40% of what we would expect to see across all 3d CAA formations, and the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde has no more than 40% of its fire support systems currently operable. The limited fields of fire and observation restrict his long range fires along the high-speed avenues of approach. Along the entire Bull Run Mountains, the Mtzd Inf Bde's mechanized forces are widely dispersed, defending from positions that are not mutually supporting.

c. Summation

(1) Most Likely Enemy Course of Action. The enemy will defend with three battalions forward covering the passes in the Bull Run Mountains.

(2) Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action. The Mtzd Inf Bde Commander will attempt to determine our main effort and then counterattack it with his reserve tank battalion in order to restore his defense.

J. HOTCHKISS
S-2

Figure A - Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO) (TBI)
Figure B - 342d Mtzd Inf Bde Situation Template
Figure C - 3d Bn, 342d Mtzd Inf Bde Situation Template
Figure D - 342d Mtzd Inf Bde Order of Battle

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
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
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


Figure D, 342d Mtzd Inf Bde Order of Battle

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Copy ____ of ____ copies
 6th MAR (REIN)
 SCHNEIDER CROSSROADS, VIRGINIA
 111000R Sep XX
 YSP-5

APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C TO Operation Order 5-XX (Operation OLD DOMINION)

Ref: (a) Maps: V734, MIDDLEBURG, Sheet 5461 I, FAIRFAX, Sheet 5561 IV, 1-DMA, 1:50,000

1. COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

The purpose of fires is to fix the enemy forces in zone, then destroy those forces through the use of combined arms and prevent reinforcement from the west. I intend to utilize F/W assets to deny the enemy the ability to provide reinforcements of enemy forces in zone from the west. I want R/W CAS and indirect surface fires to fix and destroy the enemy in zone through the maximum use of combined arms. I want the artillery to assist F/W assets in the deeper fight but retain the flexibility to influence the close battle. I need the Bn capable to support the seizure of Regt Obj A and B. Ultimately, I want the ability to mass all fire support assets at the point of our success to allow the passage of the Division reserve force, the enemy destroyed in zone and all assets prepared to continue the assault to the west toward MEF Obj A.

2. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Fires

PHASE/EVENT	PRE-LD	PRE-LD	LD THRU REGT EN CTRATTK
TASK	Disrupt En indirect fire threat	Attrit En Reserve Force	Disrupt En defenses vic of Regt Obj's
PURPOSE	To allow 6 th Mar movement unimpeded by enemy indirect fire.	To make 6 th Mar's combat power ratio more favorable	To allow 6 th Mar units to close on obj's unimpeded
METHOD PRI= (P) ALT= (A)	6 th Mar POF; 2/10, FW/CAS SE16MR (ADA, 2S1) P=Rec Tm2 A=FAC(A)	6 th Mar POF; 2/10, FWCAS SE26MR (T-62's) P=FAC(A), A= Recon Tm1	1/6 POF Arty, FWCAS 2/6 POF RWCAS 2/10 be able to support 2/6 as well as ME.
NET	FSC1	FSC1 or TAD-4	
TRIGGER / TIME	Aviation on station	Aviation on station	
WEAPON	DPICM/Rockeye	DPICM/Rockeye	
EFFECTS / ENDSTATE	ADA, (3) 2S1s Dest	10 T-62's destroyed or En Reserve	6 th Mar units attack with adequate FS throughout operation
REMARKS	CBR quick fire net to DASC for active CF throughout operation	6 th Mar units submit FS plans IAW cutoff times	

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b. Regimental Fire Support Matrix

EVENT UNIT	AA	LD	REGT OBJ A	REGT OBJ B	CONS	EN COUNTER ATK
1/6		POF ARTY/FW CAS	-----	----->		
2/6		POF RW	-----	----->		
8TH TK BN					POF ARTY, R/W CAS	----->
3/6						
2/10	SE16MR/ SE26MR	POF 1/6	-----	----->	POF 8TH TK BN	----->
6TH MAR	POF SE16MR/ SE26MR				POF F/W CAS	----->
F/W CAS	SE16MR/ SE26MR	POF 1/6	-----	----->	POF 8TH TK BN	----->
R/W CAS		POF 2/6	-----	----->	POF 8TH TK BN	----->
RADAR	TM 1: TU802002 AOL 4800 TM 2: TU794048 AOL 5600	-----	-----	----->	O/O TM 1: TU631058 AOL 4800 TM 2: TU699176 AOL 4800	----->
EW	BEGIN COLLECTION EFFORT: EN ENCYP, EN C2, COF, AND ENG NETS	CONDUCT EA VS EN C2 AND COF NETS IOT SPT ATK ON REG OBJA & B	-----	----->	BPT CONDUCT EA VS EN C2 AND COF NETS IOT SUPT REG ME	----->

b. Fire Support Available

ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION 1/10 (REIN) DS 2d Mar, O/O R 2/10 2/10 (REIN) DS 6th Mar, O/O DS 8th Mar 3/10 (REIN) DS 2d LAR Bn, O/O GS 2d MarDiv 5/10 (REIN) GS 2d MarDiv, O/O GS-R 2/10, GS 2d MarDiv	ARTILLERY POSITIONS BTRY E: TU795049 AOF 4800 BTRY F: TU783065 AOF 5600 BTRY G: TU800074 AOF 5600 CBR TM 1: TU802002 AOL 4800 CBR TM 2: TU794048 AOL 5600
NAVAL GUNFIRE ORGANIZATION <p style="text-align: center;">None</p>	FSAs FSSs <p style="text-align: center;">None</p>

<p>CAS ALLOCATION 6th Mar (4) F/A 18C, (2)F/A 18D, (4) AV-8B 1st Bn, 6th Mar: (4) AV-8B, (4) AH-1W 2d Bn, 6th Mar: (4) AH-1W 8th Tk Bn (Rein): (4) F/A-18, (4) AH-1W (4) AV-8B</p>	<p>MISSION PRIORITY (1) HPTs (2) Scheduled Fires (3) Tgts of Opp</p> <p>Mission Approval: All Smoke Msn's require approval from 6th Mar</p>
<p>TARGET PRECEDENCE LIST 1. Indirect Fire - 122 mm and larger 2. Armor, Co and larger 3. ADA 4. C2 - Bn and higher</p>	<p>Target Blocks: 1/6: AJ 1000-1999 2/6: AJ 2000-2999 3/6: AJ 3000-3999 8th Tk: AJ 1000-1999</p> <p>Series/Group Names: IAW MCFSS Naming Conventions</p> <p>TGT REFINEMENT TIME 130800R Sep XX</p>

c. AGM, HPTL, TSS Matrix

A
T
T
A
C
K
S
Y
S
T
E
M
S

PRIORITY	1	2	2	4
DESCRIPTIO N	INDIRECT FIRE 122mm 120mm	ARMOR T-62s	ADA SYSTEMS	C2
ARTY	1 100m 2 Btry> 3 3 Stat 4 <1Hr N	1 100m 2 Co> 3 2 Stat 3 <1 Hr N	1 100m 2 Sect 1 3 Stat 4 <1Hr N	1 100m 2 Bn Hq> 1 3 Stat 4 <1Hr N
RWCAS	1 500m 2 Btry> 2 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1Hr D	1 500m 2 Co> 1 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1 Hr D	1 500m 2 Sect 3 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1 Hr D	1 500m 2 Bn Hq> 2 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1 Hr N
FWCAS	1 500m 2 Btry> 1 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1Hr D	1 500m 2 Co> 2 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1Hr D	1 500m 2 Sect 2 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1 Hr D	1 500m 2 Bn Hq> 3 3 Stat/Mov 4 <1 Hr S

<p>TARGET SELECTION STANDARD 1. TARGET LOCATION ERROR 2. TARGET SIZE 3. ACTIVITY 4. TIME ACQUIRED</p> <p>5. PRIORITY OF ATTACK 1</p>	<p>6. EFFECTS: D=DESTROY N=NEUTRALIZE S=SUPPRESS</p>
---	---

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c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Current FSCL(FS): FSCL(FS)1, II MEF, trace of Skyline Drive

(2) Air Control Measures

(a) CP Freezer (Fairfax Park) UU000023

(b) IP Ford (Dulles Pond) TU881151
IP Chevy (Bull Run Sewage Plant) TT866975

(c) Submit other recommended airspace control measures through the Regimental FSC.

(3) Air Defense Status: Weapons Tight

(4) RFA(RF):

RFA(RF) 1TU520108Recon Tm 1
RFA(RF) 2TU727188Recon Tm 2
RFA(RF) 3 See SRP PE#5 (AC1331PE)Recon Tm 3

500m radius around RFA.
DTG EST: 111000R Sep 02
EST Hqs: 6th Mar
Restrictions: No 155mm or aviation ordnance

3. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. 6th Mar CP: TU823063

b. 2/10 CP: TU802014

c. 8th Tk Bn: TU854068

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

T. J. JACKSON
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

F. H. LEE
Maj, USMC
S-3

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TABS:

- A - Air Fire Plan (omitted)
- B - Artillery Fire Plan (omitted)
- C - Naval Gunfire Plan (omitted)
- D - Chemical Fire Plan (omitted)
- E - Targeting
- F - Fire Support Coordination Plan (omitted)
- G - Fire Support Communication Plan (omitted)

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TARGET LIST WORKSHEET

(6TH Marines Operation Old Dominion)

SHEET 1 OF 2

LINE No.	TARGET No. (a)	DESCRIPTION (b)	LOCATION (c)	ALTITUDE (d)	ATTITUDE (e)	SIZE		SOURCE (h)	REMARKS (I)	S E 1 6 M R	S E 2 6 M R			
						L (f)	W (g)							
1	AF0001	2S1 Btry	677187	130						X				
2	AF0002	120mm Mortars	688165	135										
3	AF0003	MRC	715170	120										
4	AF0004	MRC	725165	110										
5	AF0005	Bn CP	687180	160										
6	AF0006	ZU-23	691188	135						X				
7	AFOOO7	MRC	664049	180										
8	AF0008	Tk Bn	520108	220							X			

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Scheduling Worksheet
(SE16MR Operation Old Dominion)

Line No	Organization and Caliber	Firing Units	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7								Remarks
1	2/10 155mm			AF0006 18(a)			AF0001 18(a)											(a) DPICM
2	2/10 155mm			AF0006 18(a)			AF0001 18(a)											(b) wpmk @+:30
3	2/10 155mm			AF0001 ● (b)			AF0001 18(a)											(c) Rockeye
4	FWCAS			AF0001 ● (c)														

2-C-7

MCPPE (OPERATION OLD DOMINION)

GENERAL SITUATION

Introduction. With the outbreak of general war in Korea in early 20XX, the United States committed most of its forces to that theater. In a surprise move, a "threat" force attacked the continental United States with three Combined Arms Armies (CAAs). Using doctrine and equipment similar to the former Soviet Union, the "threat" force attacked the southeastern United States simultaneously employing a series of airborne and surface assaults to seize a beachhead around Charleston, South Carolina (see Figure 1). The 1st CAA attacked towards Atlanta, Georgia to isolate the Southeastern United States. The 2d CAA attacked south to secure the port facilities at Savannah, Georgia in order to expand the beachhead. The 3d CAA attacked northwest from Charleston, South Carolina. It soon became apparent that the 3d CAA commander intended to bypass II MEF, the only regular forces remaining in the southeastern United States, and attack north to seize the nation's capital. Leading with the 34th Motorized Infantry Division (Mtzd Inf Div) as its Covering Force, the 33rd Mechanized Infantry Division and the 37 Tank Brigade as its Main Body, and the 30th Mechanized Infantry Division as its Rear Guard, the 3d CAA began a series of attacks up the eastern seaboard. Fearing his assault would be slowed by Marine units building up at Quantico, Virginia, the 3d CAA's commander chose the Shenandoah Valley as his avenue of approach to the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

Friendly Forces. On 6 August 20XX, II MEF's forward command element flew to Andrews AFB and began to build up the MEF with Marine forces flown in from MCAS New River and MCAS Cherry Point, and moved overland from Camp Lejeune. Unified Combatant Commander, United States Northern Command assigned the 26th Maryland National Guard Division (MdNG) (Mech Infantry) and the 44th Virginia National Guard Division (VaNG) (Mech Infantry) to the MEF to form II MEF (Rein). On 20 August, II MEF completed buildup of forces and established blocking positions west of Fairfax and Vienna. 2d MAF established forward operating bases throughout Northern Virginia, including Andrews AFB, MCB Quantico, and Fredericksburg. 2d FSSG, reinforced with elements of 4th FSSG and contracted civilian line-haul transportation assets, used the secure lines of communication II MEF established to provide logistical support from the Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA) at Defense General Supply Center (DGSC) Richmond. 2d FSSG established a Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) vicinity Fort Belvoir. National Guard Divisions established Division Support commands (DISCOMs) and the FSSG is supporting USMC forces from Fort Belvoir using Combat Service Support Detachments.




Figure 1

Special Situation

On 25 August 20XX, II MEF halted the 3d CAA's advance at Dulles International Airport and the old battlefield at Manassas by defeating the lead elements of the CAA's first echelon. The 3d CAA withdrew most of its combat power into the Shenandoah Valley and assumed the defensive to rearm and refit under the cover of the inclement weather that moved in after the battle. A strong fall storm dumped inches of rain in just a few hours, causing some rivers to flood and bridges to wash away. Flooding brought a temporary halt to mechanized movement on most of the secondary roads in Northern Virginia.

On 26 August 20XX, infiltration attacks by Virginia partisans and the U.S. Army 82d Airborne against the 33rd Mech Div at Staunton (the CAA's main body), caused significant damage to command and control and combat service support facilities in the CAA's rear, worsening the 3d CAA's predicament.

A late summer warm front, fed by the remnants of a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico complicated things further when it dumped six inches of rain in the Allegheny and Shenandoah Mountains. The rain filled rivers and streams, flooding the valleys astride the 3d CAA's resupply routes. Rainy weather will continue for the next week to ten days, when a high pressure system is expected to arrive from Canada. Current conditions include intermittent rain, fog, and temperatures from 65 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.

Currently, the 3d CAA faces a desperate situation. Its offensive stalled with its forces reduced and strung out between Waynesboro and Winchester (see Figure 2). Its artillery formations suffered greatly from 2d MAF's attacks on both artillery pieces and ammunition trains. Artillery units are assessed as being at only 40% strength. Fuel and rations stocks in the CAA's forward units are low, and resupply grows more difficult with each passing day as Virginia partisans and local militias improve their effectiveness. Despite the current lull in the fighting between the 3d CAA's forward forces and II MEF forces, the likelihood of heavy engagement by maneuvering U.S. ground and air forces will increase dramatically when the weather breaks. Poor trafficability caused by flooding will increase the time required to resupply the 3d CAA's combat formations (see Figure 3) to 7-10 days.




Figure 3: 3d CAA Combat Organization

II MEF G-2 Analysis

II MEF's G-2 assesses that the 3d CAA's most likely course of action will be to complete resupply of its combat units despite the bad weather, then launch an all-out attack on Washington, D.C. in order to conclude the conflict before its extended LOCs and the partisan threat make a continued offensive impossible. The 3d CAA can attack with two mech infantry divisions and one armor brigade 72 hours after the weather breaks. The 34th Mtzd Inf Div will attempt to isolate Washington, D.C. by seizing Manassas and Dulles International Airport via the Highway 50, I-66 and 211 corridors. The 34th Mtzd Inf Div will then cross the Potomac River near Harper's Ferry or Point of Rocks to springboard a flanking attack on our nation's capital from the northwest by the remainder of the 3d CAA's forces.

Special Situation (con't)

The current line of contact extends from Leesburg, south along Highway 15 to New Baltimore. 2d MarDiv's screening forces have engaged in minor firefights east of the Bull Run Mountains, but no major ground combat has occurred since the 2d Marines, supported by the fires of 10th Marines and CAS from 2d MAW, stopped the enemy attack at Dulles International Airport. Enemy artillery strengths remain at no more than 40% overall. Known enemy dispositions of the 34th Mtzd Inf Div were as follows (see Figure 2):

341st Mtzd Inf Bde - Withdrew to Harrisonburg via Manassas Gap. The 341st sustained minimal losses and can be brought up to full combat strength except in artillery.

342d Mtzd Inf Bde - Now guards the 34th Motorized Infantry Division's (Mtzd Inf Div's) eastern flank from Leesburg to Aldie, Hopewell, Thoroughfare, and New Baltimore Gaps, then south along Highway 15 to New Baltimore. The 342d sustained approximately 20% attrition attempting to extricate itself from the engagement at Manassas.

343d Mtzd Inf Bde - Withdrew to Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley via Ashby Gap after sustaining significant losses in the Battle of Dulles Airport. The 343d Mtzd Inf Bde is essentially non-combat effective and is establishing strongpoint defenses oriented north and west.

II MEF G-2 Analysis (con't)


By leaving the 34th Mtzd Inf Div forward in the lower Shenandoah and east of the gaps in the Bull Run mountains, the 3d CAA commander created a number of vulnerabilities II MEF can exploit. Battle damage assessments and analysis show that the 34th Mtzd Inf Div is about 80% effective as a result of the recent battles. Its artillery units have suffered as much as 60% attrition and many are now non-combat effective except as pools from which to replace manpower and equipment. It seems to be guarding the 3d CAA's eastern flank on a wide frontage, perhaps wide enough where adjacent brigades cannot mutually support each other. The 34th Mtzd Inf Div's combat service support must travel through the narrow gaps in the Bull Run Mountains to sustain the forces east of the mountains. The Bull Run and Blue Ridge Mountains reduce the effectiveness of air defense systems from both the 34th Mtzd Inf Div and the 3d CAA against low level air attacks on the forces of the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde east of the Bull Run Mountains. Despite these vulnerabilities, the 34th Mtzd Inf Div's dispositions remain offensively oriented, with artillery forward. This raises two possibilities:

(1) That the 34th Mtzd Inf Div is postured to support a resumption of offensive operations by the 3d CAA once the weather clears enough to allow mechanized movement and effective CAS by threat aircraft.

(2) That the 34th Mtzd Inf Div, with a portion of its combat power exposed east of the Bull Run Mountains, anticipates that U.S. forces will resume the offensive. As such, the 34th Mtzd Inf Div is using the period of inclement weather to complete its resupply before heavy fighting renews. In this case, the 342d Mtzd Inf Bde is likely to fight for time east of the Bull Run Mountains in order to allow the 34th Mtzd Inf Div to complete its resupply and become less vulnerable to a spoiling attack.

II MEF Frag Order

In an effort to wrest the initiative away from the enemy, the Commanding General, II MEF (Rein) decided to launch a preemptive attack against the 3d CAA. II MEF is organized as depicted:



Excerpts from the II MEF Fragmentary Order to the major subordinate elements of II MEF for this phase of the operation.

Paragraph 3a, Commander's Intent

(1) PURPOSE. PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM COMPLETING RESUPPLY OPERATIONS.

(2) METHOD. PENETRATE THE 3D CAA'S COVERING FORCE BEFORE THE 3D CAA CAN COMPLETE ITS RESUPPLY AND RESUME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. ONCE WE HAVE PENETRATED THE 34TH MTZD INF DIV I WILL COMMIT THE MEF RESERVE TO CLEAR THE REMAINDER OF THE 3D CAA FROM THE ZONE.

(3) ENDSTATE. FRIENDLY FORCES CONTROLLING N-S LOC'S IN THE ZONE AND 3D CAA CLEARED FROM THE ZONE PRIOR TO IT BEING ABLE TO RESUME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

Paragraph 3b, Concept of Operations. THIS OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES.

(1) PHASE I. THE 2D MAW, AS THE MAIN EFFORT, CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO DISRUPT ENEMY RESUPPLY AND REDUCE ENEMY INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF IMPACTING MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG) AND OBJ B (HARRISONBURG), AND DETERMINE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES TO SHAPE THE BATTLESPACE FOR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE 2D MARDIV AND 44TH VANG CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS, OCCUPY ATTACK POSITIONS, AND PREPARE TO ATTACK IN ZONE. THE 26TH MDNG IS DESIGNATED AS THE MEF RESERVE. THE 2D FSSG PROVIDES COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO USMC FORCES OF THE MEF AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO NATIONAL GUARD FORCES OF THE MEF IN SUPPORT OF SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IT PROVIDES A MOBILE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DETACHMENT TO 2D MARDIV AND 44TH VANG FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION. PHASE I CONCLUDES WHEN THE 3D CAA IS UNABLE TO COORDINATE ACTIONS BETWEEN BRIGADES AND MASS ARTILLERY FIRES ON MEF OBJ A AND B.

(2) PHASE II

(a) STAGE A. THE 2D MARDIV, AS THE MAIN EFFORT, ATTACKS IN ZONE TO PENETRATE AND DEFEAT ENEMY COVERING FORCE, AND SEIZES MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG) TO CONTROL N-S LOC'S IN THE LOWER SHENANDOAH VALLEY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE 44TH VANG ATTACKS IN ZONE TO PENETRATE ENEMY COVERING FORCE, AND SEIZES MEF OBJ B (HARRISONBURG) IOT DECEIVE THE ENEMY AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN EFFORT. THE 2D MAW ISOLATES THE MEF BATTLESPACE FROM ENEMY REINFORCEMENT FROM THE SOUTH, ATTACKS TO REDUCE REMAINING ENEMY FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN THE VICINITY OF MEF OBJs, DISRUPTS THE 37TH ARMORED BRIGADE, AND PROVIDES ASSAULT SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THE 2D FSSG CONTINUES GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE MEF, AND PREPARES TO ESTABLISH FORWARD CSSA'S IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. STAGE A CONCLUDES WITH THE PENETRATION OF THE ENEMY COVERING FORCE, MEF OBJ A AND B SEIZED, AND THE 37TH ARMORED BRIGADE DISRUPTED.

(b) STAGE B. THE 26 MDNG, AS THE MAIN EFFORT, CONTINUES THE ATTACK TO DESTROY THE ENEMY ARMORED BRIGADE. THE 2D MAW CONTINUES TO ISOLATE THE MEF AREA OF OPERATION FROM

ENEMY REINFORCEMENT AND INTERDICTS ENEMY FORCES. THE 2D FSSG CONTINUES GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE MEF, AND ON ORDER ESTABLISHES FORWARD CSSA'S TO SUPPORT FUTURE OPERATIONS. 2D MARDIV ASSUMES THE MEF RESERVE. STAGE B AND THIS PHASE CONCLUDES WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMORED BRIGADE VIC NEW MARKET AND CONTROL OF THE N-S LOC'S IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

(3) PHASE III. THE 2D FSSG, AS THE MAIN EFFORT, REARMS, REFITS, AND RESUPPLIES THE MEF FOR POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER SHENANDOAH VALLEY. THE 2D MAW CONDUCTS AN EXPLOITATION TO DESTROY RETREATING 3D CAA FORCES. THE 2D MARDIV AND 44TH VANG CONDUCTS DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND PREPARES FOR POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE 26 MDNG BECOMES THE MEF RESERVE. THE THIRD PHASE CONCLUDES WITH MEF FORCES PREPARED TO CONDUCT PURSUIT OPERATIONS.

Paragraph 3c, Tasks (PHASE I TASKS ARE OMITTED FOR BREVITY)

(1) 2D MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

(a) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY, ATK IN ZONE TO SEIZE MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG) IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE N-S LOC'S IN THE LOWER SHENANDOAH VALLEY. YOU ARE THE MAIN EFFORT.

(b) UPON CONSOLIDATION, AS THE STATIONARY FORCE, CONDUCT A FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES W/ 26TH MDNG DIV VIC MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG).

(c) UPON COMPLETION OF FORWARD PASSAGE, ASSUME MEF RESERVE.

(2) 44TH VA NATIONAL GUARD

(a) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY, ATTACK IN ZONE TO SEIZE MEF OBJ B (HARRISONBURG) IN ORDER TO DECEIVE THE ENEMY AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN EFFORT.

(b) *TASKS CONTINUE BUT ARE OMITTED FOR BREVITY*

(3) 2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

(a) CONTINUE AAW IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY AIR SUPERIORITY.

(b) CONDUCT OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO SHAPE THE BATTLESPACE FOR FUTURE OFFENSIVE GROUND OPERATIONS. PRIORITY OF OPERATIONS: ISOLATE MEF OBJ FROM REINFORCEMENT FROM THE SOUTH; REDUCE REMAINING

ENEMY INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN VICINITY OF MEF
OBJS; DISRUPT THE 37TH ARMORED BRIGADE.

(c) PROVIDE ASSAULT SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE
GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

(d) *TASKS CONTINUE BUT ARE OMITTED FOR BREVITY*

(4) 2D FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (REIN)

(a) PROVIDE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO USMC FORCES OF THE
MEF AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO NATIONAL GUARD FORCES OF
THE MEF.

(b) ON ORDER, ESTABLISH FORWARD CSSA'S TO SUPPORT FUTURE
OPERATIONS.

(c) *TASKS CONTINUE BUT ARE OMITTED FOR BREVITY*

Paragraph 3d, MEF Reserve

(1) 26TH MD NATIONAL GUARD

(a) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE MAIN EFFORT AND CONDUCT
FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES WITH 2D MAR DIV VIC MEF OBJ A.

(b) BE PREPARED TO ATTACK TO DESTROY THE ENEMY TANK BDE
AT MEF OBJ C IN ORDER TO PREVENT FURTHER OFFENSIVE
ACTION BY 3D CAA.

(2) 2D MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

(a) EFFECTIVE UPON RELIEF.

(b) BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE ATK TO CLEAR THE
REMAINDER OF THE 3D CAA FROM THE ZONE.

The 2d MarDiv staff began its staff planning process and issued an Initial Warning Order to each of its subordinate regiments and separate battalions. The following are excerpts from the 2d Division's warning order to its subordinate units:

Paragraph 3a, Commander's Intent

(1) PURPOSE. CONTROL THE NORTH-SOUTH LOCS IN THE LOWER
SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

- (2) METHOD. CONDUCT A PENETRATION OF THE 342D MTZD INF BDE, THEN CONTINUE THE ATTACK WITH THE DIVISION RESERVE AGAINST THE 34TH MTZD INF DIV UNITS IN ZONE BEFORE IT CAN COMPLETE ITS RESUPPLY.
- (3) ENDSTATE. PENETRATION OF THE 342D MTZD INF BDE'S DEFENSES ALONG THE BULL RUN MOUNTAINS, ENEMY UNITS IN ZONE DESTROYED, MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG TU290182) FREE OF ENEMY AND OBSTACLES ALONG THE NORTH-SOUTH LOCS, THE MEF RESERVE (26TH MDNG DIV) PASSED THROUGH OUR ZONE, AND 2D DIVISION POISED TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK TO THE SOUTH.

Paragraph 3b, Tentative Concept of Operations

(1) PHASE I. 2D LIGHT ARMORED RECON BATTALION INITIALLY CONDUCTS AREA RECON TO DETERMINE ENEMY COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND ORIENTATION EAST OF THE BULL RUN MOUNTAINS, THEN SCREENS FORWARD OF PHASE LINE MOON TO ALLOW DIVISION UNITS TO PREP FOR THE ATTACK. 6TH MAR AND 2D MAR REGIMENTS FORWARD WITH 8TH MAR REGIMENT AS DIVISION RESERVE PREPARE TO ATTACK IN ZONE. 6TH AND 8TH MAR REGIMENTS OCCUPY ATTACK POSITIONS NLT D-1.

(2) PHASE II

(a) STAGE A. ON ORDER, 2D LIGHT ARMORED RECON BATTALION CONDUCTS AREA RECON ORIENTED ON MEF OBJ A. 6TH MAR REGIMENT, THE MAIN EFFORT, ATTACKS TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN ZONE IN ORDER TO CREATE A GAP FOR THE FORWARD PASSAGE OF FOLLOW ON FORCES. 2D MAR REGIMENT ATTACKS TO SECURE DIV OBJ 1 IN ORDER TO OPEN AN ALTERNATE ROUTE FOR THE FORWARD PASSAGE OF FOLLOW ON FORCES. 8TH MAR REGIMENT FOLLOWS AND ASSUMES THE MAIN EFFORT, PREPARED TO ATTACK TO SEIZE MEF OBJ A IN ORDER TO OPEN LOC'S FOR EXPLOITATION BY THE MEF RESERVE. UPON COMPLETION OF PASSAGE OF LINES WITH 8TH MAR REGIMENT, 6TH MAR REGIMENT BECOMES THE DIV RESERVE.

(b) STAGE B. 2D LIGHT ARMORED RECON BATTALION CONDUCTS SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISION SECURITY AREA. 8TH MAR REGIMENT CONDUCTS DEFENSIVE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS VIC MEF OBJ A. 6TH MAR REGIMENT OCCUPIES ASSEMBLY AREA VIC FRONT ROYAL AND ASSUMES THE MISSION OF COUNTERATTACK FORCE. 2D MAR REGIMENT CONDUCTS DEFENSIVE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS TO PROTECT THE DIVISION'S NORTHERN FLANK.

(3) PHASE III. 2D LIGHT ARMORED RECON BATTALION, 8TH AND 2D MAR REGIMENTS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ZONE. 6TH MAR REGIMENT IS THE DIVISION RESERVE. MCSSD, THE MAIN EFFORT, REARMS, REFITS, AND RESUPPLIES FORCES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 2D MARDIV PREPARES TO RESUME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO DESTROY REMAINING 3D CAA OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

Paragraph 3c, Anticipated Tasks (Phase I tasks and tasks to other subordinate regiments and separate battalions omitted for brevity)

6TH MAR REGT (REIN)

- (a) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY, ATTACK TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN ZONE IN ORDER TO CREATE A GAP FOR THE FORWARD PASSAGE OF FOLLOW ON FORCES.
- (b) INITIALLY, MAIN EFFORT WITH PRIORITIES OF FIRE.
- (c) O/O, AS STATIONARY UNIT, CONDUCT FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES WITH 8TH MARINES (DIV RESERVE) VIC RECTORTOWN.
- (d) UPON COMPLETION OF FORWARD PASSAGE/BATTLE HANDOVER OF 8TH MARINES, BECOME DIVISION RESERVE. BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE ATK TOWARD MEF OBJ A (STRASBURG).